The topic of the essay is the “explanatory gap” between, on one side, descriptions of conscious states from 1st person perspective, termed as phenomenal (P-) consciousness; and on the other side, the descriptions of conscious states in representational theories of mind, from 3rd person perspective, termed as access (A-) consciousness. The main source of the explanatory gap between P-consciousness and A-consciousness is the methodology of functionalism, accepted in almost contemporary representational theories. I argue for the following: (1) The principles of (...) materialist ontology, accepted in representational theories of mind, are true. But materialism is not necessary linked with functionalist research methods. The only reasonable consequence from the existence of the “explanatory gap” is that functionalism should be replaced with more adequate methodological approaches. (2) One such non-functionalist approach, termed as “aesthesionomic approach”, is proposed. The central idea is that phenomenal conscious states should be first described in objective terms (from 3rd person perspective). Only on base of such a preliminary objective description of phenomenal conscious states, the description of representational mechanisms (able to realize these states) will not give rise to an “explanatory gap”. (shrink)
Understanding enjoys a special kind of value, one not held by lesser epistemic states such as knowledge and true belief. I explain the value of understanding via a seemingly unrelated topic, the implausibility of veritism. Veritism holds that true belief is the sole ultimate epistemic good and all other epistemic goods derive their value from the epistemic value of true belief. Veritism entails that if you have a true belief that p, you have all the epistemic good qua p. Veritism (...) is a plausible and widely held view; I argue that it is untenable. I argue that integration among beliefs possesses epistemic value independent from the good of true belief, and so has value veritism cannot account for. I argue further that this integration among beliefs comprises the distinctive epistemic value of understanding. (shrink)
Jurisprudential debate about the grounds of law often focuses on the status of morality. Given the undoubted fact of judicial engagement with morality in legal reasoning, the key question is whether morality legitimately counts as a ground of law. This article seeks to challenge the special status accorded to morality in debates about the grounds of law. The claim I seek to advance is that very often judicial engagement with morality is not different in kind to judicial engagement with other (...) diverse objects of legal reasoning. What the comparison tends to show is that instances of “moral reasoning” in law do not obviously challenge our account of the grounds of law. Rather these instances can be viewed as central case examples of legal reasoning. Conventional grounds of law are left untouched. (shrink)
We address the issue of the normativity of representation and how Grush might address it for emulations as constituting representations. We then proceed to several more detailed issues concerning the learning of emulations, a possible empirical counterexample to Grush's model, and the choice of Kalman filters as the form of model-based control.
Conciliatory views of peer disagreement hold that when an agent encounters peer disagreement she should conciliate by adjusting her doxastic attitude towards that of her peer. In this paper I distinguish different ways conciliation can be understood and argue that the way conciliationism is typically understood violates the principle of commutativity of evidence. Commutativity of evidence holds that the order in which evidence is acquired should not influence what it is reasonable to believe based on that evidence. I argue that (...) when an agent encounters more than one peer, and applies the process of conciliation serially, the order she encounters the peers influences the resulting credence. I argue this is a problem for conciliatory views of disagreement, and suggest some responses available to advocates of conciliation. (shrink)
Informed by the critical humanisms of Hannah Arendt, Frantz Fanon, and Paul Gilroy, the authors argue for an orientation to teaching and learning that troubles the continuing effects of dehumanizing race logic. Reflecting on Paul Haggis's Oscar award winning film Crash from 2004, they suggest that the metaphor of racial 'crashing' captures what happens when we act out from experiences of racial injury instead of being touched by it. They propose a psychoanalytic pedagogy of emotions as a method for reading (...) representation beyond the limits of detached rational critique. Learning from the affect of racial injury as it is made manifest in representation, they suggest, is an important ethical starting point for generating new insights into what it might mean to live within and beyond contemporary legacies of racial hatred. (shrink)
Zusammenfassung In der vorliegenden Arbeit soll ein in der analytischen Philosophie aufgestelltes Programm zur Explikation der kausalen Begrifflichkeit kritisch untersucht werden. Seine kritische Analyse mag im Hinblick auf die Rolle von Interesse sein, welche die kausalen Begriffe in einer allgemeinen Theorie der wissenschaftlichen ErklÃ¤rung zu spielen haben. Diese Analyse kÃ¶nnte auÃerdem m. E. zur Bestimmung des Ausgangspunktes einer positiven Behandlung der mit den kausalen Begriffen zusammenhÃ¤ngenden Sinnfragen beitragen.
The article presents Fr. Georgy Florovsky’s conception of a neo-patristic synthesis (developed by other orthodox theologians) and discusses some polemical aspects of this project. The neo-patristic synthesis is an approach to development of the patristic thought in the contemporary world and application it to the different branches of knowledge, including science. According to Florovsky science has an imperfect character, because to know the empirical world is possible only from the theological point of view. This position is shared by Alexei Nesteruk (...) who claims that the patristic solutions can be treated as a model for the issues of relationship between science and religion. In this way a postulate of the methodological independency of science is breached. We show that this position is also is not accordance with the patristic thought because the Fathers of the Church were very open towards to the intellectual heritage of their time. Although they stressed that secular knowledge is inferior to theology, nevertheless this statement should be taken in the broad historical context of the defense of Christianity. Eastern Christian attitude to science is very sensitive for the transcendence and takes into account the anthropological dimension. In the conclusion we admit that these aspects of the patristic approach can be useful for the reflection about relationship between science and religion, under the condition that they will not break the principle of the methodological naturalism. (shrink)