An influential approach to engineering ethics is based on codes of ethics and the application of moral principles by individual practitioners. However, to better understand the ethical problems of complex technological systems and the moral reasoning involved in such contexts, we need other tools as well. In this article, we consider the role of imagination and develop a concept of distributed responsibility in order to capture a broader range of human abilities and dimensions of moral responsibility. We show that in (...) the case of Snorre A, a near-disaster with an oil and gas production installation, imagination played a crucial and morally relevant role in how the crew coped with the crisis. For example, we discuss the role of scenarios and images in the moral reasoning and discussion of the platform crew in coping with the crisis. Moreover, we argue that responsibility for increased system vulnerability, turning an undesired event into a near-disaster, should not be ascribed exclusively, for example to individual engineers alone, but should be understood as distributed between various actors, levels and times. We conclude that both managers and engineers need imagination to transcend their disciplinary perspectives in order to improve the robustness of their organisations and to be better prepared for crisis situations. We recommend that education and training programmes should be transformed accordingly. (shrink)
In my Mind and World I appeal to second nature, which, according to Hans-Peter Kr ger, plays a central role in Plessner's philosophical anthropology. But I think this convergence is less significant than Kr ger suggests.This note differentaties my purpose-to disarm the temptation to think perceptual experience, natural as it is, could not figure in what Sellars called “the space of reasons”-from Plessner's, which is to disarm the temptation to hope for an ahistorical insight into what is properly authoritative over (...) the shape of our lives. (shrink)
Gers (Biol Philos, 2011) provides a positive and constructive view of the project to generalise Darwinian principles in Geoffrey Hodgson and Thorbjørn Knudsen’s Darwin’s Conjecture. We note considerable overlap with his work and ours, and also with important recent work of Godfrey-Smith ( 2009 ), which Gers cites extensively. But we also note that there are differences in research objectives between Gers and Godfrey-Smith, on the one hand, and ourselves, on the other. Gers and Godfrey-Smith focus on the elucidation of (...) the most general principles possible. Our aim is to derive principles that are sufficiently abstract to span the natural and human social worlds, and then add additional principles to help understand the Darwinian evolution of human society. Furthermore, Gers and Godfrey-Smith critique a replicator concept that is different from ours. Once these points are made apparent, the criticisms are essentially disabled, and we end up in a position with different but complementary and overlapping research projects. (shrink)
Forfatterne søger at opstille et etisk system for anvendelse af militære magtmidler, såvel i fred som under krig, byggende på normer, som efter erfaringen ...
Abstract This paper discusses the problematic relation between liberalism and freedom of education, i.e. the right of (groups of) parents to found schools in which they can educate their children in accordance with their particular conception of the good life. First, the educational and philosophical backgrounds of the conflict between liberalism and freedom of education are explicated. Secondly, it is suggested that freedom of education can be considered a liberal value. The right to freedom of education is interpreted as a (...) group right, and it is argued that it is both possible and desirable to defend, on certain conditions, group rights within liberalism. Finally, some consequences of this position for a liberal theory are spelled out. (shrink)
Background: Biomedical science is producing an avalanche of data about risk factors, often with a small predictive value, associated with a broad diversity of diseases. Prevention and screening are increasingly moving from public health into the clinic. Therefore, the question of which risk factors to investigate and disclose in the individual patient, becomes ethically increasingly urgent. In line with Wilson and Jungner's public health-related 10 principles for screening, it seems crucial to distinguish important from unimportant health risks.Aim: to explore the (...) ways in which clinicians distinguish important from unimportant health risks.Methods: We interviewed 36 respondents (gastroenterologists and gynaecologists/obstetrics) in 5 focus group interviews and 15 open in-depth interviews on their interpretation of what makes a health risk important.Results: Physicians primarily interpreted importance as the severity of the possible harm, less often its probability. Possibilities of prevention or reassurance strongly influenced their judgment on importance.Discussion: It is not likely that interpreting ‘important’ as ‘severe’ will help in differentiating meaningful from meaningless risk knowledge. A more fundamental change in our ways of dealing with risk may be called for. We discuss existing literature on resilience as an alternative way to deal with risk. Balancing prevention and risk reduction with resilience could be a fruitful direction. (shrink)
An d rew Ku per begins his cri ti que of my vi ews on poverty by accepti n g the crux of my moral argument: The interests of all persons ought to count equally, and geographic location and citizenship m a ke no intrinsic differen ce to the ri gh t s and obl i ga ti ons of i n d ivi du a l s . Ku per also sets out some key facts about global poverty, for (...) example, that 30,000 children die every day from preventable illness and starvation, while most people in devel oped nati on s have plenty of disposable income that they s pend on lu x u ries and items that sati s f y mere wants, not basic needs. Yet after summarizing an essay I wrote for the New York Times Magazine in which I argued that the avera ge Am erican family should don a te a l a r ge porti on of t h eir income to or ga n i z ati ons like UNICEF and Ox f a m , Ku per wri te s : “ But if Si n ger ’s ex h ort a ti ons make you want to act immediately in the ways he recom m en d s , you s h ould not do so.” Why not? Because the approach I advoc a te “would seriously harm the poor.” These are strong words. It is startling to be told that a substantial transfer of resources from comfortably-off American families to UNICEF or Oxfam would harm the poor. What abo ut those 3 0,0 0 0 ch i l d ren dyi n g from preventable illness and starvation? In its 2001 fund-raising material,the U.S. Committee for UNICEF says that a donation of $17 will provide immunization “to protect a child for life against the six leading ch i l d - killing and maiming diseases:measles,polio. (shrink)
Den moralfilosofiska traditionen har sina begränsningar. De frågor som stått i centrum för den moralfilosofiska diskussionen har ofta varit helt andra än de som människor i det praktiska livet har uppfattat som centrala moraliska problem. En viktig begränsning är att moralfilosofin, liksom beslutsteorin, nästan uteslutande har handlat om hur man hanterar välavgränsade problem där handlingsalternativen är givna. I det verkliga livet löser vi ofta moraliska problem genom att finna på nya handlingsalternativ, som inte fanns med från början.1 En annan begränsning (...) är att moralfilosofin till allra största delen har handlat om situationer där konsekvensen av de olika handlingsalternativen är välkänd. I det praktiska livet är det annorlunda. Vi vet sällan med säkerhet vad som kommer att bli följden av de olika alternativ som vi väljer mellan. Man kan också uttrycka detta så att moralfilosofin i huvudsak rör sig i en tänkt deterministisk värld, där man inte behöver räkna med någon slump. Detta är aningen märkligt mot bakgrund av det oerhörda genomslag som sannolikhetstänkande och på senare år även kaos har fått inom andra vetenskapsområden. Det finns naturligtvis förklaringar till detta moralfilosofins kvardröjande i en äldre världsbild. Redan i det deterministiska fallet uppstår svårhanterliga problem som man gärna ger sin odelade uppmärksamhet. Dessutom finns det en särskild disciplin, beslutsteorin, som behandlar beslut under risk och osäkerhet. Man har i allmänhet tänkt sig ett slags arbetsfördelning, där problemen med risk och osäkerhet utelämnas i moralfilosofin för att i stället hanteras inom beslutsteorin med rena rationalitetsprinciper (dvs. utan att moraliska principer är inblandade). Enligt min mening är denna arbetsfördelning inte hållbar. Betrakta t ex osäkerheten om hur klimatet kommer att förändras med nuvarande utsläppstrender för växthusgaser. Denna osäkerhet ger upphov inte enbart till ett problem om rationellt beslutsfattande utan också till moraliska problem.. (shrink)
I sin uppsats "Satsens subjekt och textens"2 ger Staffan Hellberg en översikt över vad han kallat empatimarkörer (alternativt ‘perspektivmarkörer’, sid 2) i berättande prosa. Grundidén, så som jag förstått den, är att en empatimarkör visar på en viss typ av förändring av berättarperspektivet. Hellberg skriver: Det är vanligt, för att inte säga normalt, i modern berättarteknik, att händelseförloppet upplevs genom en deltagande persons sinnen eller på annat sätt behandlas ur dennes synvinkel.3 Utgångspunkten är att en berättelse återges på ett för (...) berättelsen normalt sätt. Vissa berättelser är t.ex. i jag-form, medan andra återges på ett mer neutralt sätt, med en framställning i tredje person av berättelsens gestalter. Emellanåt bryts denna normala framställning genom att en situation återges, helt eller delvis, ur en deltagares perspektiv, t.ex. så som sedd av denna deltagare, eller så som tolkad av denne deltagare. Det som Hellberg eftersträvat är en översikt över de språkliga element som markerar en sådan tillfällig förskjutning av berättarperspektivet. För egen del vill jag använda termen perspektivförskjutning för de fenomen jag kommer att behandla nedan. Hellbergs översikt är i mycket hög grad baserad på intuitioner om förekomster av markörer för perspektivförskjutning, och bygger på en litteraturvetenskaplig tradition där intuitioner om perspektiv och perspektivförskjutning av olika slag behandlats under åtskilliga decennier. Detta förhållande erbjuder både svårigheter och utmaningar för en som står utanför denna tradition. Hellberg försöker inte formulera några allmänna kriterier för att vara en empatimarkör, varför det ankommer på läsarens egen intuitiva uppfattning av exemplen att förstå vad som exemplifieras. För den som är skolad i den tradition Hellberg bygger på kanske detta inte erbjuder några svårigheter alls, eller endast ringa svårigheter, men för mig, som är skolad i analytisk filosofi, och som visserligen läst en del romaner men aldrig studerat skönlitteratur teoretiskt, är svårigheterna emellanåt betydande. Utmaningen består å andra sidan just i att försöka formulera en allmän idé om perspektivförskjutning, så att vi också kan erhålla ett kriterium för att vara en språklig markör av sådana förskjutningar.. (shrink)
As a distinctive philosophical tradition, phenomenology was founded by Husserl and then developed further ââ¬â into the domain of technology ââ¬â by Husserl's most original and important student, Heideg ger. Let us begin with this standard view and then develop..
We elaborate on Israel Scheffler's claim that principles of rationality can be rationally evaluated, focusing on foundational development, by which we mean the evolution of principles which are constitutive of our conceptualization of a certain domain of rationality. How can claims that some such principles are better than prior ones, be justified? We argue that Scheffler's metacriterion of overall systematic credibility is insufficient here. Two very different types of rational development are jointly involved, namely, development of general principles that are (...) strictly constitutive of rationality as such, and development of specific principles determinative of our conceptualization of particular domains. For the first type a transcendental argument applies. As to the second, we show how foundational development is itself a condition of the possibility of its justification. In both cases only principles that are typical of the later stage yield the second order criterion in terms of which the evaluative comparison with former stages can be made and defended. In a discussion of problems involved we indicate to what extent Scheffler's idea of rationally justifiable rational development may be realized here, avoiding pitfalls of both foundationalism and relativism. (shrink)
The main thrust of my argument was that ad hoc su gge s ti ons of ch a ri ty cannot replace a systematic and theoreti c a lly inform ed approach to poverty rel i ef . Ch a ri t a ble don a ti on som eti m e s h elps—and som etimes harm s — but is no general solution to global poverty, and can be po s i tively dangerous wh en pre s en (...) ted as such. We need to consider, and often choose, other routes to helping the poor—including ethical to u rism and fair trade in lu x u ry goods. We will not be able to invest in such feasible routes if we give away all our extra income, as Singer recommends. Sticking to donation above all, when a combination of other strategies is necessary, is highly likely to harm the poor. Si n ger doe s n’t re a lly en ga ge my argumen t . In s te ad , he cari c a tu res our “f u n d a m ental disa greem en t” :a pp a ren t ly, Si n ger rej ects va ri o u s policies because he takes into account the “f act s” ; wh ereas Ku per is the one seeking a “f a i t h ,” a “po l i tical ph i l o s ophy. . . i m mune to ref ut a ti on on the basis of evi den ce .” Anyon e who has re ad my arti cle (pp. 1 07 - 2 0) must fin d this puzzling. The arti cle explains at len g t h wh i ch kinds of b ack ground theories help us to d i s cern and re s pon s i bly con s i der the rel eva n t f act s . I show that Si n ger sel ects and uses fact s u n c ri ti c a lly prec i s ely because he has no po l i tical econ omy, no po l i tical soc i o l ogy, and no t h eory of ju s ti ce . We are seri o u s ly misled if we do not draw adequ a tely on the wi s dom and.. (shrink)
När är det befogat att tillskriva mening (betydelse) till beteenden? I början av 2001 presenterade en av Stockholms gratistidningar en artikel om det så kallade kroppsspråket. Rubriken var "Kroppen ljuger inte". Ämnet för artikeln var egentligen den evidens som en persons gester och kroppshållning ger om hennes sinnestillstånd eller personlighet ("självsäker", "stressad", "osäker", "nervös", "ljuger", "arg", "manipulativ", "spänd" eller "misstänksam"). Enligt artikeln är dessa gester och kroppshållningar inte avsedda att ge andra information om ens inre tillstånd. De är alltså inte (...) kommunikativa. Likafullt ger de sådan information, ibland kanske mot personens egen önskan. Trots det beskrivs de som semantiskt meningsfulla: "Varje min och rörelse kan tolkas symboliskt". (shrink)
1. Die Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (1874) Brentanos gilt als das Werk der Theorie der Intentionalität. Brentano macht dort die „intentionale Inexistenz” des Denkobjekts zum Definitionsmerkmal des Psychischen und zugleich zum zentralen Begriff eines einflußreichen Forschungsprogramms. Die Idee der intentionalen Beziehung, die in der Psychologie diese zentrale Stellung genießt, hat jedoch ganz bestimmte Aristotelisch-scholastische Wurzeln und wurde bereits in Brentanos Dissertation (1862) sowie in seiner Habilita¬tions¬schrift (1867) als ein unproblematisches Werzeug der Analyse verwendet. 2. Die Rede von der „objektiven Existenz (...) im Geiste” bedeutet dabei zunächst eine gewisse Suspendierung der ontologischen Verpflichtungen. Alles, was nur diese Seinsweise hat, wird aus dem Bereich der Ontologie ausgeschloßen. Auch in seinen Vorlesungen zur Metaphysik, die Brentano seit 1867 in Würzburg gehalten hat (Manuskript M 96), betrachtet er die Seinsweise, die den gedachten Objekten als solchen zukommt, als ontologische belanglos. 3. In der Periode nach der Psychologie wurde indessen die intentionale Inexistenz immer mehr als ein ontologi¬sches Thema für sich betrachtet. Brentano wurde sich der ontologischen Implikationen der Rede von der intentionalen Inexistenz immer mehr bewußt. Die Seinsweise der immanenten Objekte wird immer mehr ontologisch verpflichtend und Brentano entwickelt in der Tat eine höchst komplizierte Onto¬logie der intentionalen Beziehung. Sehr deutlich kann man das auf Grund der Vorlesungen zur deskriptiven Psychologie (1890/91) sehen. So kann man sagen, daß das sogenannte „Kriterium Quines” bei Brentano erst in der Periode nach der Psychologie richtig zur Geltung kommt. Das Kriterium selbst ist übrigens umstritten. Die Philo¬sophen wie Prior, Alston oder Geach betrachten es z.B. eher als dubios. Die Entwicklung der Theorie Brentanos ist demgemäß keineswegs von bloß historischer Bedeutung. 4. Die Gegenstandstheorie Meinongs, die die Objekte der intentionalen Beziehung endgültig „ontologisiert” und von der psychischen Realität eman¬zi¬piert, kann als eine konsequente Fortsetzung dieser Entwicklung angesehen werden – die Fortsetzung, die der späte Brentano (nach 1904) eher als eine reductio ad absurdum betrachten würde. Sehr interessant ist in diesem Kontext die Theorie der Intentionalität, die Brentano in seinen Logik-Vorlesungen von 80-ger Jahren (Manuskript EL 80) vorgestellt hat. Diese Theorie operiert mit den nicht-existierenden Gegenständen und kann mit guten Gründen als die Inspirationsquelle der Meinongschen Theorie angesehen werden. (shrink)
In this re-visioning, business ethics would integrate feminist theories and pedagogy which include the diversity of women in terms of race/ethnicity, class and sexual orientation, thereby expanding its coverage to include issues of power, gender, cultural and theoretical conceptualizations, both in the conceptualization of morality, as well as in ethical constructs of analysis. My research indicates that the integration of feminist scholarship, ethics and pedagogy would make it possible to teach ethical decision making, and ultimately increase the likelihood of ethical (...) behavior, by showing students how to harness the multi-cultural ways of thinking needed to resolve ever more complex organizational problems.Use of the four-stage model I propose would effectively address the three major issues which make teaching business ethics in a new way to critical. The curricula, as modified, would present enriched ethical theories which are contextual and grounded in experience and which grant the connected nature of all organizational stakeholders. By recreating personal identity, autonomy and power as a theories of community, teaching its responsible use would be easier. Expanding the definition of business ethics to include authenticity and mutuality would move it beyond "social responsibility" to a model of interrelationship which encourage principled thinking leading to more ethical behavior. By combing empirically connected ethical theories, and conflict resolution techniques, ethical precepts can be molded into more usable curriculum models. (shrink)
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Biology covers a broad range of topics in this field. It is not just a textbook focusing on evolutionary theory but encompasses ethics, social science and behaviour too. This essay outlines the scope of the work, discusses some points on methodology in the philosophy of biology, and then moves on to a more detailed analysis of cultural evolution and the applicability of a philosophy of biology toolkit to the social sciences. It is noted that (...) concepts like the species concept may generalise to other domains whilst failing to account for the nature of all species. Finally, the author notes the omission of any discussion of information in biology. (shrink)
The significant theoretical objections that have been raised against memetics have not received adequate defense, even though there is ongoing empirical research in this field. In this paper I identify the key objections to memetics as a viable explanatory tool in studies of cultural evolution. I attempt to defuse these objections by arguing that they fail to show the absence of replication, high-fidelity copying, or lineages in the cultural domain. I further respond to meme critics by arguing that, despite competing (...) explanations of cultural evolution, memetics has unique explanatory power. This is largely founded upon the increasing likelihood of formulating a workable fitness measure for memes, a memetic index. I conclude that memes must be integrated with psychological bias and population-dynamic approaches to cultural evolution. (shrink)
Darwin’s Conjecture is a bold attempt to bring evolutionary explanation to the social sciences, particularly economics. The book outlines the history of Darwinian explanation in social science then puts forward a generalized replicator account of social evolution by natural selection. The authors identify habits and routines as examples of the generative replicators necessary in order that social evolution is Darwinian. This reviewer notes that the replicator approach limits the generality of this account and suggests that habits and routines might better (...) be seen as members of a Darwinian population in the tradition of Godfrey-Smith’s (2009) generalized account of natural selection instead. Furthermore, the existence of levels of social evolution will constrain what evolution can occur low in the hierarchy. (shrink)
Drawing on the intellectual tradition of the leading comparative political science scholar, Giovanni Sartori, the contributors examine the theoretical and methodological basis of: Concept Analysis, Comparative Political Analysis and Qualitative Methods.
This commentary focuses on how bottom-up neocortical models can be developed into eigenfunction expansions of probability distributions appropriate to describe short-term memory in the context of scalp EEG. The mathematics of eigenfunctions are similar to the top-down eigenfunctions developed by Nunez, despite different physical manifestations. The bottom-up eigenfunctions are at the local mesocolumnar scale, whereas the top-down eigenfunctions are at the global regional scale. Our respective approaches have regions of substantial overlap, and future studies may expand top-down eigenfunctions into the (...) bottom-up eigenfunctions, yielding a model of scalp EEG expressed in terms of columnar states of neocortical processing of attention and short-term memory. Footnotes1 The author is also affiliated with DRW Investments LLC, 311 S. Wacker Drive, Chicago, IL 60606. (shrink)
