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Gerald Gaus [60]Gerald F. Gaus [43]
  1.  34
    Gerald F. Gaus (2010). The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World. Cambridge University Press.
    Machine generated contents note: 1. The fundamental problem; Part I. Social Order and Social Morality: 2. The failure of instrumentalism; 3. Social morality as the sphere of rules; 4. Emotion and reason in social morality; Part II. Real Public Reason: 5. The justificatory problem and the deliberative model; 6. The rights of the moderns; 7. Moral equilibrium and moral freedom; 8. The moral and political orders; Appendix A. The plurality of morality; Appendix B. Mozick's attempt to solve the prisoner's dilemma; (...)
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  2. Gerald F. Gaus (1996). Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory. Oxford University Press.
    This book advances a theory of personal, public and political justification. Drawing on current work in epistemology and cognitive psychology, the work develops a theory of personally justified belief. Building on this account, it advances an account of public justification that is more normative and less "populist" than that of "political liberals." Following the social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke and Kant, the work then argues that citizens have conclusive reason to appoint an umpire to resolve disputes arising from inconclusive (...)
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  3. Gerald Gaus & Kevin Vallier (2009). The Roles of Religious Conviction in a Publicly Justified Polity: The Implications of Convergence, Asymmetry and Political Institutions. Philosophy and Social Criticism 35 (1-2):51-76.
    Our concern in this essay are the roles of religious conviction in what we call a “publicly justified polity” — one in which the laws conform to the Principle of Public Justification, according to which (in a sense that will become clearer) each citizen must have conclusive reason to accept each law as binding. According to “justificatory liberalism,”1 this public justification requirement follows from the core liberal commitment of respect for the freedom and equality of all citizens.2 To respect each (...)
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  4.  58
    Gerald Gaus (2013). On Theorizing About Public Reason. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 9 (1):64-85.
    This essay responds to the thoughtful essays on the Order of Public Reason (OPR) by Elvio Baccarini, Giulia Bistagnino and Nenad Miscevic. All three essays interrogate OPR’s understanding of moral theory - “meta” matters about the nature of morality, reasons and modeling within moral theories. I first turn to the general understanding of the moral enterprise underlying OPR, explaining why it takes a view at odds with the contemporary mainstream in moral philosophy. I then explain the idea of moral truth (...)
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  5.  58
    Gerald Gaus (2013). Precis – The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 9 (1):8-13.
  6.  10
    Gerald Gaus (2015). The Egalitarian Species. Social Philosophy and Policy 31 (2):1-27.
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  7.  70
    Gerald Gaus (2010). Coercion, Ownership, and the Redistributive State: Justificatory Liberalism's Classical Tilt. Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (1):233.
    Justificatory liberalism1 rests on a conception of members of the public as free and equal. To say that each is free implies that each has a fundamental claim to act as she sees fit on the basis of her own reasoning. To say that each is equal is to insist that members of the public are symmetrically placed insofar as no one has a natural right to command others, nor does anyone have a natural duty to defer to the reasoning (...)
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  8.  21
    Gerald F. Gaus (1990). Value and Justification: The Foundations of Liberal Theory. Cambridge University Press.
    This important new book takes as its points of departure two questions: What is the nature of valuing? and What morality can be justified in a society that deeply disagrees on what is truly valuable? In Part One, the author develops a theory of value that attempts to reconcile reason with passions. Part Two explores how this theory of value grounds our commitment to moral action. The author argues that rational moral action can neither be seen as a way of (...)
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  9. Gerald Gaus, Social Complexity and Evolved Moral Principles.
    A central theme in F. A. Hayek’s work is the contrast between principles and expediency, and the insistence that governments follow abstract general principles rather than pursue apparently expedient social and economic policies that seek to make us better off.2 This is a radical and striking thesis, especially from an economist: governments should abjure the pursuit of social and economic policies that aim to improve welfare and, instead, adhere to moral principles. In this chapter I defend this radical claim. I (...)
     
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  10. Bruce Ackerman, Richard J. Arneson, Ronald W. Dworkin, Gerald F. Gaus, Kent Greenawalt, Vinit Haksar, Thomas Hurka, George Klosko, Charles Larmore, Stephen Macedo, Thomas Nagel, John Rawls, Joseph Raz & George Sher (2003). Perfectionism and Neutrality: Essays in Liberal Theory. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    Editors provide a substantive introduction to the history and theories of perfectionism and neutrality, expertly contextualizing the essays and making the collection accessible.
     
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  11.  50
    Gerald Gaus (2010). On Two Critics of Justificatory Liberalism: A Response to Wall and Lister. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 9 (2):177-212.
    In replying to Steven Wall’s and Andrew Lister’s thoughtful essays on my account of justificatory liberalism in this issue, I respond to many of their specific criticisms while taking the opportunity to explicate the foundations of justificatory liberalism. Justificatory liberalism takes seriously the moral requirement to justify all claims of authority over others, as well as all coercive interferences with their lives. If we do so, although we are by no means committed to libertarianism, we find that that many of (...)
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  12. Gerald F. Gaus (1999). Reasonable Pluralism and the Domain of the Political: How the Weaknesses of John Rawls's Political Liberalism Can Be Overcome by a Justificatory Liberalism. Inquiry 42 (2):259 – 284.
    Under free institutions the exercise of human reason leads to a plurality of reasonable, yet irreconcilable doctrines. Rawls's political liberalism is intended as a response to this fundamental feature of modern democratic life. Justifying coercive political power by appeal to any one (or sample) of these doctrines is, Rawls believes, oppressive and illiberal. If we are to achieve unity without oppression, he tells us, we must all affirm a public political conception that is supported by these diverse reasonable doctrines. The (...)
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  13.  6
    Gerald Gaus (2011). On Seeking the Truth Through Democracy: Estlund’s Case for the Qualified Epistemic Claim. Ethics 121 (2):270-300.
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  14.  85
    Gerald Gaus (2003). Backwards Into the Future: Neorepublicanism as a Postsocialist Critique of Market Society. Social Philosophy and Policy 20 (1):59-91.
    A. Two conceptions of moral legitimacy Socialism, understood as the rejection of markets based on private property in favor of comprehensive centralized economic planning, is no longer a serious political option. If the core of capitalism is the organization of the economy primarily through market competition based on private property, then capitalism has certainly defeated socialism. Markets have been accepted—and central planning abandoned—throughout most of the “third world” and the formerly Communist states. In the advanced industrial states of the West, (...)
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  15.  18
    Gerald Gaus (2014). The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Three Agent-Type Challenges to The Order of Public Reason. Philosophical Studies 170 (3):563-577.
    In this issue of Philosophical Studies, Richard Arneson, Jonathan Quong and Robert Talisse contribute papers discussing The Order of Public Reason (OPR). All press what I call “agent-type challenges” to the project of OPR. In different ways they all focus on a type (or types) of moral (or sometimes not-so-moral) agent. Arneson presents a good person who is so concerned with doing the best thing she does not truly endorse social morality; Quong a bad person who rejects it and violates (...)
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  16. Gerald Gaus (2008). The (Severe) Limits of Deliberative Democracy as the Basis for Political Choice. Theoria 55 (117):26-53.
    This essay analyses optimal voting rules for one form of deliberative democracy. Drawing on public choice analysis, it is argued that the voting rule that best institutionalises deliberative democracy is a type of a supermajority rule. Deliberative democracy is also committed to the standard neutrality condition according to which if x votes are enough to select alternative A, x votes must be enough to select not-A. Taken together, these imply that deliberative democracy will often be indeterminate. This result shows that (...)
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  17.  71
    Gerald F. Gaus (1995). The Rational, the Reasonable and Justification. Journal of Political Philosophy 3 (3):234–258.
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  18.  25
    Gerald Gaus (2012). Justification, Choice and Promise: Three Devices of the Consent Tradition in a Diverse Society. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 15 (2):109-127.
    The twin ideas at the heart of the social contract tradition are that persons are naturally free and equal, and that genuine political obligations must in some way be based on the consent of those obligated. The Lockean tradition has held that consent must be in the form of explicit choice; Kantian contractualism has insisted on consent as rational endorsement. In this paper I seek to bring the Kantian and Lockean contract traditions together. Kantian rational justification and actual choice are (...)
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  19. Gerald Gaus, The Place of Religious Belief in Public Reason Liberalism.
    In the few decades a new conception of liberalism has arisen—the “public reason view” — which developed out of contractualist approaches to justifying liberalism. The social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau all stressed that the justification of the state depended on showing that everyone would, in some way, consent to it. By relying on consent, social contract theory seemed to suppose a voluntarist conception of political justice: what is just depends on what people choose to agree to — (...)
     
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  20. Gerald F. Gaus (2010). The Demands of Impartiality and the Evolution of Morality. In Brian Feltham & John Cottingham (eds.), Partiality and Impartiality: Morality, Special Relationships, and the Wider World. OUP Oxford
     
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  21.  13
    Gerald Gaus (2013). Moral Constitutions. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 19:4-22.
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  22.  62
    Gerald Gaus (1997). Does Democracy Reveal the Voice of the People? Four Takes on Rousseau. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (2):141 – 162.
  23. Gerald Gaus, What is Deontology?, Part One: Orthodox Viewsa Gerald F. Gaus.
    Current moral philosophy is often seen as essentially a debate between the two great traditions of consequentialism and deontology. Although there has been considerable work clarifying consequentialism, deontology is more often attacked or defended than analyzed. Just how we are to understand the very idea of a deontological ethic? We shall see that competing conceptions of deontology have been advanced in recent ethical thinking, leading to differences in classifying ethical theories. If we do not focus on implausible versions, the idea (...)
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  24.  45
    Gerald Gaus (2009). Is the Public Incompetent? Compared to Whom? About What? Critical Review 20 (3):291-311.
    From Mill to, most recently, Bryan Caplan, political and economic elites have been seen as the solution to the public’s ignorance and incompetence. In order to show that elites are actually more competent than the public, however, we would have to find out what type of knowledge is necessary to enact good public policy. The empirical evidence shows that economic experts have a slight advantage over the general public in knowledge of how to achieve policy goals. But, contrary to Caplan, (...)
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  25.  46
    Gerald F. Gaus (2001). What is Deontology? Part One: Orthodox Views. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 35 (1):27-42.
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  26.  56
    Fred D'Agostino, John Thrasher & Gerald Gaus, Contemporary Approaches to the Social Contract. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  27.  9
    Gerald Gaus (2015). On Dissing Public Reason: A Reply to Enoch. Ethics 125 (4):1078-1095.
    This essay responds to David Enoch’s “The Disorder of Public Reason,” published in a previous issue of Ethics. I seek to set the record straight on several of the many charges Enoch makes. More importantly, having clarified some of the more basic points, I make some preliminary efforts at identifying when his brand of moral realism and my version of public reason differ—and, perhaps, where they are more compatible than one might think.
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  28. Gerald Gaus, Respect for Persons and the Evolution of Morality.
    Let me begin with a stylized contrast between two ways of thinking about morality. On the one hand, morality can be understood as the dictate of, or uncovered by, impartial reason. That which is (truly) moral must be capable of being verified by everyone’s reasoning from a suitably impartial perspective. If we are to respect the free and equal nature of each person, each must (in some sense) rationally validate the requirements of morality. If we take this view, the genuine (...)
     
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  29. Gerald Gaus, The Place of Autonomy Within Liberalism.
    My concern in this chapter is the place of autonomy within liberalism, understood as a public morality.1 To what extent is liberal morality necessarily committed to some doctrine of autonomy, and what is the nature of this doctrine? I begin (§2) by briefly explicating my understanding of liberalism, which is based the fundamental liberal principle—that all interferences with action stand in need of justification. Section 3 then defends my first core claim: given a certain compelling view of the nature of (...)
     
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  30.  56
    Gerald Gaus (2011). Weithman , Paul . Why Political Liberalism? On John Rawls's Political Turn . New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Pp. Xii+379. $65.00 (Cloth). [REVIEW] Ethics 122 (1):220-224.
  31.  61
    Gerald Gaus (2009). Recognized Rights as Devices of Public Reason. Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):111-136.
    My concern in this essay is a family of liberal theories that I shall call “public reason liberalism,” which arose out of the social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. These social contract accounts stressed that the justification of the state depended on showing that everyone would, in some way, consent to it. However, by relying on consent, social contract theory seemed to suppose a voluntarist conception of political obligation and authority: I am only bound by political authority if (...)
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  32.  42
    Gerald F. Gaus (2007). On Justifying the Moral Rights of the Moderns: A Case of Old Wine in New Bottles. Social Philosophy and Policy 24 (1):84-119.
    In this essay I sketch a philosophical argument for classical liberalism based on the requirements of public reason. I argue that we can develop a philosophical liberalism that, unlike so much recent philosophy, takes existing social facts and mores seriously while, at the same time, retaining the critical edge characteristic of the liberal tradition. I argue that once we develop such an account, we are led toward a vindication of “old” (qua classical) liberal morality—what Benjamin Constant called the “liberties of (...)
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  33.  30
    Gerald F. Gaus (2001). What is Deontology? Part Two: Reasons to Act. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 35 (2):179-193.
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  34.  10
    Gerald Gaus, Liberalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  35.  76
    Gerald F. Gaus (2001). Truth, Politics, Morality: Pragmatism and Deliberation. Cheryl Misak. Mind 110 (439):796-799.
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  36.  18
    Gerald F. Gaus & Fred D'Agostino (eds.) (2012). The Routledge Companion to Social and Political Philosophy. Routledge.
    The Routledge Companion to Social and Political Philosophy is a comprehensive, definitive reference work, providing an up-to-date survey of the field, charting its history and key figures and movements, and addressing enduring questions as ...
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  37.  11
    Gerald F. Gaus (1996). An Essay on Rights by Hillel Steiner. Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):203-207.
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  38. Gerald Gaus, What is Deontology?, Part Two: Reasons to Act Gerald F. Gaus.
    Part One of this essay considered familiar ways of characterizing deontology, which focus on the notions of the good and the right. Here we will take up alternative approaches, which stress the type of reasons for actions that are generated by deontological theories. Although some of these alternative conceptualizations of deontology also employ a distinction between the good and the right, all mark the basic contrast between deontology and teleology in terms of reasons to act.
     
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  39.  35
    Gerald F. Gaus & Loren E. Lomasky (1990). Are Property Rights Problematic? The Monist 73 (4):483-503.
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  40. Gerald Gaus, Liberal Neutrality: A Compelling and Radical Principle.
    Compared to other debates in contemporary political philosophy, the light-to-heat ratio of discussions of neutrality has been somewhat dismal. Although most political philosophers seem to know whether they are for it or against it, there is considerable confusion about what “it” is. To be sure, some of this ambiguity has been noted, and at least partially dealt with, in the literature. Neutrality understood as a constraint on the sorts of reasons that may be advanced to justify state action is regularly (...)
     
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  41. Gerald Gaus, State Neutrality and Controversial Values in On Liberty.
    In an important essay Charles Larmore tells us that Kant and Mill sought to justify the principle of political neutrality by appealing to ideals of autonomy and individuality. By remaining neutral with regard to controversial views of the good life, constitutional principles will express, according to them, what ought to be of supreme value throughout the whole of our life.1 On Larmore’s influential reading, Mill defended what we might call first-level neutrality: Millian principles determining justified legal (and, we might add, (...)
     
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  42.  18
    Gerald Gaus (2011). A Tale of Two Sets: Public Reason in Equilibrium. Public Affairs Quarterly 25 (4):305-25.
    Public reason liberalism is a family of theories according to which liberal political institutions, social structures, and/or basic social rules are politically or morally justified if and only if they can be endorsed from the perspective of each and every free and equal "reasonable and rational" person. Let us call these persons "the members of the justificatory public." Public reason liberalism idealizes the members of the justificatory public in three senses. First, the members of the justificatory public are assumed to (...)
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  43.  29
    Gerald Gaus (2012). Constructivist and Ecological Modeling of Group Rationality. Episteme 9 (3):245-254.
    These brief remarks highlight three aspects of Christian List and Philip Pettit's Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents that illustrate its constructivist nature: its stress on the discursive dilemma as a primary challenge to group rationality and reasoning; its general though qualified support for premise-based decision-making as the preferred way to cope with the problems of judgment aggregation; and its account of rational agency and moral responsibility. The essay contrasts List and Pettit's constructivist analysis of group (...)
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  44. Gerald Gaus (2011). The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World. Cambridge University Press.
    In this innovative and important work, Gerald Gaus advances a revised and more realistic account of public reason liberalism, showing how, in the midst of fundamental disagreement about values and moral beliefs, we can achieve a moral and political order that treats all as free and equal moral persons. The first part of this work analyzes social morality as a system of authoritative moral rules. Drawing on an earlier generation of moral philosophers such as Kurt Baier and Peter Strawson as (...)
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  45. Gerald Gaus, The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.
    The distinction between ‘comprehensive’ and ‘political’ liberalisms, explored in the previous chapter, has become central to contemporary political theory. My aim in this chapter is to examine various ‘comprehensive’ liberalisms, with particular care to identifying in what sense they are comprehensive. As I have argued elsewhere (Gaus, 2003: chap. 7), the distinction between political and comprehensive liberalisms is elusive. Rawls repeatedly describes as ‘comprehensive’ ‘philosophical’, ‘moral’ and ‘religious’ ‘doctrines’ (1996: xxv, 4, 36, 38, 160) or ‘beliefs’ (1996: 63). Indeed, so (...)
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  46.  12
    Gerald Gaus (2011). The Property Equilibrium in a Liberal Social Order. Social Philosophy and Policy 28 (2):74-101.
    The “welcome return” to “substantive political philosophy” that Rawls's A Theory of Justice was said to herald has resulted in forty years of proposals seeking to show that philosophical reflection leads to the demonstrable truth of almost every and any conceivable view of the justice of property rights. Select any view—from the justice of unregulated capitalist markets to the most extreme forms of egalitarianism—and one will find that some philosophers have proclaimed that rational reflection uniquely leads to its justice. This (...)
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  47.  11
    Gerald Gaus (2005). Should Philosophers 'Apply Ethics'? Think 3 (9):63-68.
    By , do philosophers actually succeed in corrupting philosophy?
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  48.  14
    Gerald F. Gaus (1994). Property, Rights, and Freedom. Social Philosophy and Policy 11 (2):209-240.
    William Perm summarized the Magna Carta thus: “First, It asserts Englishmen to be free; that's Liberty. Secondly, they that have free-holds, that's Property.” Since at least the seventeenth century, liberals have not only understood liberty and property to be fundamental, but to be somehow intimately related or interwoven. Here, however, consensus ends; liberals present an array of competing accounts of the relation between liberty and property. Many, for instance, defend an essentially instrumental view, typically seeing private property as justified because (...)
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  49. Gerald F. Gaus (1999). Social Philosophy.
     
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  50.  9
    Gerald Gaus & John Thrasher (2014). Social Evolution. In Routledge Companion to Social and Political Philosophy.
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