14 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Gerald Harrison
Profile: Gerald K. Harrison (Massey University)
  1. Gerald K. Harrison (2013). The Moral Supervenience Thesis is Not a Conceptual Truth. Analysis 73 (1):62-68.
    Virtually everyone takes the moral supervenience thesis to be a basic conceptual truth about morality. As a result, if a metaethical theory has difficulties respecting or adequately explaining the supervenience relationship it is deemed to be in big trouble. However, the moral supervenience thesis is a not a conceptual truth (though it may be true) and as such it is not a problem if a metaethical theory cannot respect or explain it.
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Gerald K. Harrison (2012). Antinatalism, Asymmetry, and an Ethic of Prima Facie Duties. South African Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):94-103.
    Benatar’s central argument for antinatalism develops an asymmetry between the pain and pleasure in a potential life. I am going to present an alternative route to the antinatalist conclusion. I argue that duties require victims and that as a result there is no duty to create the pleasures contained within a prospective life but a duty not to create any of its sufferings. My argument can supplement Benatar’s, but it also enjoys some advantages: it achieves a better fit with our (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Gerald K. Harrison (2012). Lucky Decisions: A Reply to Marouf. The Reasoner 6 (5):80-81.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Gerald K. Harrison & Julia Tanner (2011). Better Not to Have Children. Think, 10(27), 113-121 (27):113-121.
    Most people take it for granted that it's morally permissible to have children. They may raise questions about the number of children it's responsible to have or whether it's permissible to reproduce when there's a strong risk of serious disability. But in general, having children is considered a good thing to do, something that's morally permissible in most cases (perhaps even obligatory).
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Gerald K. Harrison (2010). A Challenge for Soft Line Replies to Manipulation Cases. Philosophia 38 (3):555-568.
    Cases involving certain kinds of manipulation seem to challenge compatibilism about responsibility-grounding free will. To deal with such cases many compatibilists give what has become known as a ‘soft line’ reply. In this paper I present a challenge to the soft line reply. I argue that any relevant case involving manipulation—and to which a compatibilist might wish to give a soft line reply—can be transformed into one supporting a degree of moral responsibility through the addition of libertarian elements (such as (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Gerald K. Harrison (2009). Frankfurt-Style Cases and the Significance of the First Impression. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (3):213-223.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Gerald K. Harrison (2009). Hooray! We're Not Morally Responsible! Think 8 (23):87-95.
  8. Gerald K. Harrison (2008). Modest Libertarianism and Clandestine Control. Dialectica 62 (4):495-507.
    Cases involving clandestine manipulation pose a significant challenge to compatibilist conceptions of free will. But compatibilists often argue that they are not alone and that modest libertarian conceptions of free will are also susceptible to the problem. I take issue with this claim. I argue that agent-causal libertarian views are not susceptible to the problem. I then argue that the compatibilist cannot cite a relevant difference between agent-causal libertarian views and modest libertarian views. Therefore from a compatibilist's perspective modest libertarian (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Gerald K. Harrison (2007). Free Will and Lucky Decisions. The Reasoner 1 (3):3-4.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Gerald K. Harrison (2007). Libertarian Free Will and the Erosion Argument. Polish Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):61-75.
  11. Gerald K. Harrison (2006). Frankfurt-Style Cases and Improbable Alternative Possibilities. Philosophical Studies 130 (2):399 - 406.
    It has been argued that a successful counterexample to the principle of alternative possibilities must rule out any possibility of the agent making an alternative decision right up to the moment of choice. This paper challenges that assumption. Distinguishing between an ability and an opportunity, this paper presents a Frankfurt-style case in which there is an alternative possibility, but one it is highly improbable that the agent will access. In such a case the agent has only the opportunity, not the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Gerald K. Harrison (2006). The Case for Hyper-Libertarianism. Kriterion 20 (1):1-6.
    The hyper libertarian is compatibilist about control, but incompatibilist about free will. This paper argues that such a position has more to recommend it than either compatibilism or traditional libertarianism. It combines what is strongest about both positions, without encountering their principle weaknesses. Furthermore it has the resources to help render intelligible the reality of moral luck.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Gerald K. Harrison (2005). Frankfurt-Style Cases and the Question Begging Charge. Facta Philosophica 7 (2):273-282.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Gerald K. Harrison (2004). The Principle of Avoidable Blame. Ethic@ 3 (1):37-46.
    Many now accept that Frankfurt-style cases refute the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). But, in this paper I argue that even if Frankfurt-style cases refute PAP they do not refute a related principle: the principle of avoidable blame (PAB). My argument develops from the observation that an agent in a Frankfurt-style case can be aware of the nature of their situation without this undermining their moral responsibility. I then argue that PAB captures all that is important about PAP such that (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation