33 found
Sort by:
Disambiguations:
Gerard O'Brien [32]Gerard J. O'Brien [1]
See also:
Profile: Gerard O'Brien (University of Adelaide)
  1. Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien (2006). How Do Connectionist Networks Compute? Cognitive Processing 7 (1):30-41.
    Although connectionism is advocated by its proponents as an alternative to the classical computational theory of mind, doubts persist about its _computational_ credentials. Our aim is to dispel these doubts by explaining how connectionist networks compute. We first develop a generic account of computation—no easy task, because computation, like almost every other foundational concept in cognitive science, has resisted canonical definition. We opt for a characterisation that does justice to the explanatory role of computation in cognitive science. Next we examine (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (2004). Notes Toward a Structuralist Theory of Mental Representation. In Hugh Clapin (ed.), Representation in Mind. Elsevier. 1--20.
    Any creature that must move around in its environment to find nutrients and mates, in order to survive and reproduce, faces the problem of sensorimotor control. A solution to this problem requires an on-board control mechanism that can shape the creature’s behaviour so as to render it “appropriate” to the conditions that obtain. There are at least three ways in which such a control mechanism can work, and Nature has exploited them all. The first and most basic way is for (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (2004). Vehicle, Process, and Hybrid Theories of Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2):303-305.
    Martínez-Manrique contends that we overlook a possible nonconnectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. We argue that the position he develops is better understood as a hybrid vehicle/process theory. We assess this theory and in doing so clarify the commitments of both vehicle and process theories of consciousness.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien (2004). Notes Toward a Structuralist Theory of Mental Representation. In Hugh Clapin, Phillip Staines & Peter Slezak (eds.), Representation in Mind: New Approaches to Mental Representation. Elsevier. 1--20.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (2003). The Multiplicity of Consciousness and the Emergence of the Self. In A. S. David & T. T. J. Kircher (eds.), The Self and Schizophrenia: A Neuropsychological Perspective. Cambridge University Press. 107--120.
    I look out the window and I think that the garden looks nice and the grass looks cool, but the
    thoughts of Eammon Andrews come into my mind.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Gerard O'Brien & Jon Jureidini (2002). Dispensing with the Dynamic Unconscious. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (2):141-153.
    In recent years, a number of contemporary proponents of psychoanalysis have sought to derive support for their conjectures about the _dynamic_ unconscious from the empirical evidence in favor of the _cognitive_ unconscious. It is our contention, however, that far from supporting the dynamic unconscious, recent work in cognitive science suggests that the time has come to dispense with this concept altogether. In this paper we defend this claim in two ways. First, we argue that any attempt to shore up the (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Gerard O'Brien & Jon Jureidini (2002). The Last Rites of the Dynamic Unconscious. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (2):161-166.
    © 2003 by The Johns Hopkins University Press.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Gerard O'Brien & Jon Opie (2002). Internalizing Communication. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):694-695.
    Carruthers presents evidence concerning the cross-modular integration of information in human subjects which appears to support the “cognitive conception of language.” According to this conception, language is not just a means of communication, but also a representational medium of thought. However, Carruthers overlooks the possibility that language, in both its communicative and cognitive roles, is a nonrepresentational system of conventional signals – that words are not a medium we think in, but a tool we think with. The evidence he cites (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Gerard O'Brien & Jon Opie (2002). The Computational Baby, the Classical Bathwater, and the Middle Way. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):348-349.
    We are sympathetic with the broad aims of Perruchet & Vinter's “mentalistic” framework. But it is implausible to claim, as they do, that human cognition can be understood without recourse to unconsciously represented information. In our view, this strategy forsakes the only available mechanistic understanding of intelligent behaviour. Our purpose here is to plot a course midway between the classical unconscious and Perruchet &Vinter's own noncomputational associationism.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (2002). Radical Connectionism: Thinking with (Not in) Language. Language and Communication 22 (3):313-329.
    In this paper we defend a position we call radical connectionism. Radical connectionism claims that cognition _never_ implicates an internal symbolic medium, not even when natural language plays a part in our thought processes. On the face of it, such a position renders the human capacity for abstract thought quite mysterious. However, we argue that connectionism is committed to an analog conception of neural computation, and that representation of the abstract is no more problematic for a system of analog vehicles (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Gerard O'Brien & Jon Opie (2001). Functional Resemblance and the Internalization of Rules. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (4):695-696.
    Kubovy and Epstein distinguish between systems that follow rules, and those that merely instantiate them. They regard compliance with the principles of kinematic geometry in apparent motion as a case of instantiation. There is, however, some reason to believe that the human visual system internalizes the principles of kinematic geometry, even if it does not explicitly represent them. We offer functional resemblance as a criterion for internal representation. [Kubovy & Epstein].
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Gerard O'Brien & Jon Opie (2001). Sins of Omission and Commission. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):997-998.
    O'Regan & Noë (O&N) fail to address adequately the two most historically important reasons for seeking to explain visual experience in terms of internal representations. They are silent about the apparently inferential nature of perception, and mistaken about the significance of the phenomenology accompanying dreams, hallucinations, and mental imagery.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (2001). Connectionist Vehicles, Structural Resemblance, and the Phenomenal Mind. Communication and Cognition (Special Issue) 34 (1-2):13-38.
    We think the best prospect for a naturalistic explanation of phenomenal consciousness is to be found at the confluence of two influential ideas about the mind. The first is the _computational _ _theory of mind_: the theory that treats human cognitive processes as disciplined operations over neurally realised representing vehicles.1 The second is the _representationalist theory of _ _consciousness_: the theory that takes the phenomenal character of conscious experiences (the “what-it-is-likeness”) to be constituted by their representational content.2 Together these two (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (2000). Disunity Defended: A Reply to Bayne. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):255-263.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1999). A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):127-48.
    When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches vehicle and process theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may be space (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1999). A Defense of Cartesian Materialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):939-63.
    One of the principal tasks Dennett sets himself in C onsciousness Explained i s to demolish the Cartesian theatre model of phenomenal consciousness, which in its contemporary garb takes the form of C artesian materialism : the idea that conscious experience is a p rocess of presentation realized in the physical materials of the brain. The now standard response to Dennett is that, in focusing on Cartesian materialism, he attacks an impossibly naive account of consciousness held by no one currently (...)
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1999). Finding a Place for Experience in the Physical-Relational Structure of the Brain. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 22 (6):966-967.
    In restricting his analysis to the causal relations of functionalism, on the one hand, and the neurophysiological realizers of biology, on the other, Palmer has overlooked an alternative conception of the relationship between color experience and the brain - one that liberalises the relation between mental phenomena and their physical implementation, without generating functionalism.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1999). Putting Content Into a Vehicle Theory of Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):175-196.
    The connectionist vehicle theory of phenomenal experience in the target article identifies consciousness with the brain’s explicit representation of information in the form of stable patterns of neural activity. Commentators raise concerns about both the conceptual and empirical adequacy of this proposal. On the former front they worry about our reliance on vehicles, on representation, on stable patterns of activity, and on our identity claim. On the latter front their concerns range from the general plausibility of a vehicle theory to (...)
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1999). What's Doing the Work Here: Knowledge Representation or the HOT Theory? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):778-9.
    Dienes and Perner offer us a theory of explicit and implicit knowledge that promises to systematise a large and diverse body of research in cognitive psychology. Their advertised strategy is to unpack this distinction in terms of explicit and implicit representation. But when one digs deeper one finds the HOT theory of consciousness doing much of the work. This reduces both the plausibility and usefulness of their account. We think their strategy is broadly correct, but that consensus on the explicit/implicit (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1999). What's Really Doing the Work Here? Knowledge Representation or the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):778-779.
    Dienes & Perner offer us a theory of explicit and implicit knowledge that promises to systematise a large and diverse body of research in cognitive psychology. Their advertised strategy is to unpack this distinction in terms of explicit and implicit representation. But when one digs deeper one finds the “Higher-Order Thought” theory of consciousness doing much of the work. This reduces both the plausibility and usefulness of their account. We think their strategy is broadly correct, but that consensus on the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien (1999). A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):127-148.
    When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches _vehicle_ and _process_ theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may be space (...)
    Direct download (15 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Gerard O'Brien (1998). Connectionism, Analogicity and Mental Content. Acta Analytica 22 (22):111-31.
    In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Horgan and Tienson (1996) argue that cognitive processes, pace classicism, are not governed by exceptionless, “representation-level” rules; they are instead the work of defeasible cognitive tendencies subserved by the non-linear dynamics of the brain’s neural networks. Many theorists are sympathetic with the dynamical characterisation of connectionism and the general (re)conception of cognition that it affords. But in all the excitement surrounding the connectionist revolution in cognitive science, it has largely gone unnoticed that connectionism (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Gerard O'Brien (1998). Digital Computers Versus Dynamical Systems: A Conflation of Distinctions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):648-649.
    The distinction at the heart of van Gelder's target article is one between digital computers and dynamical systems, but this distinction conflates two more fundamental distinctions in cognitive science that should be kept apart. When this conflation is undone, it becomes apparent that the computational hypothesis is not as dominant in contemporary cognitive science as van Gelder contends; nor has the dynamical hypothesis been neglected.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Gerard O'Brien (1998). The Mind: Embodied, Embedded, but Not Extended. Philosophical Explorations 7:8-83.
    This commentry focuses on the one major ecumenical theme propounded in Andy Clark's Being There that I find difficult to accept; this is Clark’s advocacy, especially in the third and final part of the book, of the extended nature of the embedded, embodied mind.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Gerard O'Brien (1998). The Role of Implementation in Connectionist Explanation. Psycoloquy 9 (6).
  26. Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1998). The Disunity of Consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (3):378-95.
    It is commonplace for both philosophers and cognitive scientists to express their allegiance to the "unity of consciousness". This is the claim that a subject’s phenomenal consciousness, at any one moment in time, is a single thing. This view has had a major influence on computational theories of consciousness. In particular, what we call single-track theories dominate the literature, theories which contend that our conscious experience is the result of a single consciousness-making process or mechanism in the brain. We argue (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1997). Cognitive Science and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Dilemma, and How to Avoid It. Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):269-86.
    When it comes to applying computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, cognitive scientists appear to face a dilemma. The only strategy that seems to be available is one that explains consciousness in terms of special kinds of computational processes. But such theories, while they dominate the field, have counter-intuitive consequences; in particular, they force one to accept that phenomenal experience is composed of information processing effects. For cognitive scientists, therefore, it seems to come down to a choice between (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Chris Mortensen, Gerard O'Brien & Belinda Paterson (1993). Distinctions: Subpersonal and Subconscious. Psycoloquy.
    Puccetti argues that Dennett's views on split brains are defective. First, we criticise Puccetti's argument. Then we distinguish persons, minds, consciousnesses, selves and personalities. Then we introduce the concepts of part-persons and part-consciousnesses, and apply them to clarifying the situation. Finally, we criticise Dennett for some contribution to the confusion.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Gerard O'Brien (1993). A Conflation of Folk Psychologies. Prospects for Intentionality Working Papers in Philosophy 3:42-51.
    Stich begins his paper "What is a Theory of Mental Representation?" (1992) by noting that while there is a dizzying range of theories of mental representation in today's philosophical market place, there is very little self-conscious reflection about what a theory of mental representation is supposed to do. This is quite remarkable, he thinks, because if we bother to engage in such reflection, some very surprising conclusions begin to emerge. The most surprising conclusion of all, according to Stich, is that (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Gerard J. O'Brien (1993). The Connectionist Vindication of Folk Psychology. In Scott M. Christensen & Dale R. Turner (eds.), Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind. L. Erlbaum. 368--87.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Gerard O'Brien (1991). Is Connectionism Commonsense? Philosophical Psychology 4 (2):165-78.
  32. Gerard O'Brien (1989). Connectionism, Analogicity and Mental Content. Acta Analytica 22 (22):111-31.
    In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Horgan and Tienson (1996) argue that cognitive processes, pace classicism, are not governed by exceptionless, “representation-level” rules; they are instead the work of defeasible cognitive tendencies subserved by the non-linear dynamics of the brain’s neural networks. Many theorists are sympathetic with the dynamical characterisation of connectionism and the general (re)conception of cognition that it affords. But in all the excitement surrounding the connectionist revolution in cognitive science, it has largely gone unnoticed that connectionism (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Gerard O'Brien (1987). Eliminative Materialism and Our Psychological Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 52 (July):49-70.
    The project of the paper is a critical examination of the "strong thesis of eliminative materialism" in the philosophy of mind--The claim that all the mental entities that constitute the framework of commonsense psychology are, In principle at least, Eliminable from our ontology. The central conclusion reached is that the traditional formulation of this thesis is demonstrably untenable as it rests on a mistaken view of the relationship between our psychological self-Knowledge and language.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation