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  1. Christian Barry & Gerhard Øverland (forthcoming). Individual Responsibility for Carbon Emissions: Is There Anything Wrong with Overdetermining Harm? In Jeremy Moss (ed.), Climate Change and Justice. Cambridge University Press
    Climate change and other harmful large-scale processes challenge our understandings of individual responsibility. People throughout the world suffer harms—severe shortfalls in health, civic status, or standard of living relative to the vital needs of human beings—as a result of physical processes to which many people appear to contribute. Climate change, polluted air and water, and the erosion of grasslands, for example, occur because a great many people emit carbon and pollutants, build excessively, enable their flocks to overgraze, or otherwise stress (...)
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  2. Gerhard Øverland (forthcoming). Self-Defense and Giving Rise to Cost: On Innocent Bystanders, Threats, Obstructors, and Obstacles, and the Permissibility to Harm Them. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-17.
    Philosophers have had trouble defending the common sense view that it is permissible to impose significant cost on an innocent person who is about to harm you to prevent the harm from occurring. In this paper, I argue that such harm can be justified if one pays attention to the moral significance of imposing a cost on others. The constraint against harming people who give rise to cost by their presence or movements is weaker than the constraint against harming bystanders. (...)
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  3. Gerhard Øverland (2015). Why Kamm's Principle of Secondary Permissibility Cannot Save the Doctrine of Double Effect. Journal of Applied Philosophy 32 (3).
    The DDE yields counterintuitive verdicts about certain cases: it may deem it permissible to kill a certain number of people when they are not used as means and their death is not intended, but deny that killing fewer of these people is permissible if that requires intending their death, or using them as means. To accommodate the judgement that we may kill the lesser number in such cases, supporters of the DDE may appeal to Frances Kamm's Principle of Secondary Permissibility. (...)
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  4. Christian Barry, Matthew Lindauer & Gerhard Øverland (2014). Doing, Allowing, and Enabling Harm: An Empirical Investigation. In Joshua Knobe, Tania Lombrozo & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press
    Traditionally, moral philosophers have distinguished between doing and allowing harm, and have normally proceeded as if this bipartite distinction can exhaustively characterize all cases of human conduct involving harm. By contrast, cognitive scientists and psychologists studying causal judgment have investigated the concept ‘enable’ as distinct from the concept ‘cause’ and other causal terms. Empirical work on ‘enable’ and its employment has generally not focused on cases where human agents enable harm. In this paper, we present new empirical evidence to support (...)
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  5. Christian Barry & Gerhard Øverland (2014). The Implications of Failing to Assist. Social Theory and Practice 40 (4):570-590.
    In this essay we argue that an agent’s failure to assist someone in need at one time can change the cost she can be morally required to take on to assist that same person at a later time. In particular, we show that the cost the agent can subsequently be required to take on to help the person in need can increase quite significantly, and can be enforced through the proportionate use of force. We explore the implications of this argument (...)
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  6. Bashshar Haydar & Gerhard Øverland (2014). The Normative Implications of Benefiting From Injustice. Journal of Applied Philosophy 31 (4):349-362.
    In this article we investigate whether non-culpably benefiting from wrongdoing or injustice generates a moral requirement to disgorge these benefits in order to compensate the victims. We argue that a strong requirement to disgorge such benefits is generated only if other conditions or factors are present. We identify three such factors and claim that their presence would explain why the normative features of certain types of cases of benefiting from wrongdoing differ from cases of benefiting from simple misfortune or bad (...)
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  7. Gerhard Øverland (2014). Moral Obstacles: An Alternative to the Doctrine of Double Effect. Ethics 124 (3):481-506.
    The constraint against harming people in order to save yourself and others seems stronger than the constraint against harming people as a consequence of saving yourself and others. The reduced constraint against acting in one type of case is often justified with reference to the intentions of the agent or to the fact that she does not use the people she harms as a means. In this article I offer a victim-centered account. I argue that the circumstances in which the (...)
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  8. Christian Barry & Gerhard Øverland (2013). How Much for the Child? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):189-204.
    In this paper we explore what sacrifices you are morally required to make to save a child who is about to die in front of you. It has been argued that you would have very demanding duties to save such a child (or any adult who is in similar circumstance through no fault of their own, for that matter), and some examples have been presented to make this claim seem intuitively correct. Against this, we argue that you do not in (...)
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  9. Gerhard Øverland (2013). 602 and One Dead: On Contribution to Global Poverty and Liability to Defensive Force. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):279-299.
    : When suggesting that we—the affluent in the developed world—are legitimate targets of defensive force due to our contribution to global poverty one is likely to be countered by one of two strategies. The first denies that we contribute to global poverty. The second seems to affirm that we contribute, and even that we have stringent contribution-based duties to address this poverty, but denies that such contribution makes forcible resistance permissible. Those in this second group employ several argumentative strategies. In (...)
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  10. Gerhard Øverland (2013). Pogge on Poverty: Contribution or Exploitation? Journal of Applied Philosophy 30 (4):319-333.
    Thomas Pogge argues that affluent people in the developing world have contribution-based duties to help protect the poor. And it follows from Pogge's most general thesis that affluent people are contributing to most, if not all, instances of global poverty. In this article I explore two problems with Pogge's general thesis. First, I investigate a typical way in which affluent people would be contributing to global poverty according to Pogge: that affluent countries use their superior bargaining power to get poor (...)
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  11. Christian Barry & Gerhard Øverland (2012). Are Trade Subsidies and Tariffs Killing the Global Poor? Social Research (4):865-896.
    In recent years it has often been claimed that policies such as subsidies paid to domestic producers by affluent countries and tariffs on goods produced by foreign producers in poorer countries violate important moral requirements because they do severe harm to poor people, even kill them. Such claims involve an empirical aspect—such policies are on balance very bad for the global poor—and a philosophical aspect—that the causal influence of these policies can fairly be characterized as doing severe harm and killing. (...)
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  12. Christian Barry & Gerhard Øverland (2012). The Feasible Alternatives Thesis: Kicking Away the Livelihoods of the Global Poor. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 11 (1):97-119.
    Many assert that affluent countries have contributed in the past to poverty in developing countries through wars of aggression and conquest, colonialism and its legacies, the imposition of puppet leaders, and support for brutal dictators and venal elites. Thomas Pogge has recently argued that there is an additional and, arguably, even more consequential way in which the affluent continue to contribute to poverty in the developing world. He argues that when people cooperate in instituting and upholding institutional arrangements that foreseeably (...)
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  13. Gerhard Øverland (2011). Moral Taint: On the Transfer of the Implications of Moral Culpability. Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (2):122-136.
    Suppose two people are about to drown. We are in a position to save only one, so the other will have to die. One of the two has just culpably killed an innocent person, but has no intention of killing anybody else and there is no reason to expect that he will. Everything else being equal, should we give them an equal chance of being saved by flipping a coin? In this paper I argue that we should not. I argue (...)
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  14. Gerhard Øverland (2011). On Disproportionate Force and Fighting in Vain. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):235-261.
    Two conditions guiding permissible use of force in self-defence are proportionality and success. According to the proportionality condition the means used to prevent an attack can be permissible only if they are proportional to the interest at stake.1 According to the success condition, otherwise impermissible acts can be justified under the right to self-defence only if they are likely to succeed in preventing the perceived threat.2 These requirements should not always be interpreted narrowly. Sometimes people are permitted to kill culpable (...)
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  15. Gerhard Øverland & Christian Barry (2011). Do Democratic Societies Have a Right to Do Wrong? Journal of Social Philosophy 42 (2):111-131.
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  16. Christian Barry & Gerhard Øverland (2010). Why Remittances to Poor Countries Should Not Be Taxed. NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 42 (1):1180-1207.
  17. Christian Barry & Gerhard Øverland (2009). Responding to Global Poverty: Review Essay of Peter Singer, the Life You Can Save. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 6 (2):239-247.
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  18. Gerhard Øverland (2009). Forced Assistance. Law and Philosophy 28 (2):203 - 232.
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  19. Gerhard Øverland (2007). Survival Lotteries Reconsidered. Bioethics 21 (7):355–363.
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  20. Gerhard Øverland (2007). The Illegal Way in and the Moral Way Out. European Journal of Philosophy 15 (2):186–203.
    At the heart of the current debate about immigration we find a conflict of convictions. Many people seem to believe that a country has a right to decide who to let in and who to keep out, but quite often they appear equally committed to the view that it is morally wrong to expel someone from within the borders of their country if that would seriously jeopardise the person in question. While the first conviction leads to stricter border controls in (...)
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  21. Gerhard Øverland (2007). The Right to Do Wrong. Law and Philosophy 26 (4):377-404.
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  22. Gerhard Øverland (2006). Killing Soldiers. Ethics and International Affairs 20 (4):455–475.
    A riddle in the ethics of war concerns whether lethal defensive force may be justifiably used against aggressing soldiers who are morally innocent.
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  23. William J. FitzPatrick, Gerhard Øverland, Talbot Brewer, David Enoch & Philip Stratton‐Lake (2005). 2.“Doing and Allowing” and Doing and Allowing “Doing and Allowing” and Doing and Allowing (Pp. 799-808). Ethics 115 (4).
     
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  24. Gerhard Øverland (2005). Poverty and the Moral Significance of Contribution. Journal of Moral Philosophy 2 (3):299-315.
    The main thesis of the article is that one’s responsibility to render assistance is not affected by having contributed to the situation by causing harm. I examine ways in which contribution to need is morally significant. Although contribution is relevant with regard to certain features, such as questions of blame, compensation, and fair distribution of the cost of assistance, I argue that contribution should carry no weight when assessing our duty to assist people in severe need if we can do (...)
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  25. Gerhard Øverland (2005). Self-Defence Among Innocent People. Journal of Moral Philosophy 2 (2):127-146.
    I explain the asymmetry between innocent aggressors and their victims, and attempt to separate justified and unjustified defensive force when both parties are innocent. I propose the principle of initiating behaviour, which states that: ‘In order for one person to be justified in using defensive force the other party must initiate the apparently threatening behaviour, but the defendant’s interpretation of that behaviour, as being threatening, would have to be reasonable.’ We can thereby maintain the view that there is a significant (...)
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  26. Gerhard Øverland (2005). Brill Online Books and Journals. Journal of Moral Philosophy 2 (2).
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  27. Gerhard Øverland (2005). Contractual Killing. Ethics 115 (4):692-720.
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  28. Gerhard Øverland (2005). Killing Civilians. European Journal of Philosophy 13 (3):345–363.
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  29. Gerhard Øverland (2004). Just Adjustments. Public Affairs Quarterly 18 (4):387-408.
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