1. Gerry Hough (2013). Anti-Substitution Intuitions and the Content of Belief Reports. Acta Analytica:1-13.
    Philosophers of language traditionally take it that anti-substitution intuitions teach us about the content of belief reports. Jennifer Saul [1997, 2002 (with David Braun), 2007] challenges this lesson. Here I offer a response to Saul’s challenge. In the first two sections of the article, I present a common sense justification for drawing conclusions about content from anti-substitution intuitions. Then, in Sect. 3, I outline Saul’s challenge—what she calls ‘the Enlightenment Problem’. Finally, in Sect. 4, I argue that Saul’s challenge does (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Gerry Hough (2011). Simple Sentences, Speech Acts, and the 'Enlightenment Problem'. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (4):539-546.
    Anti?substitution intuitions play a central role in discussion of the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions, and all theorists seem to agree that these intuitions should be explained by either semantic or pragmatic means. Jennifer Saul (2007) has recently argued that it is impossible to explain all our anti?substitution intuitions thus. In particular, she argues that any account of the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions faces the ?Enlightenment Problem? ? i.e. no such account can explain the fact that we have anti?substitution (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Gerry Hough (2008). A Dilemma for Sinnott-Armstrong's Moderate Pyrrhonian Moral Scepticism. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):457–462.
    In order for us to have epistemic justification, Sinnott-Armstrong believes we do not have to be able to rule out all sceptical hypotheses. He suggests that it is sufficient if we have 'modestly justified beliefs', i.e., if our evidence rules out all non-sceptical alternatives. I argue that modest justification is not sufficient for epistemic justification. Either modest justification is independent of our ability to rule out sceptical hypotheses, but is not a kind of epistemic justification, or else modest justification is (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation