Search results for 'Gettier Problem' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
See also:
  1. Qilin Li, Quine’s Naturalized Epistemology, Epistemic Normativity and the Gettier Problem.
    In this paper, it is argued that there are (at least) two different kinds of ‘epistemic normativity’ in epistemology, which can be scrutinized and revealed by some comparison with some naturalistic studies of ethics. The first kind of epistemic normativity can be naturalized, but the other not. The doctrines of Quine’s naturalized epistemology is firstly introduced; then Kim’s critique of Quine’s proposal is examined. It is argued that Quine’s naturalized epistemology is able to save some room for the concept of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Brent G. Kyle (2013). Knowledge as a Thick Concept: Explaining Why the Gettier Problem Arises. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):1-27.
    The Gettier problem has stymied epistemologists. But, whether or not this problem is resolvable, we still must face an important question: Why does the Gettier problem arise in the first place? So far, philosophers have seen it as either a problem peculiar to the concept of knowledge, or else an instance of a general problem about conceptual analysis. But I would like to steer a middle course. I argue that the Gettier (...) arises because knowledge is a thick concept, and a Gettier-like problem is just what we should expect from attempts at analyzing a thick concept. Section 2 is devoted to establishing the controversial claim that knowledge is thick, and, in Sect. 3, I show that there is a general problem for analyzing thick concepts of which the Gettier problem is a special instance. I do not take a stand on whether the Gettier problem, or its general counterpart, is resolvable. My primary aim is to bring these problems into better focus. (shrink)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  80
    Ian M. Church (2013). Manifest Failure Failure: The Gettier Problem Revived. Philosophia 41 (1):171-177.
    If the history of the Gettier Problem has taught us anything, it is to be skeptical regarding purported solutions. Nevertheless, in “Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved” (2011), that is precisely what John Turri offers us. For nearly fifty years, epistemologists have been chasing a solution for the Gettier Problem but with little to no success. If Turri is right, if he has actually solved the Gettier Problem, then he has done something (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  40
    Christian Piller (2015). Practical Philosophy and the Gettier Problem: Is Virtue Epistemology on the Right Track? Philosophical Studies 172 (1):73-91.
    One of the guiding ideas of virtue epistemology is to look at epistemological issue through the lens of practical philosophy. The Gettier Problem is a case in point. Virtue epistemologists, like Sosa and Greco, see the shortcoming in a Gettier scenario as a shortcoming from which performances in general can suffer. In this paper I raise some doubts about the success of this project. Looking more closely at practical philosophy, will, I argue, show that virtue epistemology misconceives (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  93
    Qilin Li, Truth-Maker Theory and the Stopped Clock: Why Heathcote Fails to Solve the Gettier Problem.
    Adrian Heathcote has proposed a truth-making account of knowledge that combines traditional conditions of justified true belief with the truth-making condition, which would jointly provide us with the sufficient condition of knowledge, and this truth-maker account of knowledge in turn explains why a gettiered justified true belief fails to be regarded as a genuine instance of knowledge. In this paper, by the comparison of two different casual models that are illustrated by the thermometer and the clock respectively, however, it will (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  38
    Geert Keil (2013). Was lehrt uns das Gettier-Problem über das Verhältnis zwischen Intuitionen und Begriffsanalysen? In Gerhard Ernst & Lisa Marani (eds.), Das Gettierproblem. Eine Bilanz nach 50 Jahren. Mentis 107-144.
    Der Beitrag beleuchtet einen bisher kaum gewürdigten Grund dafür, dass die Gettier-Debatte nicht zu einer systematisch verbesserten Analyse des Wissensbegriffs geführt hat. Es wird die These entwickelt und verteidigt, dass diejenigen Komplikationen, die einen Gettierfall zu einem solchen machen, sich stets in den blinden Flecken der Situationsrepräsentation des epistemischen Subjekts befinden. Diese These ist in die metaphilosophische Fragestellung eingebettet, was das Gettierproblem uns über das Verhältnis von sprachlichen Intuitionen und Begriffsanalysen lehrt. Es gibt unter kompetenten Sprechern beträchtliche Einmütigkeit darüber, (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  22
    Mark McEvoy (2014). Causal Tracking Reliabilism and the Gettier Problem. Synthese 191 (17):4115-4130.
    This paper argues that reliabilism can handle Gettier cases once it restricts knowledge producing reliable processes to those that involve a suitable causal link between the subject’s belief and the fact it references. Causal tracking reliabilism (as this version of reliabilism is called) also avoids the problems that refuted the causal theory of knowledge, along with problems besetting more contemporary theories (such as virtue reliabilism and the “safety” account of knowledge). Finally, causal tracking reliabilism allows for a response to (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  34
    Erik Olsson (2015). Gettier and the Method of Explication: A 60 Year Old Solution to a 50 Year Old Problem. Philosophical Studies 172 (1):57-72.
    I challenge a cornerstone of the Gettier debate: that a proposed analysis of the concept of knowledge is inadequate unless it entails that people don’t know in Gettier cases. I do so from the perspective of Carnap’s methodology of explication. It turns out that the Gettier problem per se is not a fatal problem for any account of knowledge, thus understood. It all depends on how the account fares regarding other putative counter examples and the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  9. John Turri (2011). Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (8).
    This paper provides a principled and elegant solution to the Gettier problem. The key move is to draw a general metaphysical distinction and conscript it for epistemological purposes. Section 1 introduces the Gettier problem. Sections 2–5 discuss instructively wrong or incomplete previous proposals. Section 6 presents my solution and explains its virtues. Section 7 answers the most common objection.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   28 citations  
  10.  30
    Chad Vance (2014). Truthmaker Theory Does Not Solve The Gettier Problem. Ratio 27 (3):291-305.
    Truthmaker theory has become immensely popular in recent years. So, it is not surprising that we are beginning to see it put to work in other areas of philosophy. Recently, several philosophers have proposed that truthmaker theory is the key to solving the Gettier problem. Edmund Gettier demonstrated that the traditional analysis of knowledge (as justified, true belief) was unsatisfactory. The truthmaker solution proposes that knowledge is a justified, true belief, where the source of one's justification is (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  11. L. Floridi (2004). On the Logical Unsolvability of the Gettier Problem. Synthese 142 (1):61 - 79.
    The tripartite account of propositional, fallibilist knowledge that p as justified true belief can become adequate only if it can solve the Gettier Problem. However, the latter can be solved only if the problem of a successful coordination of the resources (at least truth and justification) necessary and sufficient to deliver propositional, fallibilist knowledge that p can be solved. In this paper, the coordination problem is proved to be insolvable by showing that it is equivalent to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  12. Allan Hazlett, A Gricean Approach to the Gettier Problem.
    David Lewis maintained that epistemological contextualism (on which the truth-conditions for utterances of “S knows p” change in different contexts depending on the salient “alternative possibilities”) could solve the problem of skepticism as well as the Gettier problem. Contextualist approaches to skepticism have become commonplace, if not orthodox, in epistemology. But not so for contextualist approaches to the Gettier problem: the standard approach to this has been to add an “anti-luck” condition to the analysis of (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. B. Brogaard (2004). Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Gettier Problem. Synthese 139 (3):367 - 386.
    The contextualist epistemological theories proposed by David Lewis and othersoffer a view of knowledge which awards a central role to the contexts ofknowledge attributions. Such contexts are held to determine how strong anepistemic position must be in order to count as knowledge. Lewis has suggestedthat contextualism so construed can be used both to ward off the skeptic and tosolve the Gettier problem. A person knows P, he says, just in case her evidenceeliminates every possibility that not-P, where the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  14.  37
    Allan Hazlett (2015). Anti-Luck Epistemology and the Gettier Problem. Philosophical Studies 172 (1):93-111.
    A certain construal of the Gettier problem is offered, according to which this problem concerns the task of identifying the anti-luck condition on knowledge. A methodology for approaching this construal of the Gettier problem—anti-luck epistemology—is set out, and the utility of such a methodology is demonstrated. It is argued that a range of superficially distinct cases which are meant to pose problems for anti-luck epistemology are in fact related in significant ways. It is claimed that (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  57
    Allan Hazlett (2015). The Maturation of the Gettier Problem. Philosophical Studies 172 (1):1-6.
    Edmund Gettier’s paper “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” first appeared in an issue of Analysis , dated June of 1963, and although it’s tempting to wax hyperbolic when discussing the paper’s importance and influence, it is fair to say that its impact on contemporary philosophy has been substantial and wide-ranging. Epistemology has benefited from 50 years of sincere and rigorous discussion of issues arising from the paper, and Gettier’s conclusion that knowledge is not justified true belief is sometimes (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  4
    Michael S. Pardo (2010). The Gettier Problem and Legal Proof. Legal Theory 16 (1):37-57.
    This article explores the relationships between legal proof and fundamental epistemic concepts such as knowledge and justification. A survey of the legal literature reveals a confusing array of seemingly inconsistent proposals and presuppositions regarding these relationships. This article makes two contributions. First, it reconciles a number of apparent inconsistencies and tensions in accounts of the epistemology of legal proof. Second, it argues that there is a deeper connection between knowledge and legal proof than is typically argued for or presupposed in (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  17.  72
    Timothy McGrew & Lydia McGrew (1998). Internalism and the Collapse of the Gettier Problem. Journal of Philosophical Research 23:239-256.
    On the “Russellian” solution to the Gettier problem, every Gettier case involves the implicit or explicit use of a false premise on the part of the subject. We distinguish between two senses of “justification” ---“legitimation” and “justification proper.” The former does not require true premises, but the latter does. We then argue that in Gettier cases the subject possesses “legitimation” but not “justification proper,” and we respond to many attempted counterexamples, including several variants of the Nogot (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  18.  31
    S. Cohen (2011). The Gettier Problem in Informed Consent. Journal of Medical Ethics 37 (11):642-645.
    The duty to procure informed consent (IC) from patients before any significant intervention is among the pillars of medical and research ethics. The provision by the doctor of relevant information about treatment and free decision-making by the patient are essential elements of IC. The paper presents cases of IC where the free decision about treatment is not causally related to the information provided, and claims that such cases pose a difficulty parallel to that presented by the Gettier Problem (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  19.  43
    Mylan Engel Jr (2000). Intemalism, the Gettier Problem, and Metaepistemological Skepticism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 60:99-117.
    When it comes to second-order knowledge (i.e. knowing that one knows), internalists typically contend that when we know that p, we can, by reflecting, directly know that we are knowing it. Gettier considerations are employed to challenge this internalistic contention and to make out a prima facie case for internalistic metaepistemological skepticism, the thesis that no one ever intemalistically knows that one internalistically knows that p. In particular, I argue that at the metaepistemological second-order level, the Gettier (...) generates three distinct problems which, taken together, seriously undermine the possibility of anyone possessing second-order internalistic knowledge. (shrink)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  49
    Don S. Levi (1995). The Gettier Problem and the Parable of the Ten Coins. Philosophy 70 (271):5 - 25.
    ‘Where have you been?’ I expect philosophers to ask me this when I tell them that this paper is on the Gettier Problem. I found it difficult to participate in the discussion of the problem until now because instead of wanting to consider what could be done to revive the project of identifying necessary and conditions for knowledge after the apparent damage done to it by Gettier counter-examples, I wanted to question the legitimacy of the project (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Stephen Hetherington (2016). Knowledge and the Gettier Problem. Cambridge University Press.
    Edmund Gettier's 1963 verdict about what knowledge is not has become an item of philosophical orthodoxy, accepted by philosophers as a genuine epistemological result. It assures us that - contrary to what Plato and later philosophers have thought - knowledge is not merely a true belief well supported by epistemic justification. But that orthodoxy has generated the Gettier problem - epistemology's continuing struggle to understand how to accommodate Gettier's apparent result within an improved conception of knowledge. (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2000). Ist das Gettier-Problem wirklich ein Problem? Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 33 (82):45-56.
    Viele Philosophen Glauben, daß die sogenannte „klassische” Definition des Wissens: -/- (W)Das Subjekt S weiß, daß p =Df. (i) S glaubt (ist überzeugt), daß p; (ii) S hat eine Begründung (eine epistemische Rechtferigung) für seine Überzeugung, daß p; und (iii) es ist der Fall, daß p. -/- durch das berühmte Gegenbeispiel Gettiers endgültig demoliert wurde: Gettier hat die folgende Situation konstruiert: -/- (G)(1) Das Subjekt S hat eine gute induktive Begründung für die Überzeugung, daß p. (2) S hat die (...)
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  57
    William G. Lycan (2006). On the Gettier Problem Problem. In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press 148--168.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   33 citations  
  24. Igor Douven (2005). A Contextualist Solution to the Gettier Problem. Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):207-228.
    According to the deontological view on justification, being justified in believing some proposition is a matter of having done one's epistemic duty with respect to that proposition. The present paper argues that, given a proper articulation of the deontological view, it is defensible that knowledge is justified true belief, pace virtually all epistemologists since Gettier. One important claim to be argued for is that once it is appreciated that it depends on contextual factors whether a person has done her (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  25.  54
    Stephen Hetherington (2001). A Fallibilist and Wholly Internalist Solution to the Gettier Problem. Journal of Philosophical Research 26:307-324.
    How can a person avoid being Gettiered? This paper provides the first answer to that question that is both fallibilist and purely internalist. It is an answer that allows the justified-true-belief analysis of knowledge to survive Gettier’s attack (albeit as a nonreductionist analysis of knowledge).
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  26. Sven Bernecker (2011). Keeping Track of the Gettier Problem. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):127-152.
    This paper argues that for someone to know proposition p inferentially it is not enough that his belief in p and his justification for believing p covary with the truth of p through a sphere of possibilities. A further condition on inferential knowledge is that p's truth-maker is identical with, or causally related to, the state of affairs the justification is grounded in. This position is dubbed ‘identificationism.’.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  27. Richard L. Kirkham (1984). Does the Gettier Problem Rest on a Mistake? Mind 93 (372):501-513.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  28.  87
    Scott Sturgeon (1993). The Gettier Problem. Analysis 53 (3):156-164.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  29.  99
    Richard Greene & N. A. Balmert (1997). Two Notions of Warrant and Plantinga’s Solution to the Gettier Problem. Analysis 57 (2):132–139.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  30. Richard Creath (1992). Induction and the Gettier Problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):401-404.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  98
    Adrian Heathcote (2006). Truthmaking and the Gettier Problem. In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Aspects of Knowing: Epistemological Essays. Elsevier Science 152--67.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  32.  31
    Earl Conee (1988). Why Solve the Gettier Problem? In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Kluwer Academic Publishers 55--58.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  33.  65
    Lukasz Lozanski (2007). The Gettier Problem. Philosophy Now 63:28-29.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  6
    Jacob Rosenthal (2003). On Lehrer'S Solution to the Gettier Problem. In Olsson Erik (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Kluwer 253--259.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  35.  40
    James Summerford (2000). Virtue Epistemology and the Gettier Problem. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2):343-353.
  36.  8
    Keith Lehrer (1979). The Gettier Problem and the Analysis of Knowledge. In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel 65--78.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  37.  5
    R. Greene & N. A. Balmert (1997). Two Notions of Warrant and Plantinga's Solution to the Gettier Problem. Analysis 57 (2):132-139.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  27
    Thomas Morawetz (1975). Skepticism, Induction and the Gettier Problem. Journal of Critical Analysis 6 (1):9-13.
  39.  5
    Bernd Buldt, Gettier-Problem.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40.  4
    Michael S. Pardo (2011). More on the Gettier Problem and Legal Proof. Legal Theory 17 (1):75-80.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  2
    That Knowledge Must Be Safe (2011). More on the Gettier Problem and Legal Proof: Unsafe Nonknowledge Does Not Mean. Legal Theory 17:75-80.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. J. J. Acero (2009). The Gettier Problem and the Demands of Inquiry. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (3).
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. A. J. Anwar (1997). Chisho'm's Solution of the Gettier Problem: An Inconsistency. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 24 (3):307-314.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. R. Borges, C. de Almeida & P. Klein (eds.) (forthcoming). Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem. Oxford University Press.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Juan José Acero Fernández (2009). The Gettier Problem and the Demands of Inquiry. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):49-64.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Shane Ryan (2014). Standard Gettier Cases: A Problem for Greco? Grazer Philosophische Studien 90.
    I argue that Greco’s handling of barn-façade cases is unsatisfactory as it is at odds with his treatment of standard Gettier cases. I contend that this is so as there is no salient feature of either type of case such that that feature provides a ground to grant, as Greco argues, that there is an exercising of ability in one type of case, standard Gettier cases, but not in the other, barn-façade cases. The result, I argue, is that (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2003). Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):304 - 327.
    Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: (1) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; (2) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  48. Azam Golam (2006). Some Reflections on Gettier's Problem. The Dhaka University Studies,June 2006 (1):83-97.
  49.  10
    Ian M. Church (2015). 50 Years of Gettier: A New Direction in Religious Epistemology? Journal of Analytic Theology 3:147-171.
    In this paper, I lend credence to the move toward non-reductive religious epistemology by highlighting the systematic failings of Alvin Plantinga’s seminal, religious epistemology when it comes to surmounting the Gettier Problem. Taking Plantinga’s account as archetypal, I argue that we have systematic reasons to believe that no reductive theory of knowledge (religious or otherwise) can viably surmount the Gettier Problem, that the future of religious epistemology lies in non-reductive models of knowledge.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50.  1
    Paul Weingartner (1996). A Note on Gettier's Problem. Philosophia Scientiae 1 (S1):221-231.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 1000