Search results for 'Gettier Problem' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Qilin Li, Quine’s Naturalized Epistemology, Epistemic Normativity and the Gettier Problem.score: 90.0
    In this paper, it is argued that there are (at least) two different kinds of ‘epistemic normativity’ in epistemology, which can be scrutinized and revealed by some comparison with some naturalistic studies of ethics. The first kind of epistemic normativity can be naturalized, but the other not. The doctrines of Quine’s naturalized epistemology is firstly introduced; then Kim’s critique of Quine’s proposal is examined. It is argued that Quine’s naturalized epistemology is able to save some room for the concept of (...)
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  2. Brent G. Kyle (2013). Knowledge as a Thick Concept: Explaining Why the Gettier Problem Arises. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):1-27.score: 90.0
    The Gettier problem has stymied epistemologists. But, whether or not this problem is resolvable, we still must face an important question: Why does the Gettier problem arise in the first place? So far, philosophers have seen it as either a problem peculiar to the concept of knowledge, or else an instance of a general problem about conceptual analysis. But I would like to steer a middle course. I argue that the Gettier (...) arises because knowledge is a thick concept, and a Gettier-like problem is just what we should expect from attempts at analyzing a thick concept. Section 2 is devoted to establishing the controversial claim that knowledge is thick, and, in Sect. 3, I show that there is a general problem for analyzing thick concepts of which the Gettier problem is a special instance. I do not take a stand on whether the Gettier problem, or its general counterpart, is resolvable. My primary aim is to bring these problems into better focus. (shrink)
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  3. Ian M. Church (2013). Manifest Failure Failure: The Gettier Problem Revived. Philosophia 41 (1):171-177.score: 90.0
    If the history of the Gettier Problem has taught us anything, it is to be skeptical regarding purported solutions. Nevertheless, in “Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved” (2011), that is precisely what John Turri offers us. For nearly fifty years, epistemologists have been chasing a solution for the Gettier Problem but with little to no success. If Turri is right, if he has actually solved the Gettier Problem, then he has done something (...)
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  4. Qilin Li, Truth-Maker Theory and the Stopped Clock: Why Heathcote Fails to Solve the Gettier Problem.score: 78.0
    Adrian Heathcote has proposed a truth-making account of knowledge that combines traditional conditions of justified true belief with the truth-making condition, which would jointly provide us with the sufficient condition of knowledge, and this truth-maker account of knowledge in turn explains why a gettiered justified true belief fails to be regarded as a genuine instance of knowledge. In this paper, by the comparison of two different casual models that are illustrated by the thermometer and the clock respectively, however, it will (...)
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  5. Chad Vance (2014). Truthmaker Theory Does Not Solve The Gettier Problem. Ratio 26 (4).score: 66.0
    Truthmaker theory has become immensely popular in recent years. So, it is not surprising that we are beginning to see it put to work in other areas of philosophy. Recently, several philosophers have proposed that truthmaker theory is the key to solving the Gettier problem. Edmund Gettier demonstrated that the traditional analysis of knowledge (as justified, true belief) was unsatisfactory. The truthmaker solution proposes that knowledge is a justified, true belief, where the source of one's justification is (...)
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  6. Allan Hazlett, A Gricean Approach to the Gettier Problem.score: 60.0
    David Lewis maintained that epistemological contextualism (on which the truth-conditions for utterances of “S knows p” change in different contexts depending on the salient “alternative possibilities”) could solve the problem of skepticism as well as the Gettier problem. Contextualist approaches to skepticism have become commonplace, if not orthodox, in epistemology. But not so for contextualist approaches to the Gettier problem: the standard approach to this has been to add an “anti-luck” condition to the analysis of (...)
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  7. B. Brogaard (2004). Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Gettier Problem. Synthese 139 (3):367 - 386.score: 60.0
    The contextualist epistemological theories proposed by David Lewis and othersoffer a view of knowledge which awards a central role to the contexts ofknowledge attributions. Such contexts are held to determine how strong anepistemic position must be in order to count as knowledge. Lewis has suggestedthat contextualism so construed can be used both to ward off the skeptic and tosolve the Gettier problem. A person knows P, he says, just in case her evidenceeliminates every possibility that not-P, where the (...)
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  8. John Turri (2011). Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (8).score: 60.0
    This paper provides a principled and elegant solution to the Gettier problem. The key move is to draw a general metaphysical distinction and conscript it for epistemological purposes. Section 1 introduces the Gettier problem. Sections 2–5 discuss instructively wrong or incomplete previous proposals. Section 6 presents my solution and explains its virtues. Section 7 answers the most common objection.
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  9. L. Floridi (2004). On the Logical Unsolvability of the Gettier Problem. Synthese 142 (1):61 - 79.score: 60.0
    The tripartite account of propositional, fallibilist knowledge that p as justified true belief can become adequate only if it can solve the Gettier Problem. However, the latter can be solved only if the problem of a successful coordination of the resources (at least truth and justification) necessary and sufficient to deliver propositional, fallibilist knowledge that p can be solved. In this paper, the coordination problem is proved to be insolvable by showing that it is equivalent to (...)
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  10. Timothy McGrew & Lydia McGrew (1998). Internalism and the Collapse of the Gettier Problem. Journal of Philosophical Research 23:239-256.score: 60.0
    On the “Russellian” solution to the Gettier problem, every Gettier case involves the implicit or explicit use of a false premise on the part of the subject. We distinguish between two senses of “justification” ---“legitimation” and “justification proper.” The former does not require true premises, but the latter does. We then argue that in Gettier cases the subject possesses “legitimation” but not “justification proper,” and we respond to many attempted counterexamples, including several variants of the Nogot (...)
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  11. S. Cohen (2011). The Gettier Problem in Informed Consent. Journal of Medical Ethics 37 (11):642-645.score: 60.0
    The duty to procure informed consent (IC) from patients before any significant intervention is among the pillars of medical and research ethics. The provision by the doctor of relevant information about treatment and free decision-making by the patient are essential elements of IC. The paper presents cases of IC where the free decision about treatment is not causally related to the information provided, and claims that such cases pose a difficulty parallel to that presented by the Gettier Problem (...)
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  12. Engel (2000). Intemalism, the Gettier Problem, and Metaepistemological Skepticism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 60:99-117.score: 60.0
    When it comes to second-order knowledge (i.e. knowing that one knows), internalists typically contend that when we know that p, we can, by reflecting, directly know that we are knowing it. Gettier considerations are employed to challenge this internalistic contention and to make out a prima facie case for internalistic metaepistemological skepticism, the thesis that no one ever intemalistically knows that one internalistically knows that p. In particular, I argue that at the metaepistemological second-order level, the Gettier (...) generates three distinct problems which, taken together, seriously undermine the possibility of anyone possessing second-order internalistic knowledge. (shrink)
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  13. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2003). Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):304 - 327.score: 54.0
    Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: (1) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; (2) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its (...)
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  14. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2000). Ist das Gettier-Problem wirklich ein Problem? Conceptus 33 (82):45-56.score: 54.0
    Viele Philosophen Glauben, daß die sogenannte „klassische” Definition des Wissens: -/- (W)Das Subjekt S weiß, daß p =Df. (i) S glaubt (ist überzeugt), daß p; (ii) S hat eine Begründung (eine epistemische Rechtferigung) für seine Überzeugung, daß p; und (iii) es ist der Fall, daß p. -/- durch das berühmte Gegenbeispiel Gettiers endgültig demoliert wurde: Gettier hat die folgende Situation konstruiert: -/- (G)(1) Das Subjekt S hat eine gute induktive Begründung für die Überzeugung, daß p. (2) S hat die (...)
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  15. Igor Douven (2005). A Contextualist Solution to the Gettier Problem. Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):207-228.score: 48.0
    According to the deontological view on justification, being justified in believing some proposition is a matter of having done one's epistemic duty with respect to that proposition. The present paper argues that, given a proper articulation of the deontological view, it is defensible that knowledge is justified true belief, pace virtually all epistemologists since Gettier. One important claim to be argued for is that once it is appreciated that it depends on contextual factors whether a person has done her (...)
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  16. Stephen Hetherington (2001). A Fallibilist and Wholly Internalist Solution to the Gettier Problem. Journal of Philosophical Research 26:307-324.score: 48.0
    How can a person avoid being Gettiered? This paper provides the first answer to that question that is both fallibilist and purely internalist. It is an answer that allows the justified-true-belief analysis of knowledge to survive Gettier’s attack (albeit as a nonreductionist analysis of knowledge).
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  17. Elijah Chudnoff (2011). What Should a Theory of Knowledge Do? Dialectica 65 (4):561-579.score: 45.0
    The Gettier Problem is the problem of revising the view that knowledge is justified true belief in a way that is immune to Gettier counter-examples. The “Gettier Problem problem”, according to Lycan, is the problem of saying what is misguided about trying to solve the Gettier Problem. In this paper I take up the Gettier Problem problem. I distinguish giving conditions that are necessary and sufficient for knowledge (...)
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  18. Richard L. Kirkham (1984). Does the Gettier Problem Rest on a Mistake? Mind 93 (372):501-513.score: 45.0
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  19. Sven Bernecker (2011). Keeping Track of the Gettier Problem. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):127-152.score: 45.0
    This paper argues that for someone to know proposition p inferentially it is not enough that his belief in p and his justification for believing p covary with the truth of p through a sphere of possibilities. A further condition on inferential knowledge is that p's truth-maker is identical with, or causally related to, the state of affairs the justification is grounded in. This position is dubbed ‘identificationism.’.
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  20. Adrian Heathcote (2006). Truthmaking and the Gettier Problem. In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Aspects of Knowing: Epistemological Essays. Elsevier Science. 152--67.score: 45.0
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  21. Richard Creath (1992). Induction and the Gettier Problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):401-404.score: 45.0
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  22. Scott Sturgeon (1993). &Quot;the Gettier Problem&Quot;. Analysis 53 (3):156-164.score: 45.0
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  23. Thomas Grundmann & Joachim Horvath (2013). Thought Experiments and the Problem of Deviant Realizations. Philosophical Studies:1-9.score: 45.0
    Descriptions of Gettier cases can be interpreted in ways that are incompatible with the standard judgment that they are cases of justified true belief without knowledge. Timothy Williamson claims that this problem cannot be avoided by adding further stipulations to the case descriptions. To the contrary, we argue that there is a fairly simple way to amend the Ford case, a standard description of a Gettier case, in such a manner that all deviant interpretations are ruled out. (...)
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  24. Don S. Levi (1995). The Gettier Problem and the Parable of the Ten Coins. Philosophy 70 (271):5 - 25.score: 45.0
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  25. Richard Greene & N. A. Balmert (1997). Two Notions of Warrant and Plantinga’s Solution to the Gettier Problem. Analysis 57 (2):132–139.score: 45.0
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  26. Lukasz Lozanski (2007). The Gettier Problem. Philosophy Now 63:28-29.score: 45.0
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  27. James Summerford (2000). Virtue Epistemology and the Gettier Problem. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2):343-353.score: 45.0
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  28. Thomas Morawetz (1975). Skepticism, Induction and the Gettier Problem. Journal of Critical Analysis 6 (1):9-13.score: 45.0
  29. Errol Lord (forthcoming). Epistemic Reasons, Evidence, and Defeaters. In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.score: 45.0
    The post-Gettier literature contained many views that tried to solve the Gettier problem by appealing to the notion of defeat. Unfortunately, all of these views are false. The failure of these views greatly contributed to a general distrust of reasons in epistemology. However, reasons are making a comeback in epistemology, both in general and in the context of the Gettier problem. There are two main aims of this paper. First, I will argue against a natural (...)
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  30. Earl Conee (1988). Why Solve the Gettier Problem?. In. In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Kluwer Academic Publishers. 55--58.score: 45.0
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  31. A. J. Anwar (1997). Chisho'm's Solution of the Gettier Problem: An Inconsistency. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 24:307-314.score: 45.0
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  32. Juan José Acero Fernández (2009). The Gettier Problem and the Demands of Inquiry. Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 28 (3):49-64.score: 45.0
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  33. Keith Lehrer (1979). The Gettier Problem and the Analysis of Knowledge. In. In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. 65--78.score: 45.0
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  34. William G. Lycan (2006). On the Gettier Problem Problem. In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. 148--168.score: 45.0
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  35. Michael S. Pardo (2011). More on the Gettier Problem and Legal Proof. Legal Theory 17 (1):75-80.score: 45.0
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  36. Michael S. Pardo (2010). The Gettier Problem and Legal Proof. Legal Theory 16 (1):37-57.score: 45.0
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  37. Jacob Rosenthal (2003). On Lehrer'S Solution to the Gettier Problem. In. In Olsson Erik (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Kluwer. 253--259.score: 45.0
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  38. That Knowledge Must Be Safe (2011). More on the Gettier Problem and Legal Proof: Unsafe Nonknowledge Does Not Mean. Legal Theory 17:75-80.score: 45.0
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  39. John Turri (2013). A Conspicuous Art: Putting Gettier to the Test. Philosophers' Imprint 13 (10).score: 42.0
    Professional philosophers say it’s obvious that a Gettier subject does not know. But experimental philosophers and psychologists have argued that laypeople and non-Westerners view Gettier subjects very differently, based on experiments where laypeople tend to ascribe knowledge to Gettier subjects. I argue that when effectively probed, laypeople and non-Westerners unambiguously agree that Gettier subjects do not know.
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  40. Luciano Floridi (2012). Semantic Information and the Network Theory of Account. Synthese 184 (3):431-454.score: 42.0
    The article addresses the problem of how semantic information can be upgraded to knowledge. The introductory section explains the technical terminology and the relevant background. Section 2 argues that, for semantic information to be upgraded to knowledge, it is necessary and sufficient to be embedded in a network of questions and answers that correctly accounts for it. Section 3 shows that an information flow network of type A fulfils such a requirement, by warranting that the erotetic deficit, characterising the (...)
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  41. Emerson Carlos Valcarenghi (2011). Os anulabilismos de Klein e de Swain e o problema de Gettier. Principia 14 (2):175-200.score: 42.0
    Nós tentamos mostrar neste ensaio que as propostas anulabilistas de Peter Klein e de Marshall Swain não resolvem o problema de Gettier. Klein postula que, para qualquer contra-exemplo de tipo-Gettier, há uma proposição verdadeira que, ao ser conjugada com a evidência e de S, anula de modo legítimo a justificação de p para S. Swain postula que, para qualquer contra-exemplo de tipo-Gettier, há uma proposição verdadeira que, ao ser conjugada com o conjunto de razões R de S, (...)
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  42. Tomas Bogardus (2013). The Problem of Contingency for Religious Belief. Faith and Philosophy 30 (4):371-392.score: 39.0
  43. S. O. Welding (2004). Die Differenz Von Meinung Und Wissen. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 35 (1):147-155.score: 37.0
    The Difference between Belief and Knowledge. The assumption that knowledge can be defined in terms of belief is considered to be mistaken. Since Gettier problems are shown to be misconstrued, the question cannot arise whether his conditions for knowledge are sufficient for claiming ``knowledge is justified true belief''. Ayers' conditions for knowledge in addition with a specific stipulation proof to be instructive for elaborating the differences between knowledge and belief.
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  44. Paul Weingartner (1996). A Note on Gettier's Problem. Philosophia Scientiae 1 (S1):221-231.score: 36.0
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  45. Stephen Hetherington, Gettier Problems. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 34.0
    Gettier problems or cases are named in honor of the American philosopher Edmund Gettier, who discovered them in 1963. They function as challenges to the philosophical tradition of defining knowledge of a proposition as justified true belief in that proposition. The problems are actual or possible situations in which someone has a belief that is both true and well supported by evidence, yet which — according to almost all epistemologists — fails to be knowledge. Gettier’s original article (...)
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  46. John Turri (2012). Is Knowledge Justified True Belief? Synthese 184 (3):247-259.score: 33.0
    Is knowledge justified true belief? Most philosophers believe that the answer is clearly ‘no’, as demonstrated by Gettier cases. But Gettier cases don’t obviously refute the traditional view that knowledge is justified true belief (JTB). There are ways of resisting Gettier cases, at least one of which is partly successful. Nevertheless, when properly understood, Gettier cases point to a flaw in JTB, though it takes some work to appreciate just what it is. The nature of the (...)
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  47. Hamid Seyedsayamdost, On Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions: Failure of Replication.score: 33.0
    In one of the earlier influential papers in the field of experimental philosophy titled Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions published in 2001, Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich reported that respondents answered Gettier type questions differently depending on their ethnic background as well as socioeconomic status. There is currently a debate going on, on the significance of the results of Weinberg et al. (2001) and its implications for philosophical methodology in general and epistemology in specific. Despite the debates, (...)
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  48. Guy Axtell (2001). Epistemic Luck in Light of the Virtues. In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. 158--177.score: 33.0
    The presence of luck in our cognitive as in our moral lives shows that the quality of our intellectual character may not be entirely up to us as individuals, and that our motivation and even our ability to desire the truth, like our moral goodness, can be fragile. This paper uses epistemologists'responses to the problem of “epistemic luck” as a sounding board and locates the source of some of their deepest disagreements in divergent, value-charged “interests in explanation,” which epistemologists (...)
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  49. Susanne Mantel (2013). Acting for Reasons, Apt Action, and Knowledge. Synthese 190 (17):3865-3888.score: 33.0
    I argue for the view that there are important similarities between knowledge and acting for a normative reason. I interpret acting for a normative reason in terms of Sosa’s notion of an apt performance. Actions that are done for a normative reason are normatively apt actions. They are in accordance with a normative reason because of a competence to act in accordance with normative reasons. I argue that, if Sosa’s account of knowledge as apt belief is correct, this means that (...)
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  50. Mark Walker (2002). The Fourfold Root of Philosophical Skepticism. Sorites 14 (1):85-109.score: 33.0
    Knowledge may be defined in terms of four necessary conditions: belief, justification, truth and gettier. I argue that a form of philosophical skepticism may be raised with respect to each.
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