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Profile: Gideon Elford (Oxford University)
  1. Gideon Elford (forthcoming). Pains of Perseverance: Agent-Centred Prerogatives, Burdens and the Limits of Human Motivation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-14.
    An important question in recent work in political philosophy concerns whether facts about individuals’ motivational deficiencies are facts to which principles of justice are sensitive. In this context, David Estlund has recently argued that the difficulties individuals’ face in motivating themselves to act do not affect the content of normative principles that apply to them. Against Estlund, the paper argues that in principle the motivational difficulties individuals face can affect the content of normative principles that apply to them. This argument (...)
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  2. Gideon Elford (2013). Equality of Opportunity and Other-Affecting Choice: Why Luck Egalitarianism Does Not Require Brute Luck Equality. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):139-149.
    The luck egalitarian view famously maintains that inequalities in individuals’ circumstances are unfair or unjust, whereas inequalities traceable to individuals’ own responsible choices are fair or just. On this basis, the distinction between so-called brute luck and option luck has been seen as central to luck egalitarianism. Luck egalitarianism is interpreted, by advocates and opponents alike, as a view that condemns inequalities in brute luck but permits inequalities in option luck. It is also thought to be expressed in terms of (...)
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  3. Gideon Elford (2012). Equality of Status and Distributive Equality. Journal of Value Inquiry 46 (3):353-367.
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  4. Gideon Elford (2012). Men Who Would Be Kings. Social Theory and Practice 38 (2):193-212.
    The luck egalitarian view famously maintains that inequalities in individuals' circumstances are unfair, whereas inequalities traceable to individuals' own responsible choices are fair. There is, however, an important question about the inequality justifying power of responsible choice where choices are made in circumstances of existing unfair inequality. This paper considers a luck egalitarian answer to this question which holds that individuals are fairly held liable for disadvantages resulting from their choices unless that disadvantage would have been avoided under circumstances of (...)
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