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Profile: Gila Sher (University of California, San Diego)
  1. Gila Sher, Truth as Composite Correspondence.
    The problem that motivates me arises from a constellation of factors pulling in different, sometimes opposing directions. Simplifying, they are: (1) The complexity of the world; (2) Humans’ ambitious project of theoretical knowledge of the world; (3) The severe limitations of humans’ cognitive capacities; (4) The considerable intricacy of humans’ cognitive capacities . Given these circumstances, the question arises whether a serious notion of truth is applicable to human theories of the world. In particular, I am interested in the questions: (...)
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  2. Gila Sher (2013). Forms of Correspondence: The Intricate Route From Thought to Reality. In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press. 157--179.
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  3. Gila Sher (2013). The Foundational Problem of Logic. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 19 (2):145-198.
    The construction of a systematic philosophical foundation for logic is a notoriously difficult problem. In Part One I suggest that the problem is in large part methodological, having to do with the common philosophical conception of “providing a foundation”. I offer an alternative to the common methodology which combines a strong foundational requirement (veridical justification) with the use of non-traditional, holistic tools to achieve this result. In Part Two I delineate an outline of a foundation for logic, employing the new (...)
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  4. Gila Sher (2011). Is Logic in the Mind or in the World? Synthese 181 (2):353 - 365.
    The paper presents an outline of a unified answer to five questions concerning logic: (1) Is logic in the mind or in the world? (2) Does logic need a foundation? What is the main obstacle to a foundation for logic? Can it be overcome? (3) How does logic work? What does logical form represent? Are logical constants referential? (4) Is there a criterion of logicality? (5) What is the relation between logic and mathematics?
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  5. Gila Sher (2010). Epistemic Friction: Reflections on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 72 (2):151 - 176.
    Knowledge requires both freedom and friction . Freedom to set up our epistemic goals, choose the subject matter of our investigations, espouse cognitive norms, design research programs, etc., and friction (constraint) coming from two directions: the object or target of our investigation, i.e., the world in a broad sense, and our mind as the sum total of constraints involving the knower. My goal is to investigate the problem of epistemic friction, the relation between epistemic friction and freedom, the viability of (...)
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  6. Gila Sher (2010). Quantifiers in Language and Logic. Journal of Philosophy 107 (2):103-112.
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  7. Gila Sher (2010). Review of Stanley Peters and Dag Westerståhl: Quantifiers in Language and Logic. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 107 (2).
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  8. Gila Sher (2009). Book Review: Jody Azzouni. Tracking Reason: Proof, Consequence, and Truth. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 50 (1):97-117.
  9. Gila Sher (2008). Of the Association for Symbolic Logic. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 14 (3).
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  10. Gila Sher (2008). Tarski's Thesis. In Douglas Patterson (ed.), New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 300--339.
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  11. Gila Sher (2007). Review of Robert Hanna, Rationality and Logic. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (4).
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  12. Gila Sher & Cory D. Wright (2007). Truth as a Normative Modality of Cognitive Acts. In Geo Siegwart & Dirk Griemann (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language. Routledge. 5--280.
    Attention to the conversational role of alethic terms seems to dominate, and even sometimes exhaust, many contemporary analyses of the nature of truth. Yet, because truth plays a role in judgment and assertion regardless of whether alethic terms are expressly used, such analyses cannot be comprehensive or fully adequate. A more general analysis of the nature of truth is therefore required – one which continues to explain the significance of truth independently of the role alethic terms play in discourse. We (...)
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  13. Gila Sher (2005). Functional Pluralism. Philosophical Books 46 (4):311-330.
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  14. Gila Sher (2004). In Search of a Substantive Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophy 101 (1):5 - 36.
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  15. Gila Sher (2003). A Characterization of Logical Constants is Possible. Theoria 18 (2):189-198.
    The paper argues that a philosophically informative and mathematically precise characterization is possible by (i) describing a particular proposal for such a characterization, (ii) showing that certain criticisms of this proposal are incorrect, and (iii) discussing the general issue of what a characterization of logical constants aims at achieving.
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  16. Gila Sher (2002). Logical Consequence. The Monist 85 (4):555-579.
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  17. Gila Sher (2001). Johannes L. Brandl and Peter Sullivan (Eds) New Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Dummett. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):185-189.
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  18. Gila Sher (2001). The Formal-Structural View of Logical Consequence. Philosophical Review 110 (2):241-261.
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  19. Gila Sher (2001). Truth, Logical Structure, and Compositionality. Synthese 126 (1-2):195 - 219.
    In this paper I examine a cluster of concepts relevant to the methodology of truth theories: ‘informative definition’, ‘recursive method’, ‘semantic structure’, ‘logical form’, ‘compositionality’, etc. The interrelations between these concepts, I will try to show, are more intricate and multi-dimensional than commonly assumed.
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  20. Gila Sher & Richard L. Tieszen (eds.) (2000). Between Logic and Intuition: Essays in Honor of Charles Parsons. Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of new essays offers a 'state-of-the-art' conspectus of major trends in the philosophy of logic and philosophy of mathematics. A distinguished group of philosophers addresses issues at the centre of contemporary debate: semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes, the set/class distinction, foundations of set theory, mathematical intuition and many others. The volume includes Hilary Putnam's 1995 Alfred Tarski lectures, published here for the first time.
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  21. Gila Sher (1999). Is Logic a Theory of the Obvious. European Review of Philosophy 4:207-238.
     
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  22. Gila Sher (1999). Is There a Place for Philosophy in Quine's Theory? Journal of Philosophy 96 (10):491-524.
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  23. Gila Sher (1999). What is Tarski's Theory of Truth? Topoi 18 (2):149-166.
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  24. Gila Sher (1998). On the Possibility of a Substantive Theory of Truth. Synthese 117 (1):133-172.
    The paper offers a new analysis of the difficulties involved in the construction of a general and substantive correspondence theory of truth and delineates a solution to these difficulties in the form of a new methodology. The central argument is inspired by Kant, and the proposed methodology is explained and justified both in general philosophical terms and by reference to a particular variant of Tarski's theory. The paper begins with general considerations on truth and correspondence and concludes with a brief (...)
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  25. Gila Sher & Moshe Machover (1994). The Bounds of Logic: A Generalized Viewpoint. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (4):1078-1083.
     
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  26. Gila Sher (1990). Ways of Branching Quantifers. Linguistics and Philosophy 13 (4):393 - 422.
    Branching quantifiers were first introduced by L. Henkin in his 1959 paper ‘Some Remarks on Infmitely Long Formulas’. By ‘branching quantifiers’ Henkin meant a new, non-linearly structured quantiiier-prefix whose discovery was triggered by the problem of interpreting infinitistic formulas of a certain form} The branching (or partially-ordered) quantifier-prefix is, however, not essentially infinitistic, and the issues it raises have largely been discussed in the literature in the context of finitistic logic, as they will be here. Our discussion transcends, however, the (...)
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  27. Gila Sher (1989). A Conception of Tarskian Logic. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (4):341-368.
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