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Gilbert Harman [194]Gilbert H. Harman [15]
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Profile: Gilbert Harman (Princeton University)
  1. Gilbert Harman, Explaining an Explanatory Gap.
    Discussions of the mind-body problem often refer to an.
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  2. Gilbert Harman, Impossible Worlds and Knowledge of Necessary Truths.
    I propose that safety and sensitivity conditionals may be used to explain the reliability of beliefs in necessary truths, by appeal to a non-standard semantics for counterfactuals with impossible antecedents and necessarily true consequents.
     
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  3. Gilbert Harman, What is Cognitive Access?
    Block is concerned with the question whether there are cases of phenomenology in the absence of cognitive access. I assume that, more precisely, the question is whether there are cases in which a subject S has a phenomenological experience E to which S does not have direct cognitive access? (S might have indirect cognitive access to E through scientific reasoning. I take it that’s not the sort of cognitive access in question.).
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  4. Gilbert Harman & Erica Roedder, Moral Grammar.
    The approach to generative grammar originating with Chomsky (1957) has been enormously successful within linguistics. Seeing such success, one wonders whether a similar approach might help us understand other human domains besides language. One such domain is morality. Could there be universal generative moral grammar? More specifically, might it be useful to moral theory to develop an explicit generative account of parts of particular moralities in the way it has proved useful to linguistics to produce generative grammars for parts of (...)
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  5. Gilbert Harman, Models in the Mind.
    How do people reason about the what follows from certain assumptions? How do they think about implications between statements. According to one theory, people try to use a small number of mental rules of inference to construct an argument for or proof of a relevant conclusion from the assumptions (e.g., Rips 1994). According to a competing theory, people construct one or more mental models of the situation described in the assumptions and try to determine what conclusion fits with the model (...)
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  6. Gilbert Harman, Moral Relativism.
    According to moral relativism, there is not a single true morality. There are a variety of possible moralities or moral frames of reference, and whether something is morally right or wrong, good or bad, just or unjust, etc. is a relative matter—relative to one or another morality or moral frame of reference. Something can be morally right relative to one moral frame of reference and morally wrong relative to another. It is useful to compare moral relativism to other relativisms. One (...)
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  7. Gilbert Harman, Moral Relativism Explained.
    According to moral relativism, there is not a single true morality. There are a variety of possible moralities or moral frames of reference, and whether something is morally right or wrong, good or bad, just or unjust, etc. is a relative matter—relative to one or another morality or moral frame of reference. Something can be morally right relative to one moral frame of reference and morally wrong relative to another. It is useful to compare moral relativism to other kinds of (...)
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  8. Gilbert Harman, Review of Christopher Peacocke, the Realm of Reason. [REVIEW]
    Peacocke argues that all epistemic entitlements depend at bottom on a priori entitlements, determined by "constitutive conditions" for the application of concepts. He does not address familiar doubts about the distinction between constitutive and nonconstitutive conditions of application. (These doubts are based on the widely accepted idea that justification begins with all of one's current beliefs and methods and seeks to modify these only to improve their overall coherence with each other, hoping ultimately for "reflective equilibrium.") In addition, Peacocke conflates (...)
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  9. Sanjeev R. Kulkarni & Gilbert Harman, Statistical Learning Theory: A Tutorial.
    In this article, we provide a tutorial overview of some aspects of statistical learning theory, which also goes by other names such as statistical pattern recognition, nonparametric classification and estimation, and supervised learning. We focus on the problem of two-class pattern classification for various reasons. This problem is rich enough to capture many of the interesting aspects that are present in the cases of more than two classes and in the problem of estimation, and many of the results can be (...)
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  10. Gilbert Harman, Epistemology as Methodology.
    What is distinctive about my views in epistemology? One thing is that my concern with epistemology is a concern with methodology. Furthermore, I reject psychologism about logic and reject the idea that deductive rules like modus ponens are in any way rules of inference. I accept a kind of methodological conservatism and reject methodological theories that appeal to special foundations, analytic truth, or a priori justification. Although I believe that there are significant practical aspects of theoretical reasoning, I reject the (...)
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  11. Gilbert Harman, More on Explaining a Gap.
    In (Harman 2007) I argued “that a purely objective account of conscious experience cannot always by itself give an understanding of what it is like to have that experience.” Following Nagel (1974), I suggested that such a gap “has no obvious metaphysical implications. It [merely] reflects the distinction between two kinds of understanding,” objective and subjective, where subjective understanding or “Das Verstehen” (Dilthey 1883/1989) of another creature’s experience involves knowing what it is like to have that experience—knowing what sort of (...)
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  12. Gilbert Harman, Naturalism in Moral Philosophy.
    For philosophical naturalism, as I understand it, philosophy is continuous with natural science. It takes the methods of philosophy to be continuous with those of the natural sciences and is sceptical of allegedly apriori intuitions which it claims need to be tested against one’s other beliefs and, ideally, against the world.
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  13. Gilbert Harman, Notes on Practical Reasoning.
    In these notes, I will use the word “reasoning” to refer to something people do. The general category includes both internal reasoning, reasoning things out by oneself—inference and deliberation—and external reasoning with others—arguing, discussing and negotiating.
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  14. Gilbert Harman, Online Versions of Recently Published Work.
    "What Is Cognitive Access?" PDF. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (2007 [published 2008]): 505. Brief comments on a paper of Ned Block's. "Mechanical Mind," a review of Mind as Machine: A History of Cognitive Science by Margaret Boden. Online Published Version . From American Scientist (2008): 76-81.
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  15. Gilbert Harman, Physical Science and Common-Sense Psychology.
    Scott Sehon argues for a complex view about the relation between commonsense psychology and the physical sciences.1 He rejects any sort of Cartesian dualism and believes that the common-sense psychological facts supervene on the physical facts. Nevertheless he asserts that there is an important respect in which common-sense psychology is independent of the physical sciences. Despite supervenience, we are not to expect any sort of reduction of common-sense psychology to physical science, nor are we to expect the physical sciences to (...)
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  16. Gilbert Harman, Quine's Semantic Relativity.
    Philosophers sometimes approach meaning metaphorically, for example, by speaking of “grasping” meanings, as if understanding consists in getting mental hands around something.1 Philosophers say that a theory of meaning should be a theory about the meanings that people assign to expressions in their language, that to understand other people requires identifying the meanings they associate with what they are saying, and that to translate an expression of another language into your own is to find an expression in your language with (...)
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  17. Gilbert Harman, Response to Hawthorne.
    Hawthorne discusses (without endorsing) the following instance of our (T1) , “One knows that one is seeing a desk by taking for granted, but without knowing, that one is not a brain in a vat” (510). We believe that this is a commonsensical way of describing an ordinary situation. Intuitively, one knows one is seeing a desk. Intuitively one is normally justified in taking it for granted that one is not a brain in a vat, but one does not know (...)
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  18. Gilbert Harman, Stroud's Carnap.
    According to the “received view” of Rudolf Carnap’s philosophy, he attempted (and failed) to establish phenomenalistic foundations for science and wielded the verificationist criterion of cognitive significance against traditional metaphysics, religion and values. This characterization of Carnap’s philosophy has come to us primarily through A. J. Ayer’s introduction of positivism to the English-speaking world in his Language, Truth and Logic1 and the preliminary sketches of positivistic doctrine with which many of W.V. Quine’s essays begin (and go on, inevitably, to repudiate).2 (...)
     
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  19. Gilbert Harman, The Explanatory Role of Being Rational.
    Humeans hold that actions are movements of an agent's body that are suitably caused by a desire that things be a certain way and a belief on the agent's behalf that something she can just do, namely perform a movement of her body of the kind to be explained, has some suitable chance of making things that way (Davidson 1963). Movements of the body that are caused in some other way aren't actions, but are rather things that merely happen to (...)
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  20. Gilbert Harman, Using a Linguistic Analogy to Study Morality.
    In his elegant discussion, Sripada distinguishes three possible innate bases for aspects of morality: (1) certain specific principles might be innate, (2) a less simple “principles and parameters” model might apply, and (3) innate biases might have have some influence over what morality a person acquires without determining the content of that morality.1 He argues against (1) and (2) and in favor of (3). Without disputing his case for (3) I will try to say why I think that his arguments (...)
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  21. Gilbert Harman, Words and Pictures in Reports of Fmri Research.
    This is indeed a fallacy, if the relevant sort of consistency is logical consistency. However, the expression “is consistent with” is often used by scientists to mean something much stronger, something like confirms or even strongly confirms.
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  22. Gilbert Harman & Sanjeev Kulkarni, Statistical Learning Theory as a Framework for the Philosophy of Induction.
    Statistical Learning Theory (e.g., Hastie et al., 2001; Vapnik, 1998, 2000, 2006) is the basic theory behind contemporary machine learning and data-mining. We suggest that the theory provides an excellent framework for philosophical thinking about inductive inference.
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  23. Gilbert Harman & Erica Roedder, Moral Theory: The Linguistic Analogy.
    Analogies are often theoretically useful. Important principles of electricity are suggested by an analogy between water current flowing through a pipe and electrical current “flowing” through a wire. A basic theory of sound is suggested by an analogy between waves caused by a stone being dropped into a still lake and “sound waves” caused by a disturbance in air.
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  24. Gilbert Harman (forthcoming). About What an Adequate Grammar Could Do. Foundations of Language.
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  25. Gilbert Harman (forthcoming). Logical Form. Foundations of Language.
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  26. Gilbert Harman (forthcoming). Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism. Journal of Philosophy.
    Putnam rejects "metaphysical realism," which takes "the world" to be a single complex thing, a connected causal or explanatory order into which all facts fit. he argues that such metaphysical realism is responsible for views he finds implausible; in particular, it can lead to moral relativism when one tries to locate the place of value in the world of fact. i agree that metaphysical realism will lead a thoughtful philosopher to moral relativism, but find neither of these views implausible. in (...)
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  27. Gilbert Harman (forthcoming). Moral Relativism is Moral Realism. Philosophical Studies:1-9.
    I begin by describing my relation with Nicholas Sturgeon and his objections to things I have said about moral explanations. Then I turn to issues about moral relativism. One of these is whether a plausible version of moral relativism can be formulated as a claim about the logical form of certain moral judgments. I (now) agree that is not a good way to think of moral relativism. Instead, I think of moral relativism as a version of moral realism. I compare (...)
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  28. Gilbert Harman & Ernest Lepore (eds.) (2014). A Companion to W. V. O. Quine. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  29. Gilbert Harman (2013). Glüer, Kathrin., Donald Davidson: A Short Introduction. Review of Metaphysics 67 (1):162-164.
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  30. Gilbert Harman (2013). Skepticism & the Definition of Knowledge. Routledge.
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  31. Gilbert Harman (2012). Davidson's Contribution to the Philosophy of Language. In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental. Oxford University Press.
    The most basic theme in Davidson’s writings in philosophy of language in the 1960s is that we are finite beings whose mastery of the indefinitely many expressions of our language must somehow arise out of our mastery of finite resources. Otherwise, there would be an unbounded number of distinct things to learn in learning a language, which would make language learning..
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  32. Gilbert Harman (2012). Philosophy of Language. In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental. Oxford University Press. 39.
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  33. Gilbert Harman (2011). Judith Jarvis Thomson's Normativity. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 154 (3):435 - 441.
    Judith Jarvis Thomson’s Normativity Content Type Journal Article Pages 435-441 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9737-y Authors Gilbert Harman, Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, 1879 Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116 Journal Volume Volume 154 Journal Issue Volume 154, Number 3.
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  34. Gilbert Harman (2011). Review of Ernest Lepore and Kirk Ludwig, Donald Davidson's Truth-Theoretic Semantics. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):788-792.
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  35. Gilbert Harman (2011). Review of Piotr Stalmaszczyk (Ed.), Philosophy of Language and Linguistics, Volume 1: The Formal Turn; Volume 2: The Philosophical Turn. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (2).
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  36. Brett Sherman & Gilbert Harman (2011). Knowledge and Assumptions. Philosophical Studies 156 (1):131--140.
    Knowledge and assumptions Content Type Journal Article Pages 131-140 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9797-z Authors Brett Sherman, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA, USA Gilbert Harman, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116 Journal Volume Volume 156 Journal Issue Volume 156, Number 1.
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  37. Gilbert Harman, Kelby Mason & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2010). Moral Reasoning. In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press.
    What is moral reasoning? For that matter, what is any sort of reasoning? Let me begin by making a few distinctions. First, there is a distinction between reasoning as something that that people do and the abstract structures of proof or “argument” that are the subject matter of formal logic. I will be mainly concerned with reasoning in the first sense, reasoning that people do. Second, there is a distinction between moral reasoning with other people and moral reasoning by and (...)
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  38. W. Merritt Maria, M. Doris John & Gilbert Harman (2010). Character. In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press.
  39. Maria Merritt, John Doris & Gilbert Harman (2010). Character. In John Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press.
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  40. Erica Roedder & Gilbert Harman (2010). Linguistics and Moral Theory. In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press.
  41. Gilbert Harman (2009). Field on the Normative Role of Logic. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):333 - 335.
    I begin by summarizing the first two chapters of (Harman 1986). The first chapter stresses the importance of not confusing inference with implication and of not confusing reasoning with the sort of argument studied in deductive logic. Inference and reasoning are psychological events or processes that can be done more or less well. The sort of implication and argument studied in deductive logic have to do with relations among propositions and with structures of propositions distinguished into premises, intermediate steps, and (...)
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  42. Gilbert Harman (2009). Guilt-Free Morality. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:203-14.
    Here are some of the ways in which some philosophers and psychologists have taken the emotion of guilt to be essential to morality. One relatively central idea is that guilt feelings are warranted if an agent knows that he or she has acted morally wrongly. It might be said that in such a case the agent has a strong reason to feel guilt, that the agent ought to have guilt feelings, that the agent is justified in having guilt feelings and (...)
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  43. Gilbert Harman (2009). Skepticism About Character Traits. Journal of Ethics 13 (2/3):235 - 242.
    The first part of this article discusses recent skepticism about character traits. The second describes various forms of virtue ethics as reactions to such skepticism. The philosopher J.-P. Sartre argued in the 1940s that character traits are pretenses, a view that the sociologist E. Goffman elaborated in the 1950s. Since then social psychologists have shown that attributions of character traits tend to be inaccurate through the ignoring of situational factors. (Personality psychology has tended to concentrate on people's conceptions of personality (...)
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  44. Gilbert Harman & Sanjeev Kulkarni (2009). Précis of Reliable Reasoning: Induction and Statistical Learning Theory. Abstracta 5 (3):5-9.
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  45. Gilbert Harman & Sanjeev Kulkarni (2009). Response to Shaffer, Thagard, Strevens and Hanson. Abstracta 5 (3):47-56.
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  46. Gilbert Harman (2008). Part I: Foundations of Reasoning. In Jonathan Eric Adler & Lance J. Rips (eds.), Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations. Cambridge University Press. 35.
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  47. Gilbert Harman (2008). Thought, Selections. In Ernest Sosa (ed.), Epistemology: An Anthology. Blackwell Pub.. 194.
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  48. Mark Greenberg & Gilbert Harman (2007). Conceptual Role Semantics. In Ernest LePore & Barry Smith (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press. 242-256.
    CRS says that the meanings of expressions of a language or other symbol system or the contents of mental states are determined and explained by the way symbols are used in thinking. According to CRS one.
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  49. Gilbert Harman (2007). Epistemic Contextualism as a Theory of Primary Speaker Meaning. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):173–179.
    Jason Stanley’s Knowledge and Practical Interests is a brilliant book, combining insights about knowledge with a careful examination of how recent views in epistemology fit with the best of recent linguistic semanties. Although I am largely convinced by Stanley’s objections to epistemic contextualism, I will try in what follows to formulate aversion that might have some prospect of escaping his powerful critique.
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