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  1. Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé (2008). The Budget-Voting Paradox. Theory and Decision 64 (4):447-478.
    The budget-voting paradox states that, when social alternatives are proper subsets of a finite set of decisions, choosing decision-wise according to the majority rule may select an alternative that is covered in the majority tournament among alternatives. Individual preferences are defined on single decisions, and are extended to preferences over the alternative set by means of a preference extension rule. We prove the existence of the paradox for any rank-based, monotone, and independent extension rule.
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  2. Gilbert Laffond (2000). Majority Voting on Orders. Theory and Decision 49 (3):249-287.
    We characterize two lexicographic-type preference extension rules from a set X to the set ? of all orders on this set. Elements of X are interpreted as basic economic policy decisions, whereas elements of ? are conceived as political programs among which a collectivity has to choose through majority voting. The main axiom is called tournament-consistency, and states that whenever majority pairwise comparisons based on initial preferences on X define an order on X, then this order is also chosen by (...)
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  3. Gilbert Laffond, Jean-François Laslier & Michel Le Breton (2000). K–Player Additive Extension of Two-Player Games with an Application to the Borda Electoral Competition Game. Theory and Decision 48 (2):129-137.
    In this note we introduce the notion of K–player additive extension of a symmetric two-player game and prove a result relating the equilibria in mixed strategies in the two games. Then we apply the result to the Borda electoral competition game.
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  4. Gilbert Laffond, Jean-François Laslier & Michel Le Breton (2000). K–Player Additive Extension of Two-Player Games with an Application to the Borda Electoral Competition Game. Theory and Decision 48 (2):129-137.
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  5. Gilbert Laffond & Jean Laine (1994). Weak Covering Relations. Theory and Decision 37 (3):245-265.
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