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Margaret Gilbert [60]Margaret P. Gilbert [19]
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Profile: Margaret Gilbert (University of California, Irvine)
Profile: Margaret Gilbert (University of California, Irvine)
Profile: Margaret Patricia Gilbert (University of California, Irvine)
  1.  26
    Margaret Gilbert (1989). On Social Facts. Routledge.
    This book offers original accounts of a number of central social phenomena, many of which have received little if any prior philosophical attention. These phenomena include social groups, group languages, acting together, collective belief, mutual recognition, and social convention. In the course of developing her analyses Gilbert discusses the work of Emile Durkheim, Georg Simmel, Max Weber, David Lewis, among others.
  2.  4
    Margaret Gilbert (2000). Sociality and Responsibility: New Essays in Plural Subject Theory. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    One of the most distinguished living social philosophers, Margaret Gilbert develops and extends her application of plural subject theory of human sociality, first introduced in her earlier works On Social Facts and Living Together. Sociality and Responsibility presents an extended discussion of her proposal that joint commitments inherently involve obligations and rights, proposing, in effect, a new theory of obligations and rights. In addition, it demonstrates the extensive range and fruitfulness of plural subject theory by presenting accounts of social rules, (...)
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  3.  20
    Margaret Gilbert (2006). A Theory of Political Obligation: Membership, Commitment, and the Bonds of Society. OUP Oxford.
    Margaret Gilbert offers an incisive new approach to a classic problem of political philosophy: when and why should I do what the law tells me to do? Do I have special obligations to conform to the laws of my own country and if so, why? In what sense, if any, must I fight in wars in which my country is engaged, if ordered to do so, or suffer the penalty for law-breaking the law imposes - including the death penalty? Gilbert's (...)
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  4. Margaret P. Gilbert (2004). Collective Epistemology. Episteme 1 (2):95--107.
    This paper introduces the author's approach to everyday ascriptions of collective cognitive states as in such statements as we believe he is lying. Collective epistemology deals with these ascriptions attempting to understand them and the phenomena in question.
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  5. Margaret Gilbert (2009). Shared Intention and Personal Intentions. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):167 - 187.
    This article explores the question: what is it for two or more people to intend to do something in the future? In a technical phrase, what is it for people to share an intention ? Extending and refining earlier work of the author’s, it argues for three criteria of adequacy for an account of shared intention (the disjunction, concurrence, and obligation criteria) and offers an account that satisfies them. According to this account, in technical terms explained in the paper, people (...)
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  6.  55
    Margaret Gilbert & Daniel Pilchman (2014). Belief, Acceptance, and What Happens in Groups. In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology. Oxford University Press
    This paper argues for a methodological point that bears on a relatively long-standing debate concerning collective beliefs in the sense elaborated by Margaret Gilbert: are they cases of belief or rather of acceptance? It is argued that epistemological accounts and distinctions developed in individual epistemology on the basis of considering the individual case are not necessarily applicable to the collective case or, more generally, uncritically to be adopted in collective epistemology.
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  7.  95
    Margaret Gilbert (1987). Modelling Collective Belief. Synthese 73 (1):185-204.
    What is it for a group to believe something? A summative account assumes that for a group to believe that p most members of the group must believe that p. Accounts of this type are commonly proposed in interpretation of everyday ascriptions of beliefs to groups. I argue that a nonsummative account corresponds better to our unexamined understanding of such ascriptions. In particular I propose what I refer to as the joint acceptance model of group belief. I argue that group (...)
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  8. Margaret P. Gilbert (1990). Walking Together: A Paradigmatic Social Phenomenon. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):1-14.
    The everyday concept of a social group is approached by examining the concept of going for a walk together, an example of doing something together, or "shared action". Two analyses requiring shared personal goals are rejected, since they fail to explain how people walking together have obligations and rights to appropriate behavior, and corresponding rights of rebuke. An alternative account is proposed: those who walk together must constitute the "plural subject" of a goal (roughly, their walking alongside each other). The (...)
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  9. Margaret P. Gilbert (2009). Obligation and Joint Commitment. Utilitas 11 (02):143-.
    I argue that obligations of an important type inhere in what I call 'joint commitments'. I propose a joint commitment account of everyday agreements. This could explain why some philosophers believe that we know of the obligating nature of agreements a priori. I compare and contrast obligations of joint commitment with obligations in the relatively narrow sense recommended by H. L. A. Hart, a recommendation that has been influential. Some central contexts in which Hart takes there to be obligations in (...)
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  10.  44
    Margaret Gilbert (1993). Agreements, Coercion, and Obligation. Ethics 103 (4):679-706.
    Typical agreements can be seen as joint decisions, inherently involving obligations of a distinctive kind. These obligations derive from the joint commitment' that underlies a joint decision. One consequence of this understanding of agreements and their obligations is that coerced agreements are possible and impose obligations. It is not that the parties to an agreement should always conform to it, all things considered. Unless one is released from the agreement, however, one has some reason to conform to it, whatever else (...)
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  11. Margaret Gilbert (2006). Who's to Blame? Collective Moral Responsibility and its Implications for Group Members. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):94–114.
  12.  72
    Margaret Gilbert (1983). Agreements, Conventions, and Language. Synthese 54 (3):375 - 407.
    The question whether and in what way languages and language use involve convention is addressed, With special reference to David Lewis's account of convention in general. Data are presented which show that Lewis has not captured the sense of 'convention' involved when we speak of adopting a linguistic convention. He has, In effect, attempted an account of social conventions. An alternative account of social convention and an account of linguistic convention are sketched.
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  13.  97
    Margaret P. Gilbert (2008). Social Convention Revisited. Topoi (1-2):5-16.
    This article will compare and contrast two very different accounts of convention: the game-theoretical account of Lewis in Convention, and the account initially proposed by Margaret Gilbert (the present author) in chapter six of On Social Facts, and further elaborated here. Gilbert’s account is not a variant of Lewis’s. It was arrived at in part as the result of a detailed critique of Lewis’s account in relation to a central everyday concept of a social convention. An account of convention need (...)
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  14. Margaret Gilbert (2002). Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings. Journal of Ethics 6 (2):115-143.
    Among other things, this paper considers what so-called collective guilt feelings amount to. If collective guilt feelings are sometimes appropriate, it must be the case that collectives can indeed be guilty. The paper begins with an account of what it is for a collective to intend to do something and to act in light of that intention. An account of collective guilt in terms of membership guilt feelings is found wanting. Finally, a "plural subject" account of collective guilt feelings is (...)
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  15.  42
    Margaret Gilbert (1981). Game Theory Andconvention. Synthese 46 (1):41 - 93.
    A feature of David Lewis's account of conventions in his book "Convention" which has received admiring notices from philosophers is his use of the mathematical theory of games. In this paper I point out a number of serious flaws in Lewis's use of game theory. Lewis's basic claim is that conventions cover 'coordination problems'. I show that game-Theoretical analysis tends to establish that coordination problems in Lewis's sense need not underlie conventions.
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  16.  33
    Margaret Gilbert (2004). Scanlon on Promissory Obligation: The Problem of Promisees' Rights. Journal of Philosophy 101 (2):83 - 109.
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  17. Margaret P. Gilbert, Collective Wrongdoing: Moral and Legal Responses.
    This is a review essay of Christopher Kutz's Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age, and Jonathan Bass's Stay The Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals. Topics addressed include the nature of collective intentions and actions, the possibility of collective guilt, the moral responsibility of individuals in the context of collective actions.
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  18.  52
    Margaret P. Gilbert (2001). Collective Preferences, Obligations, and Rational Choice. Economics and Philosophy 17 (1):109-119.
    Can teams and other collectivities have preferences of their own, preferences that are not in some way reducible to the personal preferences of their members? In short, are collective preferences possible? In everyday life people speak easily of what we prefer, where what is at issue seems to be a collective preference. This is suggested by the acceptability of such remarks as ‘My ideal walk would be . . . along rougher and less well-marked paths than we prefer as a (...)
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  19.  0
    Margaret Gilbert (1989). Folk Psychology Takes Sociality Seriously. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (4):707.
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  20. Margaret Gilbert, Andrew Mason, Elizabeth S. Anderson, J. David Velleman, Matthew H. Kramer, Michele M. Moody‐Adams & Martha C. Nussbaum (1999). 10. Lucius T. Outlaw, Jr., On Race and Philosophy Lucius T. Outlaw, Jr., On Race and Philosophy (Pp. 454-456). Ethics 109 (2).
     
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  21.  71
    Margaret P. Gilbert (1994). Remarks on Collective Belief. In Frederick F. Schmitt (ed.), Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge. Rowman and Littlefield 235-56.
    The author develops and elaborates on her account of collective belief, something standardly referred to, in her view, when we speak of what we believe. This paper focuses on a special response hearers may experience in the context of expressions of belief, a response that may issue in offended rebukes to the speaker. It is argued that this response would be appropriate if both speakers and hearers were parties to what the authors calls a joint commitment to believe a certain (...)
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  22.  41
    Margaret Gilbert (1997). Group Wrongs and Guilt Feelings. Journal of Ethics 1 (1):65-84.
    Can it ever be appropriate to feel guilt just because one's group has acted badly? Some say no, citing supposed features of guilt feelings as such. If one understands group action according to my plural subject account of groups, however, one can argue for the appropriateness of feeling guilt just because one's group has acted badly - a feeling that often occurs. In so arguing I sketch a plural subject account of groups, group intentions and group actions: for a group (...)
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  23. Margaret P. Gilbert (2006). Rationality in Collective Action. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):3-17.
    Collective action is interpreted as a matter of people doing something together, and it is assumed that this involves their having a collective intention to do that thing together. The account of collective intention for which the author has argued elsewhere is presented. In terms that are explained, the parties are jointly committed to intend as a body that such-and-such. Collective action problems in the sense of rational choice theory—problems such as the various forms of coordination problem and the (...)
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  24.  59
    Margaret P. Gilbert (2004). Scanlon on Promissory Obligation. Journal of Philosophy 101 (2):83-109.
    This article offers a critique of Thomas Scanlon's well-known account of promissory obligation by reference to the rights of promisees. Scanlon's account invokes a moral principle, the "principle of fidelity". Now, corresponding to a promisor's obligation to perform is a promisee's right to performance. It is argued that one cannot account for this right in terms of Scanlon's principle. This is so in spite of a clause in the principle relating to the promisee's "consent", which might have been thought to (...)
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  25.  53
    Margaret Gilbert (1993). Is an Agreement an Exchange of Promises? Journal of Philosophy 60 (12):627-649.
    This paper challenges the common assumption that an agreement is an exchange of promises. Proposing that the performance obligations of some typical agreements are simultaneous, interdependent, and unconditional, it argues that no promise-exchange has this structure of obligations. In addition to offering general considerations in support of this claim, it examines various types of promise-exchange, showing that none satisfy the criteria noted. Two forms of conditional promise are distinguished and both forms are discussed. A positive account of agreements as joint (...)
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  26.  45
    Margaret P. Gilbert (2005). Shared Values, Social Unity, and Liberty. Public Affairs Quarterly 19 (1):25-49.
    May social unity - the unity of a society or social group - be a matter of sharing values? Political philosophers disagree on this topic. Kymlicka answers: No. Devlin and Rawls answer: Yes. It is argued that given one common 'summative' account of sharing values a negative answer is correct. A positive answer is correct, however, given the plural subject account of sharing values. Given this account, those who share values are unified in a substantial way by their participation in (...)
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  27. Margaret P. Gilbert, Acting Together, Joint Commitment, and Obligation.
    What is it to do something with another person? In the author's book On Social Facts and elsewhere, she has conjectured that a special type of commitment - joint commitment - lies at the root of acting together and many other central social phenomena. Here she surveys some data pertinent to this conjecture, including the assumption of those who act together that they have associated rights against and obligations towards each other. She explains what joint commitment is, how it relates (...)
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  28.  23
    Margaret Gilbert (1989). Rationality and Salience. Philosophical Studies 57 (1):61-77.
    A number of authors, Including Thomas Schelling and David Lewis, have envisaged a model of the generation of action in coordination problems in which salience plays a crucial role. Empirical studies suggest that human subjects are likely to try for the salient combination of actions, a tendency leading to fortunate results. Does rationality dictate that one aim at the salient combination? Some have thought so, Thus proclaiming that salience is all that is needed to resolve coordination problems for agents who (...)
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  29.  49
    Margaret Gilbert (1999). Reconsidering the “Actual Contract” Theory of Political Obligation. Ethics 109 (2):236-260.
    Do people have obligations by virtue of the fact that a given country is their country? Actual contract theory says they do because they have agreed to act in certain ways. Contemporary philosophers standardly object in terms of the 'no agreement' objection and the 'not morally binding' objection. I argue that the 'not morally binding' objection is not conclusive. As for the 'no agreement' objection, though actual contract theory succumbs, a closely related plural subject theory of political obligation does not. (...)
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  30. Kenneth J. Gergen, Margaret Gilbert, H. S. Gordon, Rom Harrè, Tim Ingold, Raymond I. M. Lee, Peter Manicas, Joseph Margolis, Lloyd Sandelands, Paul F. Secord, Jonathan H. Turner & Walter L. Wallace (1996). The Mark of the Social: Discovery or Invention? Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    Behavior, language, development, identity, and science—all of these phenomena are commonly characterized as 'social' in nature. But what does it mean to be 'social'? Is there any intrinsic 'mark' of the social shared by these phenomena? In the first book to shed light on this foundational question, twelve distinguished philosophers and social scientists from several disciplines debate the mark of the social. Their varied answers will be of interest to sociologists, anthropologists, philosophers, psychologists, and anyone interested in the theoretical foundations (...)
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  31.  46
    Margaret Gilbert (1990). Rationality, Coordination, and Convention. Synthese 84 (1):1 - 21.
    Philosophers using game-theoretical models of human interactions have, I argue, often overestimated what sheer rationality can achieve. (References are made to David Gauthier, David Lewis, and others.) In particular I argue that in coordination problems rational agents will not necessarily reach a unique outcome that is most preferred by all, nor a unique 'coordination equilibrium' (Lewis), nor a unique Nash equilibrium. Nor are things helped by the addition of a successful precedent, or by common knowledge of generally accepted personal principles. (...)
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  32.  21
    Margaret Gilbert (1998). In Search of Sociality. Philosophical Explorations 1 (3):233 – 241.
    This paper reviews some of the growing body of work in the analytic philosophy of social phenomena, with special reference to the question whether adequate accounts of particular social phenomena can be given in terms that are individualistic in a sense that is specified. The discussion focusses on accounts of what have come to be known as shared intention and action. There is also some consideration of accounts of social convention and collective belief. Particular attention is paid to the need (...)
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  33.  39
    Margaret Gilbert (1972). The Abilities of Prescriptivism. Analysis 32 (4):141 - 144.
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  34.  43
    Margaret Gilbert (1993). Group Membership and Political Obligation. The Monist 76 (1):119-131.
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  35.  1
    Margaret Gilbert (2015). Plurale Subjekte: Ein Simmelscher Ansatz. Zeitschrift für Kulturphilosophie 2015 (1-2):121-142.
    This paper discusses certain desiderata for an acceptable »Simmelian« account of social groups, and explains why my own account of social groups as plural subjects is preferable to the accounts considered. With regard to the »we«-intentionality of plural subjects, this theory of social groups should be taken to demand only that some rough general type of shared action or shared cognition must be understood to be in question of all sides. It is hoped, then, that this theory of plural subjects (...)
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  36.  74
    Margaret Gilbert (1999). Critical Notice: Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson, Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Noûs 33 (2):295–303.
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  37.  6
    Margaret Gilbert (1999). Joint Commitment and Obligation. Utilitas 11:143-163.
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  38.  68
    Margaret Gilbert (1971). Vices and Self-Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 68 (15):443-453.
    Towards an account of character traits in self-Knowledge, With an assessment of the sartrean thesis ("spectatorism") that character trait concepts are fitted for other-Ascription rather than self-Ascription. The logic of ascriptions of evil character and specific vices is dealt with. The relationship of self-Ascription to self-Falsification and "seeing oneself as an object" is examined. Self-Ascription has peculiarities, But at most a very mild form of spectatorism is born out.
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  39.  72
    Margaret P. Gilbert, Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson's Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity.
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  40.  66
    Margaret Gilbert (2002). Review: Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and Constraints. [REVIEW] Mind 111 (442):399-403.
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  41.  54
    Margaret Gilbert (2009). Pro Patria : An Essay on Patriotism. Journal of Ethics 13 (4):319 - 346.
    This essay focuses on what patriotism is, as opposed to the value of patriotism. It focuses further on the basic patriotic motive : one acts with this motive if one acts on behalf of one’s country as such. I first argue that pre-theoretically the basic patriotic motive is sufficient to make an act patriotic from a motivational point of view. In particular the agent need not ascribe virtues or achievements to his country nor need he feel towards it the emotions (...)
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  42.  12
    Margaret Gilbert (2013). Commitment. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell
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  43. Margaret Gilbert (1983). Notes on the Concept of a Social Convention. New Literary History 14 (02):225-251.
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  44.  13
    Margaret Gilbert (2008). Two Approaches to Shared Intention: An Essay in the Philosophy of Social Phenomena. Analyse & Kritik 30 (2):483-514.
    Drawing on earlier work of the author that is both clarified and amplified here, this article explores the question: what is it for two or more people to intend to do something in the future? In short, what is it for people to share an intention? It argues for three criteria of adequacy for an account of shared intention and offers an account that satisfies them. According to this account, in technical terms explained in the paper, people share an intention (...)
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  45.  11
    Margaret Gilbert (1998). Raimo Tuomela, The Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study of Basic Social Notions:The Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study of Basic Social Notions. Ethics 108 (4):811-812.
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  46. Margaret Gilbert (1990). Social Facts. [REVIEW] Mind 99 (394):308-310.
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  47.  51
    Margaret P. Gilbert, Collective Remorse.
    This essay explores the nature of an important collective emotion, namely, collective remorse. Three accounts of collective remorse are presented and evaluated. The first involves an aggregate of group members remorseful over acts of their own associated with their group's act; the second an aggregate of persons remorseful over their group's act. The third account posits, in terms that are explained, a joint commitment of a group's members to constitute as far as is possible a single remorseful body. Construed according (...)
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  48.  9
    Anthony Manser, Margaret Gilbert, Roger Trigg, R. F. Atkinson, Gerhard Zecha, Edgar Morscher & C. J. F. Williams (1971). New Books. [REVIEW] Mind 80 (320):623-639.
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  49. Margaret Gilbert (2002). Acting Together. In Georg Meggle (ed.), Social Facts & Collective Intentionality. Dr. Hänsel-Hohenhausen Ag
     
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  50.  47
    Margaret P. Gilbert (2006). Character, Essence, Action: Considerations on Character Traits After Sartre. The Pluralist 1 (1):40 - 52.
    Two radically different, general accounts of human character traits - the "essentialist" and the "summary" accounts - are given critical consideration. The former account is characterized in terms of Saul Kripke's conception of metaphysical essence. Both accounts are discussed with reference to Jean-Paul Sartre's treatment of character traits. The essentialist account cannot withstand considerations relating to personal identity over time. The summary account is also rejected, as is a certain kind of dispositional account. An approach to at least some character (...)
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