Most models of response time (RT) in elementary cognitive tasks implicitly assume that the speed-accuracy trade-off is continuous: When payoffs or instructions gradually increase the level of speed stress, people are assumed to gradually sacrifice response accuracy in exchange for gradual increases in response speed. This trade-off presumably operates over the entire range from accurate but slow responding to fast but chance-level responding (i.e., guessing). In this article, we challenge the assumption of continuity and propose a phase transition model for (...) RTs and accuracy. Analogous to the fast guess model (Ollman, 1966), our model postulates two modes of processing: a guess mode and a stimulus-controlled mode. From catastrophe theory, we derive two important predictions that allow us to test our model against the fast guess model and against the popular class of sequential sampling models. The first prediction—hysteresis in the transitions between guessing and stimulus-controlled behavior—was confirmed in an experiment that gradually changed the reward for speed versus accuracy. The second prediction—bimodal RT distributions—was confirmed in an experiment that required participants to respond in a way that is intermediate between guessing and accurate responding. (shrink)

The replicability of findings in experimental psychology can be improved by distinguishing sharply between hypothesis-generating research and hypothesis-testing research. This distinction can be achieved by preregistration, a method that has recently attracted widespread attention. Although preregistration is fair in the sense that it inoculates researchers against hindsight bias and confirmation bias, preregistration does not allow researchers to analyze the data flexibly without the analysis being demoted to exploratory. To alleviate this concern we discuss how researchers may conduct blinded analyses. As (...) with preregistration, blinded analyses break the feedback loop between the analysis plan and analysis outcome, thereby preventing cherry-picking and significance seeking. However, blinded analyses retain the flexibility to account for unexpected peculiarities in the data. We discuss different methods of blinding, offer recommendations for blinding of popular experimental designs, and introduce the design for an online blinding protocol. (shrink)

The paper argues that much of the difficulty with making progress on the issue of the normativity of logic for thought, as discussed in the literature, stems from a misapprehension of what logic is normative for. The claim is that, rather than mono-agent mental processes, logic in fact comprises norms for quite specific situations of multi-agent dialogical interactions, in particular special forms of debates. This reconceptualization is inspired by historical developments in logic and mathematics, in particular the pervasiveness of such (...) dialogical conceptions in the early days of logic in ancient Greece. The multi-agent, dialogical perspective then allows for the formulation of compelling 'bridge principles’ between the relation of logical consequence and dialogical normative principles, something that is notoriously difficult to achieve in a mono-agent setting pertaining exclusively to thought and belief. The upshot is also that the truth-preserving rules of logic generally do not have a primary normative bearing on mono-agent mental processes, and in this sense the paper sides with Harman's critique of the idea that logic has a normative import for thought and belief. (shrink)

Public engagement is one of the fundamental pillars of the European programme for research and innovation _Horizon 2020_. The programme encourages engagement that not only fosters science education and dissemination, but also promotes two-way dialogues between scientists and the public at various stages of research. Establishing such dialogues between different groups of societal actors is seen as crucial in order to attain epistemic as well as social desiderata at the intersection between science and society. However, whether these dialogues can actually (...) help attaining these desiderata is far from obvious. This paper discusses some of the costs, risks, and benefits of dialogical public engagement practices, and proposes a strategy to analyse these argumentative practices based on a three-tiered model of epistemic exchange. As a case study, we discuss the phenomenon of vaccine hesitancy, arguably a result of suboptimal public engagement, and show how the proposed model can shed new light on the problem. (shrink)

Pour Aristote, si la vertu ne naît pas naturellement en l'homme, néanmoins celui-ci est par sa nature même prédisposé à l'acquérir, dans la mesure où il appartient à chacun de la cultiver par de bonnes habitudes de vie et de la concrétiser dans des actes. Aussi, par son comportement vertueux, l'homme a-t-il la possibilité d'accomplir dans l'action ce qui lui convient le mieux et ce qui profite à la Cité. En l'occurrence, il ne s'agit pas de viser le bien en (...) soi mais de se montrer capable de faire du bien. (shrink)

This comprehensive account of the concept and practices of deduction is the first to bring together perspectives from philosophy, history, psychology and cognitive science, and mathematical practice. Catarina Dutilh Novaes draws on all of these perspectives to argue for an overarching conceptualization of deduction as a dialogical practice: deduction has dialogical roots, and these dialogical roots are still largely present both in theories and in practices of deduction. Dutilh Novaes' account also highlights the deeply human and in fact (...) social nature of deduction, as embedded in actual human practices; as such, it presents a highly innovative account of deduction. The book will be of interest to a wide range of readers, from advanced students to senior scholars, and from philosophers to mathematicians and cognitive scientists. (shrink)

A distinction often drawn is one between conservative versus revisionary conceptions of philosophical analysis with respect to commonsensical beliefs and intuitions. This paper offers a comparative investigation of two revisionary methods: Carnapian explication and ameliorative analysis as developed by S. Haslanger. It is argued that they have a number of common features, and in particular that they share a crucial political dimension: they both have the potential to serve as instrument for social reform. Indeed, they may produce improved versions of (...) key concepts of everyday life, for example those pertaining to social categories such as gender and race, which in turn may lead to social change. The systematic comparison of these two frameworks offered here, where similarities as well as differences are discussed, is likely to provide useful guidance to practitioners of both approaches, as it will highlight important aspects of each of them that tend to remain implicit and under-theorized in existing applications of these methodologies to specific questions. (shrink)

Formal languages are widely regarded as being above all mathematical objects and as producing a greater level of precision and technical complexity in logical investigations because of this. Yet defining formal languages exclusively in this way offers only a partial and limited explanation of the impact which their use actually has. In this book, Catarina Dutilh Novaes adopts a much wider conception of formal languages so as to investigate more broadly what exactly is going on when theorists put these (...) tools to use. She looks at the history and philosophy of formal languages and focuses on the cognitive impact of formal languages on human reasoning, drawing on their historical development, psychology, cognitive science and philosophy. Her wide-ranging study will be valuable for both students and researchers in philosophy, logic, psychology and cognitive and computer science. (shrink)

This book presents novel formalizations of three of the most important medieval logical theories: supposition, consequence and obligations. In an additional fourth part, an in-depth analysis of the concept of formalization is presented - a crucial concept in the current logical panorama, which as such receives surprisingly little attention.Although formalizations of medieval logical theories have been proposed earlier in the literature, the formalizations presented here are all based on innovative vantage points: supposition theories as algorithmic hermeneutics, theories of consequence analyzed (...) with tools borrowed from model-theory and two-dimensional semantics, and obligations as logical games. For this reason, this is perhaps the first time that these medieval logical theories are made fully accessible to the modern philosopher and logician who wishes to obtain a better grasp of them, but who has always been held back by the lack of appropriate ‘translations' into modern terms.Moreover, the book offers a reflection on the very nature of logic, a reflection that is prompted by the comparisons between medieval and modern logic, their similarities and dissimilarities. It is thus a contribution not only to the history of logic, but also to the philosophy of logic, the philosophy of language and semantics.The analysis of medieval logic is also relevant for the modern philosopher and logician in that, being the unifying methodology used across all disciplines at that time, logic really provided unity to science. It thus presents a unified model of scientific investigation, where logic plays the aggregating role. (shrink)

Suggests an open system of psychological exploration to cut through accepted norms of morality, language, and politics.

We investigate the philosophical significance of the existence of different semantic systems with respect to which a given deductive system is sound and complete. Our case study will be Corcoran's deductive system D for Aristotelian syllogistic and some of the different semantic systems for syllogistic that have been proposed in the literature. We shall prove that they are not equivalent, in spite of D being sound and complete with respect to each of them. Beyond the specific case of syllogistic, the (...) goal is to offer a general discussion of the relations between informal notions—in this case, an informal notion of deductive validity—and logical apparatuses such as deductive systems and (model-theoretic or other) semantic systems that aim at offering technical, formal accounts of informal notions. Specifically, we will be interested in Kreisel's famous 'squeezing argument'; we shall ask ourselves what a plurality of semantic systems (understood as classes of mathematical structures) may entail for the cogency of specific applications of the squeezing argument. More generally, the analysis brings to the fore the need for criteria of adequacy for semantic systems based on mathematical structures. Without such criteria, the idea that the gap between informal and technical accounts of validity can be bridged is put under pressure. (shrink)

What does it mean to say that logic is formal? The short answer is: it means (or can mean) several different things. In this paper, I argue that there are (at least) eight main variations of the notion of the formal that are relevant for current discussions in philosophy and logic, and that they are structured in two main clusters, namely the formal as pertaining to forms, and the formal as pertaining to rules. To the first cluster belong the formal (...) as schematic; the formal as indifference to particulars; the formal as topic-neutrality; the formal as abstraction from intentional content; the formal as de-semantification. To the second cluster belong the formal as computable; the formal as pertaining to regulative rules; the formal as pertaining to constitutive rules. I analyze each of these eight variations, providing their historical background and raising related philosophical questions. The significance of this work of ?conceptual archeology? is that it may enhance clarity in debates where the notion of the formal plays a prominent role (such as debates where it is expected to play a demarcating role), but where it is oftentimes used equivocally and/or imprecisely. (shrink)

"Le projet le plus général de Nietzsche consiste en ceci : introduire en philosophie les concepts de sens et de valeur. Nietzsche n'a jamais caché que la philosophie du sens et des valeurs dut être une critique. Que Kant n'ait pas mené la vraie critique, parce qu'il n'a pas su en poser le problème en termes de valeurs, tel est même un des mobiles principaux de l'oeuvre de Nietzsche". Cette analyse rigoureuse et critique de la philosophie de Nietzsche est une (...) lumineuse introduction à l'oeuvre d'un philosophe trop souvent réduit au nihilisme, à la volonté de puissance et l'image du surhomme. Gilles Deleuze remarque que "la philosophie moderne présente des amalgames, qui témoignent de sa vigueur et de sa vivacité, mais qui comportent aussi des dangers pour l'esprit" et que la force du projet philosophique de Nietzsche dans le "dépassement" de la métaphysique est "de dénoncer toutes les mystifications qui trouvent dans la dialectique un dernier refuge. La philosophie de Nietzsche a une grande portée polémique". (shrink)

"Gill's and Ryan's Parmenides is, simply, superb: the Introduction, more than a hundred pages long, is transparently clear, takes the reader meticulously through the arguments, avoids perverseness, and still manages to make sense of the dialogue as a whole; there is a fine selective bibliography; and those parts of the translation I have looked at in detail suggest that it too is very good indeed." --Christopher Rowe, _Phronesis_.

Machine generated contents note: -- Preface to the English edition \ Translators' Introduction \Preface to the French Edition \ 1. Theses on Movement: First Commentary onBergson \ 2. Frame and Short, Framing and Cutting \ 3. Montage \ 4. TheMovement-Image and its Three Varieties: Second Commentary on Bergson \ 5. ThePerception-Image \ 6. The Affection-Image Face and Close-Up \ 7. TheAffection-Image: Qualities, Powers, Any-Space-Whatevers \ 8. From Affect toAction: The Impulse Image \ 9. The Action-Image: The Large Form \ 10. (...) The Action-Image:The Small Form \ 11. Figures, or the Transformation of Forms \ 12. The Crisisof the Action-Image \ Glossary \ Notes \ Index. (shrink)

Praised for its rare combination of scholarly rigor and imaginative interpretation, _Nietzsche and Philosophy_ has long been recognized as one of the most important analyses of Nietzsche. It is also one of the best introductions to Deleuze's thought, establishing many of his central philosophical positions. In _Nietzsche and Philosophy_, Deleuze identifies and explores three crucial concepts in Nietzschean thought-multiplicity, becoming, and affirmation-and clarifies Nietzsche's views regarding the will to power, eternal return, nihilism, and difference. For Deleuze, Nietzsche challenged conventional philosophical (...) ideas and provided a means of escape from Hegel's dialectical thinking, which had come to dominate French philosophy. He also offered a path toward a politics of difference. In this new edition, Michael Hardt's foreword examines the profound influence of Deleuze's provocative interpretations on the study of Nietzsche, which opened a whole new avenue in postwar thought. (shrink)

‘A rare and remarkable book.’ Times Literary SupplementGilles Deleuze (1925-1995) was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Paris VIII. He is a key figure in poststructuralism, and one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century.F\’elix Guattari (1930-1992) was a psychoanalyst at the la Borde Clinic, as well as being a major social theorist and radical activist. A Thousand Plateaus is part of Deleuze and Guattari’s landmark philosophical project, Capitalism and Schizophrenia - a project that still sets the (...) terms of contemporary philosophical debate. A Thousand Plateaus provides a compelling analysis of social phenomena and offers fresh alternatives for thinking about philosophy and culture. Its radical perspective provides a toolbox for ‘nomadic thought’ and has had a galvanizing influence on today’s anti-capitalist movement.Translated by Brian Massumi>. (shrink)

Two periods in the history of logic and philosophy are characterized notably by vivid interest in self-referential paradoxical sentences in general, and Liar sentences in particular: the later medieval period (roughly from the 12th to the 15th century) and the last 100 years. In this paper, I undertake a comparative taxonomy of these two traditions. I outline and discuss eight main approaches to Liar sentences in the medieval tradition, and compare them to the most influential modern approaches to such sentences. (...) I also emphasize the aspects of each tradition that find no counterpart in the other one. It is expected that such a comparison may point in new directions for future research on the paradoxes; indeed, the present analysis allows me to draw a few conclusions about the general nature of Liar sentences, and to identify aspects that would require further investigation. (shrink)

Genealogical anxiety is the worry that the origins of beliefs, once revealed to be influenced by “irrelevant” factors such as personal histories and circumstances of upbringing, will undermine or cast doubt on those beliefs. Discussions on these irrelevant influences in the epistemological literature have so far primarily focused on their contingency. But there is another issue that merits further examination: the fact that epistemic environments condition beliefs suggests that epistemic agency is significantly curtailed. I present a model of belief-forming processes (...) that highlights how networks of attention and trust/distrust influence these processes. The model suggests that, while there is a lot happening beyond our control that shapes what we come to believe, we still retain some degree of agency to the extent that we can rewire our networks of attention and trust/distrust. I conclude that, surprisingly, genealogical anxiety may in fact increase agency insofar as it may encourage critical resistance. (shrink)

This article proposes an interpretation of the chapters of theNicomachean Ethicsconcerning exchange and friendship. Rejecting approaches where Aristotle anticipates modern labour or need-based theories of value, the article claims that those notions of labour and need are required for a satisfactory interpretation of the most obscure passages of Book V. Finally, Aristotle's texts on exchange and friendship are related in such a way that the latter, since it is free from any political considerations, allows us to better understand the philosopher's (...) view on exchange. (shrink)

La philosophie théorique de Spinoza est une des tentatives les plus radicales pour constituer une ontologie pure : une seule substance absolument infinie, avec tous les attributs, les êtres n'étant que des manières d'être de cette substance. Mais pourquoi une telle ontologie s'appelle-t-elle Ethique? Quel rapport y a-t-il entre la grande proposition spéculative et les propositions pratiques qui ont fait le scandale du spinozisme? L'éthique est la science pratique des manières d'être. C'est une éthologie, non pas une morale. L'opposition de (...) l'éthique avec la morale, le lien des propositions éthiques avec la proposition ontologique, sont l'objet de ce livre qui présente, de ce point de vue, un dictionnaire des principales notions de Spinoza. D'où vient la place très particulière de Spinoza, la façon dont il concerne immédiatement le non-philosophe autant que le philosophe? (shrink)

The paper investigates the propriety of applying the form versus matter distinction to arguments and to logic in general. Its main point is that many of the currently pervasive views on form and matter with respect to logic rest on several substantive and even contentious assumptions which are nevertheless uncritically accepted. Indeed, many of the issues raised by the application of this distinction to arguments seem to be related to a questionable combination of different presuppositions and expectations; this holds in (...) particular of the vexed issue of demarcating the class of logical constants. I begin with a characterization of currently widespread views on form and matter in logic, which I refer to as 'logical hylomorphism as we know it'—LHAWKI, for short—and argue that the hylomorphism underlying LHAWKI is mereological. Next, I sketch an overview of the historical developments leading from Aristotelian, non-mereological metaphysical hylomorphism to mereological logical hylomorphism (LHAWKI). I conclude with a reassessment of the prospects for the combination of hylomorphism and logic, arguing in particular that LHAWKI is not the only and certainly not the most suitable version of logical hylomorphism. In particular, this implies that the project of demarcating the class of logical constants as a means to define the scope and nature of logic rests on highly problematic assumptions. (shrink)

Until recently, cognitive science focused on such mental functions as problem solving, grammar, and pattern-the functions in which the human mind most closely resembles a computer. But humans are more than computers: we invent new meanings, imagine wildly, and even have ideas that have never existed before. Today the cutting edge of cognitive science addresses precisely these mysterious, creative aspects of the mind.The Way We Think is a landmark analysis of the imaginative nature of the mind. Conceptual blending is already (...) widely known in research laboratories throughout the world; this book, written to be accessible to both lay readers and interested scientists, is its definitive statement. Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner show that conceptual blending is the root of the cognitively modern human mind, and that conceptual blends themselves are continually combined and reblended to create the rich mental fabric in which we live.The Way We Think shows how this blending operates; how it is affected by (and gives rise to) language, identity, culture, and invention; and how we imagine what could be and what might have been. The result is a bold and exciting new view of how the mind works. (shrink)

The paradoxes of (in)tolerance in epistemic networks Does the Capitol invasion of January 2021 teach us that intolerant viewpoints have no place in public debates? This view is defensible on the basis of Karl Popper’s paradox of tolerance, which states that too much tolerance will ultimately entail the demise of that very tolerance. But how are the limits of (in)tolerance to be determined? We argue that Popper’s purely epistemological interpretation of the concept of tolerance is untenable; determining such limits ultimately (...) requires a political-normative interpretation. As an alternative epistemological perspective, we show how network epistemology can give us insight into how information, especially intolerant content, spreads through communities. This analysis can help us assess the consequences of potential interventions in public debates, and thus make informed choices. (shrink)

Many terminally ill patients perceive themselves to be a burden to loved ones who care for them. The self-perception of being a burden can play a significant role in terminal patients’ decisions to take courses of action, such as ceasing life-sustaining treatment or requesting physician-assisted suicide, that hasten death. I will use the term ‘burden-based decision’ as a shorthand for cases in which a terminal patient’s perception that she is a burden to her loved ones influences her decision to hasten (...) death. When should we view a terminal patient’s inclination to make a burden-based decision to be an ethical problem or a failure of treatment? And when should we view it to be an acceptable response rather than a problem or failure? I argue here that such decisions are acceptable more often than many who write on this topic imply. (shrink)

I examine the theory of consequentia of the medieval logician, John Buridan. Buridan advocates a strict commitment to what we now call proposition-tokens as the bearers of truth-value. The analysis of Buridan's theory shows that, within a token-based semantics, amendments to the usual notions of inference and consequence are made necessary, since pragmatic elements disrupt the semantic behaviour of propositions. In my reconstruction of Buridan's theory, I use some of the apparatus of modern two-dimensional semantics, such as two-dimensional matrices and (...) the distinction between the context of formation and the context of evaluation of utterances. (shrink)

Avec Hume, l'empirisme ne se définit plus essentiellement par l'origine sensible des idées. Il développe trois problèmes, les relations, les cas, les illusions. D'une part, les relations sont toujours extérieures à leurs termes, et dépendent de principes d'association qui en déterminent l'établissement et l'exercice (croyance). D'autre part, ces principes d'association n'agissent qu'en fonction des passions, pour indiquer des "cas" dans un monde de la culture ou du droit : c'est tout l'associationnisme qui est au service d'une pratique du droit, de (...) la politique et de l'économie (suffit-il, pour devenir propriétaire d'une cité abandonnée, de lancer un javelot sur la porte, ou faut-il toucher la porte du doigt?). Enfin, de telles règles de légitimité des relations peuvent-elles être séparées des fictions, des croyances illégitimes qui les accompagnent ou les doublent? Si bien que la philosophie est moins critique des erreurs que dénonciation des illusions inévitables. Dans tous ces domaines, l'empirisme opère la substitution de la croyance pratique au savoir, dans une entreprise athée qui consiste à naturaliser la croyance. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Functives and Concepts.

A posthumous collection of writings by Deleuze, including letters, youthful essays, and an interview, many previously unpublished. Letters and Other Texts is the third and final volume of the posthumous texts of Gilles Deleuze, collected for publication in French on the twentieth anniversary of his death. It contains several letters addressed to his contemporaries (Michel Foucault, Pierre Klossowski, François Châtelet, and Clément Rosset, among others). Of particular importance are the letters addressed to Félix Guattari, which offer an irreplaceable account (...) of their work as a duo from Anti-Oedipus to What is Philosophy? Later letters provide a new perspective on Deleuze's work as he responds to students' questions. his volume also offers a set of unpublished or hard-to-find texts, including some essays from Deleuze's youth, a few unusual drawings, and a long interview from 1973 on Anti-Oedipus with Guattari. (shrink)

The flames of Alexandria continue to rage. After twenty centuries, they still dazzle us, as though the Mouseion were the only massacred library. One would believe that Julius Caesar, Theophilus of Antioch and Omar (the three pyromaniacs, the pagan, the Christian and the Moslem) had had no predecessors or imitators. But the race of incendiaries is as numerous as the waves of the sea. It is monotonous, it is indestructible, it is equal to that of the ants. It was born (...) at the same time as the first Babylonian tablets. In 1988, it continues its work. All over the world and in all times, the incendiaries were there with their torches. They burned parchments, wood or clay tablets, leather manuscripts, papyrus or folios. The same warriors who profaned temples set fire to incunabula. The same ones who slaughtered the Aztecs threw their firebrands into the collection of codices. What is it, this unleashed fury of prince and priest, judge and soldier against these small monuments of clay or paper, against these sepulchres in which the dead say that they have lived and loved, suffered and hoped? (shrink)

Examines the philosophy of Henri Bergson, explains his concepts of duration, memory, and elan vital, and discusses the influence of science on Bergson.

We investigate the relations among Brandom’s three dimensions of semantic inferential articulation, namely, incompatibility entailments, committive consequences, and permissive consequences. In his unpublished manuscript “Conceptual Content and Discursive Practice” Brandom argues that (1) incompatibility entailment implies committive consequence, and that (2) committive consequence in turn implies permissive consequence. We criticize this hierarchy both on internal and external grounds. Firstly, we prove that, using Brandom’s own definitions, the reverse of (1) also holds, and that the reverse of (2) may hold (but (...) the proof relies on substantive assumptions). This suggests that there are no three different notions of inference emerging from Brandom’s definitions, but at most two, and perhaps even just one. Secondly, this result puts into question the connections between the three inferential relations and the familiar notions of deduction and induction. (shrink)

In describing numerosity as “a kind of ersatz number,” Clarke and Beck fail to consider a familiar and compelling definition of numerosity, which conceptualizes numerosity as the cognitive counterpart of the mathematical concept of cardinality; numerosity is the magnitude, whereas number is a scale through which numerosity/cardinality is measured. We argue that these distinctions should be considered.

Overdoing Democracy is an important contribution to the literature on (deliberative) democracy, as it offers a sobering diagnosis of the risks and pitfalls of (overdoing) democracy in the form of internal critique. But the book does not go far enough in its diagnosis because it is not sufficiently critical towards some of the basic assumptions of deliberative conceptions of democracy. In particular, Talisse does not sufficiently attend to the inevitable power struggles in a society, where different groups and individuals must (...) protect their own (often conflicting) interests instead of working towards a ‘common good.’ In this essay, I contrast two different visions of democracy and politics, one based on ideals of consensus and cooperation, and another on the inevitability of perennial conflict. I then briefly present an alternative to deliberative conceptions of democracy that has gained traction in recent decades, known as agonism. Next, I offer a short reconstruction of Talisse’s proposal, and finally I sketch a critical assessment of some of his main claims and assumptions from an agonistic perspective. (shrink)

This volume, the first dedicated and comprehensive companion to medieval logic, covers both the Latin and the Arabic traditions, and shows that they were in fact sister traditions, which both arose against the background of a Hellenistic heritage and which influenced one another over the centuries. A series of chapters by both established and younger scholars covers the whole period including early and late developments, and offers new insights into this extremely rich period in the history of logic. The volume (...) is divided into two parts, 'Periods and Traditions' and 'Themes', allowing readers to engage with the subject from both historical and more systematic perspectives. It will be a must-read for students and scholars of medieval philosophy, the history of logic, and the history of ideas. (shrink)

Dans cet essai, Gilles Deleuze entreprend une analyse de la méthode philosophique employée par Kant dans ses trois grands livres, Critique de la raison pure, Critique de la raison pratique, Critique du jugement. " Il nous suffit de retenir le principe d'une thèse essentielle de la Critique en général : il y a des intérêts de la raison qui diffèrent en nature. Ces intérêts forment un système organique et hiérarchisé qui est celui des fins de l'être raisonnable. " Mais, (...) précise Gilles Deleuze, " une faculté législatrice ne supprime pas tout emploi des autres facultés... Suivant chaque Critique, l'entendement, la raison, l'imagination entreront clans des rapports divers sous la présidence d'une de ces facultés. ". (shrink)

Can arguments change minds? Philosophers like to think that they can. However, a wealth of empirical evidence suggests that arguments are not very efficient tools to change minds. What to make of the different assessments of the mind-changing potential of arguments? To address this issue, we must take into account the broader contexts in which arguments occur, in particular the propagation of messages across networks of attention, and the choices that epistemic agents must make between alternative potential sources of content (...) and information, which are very much influenced by perceptions of reliability and trustworthiness. Arguments can change minds, but only under conducive, favourable socio-epistemic conditions. (shrink)

Introduction. Exister, c'est être seul -- 1. Conformisme et aristocratisme -- 2. Penser et lire -- 3. Communauté et économie -- 4. De la politique à l'enseignement -- 5. Des degrés de communauté -- 6. L'épreuve du collectif -- 7. Du "je" au "nous" -- 8. Une communauté à deux? -- 9. Le collectif en conflit -- 10. Ennemis et adversaires -- Conclusion. Quelques-uns.