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Gillian K. Russell [4]Gillian Kay Russell [3]
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Profile: Gillian Russell (Washington University in St. Louis)
  1. Gillian K. Russell (2014). Metaphysical Analyticity and the Epistemology of Logic. Philosophical Studies 171 (1):161-175.
    Recent work on analyticity distinguishes two kinds, metaphysical and epistemic. This paper argues that the distinction allows for a new view in the philosophy of logic according to which the claims of logic are metaphysically analytic and have distinctive modal profiles, even though their epistemology is holist and in many ways rather Quinean. It is argued that such a view combines some of the more attractive aspects of the Carnapian and Quinean approaches to logic, whilst avoiding some famous problems.
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  2. Greg Restall & Gillian Kay Russell (eds.) (2012). New Waves in Philosophical Logic. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Machine generated contents note: -- Series Editors' PrefaceAcknowledgementsNotes on ContributorsHow Things Are Elsewhere; W. Schwarz Information Change and First-Order Dynamic Logic; B.Kooi Interpreting and Applying Proof Theories for Modal Logic; F.Poggiolesi & G.Restall The Logic(s) of Modal Knowledge; D.Cohnitz On Probabilistically Closed Languages; H.Leitgeb Dogmatism, Probability and Logical Uncertainty; B.Weatherson & D.Jehle Skepticism about Reasoning; S.Roush, K.Allen & I.HerbertLessons in Philosophy of Logic from Medieval Obligations; C.D.Novaes How to Rule Out Things with Words: Strong Paraconsistency and the Algebra of Exclusion; (...)
     
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  3. Gillian K. Russell & John M. Doris 1 (2008). Knowledge by Indifference. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):429--437.
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  4. Gillian K. Russell & John M. Doris 1 (2008). Knowledge by Indifference. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):429-437.
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  5. Gillian K. Russell & John M. Doris (2008). Knowledge by Indifference. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):429 – 437.
    Is it harder to acquire knowledge about things that really matter to us than it is to acquire knowledge about things we don't much care about? Jason Stanley 2005 argues that whether or not the relational predicate 'knows that' holds between an agent and a proposition can depend on the practical interests of the agent: the more it matters to a person whether p is the case, the more justification is required before she counts as (...)
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  6. Gillian Kay Russell (2008). Truth in Virtue of Meaning. Oxford University Press.
    The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence. Synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because of what they mean. Analytic sentences - like all bachelors are unmarried and triangles have three sides - are different. They are true in virtue of meaning, so no matter what the world is like, as long as the sentence means what it does, it will be true. -/- (...)
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  7. Gillian Kay Russell (2004). Analyticity, Meaning and Paradox. Dissertation, Princeton University
    Some philosophers have claimed that sentences like all bachelors are unmarried are analytic, where this is to say that they are true in virtue of meaning, and that anyone who understands one can know that it is true. Some have claimed in addition that the notion of analyticity can be used to solve problems in epistemology. However, in the last century the work of Quine and Putnam led many to doubt such claims, and to suspect that there is no analyticity, (...)
     
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