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Profile: Gillian Russell (Washington University in St. Louis)
  1. Gillian Russell, Analyticity, Meaning and Paradox.
    There seems to be something special about sentences like ‘all bachelors are unmarried’ and ‘red is a colour’. Philosophers have claimed that this is because they are analytic, where this is to say that they are true in virtue of meaning, and that anyone who understands one can know that it is true. Some have also claimed that the notion of analyticity can be used to solve problems in epistemology. However, in the last century the work of Quine and Putnam (...)
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  2. Gillian Russell, Could “Knows That” Be Inconsistent?
    In his recent Philosophers’ Imprint paper “The (mostly harmless) inconsistency of knowledge attributions” [Weiner, 2009], Matt Weiner argues that the semantics of the expression “knows that”, as it is used in attributions of knowledge like “Hannah knows that the bank will be open,” are inconsistent, but that this inconsistency is “mostly harmless.” He presents his view as an alternative to the invariantist, contextualist and relativist approaches currently prevalent in the literature, (e.g. [Stanley, 2005], [DeRose, 1995], [Hawthorne, 2006], [MacFarlane, 2005]) and (...)
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  3. Gillian Russell, E Language of Causation.
    () e fall caused the vase to break. () e fall was the cause of the vase’s breaking. () e fall was a cause of the vase’s breaking. () e fall was causally relevant to the vase’s breaking.
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  4. Delia Graff Fara & Gillian Russell (eds.) (forthcoming). The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Routledge.
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  5. Gillian Russell (forthcoming). Epistemic Viciousness in the Martial Arts. In Graham Priest & Damon Young (eds.), Martial Arts and Philosophy. Open Court.
    When I was eleven, my form teacher, Mr Howard, showed some of my class how to punch. We were waiting for the rest of the class to finish changing after gym, and he took a stance that I would now call shizentai yoi and snapped his right fist forward into a head-level straight punch, pulling his left back to his side at the same time. Then he punched with his left, pulling back on his right. We all lined up in (...)
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  6. Gillian Russell (forthcoming). In Defence of Hume’s Law. In Charles Pigden (ed.), Hume on Is and Ought. Palgrave MacMillan.
    An argument defending the view that one cannot derive an ought from an is against the usual (suspect) counterexamples.
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  7. Gillian Russell (forthcoming). Logical Pluralism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  8. Gillian Russell & Greg Restall (forthcoming). Barriers to Implication. In Charles Pigden (ed.), Hume on Is and Ought. Palgrave MacMillan.
    The formulation and proof of Hume’s Law and several related inference barrier theses.
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  9. Gillian Russell (2014). Hybrid Identities and Just Being Yourself. Inquiry 57 (4):455-465.
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  10. Gillian K. Russell (2013). Metaphysical Analyticity and the Epistemology of Logic. Philosophical Studies:1-15.
    Recent work on analyticity distinguishes two kinds, metaphysical and epistemic. This paper argues that the distinction allows for a new view in the philosophy of logic according to which the claims of logic are metaphysically analytic and have distinctive modal profiles, even though their epistemology is holist and in many ways rather Quinean. It is argued that such a view combines some of the more attractive aspects of the Carnapian and Quinean approaches to logic, whilst avoiding some famous problems.
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  11. Greg Restall & Gillian Kay Russell (eds.) (2012). New Waves in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Machine generated contents note: -- Series Editors' PrefaceAcknowledgementsNotes on ContributorsHow Things Are Elsewhere; W. Schwarz Information Change and First-Order Dynamic Logic; B.Kooi Interpreting and Applying Proof Theories for Modal Logic; F.Poggiolesi & G.Restall The Logic(s) of Modal Knowledge; D.Cohnitz On Probabilistically Closed Languages; H.Leitgeb Dogmatism, Probability and Logical Uncertainty; B.Weatherson & D.Jehle Skepticism about Reasoning; S.Roush, K.Allen & I.HerbertLessons in Philosophy of Logic from Medieval Obligations; C.D.Novaes How to Rule Out Things with Words: Strong Paraconsistency and the Algebra of Exclusion; (...)
     
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  12. Greg Restall & Gillian Kay Russell (eds.) (2012). New Waves in Philosophical Logic. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Machine generated contents note: -- Series Editors' PrefaceAcknowledgementsNotes on ContributorsHow Things Are Elsewhere; W. Schwarz Information Change and First-Order Dynamic Logic; B.Kooi Interpreting and Applying Proof Theories for Modal Logic; F.Poggiolesi & G.Restall The Logic(s) of Modal Knowledge; D.Cohnitz On Probabilistically Closed Languages; H.Leitgeb Dogmatism, Probability and Logical Uncertainty; B.Weatherson & D.Jehle Skepticism about Reasoning; S.Roush, K.Allen & I.HerbertLessons in Philosophy of Logic from Medieval Obligations; C.D.Novaes How to Rule Out Things with Words: Strong Paraconsistency and the Algebra of Exclusion; (...)
     
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  13. Gillian Russell & Delia Fara (eds.) (2012). Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Routledge.
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  14. Gillian Russell & Delia Graff Fara (eds.) (2012). Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language. Routledge.
    Philosophy of language is the branch of philosophy that examines the nature of meaning, the relationship of language to reality, and the ways in which we use, learn, and understand language. The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language provides a comprehensive and up-to-date survey of the field, charting its key ideas and movements, and addressing contemporary research and enduring questions in the philosophy of language. Unique to this Companion is clear coverage of research from the related disciplines of formal logic (...)
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  15. Gillian Russell & Delia Graff Fara (eds.) (2012). Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language. Routledge.
    The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language provides a comprehensive and up-to-date survey of the field, charting its key ideas and movements, and addressing contemporary research and enduring questions in the philosophy of language.
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  16. Gillian Russell & Delia Graff Fara (eds.) (2012). The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language. Routledge.
    The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language provides a comprehensive and up-to-date survey of the field, charting its key ideas and movements, and addressing contemporary research and enduring questions in the philosophy of language.
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  17. Delia Graff Fara & Gillian Russell (eds.) (2011). The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language. Routledge.
    This volume provides a comprehensive and up-to-date survey of the field, charting key ideas and movements, and addressing contemporary research.
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  18. Gillian Russell (2011). Indexicals, Context-Sensitivity and the Failure of Implication. Synthese 183 (2):143 - 160.
    This paper investigates, formulates and proves an indexical barrier theorem, according to which sets of non-indexical sentences do not entail (except under specified special circumstances) indexical sentences. It surveys the usual difficulties for this kind of project, as well some that are specific to the case of indexicals, and adapts the strategy of Restall and Russell's "Barriers to Implication" to overcome these. At the end of the paper a reverse barrier theorem is also proved, according to which an indexical sentence (...)
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  19. Gillian Russell (2011). Truth in Virtue of Meaning: A Defence of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction. OUP Oxford.
    The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence. Synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because of what they mean. Analytic sentences--like all bachelors are unmarried and triangles have three sides--are different. They are true in virtue of meaning, so no matter what the world is like, as long as the sentence means what it does, it will be true. This distinction seems powerful because (...)
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  20. Gillian Russell (2010). A Review of Timothy Williamson's the Philosophy of Philosophy. [REVIEW] Philosophical Books 51 (1):39-52.
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  21. Gillian Russell (2010). Analyticity in Externalist Languages. In Sarah Sawyer (ed.), New Waves in Philosophy of Language. Palgrave Macmillan.
  22. Gillian Russell (2010). A New Problem for the Linguistic Doctrine of Necessary Truth. In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan. 267--281.
    My target in this paper is a view that has sometimes been called the ‘Linguistic Doctrine of Necessary Truth’ (L-DONT) and sometimes ‘Conventionalism about Necessity’. It is the view that necessity is grounded in the meanings of our expressions—meanings which are sometimes identified with the conventions governing those expressions—and that our knowledge of that necessity is based on our knowledge of those meanings or conventions. In its simplest form the view states that a truth, if it is necessary, is necessary (...)
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  23. Gillian Russell (2010). Language, Locations and Presupposition. Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 9:194-205.
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  24. Gillian Russell (2008). One True Logic? Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (6):593 - 611.
    This is a paper about the constituents of arguments. It argues that several different kinds of truth-bearer may be taken to compose arguments, but that none of the obvious candidates—sentences, propositions, sentence/truth-value pairs etc.—make sense of logic as it is actually practiced. The paper goes on to argue that by answering the question in different ways, we can generate different logics, thus ensuring a kind of logical pluralism that is different from that of J. Beall and Greg Restall.
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  25. Gillian K. Russell & John M. Doris 1 (2008). Knowledge by Indifference. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3).
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  26. Gillian K. Russell & John M. Doris 1 (2008). Knowledge by Indifference. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):429-437.
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  27. Gillian K. Russell & John M. Doris (2008). Knowledge by Indifference. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):429 – 437.
    Is it harder to acquire knowledge about things that really matter to us than it is to acquire knowledge about things we don't much care about? Jason Stanley 2005 argues that whether or not the relational predicate 'knows that' holds between an agent and a proposition can depend on the practical interests of the agent: the more it matters to a person whether p is the case, the more justification is required before she counts as (...)
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  28. Gillian Kay Russell (2008). Truth in Virtue of Meaning. Oxford University Press.
    The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence. Synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because of what they mean. Analytic sentences - like all bachelors are unmarried and triangles have three sides - are different. They are true in virtue of meaning, so no matter what the world is like, as long as the sentence means what it does, it will be true. -/- (...)
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  29. Gillian Russell (2007). The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction. Philosophy Compass 2 (5):712–729.
    Once a standard tool in the epistemologist’s kit, the analytic/synthetic distinction was challenged by Quine and others in the mid-twentieth century and remains controversial today. But although the work of a lot contemporary philosophers touches on this distinction – in the sense that it either has consequences for it, or it assumes results about it – few have really focussed on it recently. This has the consequence that a lot has happened that should affect our view of the analytic/synthetic distinction, (...)
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  30. Gillian Russell (2007). Teaching & Learning Guide For: The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction. Philosophy Compass 3 (1):273-276.
  31. Gillian Russell (2005). Review: Warren Goldfarb's Deductive Logic. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Logic 3:63-66.
    Deductive Logic is an introductory textbook in formal logic. The book is divided into four parts covering (i) truth-functional logic, (ii) monadic quantifi- cation, (iii) polyadic quantification and (iv) names and identity, and there are exercises for all these topics at the end of the book. In the truth-functional logic part, the reader learns to produce paraphrases of English statements and arguments in logical notation (this subsection is called “analysis”), then about the semantic properties of such paraphrased statements and arguments, (...)
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