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Profile: Giorgio Volpe (Università degli Studi di Bologna)
  1. Giorgio Volpe, Facts as Pleonastic Truth-Makers for Pleonastic Propositions.
    One often hears the claim that fact-based versions of the correspondence theory of truth face a disruptive dilemma: ‘if all true propositions correspond to the same fact, the notion is useless, and if every [true] proposition corresponds to a distinct fact, then the notion becomes idle’ (Engel 2002, 21). The assumption underlying this claim is that all conceptions of facts can be assigned to either of two categories. The first includes those conceptions according to which facts are so coarse-grained that (...)
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  2. Annalisa Coliva, Sebastiano Moruzzi & Giorgio Volpe (2012). Guest Editors' Preface. Discipline Filosofiche 22 (2):5-6.
    This is the guest editors' preface to the Discipline Filosofiche special issue on Knowledge and Justification.
     
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  3. Annalisa Coliva, Sebastiano Moruzzi & Giorgio Volpe (2012). Introduction. Synthese 189 (2):221-234.
    This Introduction to the special issue on “Skepticism and Justification” provides a background to the nine articles collected here and a detailed summary of each, which highlights their interconnections and relevance to the debate at the heart of the issue.
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  4. Giorgio Volpe (2012). Cornerstones: You'd Better Believe Them. Synthese 189 (2):1-23.
    Crispin Wright’s “Unified Strategy” for addressing some familiar sceptical paradoxes exploits a subtle distinction between two different ways in which we can be related to a proposition: (full-blown) belief and (mere) acceptance. The importance of the distinction for his strategy stems from his conviction that we cannot acquire any kind of evidence, either empirical or a priori, for the “cornerstones” of our cognitive projects, i.e., for those basic presuppositions of our inquiries that we must be warranted to endorse if we (...)
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  5. Giorgio Volpe (2012). La Verità. Carocci.
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  6. Giorgio Volpe (2007). Fattori di Verità – by Stefano Caputo. Dialectica 61 (2):297–302.
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  7. Giorgio Volpe (2005). Teorie Della Verità. Guerini Scientifica.
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  8. Giorgio Volpe (2003). Ideal Epistemic Situations and the Accessibility of Realist Truth. Erkenntnis 58 (1):13 - 31.
    There is a widespread opinion that the realist idea that whether a proposition is true or false typically depends on how things are independently of ourselves is bound to turn truth, in Davidson's words, into something to which humans can never legitimately aspire. This opinion accounts for the ongoing popularity of epistemic theories of truth, that is, of those theories that explain what it is for a proposition (or statement, or sentence, or what have you) to be true or false (...)
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  9. Giorgio Volpe (2002). Minimalism and Normative Reasoning: A Reply to Sean Coyle. Ratio Juris 15 (3):319-327.
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  10. Giorgio Volpe (1999). A Minimalist Solution to Jorgensen's Dilemma. Ratio Juris 12 (1):59-79.
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  11. Giorgio Volpe (1997). Alcune considerazioni sui presupposti epistemologia della sociologia della scienza attuale. Epistemologia 20 (2).
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  12. Giorgio Volpe (1995). A Semantic Approach to Comparative Verisimilitude. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):563-581.
    The importance of the comparative notion of versimilitude, or truthlikeness, for a realist conception of knowledge follows from two modest ‘realist’ assumptions, namely, that the aim of an enquiry, as an enquiry, is the truth of some matter; and that one false theory may realize this aim better than another. However, there seem to be two ways in which one (false) theory can realize this aim better than another. One (false) theory can be closer to the truth than another either (...)
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  13. Giorgio Volpe (1995). Popper's Fallibilism Without a Knowing Subject. Epistemologia 18:75-86.
     
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