10 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Giovanni B. Grandi (University of British Columbia)
  1. Giovanni B. Grandi (2014). Hume and Reid on Political Economy. Eighteenth-Century Thought 5.
    While Hume had a favorable opinion of the new commercial society, Reid envisioned a utopian system that would eliminate private property and substitute the profit incentive with a system of state-conferred honors. Reid’s predilection for a centralized command economy cannot be explained by his alleged discovery of market failures, and has to be considered in the context of his moral psychology. Hume tried to explain how the desire for gain that motivates the merchant leads to industry and frugality. These, in (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Giovanni B. Grandi (2014). The Extension of Color Sensations: Reid, Stewart, and Fearn. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (S1).
    It seems to be a consequence of Reid’s views on sensations that colour sensations are not extended nor are they arranged in figured patterns. Reid further claimed that ‘there is no sensation appropriated to visible figure.’ As I show, Reid tried to justify these controversial claims by appeal to Cheselden’s report of the experiences of a young man affected by severe cataracts, and by appeal to cases of perception of visible figure without colour. While holding fast to the principle that (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Giovanni B. Grandi (ed.) (2012). Thomas Reid: Selected Philosophical Writings. Imprint Academic.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Giovanni B. Grandi (2010). Reid and Wells on Single and Double Vision. Journal of Scottish Thought 3:143-163.
    In a recent article on Reid’s theory of single and double vision, James Van Cleve considers an argument against direct realism presented by Hume. Hume argues for the mind-dependent nature of the objects of our perception from the phenomenon of double vision. Reid does not address this particular argument, but Van Cleve considers possible answers Reid might have given to Hume. He finds fault with all these answers. Against Van Cleve, I argue that both appearances in double vision could be (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Giovanni Battista Grandi (2009). Comments on Daniel E. Flage's “Berkeley's Contingent Necessities”. Philosophia 37 (3):373-378.
    According to Daniel Flage, Berkeley thinks that all necessary truths are founded on acts of will that assign meanings to words. After briefly commenting on the air of paradox contained in the title of Flage’s paper, and on the historical accuracy of Berkeley’s understanding of the abstractionist tradition, I make some remarks on two points made by Flage. Firstly, I discuss Flage’s distinction between the ontological ground of a necessary truth and our knowledge of a necessary truth. Secondly, I discuss (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Giovanni B. Grandi (2008). Reid and Condillac on Sensation and Perception. Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (1):191-200.
    In order to illustrate the difference between sensation and perception, Reid imagines a blind man that by ‘some strange distemper’ has lost all his notions of external objects, but has retained the power of sensation and reasoning. Reid argues that since sensations do not resemble external objects, the blind man could not possibly infer from them any notion of primary qualities. Condillac proposed a similar thought experiment in the Treatise on Sensations. I argue that Condillac can reach a conclusion opposite (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Giovanni B. Grandi (2008). Reid on Ridicule and Common Sense. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 6 (1):71-90.
    According to Reid, opinions that contradict the principles of common sense are not only false but also absurd. Nature has given us an emotion that reveals the absurdity of an opinion: the emotion of ridicule. An appeal to ridicule in philosophical arguments may easily be discounted as a logical fallacy in the same manner as an appeal to the common consent of people. This essay traces the origins of Reid's defense of ridicule in the works of Addison, Hutcheson, Shaftesbury and (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Giovanni B. Grandi (2006). Reid's Direct Realism About Vision. History of Philosophy Quarterly 23 (3):225 - 241.
    Thomas Reid presented a two-dimensional geometry of the visual field in his Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764). The axioms of this geometry are different from those of Euclidean plane geometry. The ‘geometry of visibles’ is the same as the geometry of the surface of the sphere, described without reference to points and lines outside the surface itself. In a recent article, James Van Cleve has argued that Reid can secure a non-Euclidean geometry of visibles only at the cost of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Giovanni B. Grandi (2005). Thomas Reid's Geometry of Visibles and the Parallel Postulate. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (1):79-103.
    Thomas Reid (1710–1796) presented a two-dimensional geometry of the visual field in his Inquiry into the human mind (1764), whose axioms are different from those of Euclidean plane geometry. Reid’s ‘geometry of visibles’ is the same as the geometry of the surface of the sphere, described without reference to points and lines outside the surface itself. Interpreters of Reid seem to be divided in evaluating the significance of his geometry of visibles in the history of the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Lorne Falkenstein & Giovanni B. Grandi (2003). The Role of Material Impressions in Reid's Theory of Vision: A Critique of Gideon Yaffe's “Reid on the Perception of the Visible Figure”. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 1 (2):117-133.
    Reid maintained that the perceptions that we obtain from the senses of smell, taste, hearing, and touch are ‘suggested’ by corresponding sensations. However, he made an exception for the sense of vision. According to Reid, our perceptions of the real figure, position, and magnitude of bodies are suggested by their visible appearances, which are not sensations but objects of perception in their own right. These visible appearances have figure, position, and magnitude, as well as ‘colour,’ and the standard view among (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation