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Profile: Giuseppina D'Oro (Keele University)
  1. Giuseppina D'Oro (2014). De la distinction entre action et événement. Recherches Sur la Philosophie Et le Langage 30:169-186.
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  2. Giuseppina D'Oro (2013). The Philosopher and the Grapes: On Descriptive Metaphysics and Why It Is Not 'Sour Metaphysics'. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (4):586 - 599.
    There is a widespread view according to which descriptive metaphysics is not ?real? metaphysics. This paper argues that first-order philosophical disagreements cannot be settled without re-opening the debate about the nature of philosophical enquiry and that failure to scrutinize and justify one?s own metaphilosophical stance leads to arguments which are circular or question begging.
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  3. Giuseppina D'Oro (2013). Understanding Others: Cultural Anthropology with Collingwood and Quine. Journal of the Philosophy of History 7 (3):326-345.
  4. Giuseppina D'Oro & Constantine Sandis (eds.) (2013). Reasons and Causes: Causalism and Non-Causalism in the Philosophy of Action. Palgrave Macmillan.
    To mark the 50th anniversary of Donald Davidson's 'Actions, reasons and causes', eight philosophers with distinctive and contrasting views revisit and update the reasons/causes debate.Their essays are preceded by a historical introduction which traces current debates to their roots in the philosophy of history and social science, linking the rise of causalism to a metaphysical backlash against the linguistic turn. Both historically grounded and topical, this volume will be of great interest to both students and scholars in the philosophy of (...)
     
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  5. Constantine Sandis & Giuseppina D'Oro (2013). Reasons and Causes. Palgrave Macmillan.
  6. Giuseppina D'Oro (2012). Between the Old Metaphysics and the New Empiricism: Collingwood's Defence of the Autonomy of Philosophy. Ratio 25 (1):34-50.
    Collingwood has failed to make a significant impact in the history of twentieth century philosophy either because he has been dismissed as a dusty old idealist committed to the very metaphysics the analytical school was trying to leave behind, or because his later work has been interpreted as advocating the dissolution of philosophy into history. I argue that Collingwood's key philosophical works are a sustained attempt to defend the view that philosophy is an autonomous discipline with a distinctive domain of (...)
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  7. Giuseppina D'Oro (2012). Reasons and Causes: The Philosophical Battle and The Meta-Philosophical War. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):207 - 221.
    ?Are the reasons for acting also the causes of action?? When this question was asked in the early 1960s it received by and large a negative reply: ?No, reasons are not causes?. Yet, when the same question ?Are the reasons for acting the causes of action?? is posed some twenty years later, the predominant answer is ?Yes, reasons are causes?. How could one and the same question receive such diverging answers in the space of only a couple of decades? This (...)
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  8. Giuseppina D'Oro (2011). Davidson and the Autonomy of the Human Sciences. In Jeff Malpas (ed.), Dialogues with Davidson: New Perspectives on his Philosophy. MIT.
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  9. Giuseppina D'oro (2011). The Myth of Collingwood's Historicism. Inquiry 53 (6):627-641.
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  10. Frank Ankersmit, Mark Bevir, Paul Roth, Aviezer Tucker, Alison Wylie & Giuseppina D'Oro (2010). Brill Online Books and Journals. Journal of the Philosophy of History 4 (3-4).
     
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  11. Giuseppina D'Oro & James Connelly, Robin George Collingwood. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  12. Giuseppina D'Oro (2009). Reclaiming the Ancestors of Simulation Theory. History and Theory 48 (1):129-139.
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  13. Giuseppina D'oro, Mark Day, Luke O'sullivan, Jakub Capek, Nick Tosh, Adrian Haddock & Robert John Inkpen (2008). Philosophy of History. Philosophia 36 (4).
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  14. Giuseppina D'Oro (2007). Two Dogmas of Contemporary Philosophy of Action. Journal of the Philosophy of History 1 (1):10-24.
    Davidson's seminal essay "Actions, Reasons and Causes" brought about a paradigm shift in the theory of action. Before Davidson the consensus was that the fundamental task of a theory of action was to elucidate the concept of action and event explanation. The debate concerning the nature of action explanation thus took place primarily in the philosophy of history and social science and was focussed on purely methodological issues. After Davidson it has been assumed that the fundamental challenge for the theory (...)
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  15. Giuseppina D'Oro (2007). The Gap is Semantic, Not Epistemological. Ratio 20 (2):168�178.
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  16. Giuseppina D'Oro (2005). Collingwood's Solution to the Problem of Mind-Body Dualism. Philosophia 32 (1-4):349-368.
    This paper contrasts two approaches to the mind-body problem and the possibility of mental causation: the conceptual approach advocated by Collingwood/Dray and the metaphysical approach advocated by Davidson. On the conceptual approach to show that mental causation is possible is equivalent to demonstrating that mentalistic explanations possess a different logical structure from naturalistic explanations. On the metaphysical approach to show that mental causation is possible entails explaining how the mind can intelligibly be accommodated within a physicalist universe. I argue that (...)
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  17. Giuseppina D'Oro (2005). Idealism and the Philosophy of Mind. Inquiry 48 (5):395-412.
    This paper defends an idealist form of non-reductivism in the philosophy of mind. I refer to it as a kind of conceptual dualism without substance dualism. I contrast this idealist alternative with the two most widespread forms of non-reductivism: multiple realisability functionalism and anomalous monism. I argue first, that functionalism fails to challenge seriously the claim for methodological unity since it is quite comfortable with the idea that it is possible to articulate a descriptive theory of the mind. Second, that (...)
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  18. Giuseppina D'Oro (2005). In Defence of the Agent-Centred Perspective. Metaphilosophy 36 (5):652-667.
  19. Giuseppina D'Oro (2004). Apriority and Philosophical Analysis. Science Et Esprit 56 (3):247-263.
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  20. Giuseppina D'Oro (2004). Collingwood on Philosophical Knowledge and the Enduring Nature of Philosophical Problems. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (1):93 – 109.
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  21. Giuseppina D'Oro (2004). Collingwood, Psychologism and Internalism. European Journal of Philosophy 12 (2):163–177.
    The paper defends Collingwood's account of rational explanation against two objections. The first is that he psychologizes the concept of practical reason. The second is that he fails to distinguish mere rationalizations from rationalizations that have causal power. I argue that Collingwood endorses a form of nonpsychologizing internalism which rests on the view that the appropriate explanans for actions are neither empirical facts (as externalists claim), nor psychological facts (as some internalists claim), but propositional facts. I then defend this form (...)
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  22. Giuseppina D'Oro (2004). Re-Enactment and Radical Interpretation. History and Theory 43 (2):198–208.
  23. Giuseppina D'oro (2003). Collingwood and Ryle on the Concept of Mind. Philosophical Explorations 6 (1):18 – 30.
    This paper argues that Collingwood's philosophy of mind offers an interesting and compelling account of the nature of the mind and of the irreducibility of the mental, an account whose viability and relevance to contemporary debates ought to be given serious consideration. I suggest that the reason why Collingwood's contribution to the philosophy of mind has been neglected is due to the fact that his philosophy of mind is widely, even if mistakenly, regarded as the target of Ryle's attacks on (...)
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  24. Giuseppina D'Oro (2002). Collingwood and the Metaphysics of Experience. Routledge.
    Collingwood and the Metaphysics of Experience re-visits Collingwood's body of work and locates it in the context of the fundamental problems of philosophy and shows that Collingwood is both an influential and key philosophical figure of the twentieth century.
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  25. Giuseppina D'oro (2002). Collingwood, Metaphysics, and Historicism. Dialogue 41 (01):71-.
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  26. Giuseppina D'Oro (2000). Collingwood on Re-Enactment and the Identity of Thought. Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (1):87-101.
  27. Giuseppina D'Oro (2000). On Collingwood's Rehabilitation of the Ontological Argument. Idealistic Studies 30 (3):173-188.
    The paper is divided in two parts. In the first I consider the nature of Ryle's attack on Collingwood's appropriation of the ontological argument and Collingwood's defence in the unpublished correspondence. In the second, I go beyond the confines of the Ryle-Collingwood exchange in the mid 'thirties to say something much more general about the nature of Collingwood's metaphysics as well as to advance an explanation of the compatibility of Collingwood's combined defence of descriptive metaphysics and the ontological proof.
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