Search results for 'Goedel' (try it on Scholar)

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Profile: Kurt Goedel
  1. George D. Goedel (1974). Connotative Evaluation and Concreteness Shifts in Short-Term Memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology 102 (2):314.score: 30.0
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  2. Robert C. Radtke, Larry L. Jacoby & George D. Goedel (1971). Frequency Discrimination as a Function of Frequency of Repetition and Trials. Journal of Experimental Psychology 89 (1):78.score: 30.0
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  3. Hung-Yul So (2008). Goedel, Nietzsche and Buddha. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 13:105-111.score: 18.0
    Hawking, in his book, A Brief History of Time, concludes with a conditional remark: If we find a complete theory to explain the physical world, then we will come to understand God’s mind. With Goedel in mind, we can raise questions about the completeness of our scientific understanding and the nature of our understanding with regard to God’s mind. We need to ask about the higher order of our understanding when we move to knowing God’s mind. We go onto (...)
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  4. Woosuk Park (2003). On the Motivations of Goedel's Ontological Proof. Modern Schoolman 80 (2):144-153.score: 15.0
  5. Mauro Dorato, Kant, Goedel and Relativity.score: 15.0
    Since the onset of logical positivism, the general wisdom of the philosophy of science has it that the kantian philosophy of (space and) time has been superseded by the theory of relativity, in the same sense in which the latter has replaced Newton’s theory of absolute space and time. On the wake of Cassirer and Gödel, in this paper I raise doubts on this commonplace by suggesting some conditions that are necessary to defend the ideality of time in the sense (...)
     
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  6. Tobias Chapman (1995). Goedel on Kantian Idealism and Time. Idealistic Studies 25 (2):129-139.score: 15.0
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  7. Robert A. Schultz (1980). What Could Self-Reflexiveness Be? Or Goedel's Theorem Goes to Hollywood and Discovers That It's All Done with Mirrors. Semiotica 30 (1-2).score: 15.0
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  8. Geoffrey Hellman (1981). How to Goedel a Frege-Russell: Goedel's Incompleteness Theorem. Noûs 15:451-68.score: 15.0
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  9. Douglas S. Robertson (2000). Goedel's Theorem, the Theory of Everything, and the Future of Science and Mathematics. Complexity 5 (5):22-27.score: 15.0
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  10. I. Aimonetto (1993). Goedel Theorem of Incompleteness. Filosofia 44 (1):113-136.score: 15.0
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  11. I. Aimonetto (1993). Il teorema di incompletezza di goedel. Filosofia 44 (1):113-136.score: 15.0
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  12. I. Aimonetto (1988). The Foundations of the Goedel Theorem-From Peano to Frege and Russell. Filosofia 39 (3):231-249.score: 15.0
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  13. U. Fidelman (1999). Goedel's Theorem and Models of the Brain: Possible Hemispheric Basis for Kant's Psychological Ideas. Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (1):43-56.score: 15.0
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  14. A. D. Irvine (1995). Kurt Goedel, Collected Works. Volumes I and II. Philosophia Mathematica 3:299-299.score: 15.0
     
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  15. F. RivettiBarbo (1996). A Surreptitious Change in the Designation of a Term: The Foundation of Goedel's Theorem of the Non-Demonstrability of Non-Contradictoriness-A New Metalinguistic Exposition and Philosophical Considerations. Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 88 (1):95-128.score: 15.0
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  16. A. A. Zenkin & A. Linear (2002). Goedel's Numbering of Multi-Modal Texts. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):180.score: 15.0
     
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  17. John R. Lucas (1961). Minds, Machines and Godel. Philosophy 36 (April-July):112-127.score: 9.0
    Goedel's theorem states that in any consistent system which is strong enough to produce simple arithmetic there are formulae which cannot be proved-in-the-system, but which we can see to be true. Essentially, we consider the formula which says, in effect, "This formula is unprovable-in-the-system". If this formula were provable-in-the-system, we should have a contradiction: for if it were provablein-the-system, then it would not be unprovable-in-the-system, so that "This formula is unprovable-in-the-system" would be false: equally, if it were provable-in-the-system, then (...)
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  18. Aaron Sloman (1992). The Emperor's Real Mind -- Review of Roger Penrose's The Emperor's New Mind: Concerning Computers Minds and the Laws of Physics. Artificial Intelligence 56 (2-3):355-396.score: 9.0
    "The Emperor's New Mind" by Roger Penrose has received a great deal of both praise and criticism. This review discusses philosophical aspects of the book that form an attack on the "strong" AI thesis. Eight different versions of this thesis are distinguished, and sources of ambiguity diagnosed, including different requirements for relationships between program and behaviour. Excessively strong versions attacked by Penrose (and Searle) are not worth defending or attacking, whereas weaker versions remain problematic. Penrose (like Searle) regards the notion (...)
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  19. Douglas Kutach (2013). Time Travel and Time Machines. In Adrian Bardon & Heather Dyke (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Time. Blackwell.score: 6.0
    Thinking about time travel is an entertaining way to explore how to understand time and its location in the broad conceptual landscape that includes causation, fate, action, possibility, experience, and reality. It is uncontroversial that time travel towards the future exists, and time travel to the past is generally recognized as permitted by Einstein’s general theory of relativity, though no one knows yet whether nature truly allows it. Coherent time travel stories have added flair to traditional debates over the metaphysical (...)
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  20. William E. Seager (2003). Yesterday's Algorithm: Penrose and the Godel Argument. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (9):265-273.score: 6.0
    Roger Penrose is justly famous for his work in physics and mathematics but he is _notorious_ for his endorsement of the Gödel argument (see his 1989, 1994, 1997). This argument, first advanced by J. R. Lucas (in 1961), attempts to show that Gödel’s (first) incompleteness theorem can be seen to reveal that the human mind transcends all algorithmic models of it1. Penrose's version of the argument has been seen to fall victim to the original objections raised against Lucas (see Boolos (...)
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  21. H. Gaifman (2000). What Godel's Incompleteness Result Does and Does Not Show. Journal of Philosophy 97 (8):462-471.score: 6.0
    In a recent paper S. McCall adds another link to a chain of attempts to enlist Gödel’s incompleteness result as an argument for the thesis that human reasoning cannot be construed as being carried out by a computer.1 McCall’s paper is undermined by a technical oversight. My concern however is not with the technical point. The argument from Gödel’s result to the no-computer thesis can be made without following McCall’s route; it is then straighter and more forceful. Yet the argument (...)
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  22. Storrs McCall (1999). Can a Turing Machine Know That the Godel Sentence is True? Journal of Philosophy 96 (10):525-32.score: 6.0
  23. Paul Benacerraf (1967). God, the Devil, and Godel. The Monist 51 (January):9-32.score: 6.0
  24. G. Lee Bowie (1982). Lucas' Number is Finally Up. Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (3):279-85.score: 6.0
  25. John R. Lucas (1968). Satan Stultified: A Rejoinder to Paul Benacerraf. The Monist 52 (1):145-58.score: 6.0
    The argument is a dialectical one. It is not a direct proof that the mind is something more than a machine, but a schema of disproof for any particular version of mechanism that may be put forward. If the mechanist maintains any specific thesis, I show that [146] a contradiction ensues. But only if. It depends on the mechanist making the first move and putting forward his claim for inspection. I do not think Benacerraf has quite taken the point. He (...)
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  26. I. J. Good (1969). Godel's Theorem is a Red Herring. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (February):357-8.score: 6.0
  27. John R. Lucas (1970). The Freedom of the Will. Oxford University Press.score: 6.0
    It might be the case that absence of constraint is the relevant sense of ' freedom' when we are discussing the freedom of the will, but it needs arguing for. ...
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  28. John R. Lucas (1970). Mechanism: A Rejoinder. Philosophy 45 (April):149-51.score: 6.0
    PROFESSOR LEWIS 1 and Professor Coder 2 criticize my use of Gödel's theorem to refute Mechanism. 3 Their criticisms are valuable. In order to meet them I need to show more clearly both what the tactic of my argument is at one crucial point and the general aim of the whole manoeuvre.
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  29. A. Hutton (1976). This Godel is Killing Me. Philosophia 3 (March):135-44.score: 6.0
  30. C. Chihara (1972). On Alleged Refutations of Mechanism Using Godel's Incompleteness Results. Journal of Philosophy 69 (September):507-26.score: 6.0
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  31. Taner Edis (1998). How Godel's Theorem Supports the Possibility of Machine Intelligence. Minds and Machines 8 (2):251-262.score: 6.0
    Gödel's Theorem is often used in arguments against machine intelligence, suggesting humans are not bound by the rules of any formal system. However, Gödelian arguments can be used to support AI, provided we extend our notion of computation to include devices incorporating random number generators. A complete description scheme can be given for integer functions, by which nonalgorithmic functions are shown to be partly random. Not being restricted to algorithms can be accounted for by the availability of an arbitrary random (...)
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  32. Cezary Cieśliński & Rafal Urbaniak (2013). Gödelizing the Yablo Sequence. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (5):679-695.score: 6.0
    We investigate what happens when ‘truth’ is replaced with ‘provability’ in Yablo’s paradox. By diagonalization, appropriate sequences of sentences can be constructed. Such sequences contain no sentence decided by the background consistent and sufficiently strong arithmetical theory. If the provability predicate satisfies the derivability conditions, each such sentence is provably equivalent to the consistency statement and to the Gödel sentence. Thus each two such sentences are provably equivalent to each other. The same holds for the arithmetization of the existential Yablo (...)
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  33. Peter Slezak (1982). Godel's Theorem and the Mind. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 33 (March):41-52.score: 6.0
  34. Albert E. Lyngzeidetson (1990). Massively Parallel Distributed Processing and a Computationalist Foundation for Cognitive Science. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (March):121-127.score: 6.0
    My purpose in this brief paper is to consider the implications of a radically different computer architecure to some fundamental problems in the foundations of Cognitive Science. More exactly, I wish to consider the ramifications of the 'Gödel-Minds-Machines' controversy of the late 1960s on a dynamically changing computer architecture which, I venture to suggest, is going to revolutionize which 'functions' of the human mind can and cannot be modelled by (non-human) computational automata. I will proceed on the presupposition that the (...)
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  35. Charles Sayward (2002). A Conversation About Numbers. Philosophia 29 (1-4):191-209.score: 6.0
    This is a dialogue in which five characters are involved. Various issues in the philosophy of mathematics are discussed. Among those issues are these: numbers as abstract objects, our knowledge of numbers as abstract objects, a proof as showing a mathematical statement to be true as opposed to the statement being true in virtue of having a proof.
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  36. William H. Hanson (1971). Mechanism and Godel's Theorem. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 22 (February):9-16.score: 6.0
  37. David L. Boyer (1983). R. Lucas, Kurt Godel, and Fred Astaire. Philosophical Quarterly 33 (April):147-59.score: 6.0
  38. Jerome A. Shaffer (1965). Recent Work on the Mind-Body Problem. American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (April):81-104.score: 6.0
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  39. F. H. George (1962). Minds, Machines and Godel: Another Reply to Mr. Lucas. Philosophy 37 (January):62-63.score: 6.0
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  40. William S. Robinson (1992). Penrose and Mathematical Ability. Analysis 52 (2):80-88.score: 6.0
  41. Robert Kirk (1986). Mental Machinery and Godel. Synthese 66 (March):437-452.score: 6.0
  42. John R. Lucas (1976). This Godel is Killing Me: A Rejoinder. Philosophia 6 (March):145-8.score: 6.0
  43. Peter Slezak (1984). Minds, Machines and Self-Reference. Dialectica 38 (1):17-34.score: 6.0
  44. C. Whitely (1962). Minds, Machines and Godel: A Reply to Mr Lucas. Philosophy 37 (January):61-62.score: 6.0
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  45. David Coder (1969). Godel's Theorem and Mechanism. Philosophy 44 (September):234-7.score: 6.0
  46. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1989). Can There Be a Proof That an Unprovable Sentence of Arithmetic is True? Dialectica 43 (43):289-292.score: 6.0
    Various authors of logic texts are cited who either suggest or explicitly state that the Gödel incompleteness result shows that some unprovable sentence of arithmetic is true. Against this, the paper argues that the matter is one of philosophical controversy, that it is not a mathematical or logical issue.
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  47. A. George & Daniel J. Velleman (2000). Leveling the Playing Field Between Mind and Machine: A Reply to McCall. Journal of Philosophy 97 (8):456-452.score: 6.0
  48. Richard Zach (2005). Book Review: Michael Potter. Reason's Nearest Kin. Philosophies of Arithmetic From Kant to Carnap. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 46 (4):503-513.score: 6.0
  49. Paolo Mancosu (2004). Book Review: Kurt G�Del. Collected Works , Volumes IV and V. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 45 (2):109-125.score: 6.0
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  50. Thomas Macaulay Ferguson (2014). Łukasiewicz Negation and Many-Valued Extensions of Constructive Logics. In Proc. 44th International Symposium on Multiple-Valued Logic. IEEE Computer Society Press. 121-127.score: 6.0
    This paper examines the relationships between the many-valued logics G~ and Gn~ of Esteva, Godo, Hajek, and Navara, i.e., Godel logic G enriched with Łukasiewicz negation, and neighbors of intuitionistic logic. The popular fragments of Rauszer's Heyting-Brouwer logic HB admit many-valued extensions similar to G which may likewise be enriched with Łukasiewicz negation; the fuzzy extensions of these logics, including HB, are equivalent to G ~, as are their n-valued extensions equivalent to Gn~ for any n ≥ 2. These enriched (...)
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