How Galileo created the problem of consciousness -- Is there a ghost in the machine? -- Can physical science explain consciousness? -- How to solve the problem of consciousness -- Consciousness and the meaning of life.

World Ethics: The New Agenda identifies different ways of thinking about ethics, and of thinking ethically about international and global relations. It also considers several theories of world ethics in the context of issues such as war and peace, world poverty, the environment and the United Nations. The discussion is grounded in an awareness of the post-9/11 world in which we live and offers a more detailed exploration of the idea of global citizenship and a global or cosmopolitan ethic.

There has recently been a revival of interest in panpsychism as a theory of consciousness. The hope of the contemporary proponents of panpsychism is that the view enables us to integrate consciousness into our overall theory of reality in a way that avoids the deep difficulties that plague the more conventional options of physicalism on the one hand and dualism on the other. However, panpsychism comes in two forms — strong and weak emergentist — and there are arguments that seem (...) to show that weak emergentist panpsychism faces problems analogous to those of physicalism whilst strong emergentist panpsychism faces problems analogous to those of dualism. In this paper, I will develop a new hybrid of the strong and weak emergentist forms of panpsychism, a view according to which subjects of experience are strongly emergent but their phenomenal properties are weakly emergent. I will argue that this hybrid view manages to avoid the challenges facing both physicalism and dualism, and the analogues of those challenges that seem to undermine standard forms of panpsychism. (shrink)

Dualists say plausible things about our mental concepts: there is a way of thinking of pain, in terms of how it feels, which is independent of causal role. Physicalists make attractive ontological claims: the world is wholly physical. The attraction of a posteriori physicalism is that it has seemed to do both: to agree with the dualist about our mental concepts, whilst retaining a physicalist ontology. In this paper I argue that, in fact, a posteriori physicalism departs from the dualist's (...) intuitive picture of our phenomenal concepts in just as radical a manner as more traditional forms of physicalism. Whereas the physicalism of David Lewis and David Armstrong is counterintuitive in holding that our only way of thinking about pain is in terms of its causal role, the physicalism of David Papineau and Brian Loar departs from common sense in holding that our phenomenal concept of pain is opaque: thinking of pain in terms of how it feels reveals nothing of what it is for something to feel pain. The arguments of David Chalmers and Frank Jackson against a posteriori physicalism involve general claims about all concepts. In contrast, my argument makes a claim only about phenomenal concepts: phenomenal concepts are not opaque. (shrink)

1 Non-reductive physicalists deny that there is any explanation of mentality in purely physical terms, but do not deny that the mental is entirely determined by and constituted out of underlying physical structures. There are important issues about the stability of such a view which teeters on the edge of explanatory reductionism on the one side and dualism on the other (see Kim 1998). 2 Save perhaps for eliminative materialism (see Churchland 1981 for a classic exposition). In fact, however, while.

Our story is changing. The Universe has given our species everything we need to actualize our potential. Evolution is knocking at our doors. The connected life is here. We are being fed this minute with the very nutrients that can assure that we live the lives that fulfill us and that serve the greater whole. Our natural inheritance, combined with the pattern that connects us with the rest of Life, calls us to be fully ourselves. This has always been the (...) case, but now it is becoming more evident. Our lives are Life's life. The details unfold within. David "Lucky" Goff, Ph.D., M.F.T., served as adjunct faculty at the Institute of Transpersonal Psychology, where he employed large group processes to promote community and personal development. David also assists organizations, including therapeutic and spiritual communities, in their quests to create and sustain genuine community. His research into the "psychological sense of community" is the first to examine and describe the conditions that facilitate collective consciousness. In 2003 David had a brain aneurism. As a result of his stroke and the onset of a rare brain syndrome, he nearly died and ended up permanently disabled. This experience had a transformational effect on David, which made him "Lucky" and cued him into how radically connected all things are. This broader awareness now informs his approach toward what it means to be human. He maintains a psychotherapy practice specializing in psycho-spiritual development. He also writes extensively about a psychology of interdependence, community, elders, and the conditions that lead to a social and ecological sense of connection. (shrink)

Les partisans de la démocratie radicale ont développé une critique de la démocratie représentative, mettant en avant une priorité du politique sur le social ainsi que la centralité du conflit. Ils n'ont cependant pas produit une réflexion suffisante sur les conditions de la participation politique. C'est ce à quoi s'attelle ce livre, en s'inspirant du pragmatisme de Dewey et de sa définition de la politique démocratique en termes d'expérimentation. Après avoir dégagé l'ossature de la pensée de Dewey, ce livre en (...) interroge certains des points aveugles en puisant à la source des travaux de Charles Wright Mills. Puis il en examine une des actualisations récentes. Tout en montrant les richesses du pragmatisme deweyen qui déconstruit certains clivages stériles en philosophie politique et permet de penser la dynamique de formation des liens civils, ce livre met en relief certaines limites de l'expérimentalisme démocratique."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Quels sont les ressorts profonds de la grave crise économique, sociale et politique que nous traversons? Quelles lignes de fracture souterraines révèle-t-elle? Ces questions ont fait l'objet d'une journée de réflexion organisée à l'occasion du 60e anniversaire de la disparition du philosophe Emmanuel Mounier à l'âge de 45 ans, le 22 mars 1950. Vingt ans durant, le fondateur de la revue Esprit n'a cessé de passer au feu de la critique les politiques et idéologies aboutissant à la négation de la (...) personne, coeur vivant du personnalisme, sa doctrine. A l'origine de ces perversions : une erreur sur l'homme. Mounier l'identifie dès ses premiers textes consacrés à la crise des années 1930. Crise financière, crise économique, certes, mais plus en profondeur, " crise morale " et " spirituelle ". Elle se manifeste par le primat de l'argent déconnecté de l'économie réelle dans une délirante " autofécondité ", l'instrumentalisation du travail, la domination et les inégalités, la prolifération de besoins factices... 500 personnes dont 150 scolaires et étudiants ont participé à cette belle journée de débats qui s'est également interrogée sur l'influence internationale actuelle de la pensée de Mounier. (shrink)

Le dépassement du mythe du donné est au fondement de la conception mcdowellienne de la connaissance et de la pensée. En cela, McDowell prolonge l'analyse de Sellars. Il s'oppose cependant à la recherche, par ce dernier, d'une « pure sensation » comme élément causal de la connaissance. Celle-ci ne serait qu'un nouvel avatar du donné et tombe, d'après McDowell, sous le coup de la propre réfutation sellarsienne du mythe. Mais il reste possible de concevoir un donné déjà conceptuel. C'est ainsi (...) que peut être dépassé le mythe et c'est, d'après McDowell, ce que Kant, nonobstant les critiques que lui adresse Sellars, permet de penser. Toutefois, McDowell lui-même ne tombe-t-il pas dans une autre version du mythe du donné, à propos de ce que Sellars appelle le donné catégorial ? Nous montrerons que cette accusation, élevée notamment par Rosenberg, méconnaît le sens du donné conceptuel proposé par McDowell. The rebuking of the myth of the given lies at the foundation of McDowell's epistemology and philosophy of mind. He follows Sellars in this path, yet rejects Sellars' solution of a « sheer sensation » as the basis of knowledge and thought. Such a sheer sensation only is a new form of the myth, it falls under Sellars' own refutation of the myth. Something merely causal cannot contribute to knowledge or thought. Yet, it is possible to conceive of an already conceptual given. According to McDowell, this is the way to overcome the myth, a way already shown by Kant. But does McDowell himself not fall prey to another version of the myth, the myth of the categorial given, as Sellars puts it? I will show that this accusation, professed by Rosenberg among others, rests on a misunderstanding of what McDowell means by conceptual. (shrink)

The notion of ‘gentle barbarism’ was developed during our critical analysis of the discourses and mechanisms of ‘modernisation’ that emerged in the context of the movement for permanent reform (in education, the public services and business management), in which public bodies and businesses have been engaged since the 1980s. These discourses and mechanisms of modernisation seem to us to represent a blind spot where sociological analysis is concerned.

_‘Informative, accessible, and fun to read— this is an excellent reference guide for undergraduates and anyone wanting an introduction to the fundamental issues of metaphysics. I know of no other resource like it.’– __Meghan Griffith, Davidson College, USA_ _'Marvellous! This book provides the very best place to start for students wanting to take the first step into understanding metaphysics.Undergraduates would do well to buy it and consult it regularly. The quality and clarity of the material are consistently high.' – __Chris (...) Daly, University of Manchester, UK_ Ever wondered about Gunk, Brains in a Vat or Frankfurt’s Nefarious Neurosurgeon? With complete explanations of these terms and more, _Metaphysics: The Key Concepts_ is an accessible and engaging introduction to the most widely studied and challenging concepts in metaphysics. The authors clearly and lucidly define and discuss key terms and concepts, under the themes of: time particulars & universals realism & antirealism free will personal identity causation and laws. Arranged in an easy to use A-Z format, each concept is explored and illustrated with engaging and memorable examples, and accompanied by an up-to-date guide to further reading. Fully cross-referenced throughout, this remarkable reference guide is essential reading for students of philosophy and all those interested in the nature of reality. (shrink)

The first half of this book argues that physicalism cannot account for consciousness, and hence cannot be true. The second half explores and defends Russellian monism, a radical alternative to both physicalism and dualism. The view that emerges combines panpsychism with the view that the universe as a whole is fundamental.

In this brillant meditation on conceptions of history, Le Goff traces the evolution of the historian's craft. Examining real and imagined oppositions between past and present, ancient and modern, oral and written history, _History and Memory_ reveals the strands of continuity that have characterized historiography from ancient Mesopotamia to modern Europe.

This volume comprises a multidisciplinary study of the work of the important Scottish philosopher, John Macmurray. Macmurray held university posts in London and Edinburgh and exercised a wide influence through his many writings and BBC radio broadcasts. More recently, his work has come to prominence through his acknowledged influence on British Prime Minister Tony Blair. The essays in this collection are from a range of international scholars in the humanities and social sciences. In addition to a biographical introduction, they cover (...) themes in philosophy, religion, political theory, psychology, and ethics. A comprehensive bibliography of Macmurray's publications is also included. (shrink)

In this brillant meditation on conceptions of history, Le Goff traces the evolution of the historian's craft. Examining real and imagined oppositions between past and present, ancient and modern, oral and written history, _History and Memory_ reveals the strands of continuity that have characterized historiography from ancient Mesopotamia to modern Europe.

This article surveys the recently established field of enquiry called 'development ethics' - that is, ethical enquiry into the normative basis of socio-economic development. This covers two levels of enquiry. First, it involves enquiry into the nature of human well-being and the social norms within which the conditions of well-being should be promoted, and includes consideration of both the means and the ends of development. Second, it involves the ethical basis of the wider global framework within which the development of (...) countries takes place. This covers both the normative basis of international relations and the global relations between individuals in different parts of the world as expressed in the idea of global responsibility. (shrink)

Global ethics is an emerging discipline which has not yet reached maturity. The main tasks before it to gain maturity are: first, to achieve a greater integration of various domains of enquiry all of which are concerned with global normative issues. At a general level this includes integrating global ethics with cosmopolitanism, global justice and human right discourse. At the level of areas of concern, there needs to be greater integration of various areas such as development, trade, environment and climate (...) change. And it must grapple with the question of diversity within universality: how far can diversity of practices be accommodated within a culturally sensitive universal framework? Second, there is the question of finding a shared normative framework with respect to the diverse worldviews that may lie behind this: what degree and kind of convergence/consensus are worth working for? Third, there is the task of creating the conditions for its own wider acceptance, which should include taking the idea of global citizenship seriously. (shrink)

This paper starts from the assumption that panpsychism is counterintuitive and metaphysically demanding. A number of philosophers, whilst not denying these negative aspects of the view, think that panpsychism has in its favour that it offers a good explanation of consciousness. In opposition to this, the paper argues that panpsychism cannot help us to explain consciousness, at least not the kind of consciousness we have pre-theoretical reason to believe in.

In this paper, I reply to 18 of the essays on panpsychism in this issue. Along the way, I sketch out what a post-Galilean science of consciousness, one in which consciousness is taken to be a fundamental feature of reality, might look like.

We introduce the topic of panpsychism, before briefly outlining the 19 essays on panpsychism containing in this special issue.

Many philosophers and scientists believe that we need an explanation as to why the laws of physics and the initial conditions of the universe are fine-tuned for life. The standard two options are: theism and the multiverse hypothesis. Both of these theories are extravagant and arguably have false predictions. Drawing on contemporary philosophy of mind, I outline a form of panpsychism that I believe offers a more parsimonious and less problematic explanation of cosmological fine-tuning.

The revival of recognition theory has brought new energy to critical theory. In general terms, recognition theory aims to critically evaluate social structures against a standard of social freedom identified with norms of interaction which are freely recognized by all parties. Until now, attention has primarily focused on the categories and forms of recognition theory. However, the influence of contemporary French theory upon the development of theories of recognition has not yet received the consideration it merits. The book takes up (...) this task. With chapters by internationally recognized authors, the collection outlines the current state of recognition theory, studies the impact of French theory, and uses French thought to identity aspects of the recognitive process which are often overlooked. Exploring French accounts of agonistic identity construction, vulnerability, power, ethical obligation, and reflexive theory construction, this book supports the intentions of critical theory with heightened attentiveness to oppression in all of its forms. (shrink)

This paper starts from the assumption that panpsychism is counterintuitive and metaphysically demanding. A number of philosophers, whilst not denying these negative aspects of the view, think that panpsychism has in its favour that it offers a good explanation of consciousness. In opposition to this, the paper argues that panpsychism cannot help us to explain consciousness, at least not the kind of consciousness we have pre-theoretical reason to believe in.

It used to be thought that rational coherence and metaphysical possibility went hand in hand. Kripke and Putnam put a spanner in the works by proposing examples of propositions which seem to violate this principle. I will propose a nuanced form of modal rationalism consistent with the Kripke/putnam cases. The rough idea is that rational coherence entails possibility when you grasp the essential nature of what you’re conceiving of.

Revelation is roughly the thesis that we have introspective access to the essential nature of our conscious states. This thesis is appealed to in arguments against physicalism. Little attention has been given to the problem that Revelation is a source of pressure in the direction of epiphenomenalism, as introspection does not seem to reveal our conscious states as being essentially causal. I critique Hedda Hassel Mørch’s ‘phenomenal powers view’ response to this difficulty, before defending a form of the ‘consciousness+’ response.

Cognitive phenomenalism is the view that occurrent thoughts are identical with, or constituted of, cognitive phenomenology. This paper raises a challenge for this view: the cognitive fine-tuning problem. In broad brushstrokes the difficulty is that, for the cognitive phenomenalist, there is a distinction between three kinds of fact: cognitive phenomenal facts, sensory phenomenal facts, and functional facts. This distinction gives rise to the challenge of explaining why, in actuality, these three phenomena tend to be matched together in ways that respect (...) norms of rationality. Various solutions to this problem are explored – divine intervention, value-involving laws of nature, or basic capacities to respond to reasons – all of which are wildly at odds with naturalism. If cognitive phenomenalists want their view to be consistent with naturalism, as many do, they must come up with a naturalistic solution to the cognitive fine-tuning problem. (shrink)

Spinoza believed that there was only one substance in reality, which he called "God or nature." A number of leading contemporary philosophers have defended monism, this strange and beautiful idea that the cosmos is the source of all being. This book explores both the historical roots of the monism in Spinoza, and its flowering in the 21st century.

Physicalism dominated Anglo‐American philosophy in the latter half of the twentieth century, and is perhaps still the most popular view among analytic philosophers. Panpsychism is increasingly being seen as a serious option, both for explaining consciousness and for providing a satisfactory theory of the natural world. Perhaps the most popular form of panpsychism at present is constitutive panpsychism. At least some fundamental material entities are conscious; facts about human and animal consciousness are grounded in facts about the consciousness of their (...) fundamental material parts. This chapter equates panpsychism with constitutive panpsychism. In considering responses to the notorious combination problem for panpsychism, the chapter moves onto other forms of panpsychism to examine whether they fare any better against this challenge. It adopts the via negativa definition of physicalism. Panqualityism is the only form of panprotopsychism which offers a clear positive proposal as to what protophenomenal properties are. (shrink)

L’anthropologie philosophique est l’un des fronts sur lesquels s’est développée, ces dernières années, la critique du libéralisme politique : à la figure d’un sujet rationnel et souverain, déjà autonome, certains courants de la théorie politique ont tenté d’opposer une conception alternative du sujet et c’est dans ce contexte qu’a émergé la thématique de la vulnérabilité dont le développement est apparu comme le fondement éventuel d’un dépassement de la problématique libérale. On ne s’étonnera pas de voir la référence à la vulnérabilité (...) figurer en bonne place dans la réflexion néorépublicaine et en particulier dans la théorie de liberté comme non-domination élaborée par Philip Pettit. Comment les néorépublicains définissent-ils la vulnérabilité et quel statut lui accordent-ils ? Quel rôle la vulnérabilité joue-t-elle dans la définition d’une perspective républicaine originale et dans l’élaboration d’une conception non libérale de l’autonomie ? Que nous apprend-elle enfin sur les limites éventuelles du projet néorépublicain ? C’est à ces questions que tentent de répondre les deux articles rassemblés ici. Ces deux textes correspondent aux deux volets d’une étude sur le statut de la catégorie de la vulnérabilité dans la théorie néorépublicaine. Le premier article (« Vulnérabilité, non-domination et autonomie : l’apport du républicanisme ») correspond au volet proprement analytique de notre étude : il propose un état des lieux du statut de la vulnérabilité dans le cadre des théories néorépublicaines, de Pettit à Iseult Honohan, en passant par John Maynor... L’examen de l’articulation entre vulnérabilité et non-domination met en lumière les ressources du néorépublicanisme et son potentiel d’élargissement (via l’intégration des problématiques socialistes, multiculturalistes, écologistes et féministes). Le second article (« Vulnérabilité, non-domination et autonomie : vers une critique du néorépublicanisme ») part de la manière dont les néorépublicains ont souligné la convergence entre l’autonomie telle qu’elle est pensée à l’aune de la non-domination et les approches relationnelles de l’autonomie. Il s’agit pour nous d’interroger ce rapprochement et par là de dégager certaines limites de l’approche néorépublicaine de la vulnérabilité en la confrontant de façon systématique à d’autres conceptions mises en avant dans la théorie des « capabilités », dans les théories de la reconnaissance et dans les éthiques du care. (shrink)

This article presents global ethics as critical reflection on the nature, justification and application of a global ethic. Much of the article focuses on the nature of a global ethic as the content of global ethics, e.g. whether it is thick or thin, is about universal values or transnational responsibilities, is a set of values justified by a particular thinker, values widely shared or values universally accepted. Global ethics itself as a process is also examined. In the last part the (...) Earth Charter is examined as an example of a global ethic, and a case is made for regarding it, both in respect to its content and in respect to the senses in which it is and is not a global ethic, as an appropriate subject matter for global ethics. (shrink)

Dower observes mounting tension in U.S.-Japan relations. He identifies two factors as contributing to mutual fear: differences in capitalism on national and international levels, and stereotypical perceptions based on racial phobias.

Zombies are bodies without minds: creatures that are physically identical to actual human beings, but which have no conscious experience. Much of the consciousness literature focuses on considering how threatening philosophical reflection on such creatures is to physicalism. There is not much attention given to the converse possibility, the possibility of minds without bodies, that is, creatures who are conscious but whose nature is exhausted by their being conscious. We can call such a ‘purely conscious’ creature a ghost.

Alice Le Goff ,Christian Nadeau | : Ce texte constitue une introduction au dossier. Il introduit les différentes contributions en mettant en relief leurs principales orientations. Ce faisant, il propose donc une cartographie conceptuelle, forcément partielle, des enjeux associés à la notion de démocratie épistémique et des enjeux du croisement de cette notion avec celle de démocratie de contestation. En un premier temps, nous revenons sur l’apport du procéduralisme épistémique et sur les questions qu’il soulève. Ensuite, nous revenons sur le (...) néo-pragmatisme et la façon dont il permet d’envisager une justification épistémique de la démocratie. Puis nous mettons l’accent sur les enjeux d’un dialogue entre modèle républicain de la démocratie contestataire et modèle épistémique. Enfin, le texte propose un résumé du parcours proposé dans le cadre de ce dossier. | : This introduction brings out the main lines of the articles collected in the present issue. Our aim is to provide the reader with a conceptual overview of the main stakes of epistemic democracy and of its intersections with the model of contestatory democracy. First, we focus on epistemic proceduralism, its contributions and the questions it raises. Second, we emphasize the way neo-pragmatism deals with the epistemic justification of democracy. Then, we insist on the interest of a dialogue between epistemic democracy and the neo-republican model of contestatory democracy. Finally, the text sums up the path followed in that issue. (shrink)