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Profile: Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (Oxford University)
  1. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2013). Resemblance Nominalism, Conjunctions and Truthmakers. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (1):21-38.
    The resemblance nominalist says that the truthmaker of 〈Socrates is white〉 ultimately involves only concrete particulars that resemble each other. Furthermore he also says that Socrates and Plato are the truthmakers of 〈Socrates resembles Plato〉, and Socrates and Aristotle those of 〈Socrates resembles Aristotle〉. But this, combined with a principle about the truthmakers of conjunctions, leads to the apparently implausible conclusion that 〈Socrates resembles Plato and Socrates resembles Aristotle〉 and 〈Socrates resembles Plato and Plato resembles Aristotle〉 have the same truthmakers, (...)
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  2. Gonzalo Rodríguez-Pereyra (2013). The Language of Publication of "Analytic" Philosophy. Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 45 (133):83-90.
    This note argues that research in analytical philosophy broadly conceived should be published exclusively in English. Reasons are given for this and the thesis is defended against thirteen objections.
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  3. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2013). The Subtraction Arguments for Metaphysical Nihilism: Compared and Defended. In Tyron Goldschmidt (ed.), The Puzzle of Existence. Why is There Something rather than Nothing? Routledge. 197-214.
    The subtraction argument, originally put forward by Thomas Baldwin (1996), is intended to establish Metaphysical Nihilism, the thesis that there could have been no concrete objects. Some modified versions of the argument have been proposed in order to avoid some difficulties faced by the original argument. In this paper I shall concentrate on two of those versions, the so-called subtraction argument* (presented and defended in Rodriguez-Pereyra 1997, 2000, 2002), and Efird and Stoneham’s recent version of the argument (Efird and Stoneham (...)
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  4. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2011). Truth and Ontology, by Trenton Merricks. [REVIEW] Mind 120 (478):542-552.
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  5. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra & Paul Lodge (2011). Infinite Analysis, Lucky Proof, and Guaranteed Proof in Leibniz. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 93 (2):222-236.
    According to one of Leibniz's theories of contingency a proposition is contingent if and only if it cannot be proved in a finite number of steps. It has been argued that this faces the Problem of Lucky Proof , namely that we could begin by analysing the concept ‘Peter’ by saying that ‘Peter is a denier of Christ and …’, thereby having proved the proposition ‘Peter denies Christ’ in a finite number of steps. It also faces a more general but (...)
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  6. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2009). Leibniz : Mind-Body Causation and Pre-Established Harmony. In Robin Le Poidevin, Peter Simons, Andrew McGonigal & Ross Cameron (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. Routledge. 109-118.
    Causation was an important topic of philosophical reflection during the Seventeenth Century. This reflection centred around certain particular problems about causation, one of which was the problem of causation between mind and body. The doctrine of the pre-established harmony is Leibniz's response to the problem of causation between mind and body. In this chapter I shall (a) explain the problem of mind-body causation; (b) explain Leibniz's pre-established harmony; and (c) assess his case for it.
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  7. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2009). The Disjunction and Conjunction Theses. Mind 118 (470):427-443.
    This paper is a response to replies by Dan López de Sa and Mark Jago to my ‘Truthmaking, Entailment, and the Conjuction Thesis’. In that paper, my main aim was to argue against the Entailment Principle by arguing against the Conjunction Thesis, which is entailed by the Entailment Principle. In the course of so doing, although not essential for my project in that paper, I defended the Disjunction Thesis. López de Sa has objected both to my defence of the Disjunction (...)
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  8. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2008). Descartes's Substance Dualism and His Independence Conception of Substance. Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (1):69-89.
    Descartes maintained substance dualism, the thesis that no substance has both mental and material properties. His main argument for this thesis, the so-called separability argument from the Sixth Meditation (AT VII: 78) has long puzzled readers. In this paper I argue that Descartes’ independence conception of substance (which Descartes presents in article 51 of the Principles) is crucial for the success of the separability argument and that Descartes used this conception of substance to defend his argument for substance dualism from (...)
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  9. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, Nominalism in Metaphysics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  10. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2008). Postscript to Why Truthmakers. In E. J. Lowe & A. Rami (eds.), Truth and Truth-making. Acumen.
    In this chapter I shall reply to a pair of articles in which the main contention of my “Why truthmakers” – namely, that an important class of synthetic true propositions have entities as truth-makers – is rejected. In §§1–5 I reply to Jennifer Hornsby’s “Truth without Truthmaking Entities” (2005) and in §§6–7 I reply to Julian Dodd’s “Negative Truths and Truthmaker Principles” (2007).
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  11. Gonzalo Rodríguez-Pereyra (2007). El hacer verdad, la implicación y la tesis de la conjunción. Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía 33 (1):55-85.
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  12. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006). How Not to Trivialise the Identity of Indiscernibles. In P. F. Strawson & A. Chakrabarti (eds.), Concepts, Properties and Qualities. Ashgate.
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  13. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006). Truthmakers. Philosophy Compass 1 (2):186–200.
    This bulletin contains a summary of the main topics of discussion in truthmaker theory, namely: the definition of truthmakers, problems with Truthmaker Necessitarianism and Truthmaker Maximalism, the ontological burden of truthmakers and the recalcitrant topic of truthmakers for negative truths.
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  14. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006). Truthmaking, Entailment, and the Conjunction Thesis. Mind 115 (460):957-982.
    In this paper I undermine the Entailment Principle according to which if an entity is a truthmaker for a certain proposition and this proposition entails another, then the entity in question is a truthmaker for the latter proposition. I argue that the two most promising versions of the principle entail the popular but false Conjunction Thesis, namely that a truthmaker for a conjunction is a truthmaker for its conjuncts. One promising version of the principle understands entailment as strict implication but (...)
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  15. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006). Truthmaker Maximalism Defended. Analysis 66 (3):260–264.
    Peter Milne has tried to refure Truthmaker Maximalism. the thesis that every truth has a truthmaker, by producing a simple and direct counterexample to it, the sentence M: This sentence has no truthmaker. I argue that, contrary to what Milne argues, on Truthmaker Maximalism M is equivalent to the Liar, which gives the truthmaker maximalist a way to defend his position from Milne's counterexample: to argue that M expresses no proposition.
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  16. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005). Why Truthmakers. In H. Beebee & J. Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: the contemporary debate. Oxford University Press. 17-31.
    Consider a certain red rose. The proposition that the rose is red is true because the rose is red. One might say as well that the proposition that the rose is red is made true by the rose’s being red. This, it has been thought, does not commit one to a truthmaker of the proposition that the rose is red. For there is no entity that makes the proposition true. What makes it true is how the rose is, and how (...)
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  17. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2004). Leibniz's Argument for the Identity of Indiscernibles in Primary Truths. In M. Carrara, A. M. Nunziante & G. Tomasi (eds.), Individuals, minds and bodies: themes from Leibniz. Franz Steiner Verlag.
    In this paper I reconstruct Leibniz's argument for the Identity of Indiscernibles in his *Primary Truths*. I criticise the alternative interpretation put forward by Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne and defend my own interpretation, both on philosophical and hermeneutical grounds.
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  18. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2004). Modal Realism and Metaphysical Nihilism. Mind 113 (452):683-704.
    In this paper I argue that Modal Realism, the thesis that there exist non-actual possible individuals and worlds, can be made compatible with Metaphysical Nihilism, the thesis that it is possible that nothing concrete exists. Modal Realism as developed by Lewis rules out the possibility of a world where nothing concrete exists and so conflicts with Metaphysical Nihilism. In the paper I argue that Modal Realism can be modified so as to be compatible with Metaphysical Nihilism. Such a modification makes (...)
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  19. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2004). Paradigms and Russell's Resemblance Regress. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (4):644 – 651.
    Resemblance Nominalism is the view that denies universals and tropes and claims that what makes F-things F is their resemblances. A famous argument against Resemblance Nominalism is Russell's regress of resemblances, according to which the resemblance nominalist falls into a vicious infinite regress. Aristocratic Resemblance Nominalism, as opposed to Egalitarian Resemblance Nominalism, is the version of Resemblance Nominalism that claims that what makes F-things F is that they resemble the F-paradigms. In this paper I attempt to show that a recently (...)
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  20. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2004). The Bundle Theory is Compatible with Distinct but Indiscernible Particulars. Analysis 64 (1):72–81.
    According to a widely held philosophical opinion the Bundle Theory entails the Identity of Indiscernibles. In this paper I show that the Bundle Theory neither entails nor is otherwise committed to the Identity of Indiscernibles and therefore the Bundle Theory is compatible with the falsity of the Identity of Indiscernibles. I also show that the Bundle Theory can give an account of particulars consistent with the falsity of the Identity of Indiscernibles. Not only that, when developed in this way the (...)
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  21. Hallvard Lillehammer & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.) (2003). Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor. New York: Routledge.
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  22. Hallvard Lillehammer & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.) (2003). Real Metaphysics. Routledge.
    This text brings together a collection of new essays by a number of philosophers to honor Hugh Mellor's contribution to philosophy.
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  23. Hallvard Lillehammer & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.) (2003). Real Metaphysics. Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor. Routledge.
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  24. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2003). Review: Facing Facts. [REVIEW] Mind 112 (448):780-786.
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  25. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2003). Resemblance Nominalism and Counterparts: Reply to Bird. Analysis 63 (3):229–237.
    In my book *Resemblance Nominalism* I argued that the truthmakers of ´a and b resemble each other´ are just a and b. In his "Resemblance Nominalism and counterparts" Alexander Bird objects to my claim that the truthmakers of ´a and b resemble each other´ are just a and b. In this paper I respond to Bird´s objections.
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  26. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2003). Review of "Facing Facts", by S. Neale. [REVIEW] Mind 112 (448):780-786.
  27. Gonzalo Rodríguez-Pereyra (2003). What is Wrong with the Relational Theory of Change? In Hallvard Lillehammer & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics. Routledge. 184--195.
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  28. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra & Hallvard Lillehammer (eds.) (2003). Real Metaphysics. Routledge.
    Real Metaphysics brings together new articles by leading metaphysicians to honour Hugh Mellor's outstanding contribution to metaphysics. Some of the most outstanding minds of current times shed new light on all the main topics in metaphysics: truth, causation, dispositions and properties, explanation, and time. At the end of the book, Hugh Mellor responds to the issues raised by each of the thirteen contributors and gives us new insight into his own highly influential work on metaphysics.
     
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  29. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002). Metaphysical Nihilism Defended: Reply to Lowe and Paseau. Analysis 62 (2):172–180.
    I believe in metaphysical nihilism, the thesis that there could have been no concrete objects, because I believe in a version of the subtraction argument, the subtraction argument*, that proves it. But both Jonathan Lowe (2002) and Alexander Paseau (2002) express doubts about the subtraction argument*. Paseau thinks the argument is invalid, and Lowe argues that invoking concrete* objects is unnecessary. Furthermore Lowe attempts to rebut my objections (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2000) to his anti-nihilist argument (Lowe 1998). In this paper I defend (...)
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  30. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002). Resemblance Nominalism. Oxford University Press.
    Gardeners, poets, lovers, and philosophers are all interested in the redness of roses; but only philosophers wonder how it is that two different roses can share the same property. Are red things red because they resemble each other? Or do they resemble each other because they are red? Since the 1970s philosophers have tended to favour the latter view, and held that a satisfactory account of properties must involve the postulation of either universals or tropes. But Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra revives the (...)
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  31. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002). Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. Oxford University Press.
    Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra offers a fresh philosophical account of properties. How is it that two different things (such as two red roses) can share the same property (redness)? According to resemblance nominalism, things have their properties in virtue of resembling other things. This unfashionable view is championed with clarity and rigor.
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  32. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002). The Problem of Universals and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis. Philosophical Papers 31 (1):39-47.
    In this paper I argue, contra Fraser MacBride, that conceptual analysis, and in particular the distinction between numerical and qualitative identity, can solve the Problem of Universals, whether understood as the One over Many or the as the Many over One. In this paper I show why the solutions needed to solve either version of the problem must be in terms of truthmakers, and that the distinction between numerical and qualitative identity is not sufficient to solve them.
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  33. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2001). Resemblance Nominalism and Russell's Regress. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):395 – 408.
    Bertrand Russell argued that any attempt to get rid of universals in favor of resemblances fails. He argued that no resemblance theory could avoid postulating a universal of resemblance without falling prey to a vicious infinite regress. He added that admitting such a universal of resemblance made it pointless to avoid other universals. In this paper I defend resemblance nominalism from both of Russell's points by arguing that (a) resemblance nominalism can avoid the postulation of a universal of resemblance without (...)
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  34. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2000). El problema metafísico de la verdad. Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 26 (2):351-59.
    In this paper I present what I call the 'Metaphysical Problem of Truth', which consists in explaining in virtue of what all true sentences are true, and argue that a version of the Correspondence Theory of Truth is the most plausible solution to this problem.
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  35. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2000). Lowe's Argument Against Nihilism. Analysis 60 (4):335–340.
    By nihilism I shall understand the thesis that it is metaphysically possible that there are no concrete objects. I think there is a version of an argu- ment, the subtraction argument, which proves nihilism nicely (see Baldwin 1996 and Rodriguez-Pereyra 1997). But E. J. Lowe, who is no nihilist, has a very interesting argument purporting to show that concrete objects exist necessarily (Lowe 1996, 1998). In this paper I shall defend nihilism from Lowe’s argument.
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  36. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2000). What is the Problem of Universals? Mind 109 (434):255-273.
    In this article I address the Problem of Universals by answering questions about what facts a solution to the Problem of Universals should explain and how the explanation should go. I argue that a solution to the Problem of Universals explains the facts the Problem of Universals is about by giving the truthmakers (as opposed to the conceptual content and the ontological commitments) of the sentences stating those facts. I argue that the sentences stating the relevant facts are those like (...)
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  37. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (1999). Leibniz's Argument for the Identity of Indiscernibles in His Correspondence with Clarke. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4):429 – 438.
    In Section 21 of his fifth letter to Clarke Leibniz attempts to derive the Identity of Indiscernibles from an application of the Principle of Sufficient Reason to God´s act of creation, namely that God has a reason to create the world he creates. In this paper I argue that this argument fails, not just because the Identity of Indiscernibles is false, but because there is a counterexample to one of the premises that Leibniz cannot satisfactorily rule out.
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  38. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (1999). Resemblance Nominalism and the Imperfect Community. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):965-982.
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  39. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (1999). Truthmaking and the Slingshot. In Uwe Meixner & Peter Simons (eds.), Metaphysics in the Post-Metaphysical Age: Papers of the 22nd International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
    In this paper I shall show how the Correspondence Theory of Truth can block Davidson’s Slingshot (Davidson 1984), which threatens to make the Correspondence Theory collapse. In particular I shall show that the Slingshot is unsound − and in so doing I shall show that the Correspondence Theory has some metaphysical commitments about the nature of facts.
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  40. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (1998). Mellor's Facts and Chances of Causation. Analysis 58 (3):175–181.
    Mellor´s theory of causation has two components, one according to which causes raise their effects´ chances, and one according to which causation links facts. I argue that these two components are not independent from each other and, in particular, that Mellor´s thesis that causation links facts requires his thesis that causes raise their effects´ chances, since without the latter thesis Mellor cannot stop the slingshot argument, an argument that is a threat to any theory postulating facts as the relata of (...)
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  41. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (1998). Searle's Correspondence Theory of Truth and the Slingshot. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (193):513-522.
  42. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (1997). There Might Be Nothing: The Subtraction Argument Improved. Analysis 57 (3):159–166.
  43. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (1996). Sobre una version del Nominalismo de Semejanzas. Revista de Filosofia 11 (1/2).
    The concern of this paper is a version of Resemblance Nominalism according to which resemblance classes, i.e. classes of resembling things, are determined by paradigms. I show that the theory is false, since paradigms do not generally determine resemblance classes. Although I concentrate upon the version of the theory which was delineated by H. H. Price, my results apply to any other theory constructing resemblance classes out of paradigms.
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  44. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (1993). La anotación 202 de las Investigaciones Filosóficas de Wittgenstein. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica 27 (2):25-3.
    The paper clarifies the sense of remark 202 of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* with respect to its relation to the private language argument. It argues, against what some have maintained, that remark 202 is not meant to reject the possibility of a private language as this is defined in remark 243.
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  45. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (1993). Kripke y las descripciones rígidas. Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía 19 (1):109-113.
    In this paper I discuss a passage from *Naming and Necessity* where Kripke assumes that the essential properties by means of which a definite description designates are a sufficient condition of its rigidity. I put forward two examples that show the falsity of this assumption. Then I examine the non-rigid character of definite descriptions that designate by means of properties that are sufficient conditions of identity of the objects designated by those descriptions. I conclude that the properties by means of (...)
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  46. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (1989). Sobre los escepticos griegos. Idea 3 (3):59-74.
    In this paper I argue that Ancient Greek Sceptics implicitly presupposed a Parmenidean ontology.
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