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Gordon G. Globus [22]Gordon Globus [11]
  1. Gordon Globus (2013). Consciousness Vs. Disclosure A Deconstruction of Consciousness Studies. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (1-2):1-2.
    The field of consciousness studies is 'deconstructed' in terms of etymology, definition, and the deep involvement of perceptual consciousness in two persistently controversial areas: the hard problem of qualia and the measurement problem in quantum physics. An alternative to perceptual consciousness is developed within the framework of dissipative quantum thermofield brain dynamics: disclosure. Like consciousness, disclosure is constrained by sensory action, 'self-action' , and memory. The problematics of consciousness/brain, qualia, and measurement in quantum physics are resolved by substituting disclosure for (...)
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  2. Gordon Globus (2013). Ontological Significance of the Dream World. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (6):619-620.
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  3. Gordon Globus (2010). Dissipative Thermofield Logic of the Tao Symbol. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (5-6):5-6.
    The well-known symbol of the Tao is freshly interpreted in terms of dissipative quantum thermofield brain dynamics. The primary duality of the Tao is between two dynamical modes of operation. The secondary duality within each mode of the Tao symbolizes creation and annihilation operations. The relation between the dual modes is 'intrinsic' in that these modes do not exist independently of their relationship. What is ontologically primary is the dual modes belonging-together in the 'between-two'. Three sources of constraint on the (...)
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  4. Gordon Globus (2007). Mind, Matter, and Monad. Mind and Matter 5 (2):201-214.
    The indiscernability of the waking life and well-developed in- stances of the dream life suggests that the world perceived during waking is also 'virtual '.real in effect but not in fact. The naturalistic philosophical framework for virtual reality developed by Metzinger and by Revonsuo is discussed and critiqued. An alternative monadological realism is proposed and comparisons are made with Leibniz and Bohm.
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  5. Gordon Globus (2006). Consciousness and Quantum Brain Dynamics. In J. Tuszynski (ed.), The Emerging Physics of Consciousness. Springer-Verlag. 371--385.
  6. Gordon G. Globus (2005). Nonlinear Dynamics at the Cutting Edge of Modernity: A Postmodern View. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (3):229-234.
  7. Elena Bezzubova & Gordon Globus (2004). Underconstraint and Overconstraint in Psychiatry. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6):788-789.
    Hallucination lies at an intriguing border between psychiatry and philosophy. Although Behrendt & Young (B&Y) tie their proposal to Kantian transcendental idealism, other philosophical positions are equally consistent. Cognition is underconstrained by reality not only in hallucination but also in autism and dreaming. Sensory underconstraint is insufficient to encompass schizophrenia. There is also a breakdown in integrative capacity on the cognitive side. From a wider clinical perspective than schizophrenia, there can be underconstraint or overconstraint in sensory and cognitive functionalities.
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  8. Emilio Del Giudice, Fabrizio Desideri, Martin Fleischmann, Bury Lodge, Duck Street, Georg Franck, Gordon Globus, B. J. Hiley, Mari Jibu & Teruaki Nakagomi (2004). List of the Contributors. In Gordon G. Globus, Karl H. Pribram & Giuseppe Vitiello (eds.), Brain and Being. John Benjamins. 349.
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  9. Gordon G. Globus, Karl H. Pribram & Giuseppe Vitiello (eds.) (2004). Brain and Being. John Benjamins.
  10. Gordon G. Globus (2003). Quantum Closures and Disclosures: Thinking-Together Postphenomenology and Quantum Brain Dynamics. John Benjamins.
    CHAPTER Heidegger and the Quantum Brain In any case the orientation to "I" and " consciousness" and re-presentation ...
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  11. Gordon G. Globus (2002). Ontological Implications of Quantum Brain Dynamics. In Kunio Yasue, Marj Jibu & Tarcisio Della Senta (eds.), No Matter, Never Mind. John Benjamins. 33--137.
  12. Gordon Globus (2001). Thinking Together Quantum Brain Dynamics and Postmodernism. In P. Van Loocke (ed.), The Physical Nature of Consciousness. John Benjamins. 29--175.
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  13. Gordon G. Globus (1998). Self, Cognition, Qualia, and World in Quantum Brain Dynamics. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (1):34-52.
    If the brain has a level of quantum functioning that permits superposition of possibilities and nonlocal control of states, then new answers to the problem of the consciousness/brain relation become available. My discussion is based on Yasue and co-workers’ account of a quantum field theory of brain functioning, called ‘quantum brain dynamics’. In the framework developed each person can properly state: ‘I am nonlocal control and my meanings are control variables.’ Cognition is identified with a conjugate reality and perception is (...)
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  14. Gordon G. Globus (1997). Nonlinear Brain Systems with Nonlocal Degrees of Freedom. Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (2-3):195-204.
    Quantum degrees of freedom greatly enrich nonlinear systems, which can support nonlocal control and superposition of states. Basing my discussion on Yasue’s quantum brain dynamics, I suggest that the Cartesian subject is a cybernetic process rather than a substance: I am nonlocal control and my meanings are cybernetic variables. Meanings as nonlocal attunements are not mechanically determined, thus is it concluded we have freedom to mean.
     
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  15. Gordon G. Globus (1996). Quantum Consciousness is Cybernetic. Psyche 2 (21).
    Classical mechanics cannot naturally accommodate consciousness, whereas quantum mechanics can, but the Heisenberg/Stapp approach, in which consciousness randomly collapses the neural wave function, leaves the conscious function unrestricted by known physical principles. The Umezawa/Yasue approach, in which consciousness offers superposed possibilities to the match with sensory input, is based in the first physical principles of quantum field theory. Stapp thinks of the brain as a measuring device, like a Geiger counter, and overlooks that the brain upholds second-order quantum fields that (...)
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  16. Gordon G. Globus (1994). Some Philosophical Implications of Dream Existence. Anthropology of Consciousness 5 (3):24-27.
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  17. Gordon G. Globus (1992). Derrida and Connectionism: Differance in Neural Nets. Philosophical Psychology 5 (2):183-97.
    A possible relation between Derrida's deconstruction of metaphysics and connectionism is explored by considering diffeacuterance in neural nets terms. First diffeacuterance, as the crossing of Saussurian difference and Freudian deferral, is modeled and then the fuller 'sheaf of diffeacuterance is taken up. The metaphysically conceived brain has two versions: in the traditional computational version the brain processes information like a computer and in the connectionist version the brain computes input vector to output vector transformations non-symbolically. The 'deconstructed brain' neither processes (...)
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  18. Gordon G. Globus (1992). Toward a Noncomputational Cognitive Science. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 4:299-310.
  19. Gordon G. Globus (1991). Deconstructing the Chinese Room. Journal of Mind and Behavior 12 (3):377-91.
    The "Chinese Room" controversy between Searle and Churchland and Churchland over whether computers can think is subjected to Derridean "deconstruction." There is a hidden complicity underlying the debate which upholds traditional subject/object metaphysics, while deferring to future empirical science an account of the problematic semantic relation between brain syntax and the perceptible world. I show that an empirical solution along the lines hoped for is not scientifically conceivable at present. An alternative account is explored, based on the productivity of neural (...)
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  20. Gordon G. Globus (1990). Heidegger and Cognitive Science. Philosophy Today 34 (1):20-29.
  21. Gordon Globus (1989). Connectionism and The Dreaming Mind. Journal of Mind and Behavior 10 (2).
  22. Gordon G. Globus (1989). The Strict Identity Theory of Schlick, Russell, Maxwell, and Feigl. In M. Maxwell & C. Wade Savage (eds.), Science, Mind, and Psychology: Essays in Honor of Grover Maxwell. University Press of America.
  23. Gordon Globus (1988). Existence and the Brain. Journal of Mind and Behavior 9 (4).
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  24. Gordon G. Globus (1986). The Machine Basis for the Dasein: On the Prospects for an Existential Functionalism. [REVIEW] Man and World 19 (1):55-72.
    Heidegger has provided a profound account of human existence in terms of the to-be-da. Even though Heidegger disregarded its brain machine basis (and even though brain scientists disregard Heidegger), the issue of the Dasein's machine basis is raised by the empirically extremely well confirmed “supervenience” of the Dasein on the brain. Since the Turing machine will not do as basis for the Dasein, as Dreyfus has shown, contemporary functionalism cannot resolve the issue. Instead an “existential functionalism,” which looks to some (...)
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  25. Gordon G. Globus (1984). Can Methodological Solipsism Be Confined to Psychology? Cognition and Brain Theory 7:233-46.
  26. Gordon G. Globus (1982). Can Phenomenology Contribute to Brain Science? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (3):430.
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  27. Gordon Globus & Stephen Franklin (1980). Prospects for the Scientific Observer of Perceptual Consciousness. In J. M. Davidson & Richard J. Davidson (eds.), The Psychobiology of Consciousness. Plenum. 465--481.
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  28. Gordon G. Globus (1978). What is the Sound of One Hand Clapping, the Touch of a Still Wind, the Sight of a “Black Hole”? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (3):355.
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  29. Gordon G. Globus, Maxwell Grover & Irwin Savodnik (1976). Consciousness and the Brain a Scientific and Philosophical Inquiry. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
     
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  30. Gordon G. Globus, Grover Maxwell & I. Savodnik (eds.) (1975). Consciousness and the Brain. Plenum Press.
  31. Gordon G. Globus (1974). The Problem of Consciousness. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Science 3:40-69.
     
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  32. Gordon G. Globus (1972). Biological Foundations of the Psychoneural Identity. Philosophy of Science 39 (September):291-300.
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  33. Gordon G. Globus (1972). Biological Foundations of the Psychoneural Identity Hypothesis. Philosophy of Science 39 (3):291-301.
    Biological foundations of the psychoneural identity hypothesis are explicated and their implications discussed. "Consciousness per se" and phenomenal contents of consciousness per se are seen to be identical with events in the (unobserved) brain in accordance with Leibniz's Law, but only informationally equivalent to neural events as observed. Phenomenal content potentially is recoverable by empirical means from observed neural events, but the converse is not possible. Consciousness per se is identical with events which do not represent anything distal to sensory (...)
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