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  1. Gordon Park Stevenson (2005). Time Travel, Agency, and Nomic Constraint. The Monist 88 (3):396-412.
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  2. Gordon Park Stevenson (2004). Revamping Action Theory. Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):427 - 451.
    Philosophical interest in intentional action has flourished in recent decades. Typically, action theorists propose necessary and sufficient conditions for a movement's being an action, conditions derived from a conceptual analysis of folk psychological action ascriptions. However, several key doctrinal and methodological features of contemporary action theory are troubling, in particular (i) the insistence that folk psychological kinds like beliefs and desires have neurophysiological correlates, (ii) the assumption that the concept of action is "classical" in structure (making it amenable to definition (...)
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  3. Gordon Park Stevenson (2001). The Naturalistic Foundations of Intentional Action. Dissertation, The University of Connecticut
    Philosophical interest in intentional action has flourished in recent decades. Typically, writers in the field of action theory seek necessary and sufficient conditions for a movement's being an action, conditions derived from a conceptual analysis of everyday action ascriptions. However, only a naturalistic account of intentional action, an account whose methods and aims are continuous with those of the empirical sciences, will truly help further our understanding of action as a biological phenomenon. ;Action is naturalized as a species of movement (...)
     
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  4. Gordon Park Stevenson (1998). Humean Sef-Consciousness Explained. Hume Studies 24 (1):95-129.
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  5. Gordon Park Stevenson (1997). Miracles, Force, and Leibnizean Laws of Nature. Studia Leibnitiana 29 (2):167-188.
    Leibniz vollbringt ein wichtiges philosophisches Manover, wenn er behauptet, daß Wunder, wenn sie auch nicht im Einklang mit den Naturgesetzen stehen, so doch im Einklang mit den allgemeineren metaphysischen Gesetzen, die Gott den Monaden in Form von Kraft eingeprägt hat. Leider hat er jedoch nie genug abgeklärt, auf welche Weise das Auftreten von Wundern mit seiner Physik der Kraft übereinstimmen kann. In verschiedenen Passagen scheint Leibniz sogar in einen Widerspruch verwickelt zu sein: wahrend er darauf besteht, daß Wunder über den (...)
     
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