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  1. Graciela De Pierris (forthcoming). Hume and Locke on Scientific Methodology: The Newtonian Legacy. Hume Studies 32 (2):277-329.
  2. Graciela De Pierris (2012). Hume on Space, Geometry, and Diagrammatic Reasoning. Synthese 186 (1):169-189.
    Hume’s discussion of space, time, and mathematics at T 1.2 appeared to many earlier commentators as one of the weakest parts of his philosophy. From the point of view of pure mathematics, for example, Hume’s assumptions about the infinite may appear as crude misunderstandings of the continuum and infinite divisibility. I shall argue, on the contrary, that Hume’s views on this topic are deeply connected with his radically empiricist reliance on phenomenologically given sensory images. He insightfully shows that, working within (...)
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  3. Graciela De Pierris & Michael Friedman (2008). Kant and Hume on Causality. In Edward Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  4. Graciela de Pierris (2006). Hume and Locke on Scientific Methodology. Hume Studies 32 (2):277-329.
    Hume follows Newton in replacing the mechanical philosophy’s demonstrative ideal of science by the Principia’s ideal of inductive proof (especially as formulated in Newton’s Rule III); in this respect, Hume differs sharply from Locke. Hume is also guided by Newton’s own criticisms of the mechanical philosophers’ hypotheses. The first stage of Hume’s skeptical argument concerning causation targets central tenets of the mechanical philosophers’ (in particular, Locke’s) conception of causation, all of which rely on the a priori postulation of a hidden (...)
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  5. Graciela De Pierris (2005). Hume and Descartes on Skepticism with Regard to Demonstrative Reasoning. Análisis Filosófico 25 (2):101-119.
    Commentaries on Hume's Treatise 1.4.1, "Of scepticism with regard to reason," have focused on the argument that an initial lack of certainty concerning the conclusion of an inference gradually diminishes to zero. In my view, Hume offers this famous argument only after, and as corollary to, a far more interesting skeptical argument concerning demonstrative reasoning, which occurs at the very beginning of Treatise 1.4.1. I focus on this neglected argument, point to its Cartesian roots, and draw a distinction between ordinary (...)
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  6. Graciela de Pierris (2002). Causation as a Philosophical Relation in Hume. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):499-545.
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  7. Graciela De Pierris (2001). Hume's Pyrrhonian Skepticism and the Belief in Causal Laws. Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 (3):351-383.
  8. Graciela De Pierris (1992). The Constitutive a Priori. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (sup1):179-214.
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  9. Nicholas Asher, Graciela De Pierris, Paul Gomberg, Robert E. Goodin, Charles W. Mills, Jordan Howard Sobel, Andrew Levine, Frank Cunningham, W. J. Waluchow & Wesley Cooper (1989). Tp [\ Canadian (Q\ JJJournal of£| Philosophy. Philosophy 19 (3).
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  10. Graciela de Pierris (1989). Subjective Justification. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):363-382.
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