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Graeme Forbes [81]Graeme A. Forbes [8]Graeme R. Forbes [3]
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Profile: Graeme Forbes (University of Colorado, Boulder)
Profile: Graeme A Forbes (University of Kent at Canterbury)
  1.  59
    Graeme Forbes (1985). The Metaphysics of Modality. Clarendon Press.
    Analytic philosophy has recently demonstrated a revived interest in metaphysical problems about possibility and necessity. Graeme Forbes here provides a careful description of the logical background of recent work in this area for those who may be unfamiliar with it, moving on to d discuss the distinction between modality de re and modality de dicto and the ontological commitments of possible worlds semantics. In addition, Forbes offers a unified theory of the essential properties of sets, organisms, artefacts, substances, and events, (...)
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  2. Graeme Forbes (1989). Languages of Possibility: An Essay in Philosophical Logic. Blackwell.
  3.  86
    Graeme A. Forbes (2016). The Growing Block’s Past Problems. Philosophical Studies 173 (3):699-709.
    The Growing-Block view of time has some problems with the past. It is committed to the existence of the past, but needs to say something about the difference between the past and present. I argue that we should resist Correia and Rosenkranz’ response to Braddon-Mitchell’s argument that the Growing-Block leads to scepticism about whether we are present. I consider an approach, similar to Peter Forrest, and show it is not so counter-intuitive as Braddon-Mitchell suggests and further show that it requires (...)
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  4.  29
    Graeme Forbes (2006). Attitude Problems: An Essay on Linguistic Intensionality. Clarendon Press.
    Ascriptions of mental states to oneself and others give rise to many interesting logical and semantic problems. Attitude Problems presents an original account of mental state ascriptions that are made using intensional transitive verbs such as 'want', 'seek', 'imagine', and 'worship'. Forbes offers a theory of how such verbs work that draws on ideas from natural language semantics, philosophy of language, and aesthetics.
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  5. Rachael Briggs & Graeme A. Forbes (2012). The Real Truth About the Unreal Future. In Karen Bennett & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume 7.
    Growing-Block theorists hold that past and present things are real, while future things do not yet exist. This generates a puzzle: how can Growing-Block theorists explain the fact that some sentences about the future appear to be true? Briggs and Forbes develop a modal ersatzist framework, on which the concrete actual world is associated with a branching-time structure of ersatz possible worlds. They then show how this branching structure might be used to determine the truth values of future contingents. They (...)
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  6.  81
    Graeme Forbes (1990). The Indispensability of Sinn. Philosophical Review 99 (4):535-563.
  7. Graeme Forbes (2011). The Problem of Factives for Sense Theories. Analysis 71 (4):654-662.
    This paper discusses some recent responses to Kripke’s modal objections to descriptivism about names. One response, due to Gluer-Pagin and Pagin, involves employing "actually" operators in a new way. Another, developed mainly by Chalmers, involves distinguishing the dimension of meaning modal operators affect from the dimension other operators, especially epistemic ones, affect. I argue that both these moves run into problems with "mixed" contexts involving factive verbs such as "know", "establish", "prove", etc. In mixed contexts there are both modal and (...)
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  8.  60
    Graeme Forbes (1987). Indexicals and Intensionality: A Fregean Perspective. Philosophical Review 96 (1):3-31.
  9.  57
    Graeme Forbes (2008). Intensional Transitive Verbs. In Edward Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    A verb is transitive iff it usually occurs with a direct object, and in such occurrences it is said to occur transitively . Thus ‘ate’ occurs transitively in ‘I ate the meat and left the vegetables’, but not in ‘I ate then left’ (perhaps it is not the same verb ‘left’ in these two examples, but it seems to be the same ‘ate’). A verb is intensional if the verb phrase (VP) it forms with its complement is anomalous in at (...)
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  10.  30
    Graeme Forbes (2015). Philosophical Troubles, by Saul Kripke. Mind 124 (495):927-933.
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  11.  97
    Graeme Forbes (1997). How Much Substitutivity? Analysis 57 (2):109–113.
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  12.  23
    Graeme A. Forbes, Review of Adrian Bardon , 'The Future of the Philosophy of Time'. [REVIEW]
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  13.  66
    Graeme Forbes (2000). Objectual Attitudes. Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (2):141-183.
  14.  93
    Graeme Forbes (1995). Realism and Skepticism: Brains in a Vat Revisited. Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):205-222.
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  15.  62
    Graeme Forbes (1983). Actuality and Context Dependence I. Analysis 43 (3):123 - 128.
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  16.  95
    Graeme Forbes (1982). Canonical Counterpart Theory. Analysis 42 (1):33 - 37.
    In a recent article in Analysis, Graeme Hunter and William Seager (1981) attempt to rescue counterpart theory (CT) from some objections of Hazen 1979. They see these objections as arising from ‘uncritical use of the translation scheme originally proposed by Lewis’, and intend to meet them by refraining from use of that scheme. But they do not offer a new scheme; they say ‘…it is no more necessary to have one to capture the sense of modal idiom than it is (...)
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  17.  37
    Teresa Robertson & Graeme Forbes (2006). Does the New Route Reach its Destination? Mind 115 (458):367-374.
    A New Route to the Necessity of Origin’, Guy Rohrbaugh and Louis deRossett argue for the Necessity of Origin in a way that they believe avoids use of any kind of transworld constitutional sufficiency principle. In this discussion, we respond that either their arguments do imply a sufficiency principle, or else they entirely fail to establish the Necessity of Origin.
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  18.  53
    Graeme Forbes (1999). Enlightened Semantics for Simple Sentences. Analysis 59 (2):86–91.
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  19.  55
    Graeme Forbes (1996). Substitutivity and the Coherence of Quantifying In. Philosophical Review 105 (3):337-372.
  20. Graeme Forbes (1993). Time, Events, and Modality. In Robin Le Poidevin & Murray MacBeath (eds.), The Philosophy of Time. Oxford University Press 80--95.
     
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  21.  65
    Graeme Forbes (1980). Origin and Identity. Philosophical Studies 37 (4):353-62.
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  22.  8
    Graeme Forbes & Baruch Brody (1981). Identity and Essence. Philosophical Quarterly 31 (125):368.
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  23. Graeme Forbes, Intensional Transitive Verbs: The Limitations of a Clausal Analysis.
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  24.  96
    Graeme Forbes (2010). Intensional Verbs in Event Semantics. Synthese 176 (2):227 - 242.
    In Attitude Problems, I gave an account of opacity in the complement of intensional transitive verbs that combined neo-Davidsonian event-semantics with a hidden-indexical account of substitution failure. In this paper, I extend the account to clausal verbs.
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  25.  96
    Graeme Forbes (1981). An Anti-Essentialist Note on Substances. Analysis 41 (1):32 - 37.
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  26.  56
    Graeme Forbes (1986). In Defense of Absolute Essentialism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):3-31.
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  27.  42
    Graeme A. Forbes (2015). Accounting for Experiences as of Passage: Why Topology Isn’T Enough. Topoi 34 (1):187-194.
    Time appears to us to pass. Some philosophers think that we should account for these experiences by appeal to change in what there unrestrictedly is . I argue that such an appeal can only be the beginning of an account of passage. To show this, I consider a minimal type of view—a purely topological view—that attempts to account for experiences as of passage by an appeal to ontological change and topological features of the present. I argue that, if ontological change (...)
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  28.  73
    Graeme Forbes (2008). Critical Notice of Kit Fine's Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers. Philosophical Review 117 (2):275-287.
    In this critical review I discuss the main themes of the papers in Kit Fine's Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers. These themes are that modal operators are intelligible in their own right and that actualist quantifiers are to be taken as basic with respect to possibilist quantifiers. I also discuss a previously unpublished paper of Fine's on modality and existence.
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  29.  35
    Graeme Forbes (1984). Nozick on Scepticism. Philosophical Quarterly 34 (134):43-52.
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  30.  49
    Graeme Forbes (1983). Thisness and Vagueness. Synthese 54 (2):235-259.
    This paper is about two puzzles, or two versions of a single puzzle, which deserve to be called paradoxes, and develops some apparatus in terms of which the apparently conflicting principles which generate the puzzles can be rendered consistent. However, the apparatus itself is somewhat controversial: the puzzles are modal ones, and the resolution to be advocated requires the adoption of a counterpart theoretic semantics of essentially the kind proposed by David Lewis, which in turn requires qualified rejection of certain (...)
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  31.  36
    Graeme R. Forbes (1987). A Dichotomy Sustained. Philosophical Studies 51 (March):187-211.
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  32. Graeme Forbes (1994). Modern Logic: A Text in Elementary Symbolic Logic. Oxford University Press.
    Filling the need for an accessible, carefully structured introductory text in symbolic logic, Modern Logic has many features designed to improve students' comprehension of the subject, including a proof system that is the same as the award-winning computer program MacLogic, and a special appendix that shows how to use MacLogic as a teaching aid. There are graded exercises at the end of each chapter--more than 900 in all--with selected answers at the end of the book. Unlike competing texts, Modern Logic (...)
     
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  33. Graeme Forbes, Meaning Postulates, Inference, and the Relational/Notional Ambiguity.
    This paper in revised form appears in Facta Philosophica 5:1 (2003) 49­75. It addresses some problems about intensional transitives raised by Moltmann and Zimmerman, corrects some oversights in my paper in The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (S.V. for 2002), and adds new material on binary vs. tripartite construals of “relational/notional”, bridge inferences, weakening inferences, and the relevance problem. Its other sections are, like the PASS paper, concerned with the conjunctive force of disjunctive NP complements of intensional transitive verbs: “Smith (...)
     
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  34.  27
    Graeme Forbes (1983). Physicalism, Instrumentalism and the Semantics of Modal Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 12 (3):271 - 298.
    The delicate point in the formalistic position is to explain how the non-intuitionistic classical mathematics is significant, after having initially agreed with the intuitionists that its theorems lack a real meaning in terms of which they are true (S. C. Kleene, 1952).
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  35.  40
    Graeme Forbes (1990). Counterparts, Logic and Metaphysics: Reply to Ramachandran. Analysis 50 (3):167 - 173.
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  36.  58
    Graeme Forbes (1987). Free and Classical Counterparts: Response to Lewis. Analysis 47 (3):147 - 152.
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  37.  81
    Graeme A. Forbes (2010). Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Vol. Analysis 70 (3):571-577.
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  38.  13
    Graeme Forbes (1994). Comparatives in Counterpart Theory: Another Approach. Analysis 54 (1):37 - 42.
    The article considers whether arguments involving sentences that make cross-world comparisons ("I could have been taller than I actually am") are better handled by counterpart theory than by standard modal semantics. The author describes a modal object-language in which such statements may be symbolized and gives both a Kripkean and a counterpart-theoretic semantics for it.
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  39.  33
    Graeme Forbes (1984). Two Solutions to Chisholm's Paradox. Philosophical Studies 46 (2):171 - 187.
  40.  19
    Graeme Forbes (1993). Solving the Iteration Problem. Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (3):311 - 330.
  41.  26
    Graeme R. Forbes (1983). Scepticism and Semantic Knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 84:223-37.
  42.  59
    Graeme Forbes (1996). Logic, Logical Form, and the Open Future. Philosophical Perspectives 10:73 - 92.
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  43.  35
    Graeme Forbes (1981). On the Philosophical Basis of Essentialist Theories. Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (1):73-99.
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  44.  20
    Graeme Forbes (2013). Marcus and Substitutivity. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 28 (78):359-374.
    El artículo discute la formulación de Marcus del principio de sustituibilidad. Se apoyó en una noción de forma lógica en la que el análisis elimina algunos tipos problemáticos de contexto. Defiendo una formulación variante del principio en la cual los contextos problemáticos se acomodan por derecho propio.
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  45.  72
    Graeme Forbes (1994). Donnellan on a Puzzle About Belief. Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):169 - 180.
    Keith Donnellan has advanced an interpretation of Kripke's well-known "Puzzle About Belief" according to which the puzzle concerns the true nature of beliefs. In this paper I argue that the puzzle merely concerns problems that others can have in "reporting" a confused individual's beliefs. I conclude that a new-Fregean account of belief- ascription is best- equipped to solve the puzzle.
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  46.  13
    Graeme Forbes (1989). Cognitive Architecture and the Semantics of Belief. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 14 (1):84-100.
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  47.  19
    Graeme A. Forbes (2014). The Future of the Philosophy of Time, Edited by Adrian Bardon. Mind 123 (490):576-579.
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  48.  37
    Graeme Forbes (2002). Intensionality: Graeme Forbes. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):75–99.
    [Graeme Forbes] In I, I summarize the semantics for the relational/notional distinction for intensional transitives developed in Forbes (2000b). In II-V I pursue issues about logical consequence which were either unsatisfactorily dealt with in that paper or, more often, not raised at all. I argue that weakening inferences, such as 'Perseus seeks a mortal gorgon, therefore Perseus seeks a gorgon', are valid, but that disjunction inferences, such as 'Perseus seeks a mortal gorgon, therefore Perseus seeks a mortal gorgon or an (...)
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  49.  19
    Graeme Forbes (1993). Reply to Marks. Philosophical Studies 69 (2-3):281 - 295.
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  50. Graeme Forbes, Content and Theme in Attitude Ascriptions.
    This paper is about a substitution-failure in attitude ascriptions, but not the one you think. A standard view about the semantic shape of ‘that’-clause attitude ascriptions is that they are fundamentally relational. The attitude verb expresses a binary relation whose extension, if not empty, is a collection of pairs each of which consists in an individual and a proposition, while the ‘that’-clause is a term for a proposition. One interesting problem this view faces is that, within the scope of many (...)
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