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Profile: Graham Oddie (University of Colorado, Boulder)
  1.  81
    Graham Oddie, What Accuracy Could Not Be.
    The concept of accuracy is ubiquitous. Two different programs—both born in 1960 but raised separately—are in the business of trying to explicate it. The epistemic utility (EU) program was ushered into the world by Carl Hempel, and the truthlikeness (TL) program by Karl Popper. In this paper I begin a long overdue examination of the relationship between these two important programs. The upshot is unsettling. There are two rather obvious principles that govern accuracy—I call them the Weak Proximity and Strong (...)
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  2.  36
    Graham Oddie (2005/2009). Value, Reality, and Desire. Clarendon Press.
    Value, Reality, and Desire is an extended argument for a robust realism about value. The robust realist affirms the following distinctive theses. There are genuine claims about value which are true or false--there are facts about value. These value-facts are mind-independent - they are not reducible to desires or other mental states, or indeed to any non-mental facts of a non-evaluative kind. And these genuine, mind-independent, irreducible value-facts are causally efficacious. Values, quite literally, affect us. These are not particularly fashionable (...)
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  3.  85
    Graham Oddie, Truthlikeness. Stanford Encyclopedia.
    Truth is the aim of inquiry. Nevertheless, some falsehoods seem to realize this aim better than others. Some truths better realize the aim than other truths. And perhaps even some falsehoods realize the aim better than some truths do. The dichotomy of the class of propositions into truths and falsehoods should thus be supplemented with a more fine-grained ordering — one which classifies propositions according to their closeness to the truth, their degree of truthlikeness or verisimilitude. The logical problem of (...)
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  4.  2
    Graham Oddie (1986). Likeness to Truth. Reidel.
    What does it take for one proposition to be closer to the truth than another. In this, the first published monograph on the topic, Oddie develops a comprehensive theory that takes the likeness in truthlikeness seriously.
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  5.  79
    Graham Oddie (2013). The Content, Consequence and Likeness Approaches to Verisimilitude: Compatibility, Trivialization, and Underdetermination. Synthese 190 (9):1647-1687.
    Theories of verisimilitude have routinely been classified into two rival camps—the content approach and the likeness approach—and these appear to be motivated by very different sets of data and principles. The question thus naturally arises as to whether these approaches can be fruitfully combined. Recently Zwart and Franssen (Synthese 158(1):75–92, 2007) have offered precise analyses of the content and likeness approaches, and shown that given these analyses any attempt to meld content and likeness orderings violates some basic desiderata. Unfortunately their (...)
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  6.  99
    Graham Oddie (2014). Thinking Globally, Acting Locally: Partiality, Preferences and Perspective. Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 9 (2):57-81.
    A rather promising value theory for environmental philosophers combines the well-known fitting attitude (FA) account of value with the rather less well-known account of value as richness. If the value of an entity is proportional to its degree of richness (which has been cashed out in terms of unified complexity and organic unity), then since natural entities, such as species or ecosystems, exhibit varying degrees of richness quite independently of what we happen to feel about them, they also possess differing (...)
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  7.  98
    Graham Oddie (forthcoming). Fitting Attitudes, Finkish Goods, and Value Appearances. In Russ Shafer Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics (Volume 11). Oxford University Press
    According to Fitting Attitude theorists, for something to possess a certain value it is necessary and sufficient that it be fitting (appropriate, or good, or obligatory, or something) to take a certain attitude to the bearer of that value. The idea seems obvious for thick evaluative attributes, but less obvious for the thin evaluative attributes—like goodness, betterness, and degrees of value. This paper is an extended argument for the thesis that the fitting response to the thin evaluative attributes of states (...)
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  8.  6
    Graham Oddie (forthcoming). Speech and Morality: On the Metaethical Implications of Speaking, by Cuneo, Terence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-4.
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  9.  65
    Graham Oddie & Peter Milne (1991). Act and Value: Expectation and the Representability of Moral Theories. Theoria 57 (1-2):42-76.
    According to the axiologist the value concepts are basic and the deontic concepts are derivative. This paper addresses two fundamental problems that arise for the axiologist. Firstly, what ought the axiologist o understand by the value of an act? Second, what are the prospects in principle for an axiological representation of moral theories. Can the deontic concepts of any coherent moral theory be represented by an agent-netural axiology: (1) whatever structure those concepts have and (2) whatever the causal structure of (...)
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  10.  69
    Graham Oddie (1997). Conditionalization, Cogency, and Cognitive Value. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (4):533-541.
  11. Graham Oddie (1986). The Poverty of the Popperian Program for Truthlikeness. Philosophy of Science 53 (2):163-178.
    The importance for realism of the concept of truthlikeness was first stressed by Popper. Popper himself not only mapped out a program for defining truthlikeness (in terms of falsity content and truth content) but produced the first definitions within this program. These were shown to be inadequate. But the program lingered on, and the most recent attempt to revive it is that of Newton-Smith. His attempt is a failure, not because of some minor defect or technical flaw in his particular (...)
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  12.  47
    Graham Oddie & David Ward (1989). The Aesthetic Adequacy of Copies. British Journal of Aesthetics 29 (3):258-260.
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  13. Graham Oddie (1998). Moral Realism, Moral Relativism and Moral Rules (a Compatibility Argument). Synthese 117 (2):251-274.
  14.  43
    Graham Oddie (2006). A Refutation of Peircean Idealism. In Cheyne C. (ed.), Rationality and Reality. Kluwer 155-66.
  15.  23
    Graham Oddie (2001). Axiological Atomism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):313 – 332.
    Value is either additive or else it is subject to organic unity. In general we have organic unity where a complex whole is not simply the sum of its parts. Value exhibits organic unity if the value of a complex, whether a complex state or complex quality, is greater or less than the sum of the values of its components or parts. Whether or not value is additive might be thought to be of purely metaphysical interest, but it is also (...)
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  16.  78
    Graham Oddie (1982). Armstrong on the Eleatic Principle and Abstract Entities. Philosophical Studies 41 (2):285 - 295.
  17. Graham Oddie & Dan Demetriou (2007). The Fictionalist's Attitude Problem. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):485 - 498.
    According to John Mackie, moral talk is representational (the realists go that bit right) but its metaphysical presuppositions are wildly implausible (the non-cognitivists got that bit right). This is the basis of Mackie’s now famous error theory: that moral judgments are cognitively meaningful but systematically false. Of course, Mackie went on to recommend various substantive moral judgments, and, in the light of his error theory, that has seemed odd to a lot of folk. Richard Joyce has argued that Mackie’s approach (...)
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  18.  26
    Graham Oddie, An Argument Against Commensurate Truthmakers.
    The core of the truthmaker research program is that true propositions are made true by appropriate parts of the actual world. This idea seems to give realists their best shot at capturing a robust account of the dependence of truth on the world. For a part of the world to be a truthmaker for a particular it must suffice for, or necessitate, the truth of the proposition. There are two extreme and unsatisfactory truthmaker theories. At one extreme any part of (...)
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  19.  84
    Graham Oddie (1994). Harmony, Purity, Truth. Mind 103 (412):451-472.
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  20.  44
    Graham Oddie & Peter Menzies (1992). An Objectivist's Guide to Subjective Value. Ethics 102 (3):512-533.
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  21.  27
    Graham Oddie (forthcoming). What Do We See in Museums? Philosophy.
    I address two related questions. First: what value is there in visiting a museum and becoming acquainted with the objects on display? For art museums the answer seem obvious: we go to experience valuable works of art, and experiencing valuable works of art is itself valuable. In this paper I focus on non-art museums, and while these may house aesthetically valuable objects, that is not their primary purpose, and at least some of the objects they house might not be particularly (...)
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  22.  17
    Graham Oddie (2001). Recombinant Values. Philosophical Studies 106 (3):259 - 292.
    An attractive admirer of George Bernard Shaw once wrote to him with a not-so modest proposal: ``You have the greatest brain in the world, and I have the most beautiful body; so we ought to produce the most perfect child.'' Shaw replied: ``What if the child inherits my body and your brains?''What if, indeed? Shaw's retort is interesting not because it revealsa grasp of elementary genetics, but rather because it suggests his grasp of an interesting and important principle of axiology. (...)
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  23.  13
    Graham Oddie (1981). Verisimilitude Reviewed. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (3):237-265.
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  24.  91
    Dan Demetriou & Graham Oddie (2007). Moral Fictionalism. [REVIEW] Mind 116 (462):439-446.
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  25.  77
    Graham Oddie (1990). Verisimilitude by Power Relations. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (1):129-135.
    A number of different theories of truthlikeness have been proposed, but most can be classified into one of two different main programmes: the probability-content programme and the likeness programme.1 In Brink and Heidema [1987] we are offered a further proposal, with the attraction of some novelty. I argue that while the heuristic path taken by the authors is rather remote from what they call ‘the well-worn paths’,2 in fact their point of arrival is rather closer to existing proposals within the (...)
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  26.  25
    Graham Oddie (2001). Hume, the BAD Paradox, and Value Realism. Philo 4 (2):109-122.
    A recent slew of arguments, if sound, would demonstrate that realism about value involves a kind of paradox-I call it the BAD paradox.More precisely, they show that if there are genuine propositions about the good, then one could maintain harmony between one’s desires and one’s beliefs about the good only on pain of violating fundamental principles of decision theory. I show. however, the BAD paradox turns out to be a version of Newcomb’s problem, and that the cognitivist about value can (...)
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  27.  26
    Graham Oddie (1991). Supervenience, Goodness, and Higher-Order Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (1):20 – 47.
    Supervenience theses promise ontological economy without reducibility. The problem is that they face a dilemma: either the relation of supervenience entails reducibility or it is mysterious. Recently higher-order universals have been invoked to avoid the dilemma. This article develops a higher-order framework in which this claim can be assessed. It is shown that reducibility can be avoided, but only at the cost of a rather radical metaphysical proposal.
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  28.  7
    Graham Oddie (1982). Cohen on Verisimilitude and Natural Necessity. Synthese 51 (3):355 - 379.
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  29.  82
    Graham Oddie (1997). Killing and Letting-Die: Bare Differences and Clear Differences. Philosophical Studies 88 (3):267-287.
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  30.  23
    Graham Oddie & Pavel Tichý (1990). Resplicing Properties in the Supervenience Base. Philosophical Studies 58 (3):259-69.
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  31. Graham Oddie (2010). Experiences of Value. In Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave Macmillan 121.
  32.  15
    Pavel Tichy & Graham Oddie (1983). Ability and Freedom. American Philosophical Quarterly 20 (2):135 - 147.
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  33.  33
    Graham Oddie (1993). Addiction and the Value of Freedom. Bioethics 7 (5):373-401.
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  34.  24
    Colin Howson & Graham Oddie (1979). Miller's so-Called Paradox of Information. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30 (3):253-261.
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  35.  16
    Graham Oddie (2013). Value Realism. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell
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  36. Graham Oddie & Roy W. Perrett (eds.) (1992). Justice, Ethics, and New Zealand Society. Oxford University Press.
    What is sovereignty? Was it ceded to the Crown in the Treaty of Waitangi? If land was unjustly confiscated over a century ago, should it be returned? Is an ecosystem valuable in itself, or only because of its value to people? Does a property right entail a right to destroy? Can collectives (such as tribes) bear moral responsibility? Do they have moral rights? If so, what are the implications for the justice system? These questions are essentially philosophical, yet all thoughtful (...)
     
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  37.  3
    Graham Oddie (1989). The Unity of Theories. In Fred D'Agostino & I. C. Jarvie (eds.), Freedom and Rationality. Reidel 343--368.
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  38.  47
    Graham Oddie (1990). Backwards Causation and the Permanence of the Past. Synthese 85 (1):71 - 93.
    Can a present or future event bring about a past event? An answer to this question is demanded by many other interesting questions. Can anybody, even a god, do anything about what has already occurred? Should we plan for the past, as well as for the future? Can anybody precognise the future in a way quite different from normal prediction? Do the causal laws and the past jointly preclude free action? Does current physical theory entail a consistent version of backwards (...)
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  39.  8
    Graham Oddie (1994). Moral Uncertainty and Human Embryo Experimentation. In K. W. M. Fulford, Grant Gillett & Janet Martin Soskice (eds.), Medicine and Moral Reasoning. Cambridge University Press 3--144.
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  40.  8
    Graham Oddie (2012). Reasons From Within. [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (3):473-476.
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  41.  8
    Graham Oddie & Roy W. Perrett (1992). Simultaneity and God's Timelessness. Sophia 31 (1-2):123-127.
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  42.  9
    Graham Oddie (1996). Rescuing Reason. Philosophy 71 (277):445 - 460.
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  43. Graham Oddie (1978). Verisimilitude and Distance in Logical Space. Acta Philosophica Fennica 30 (2-4):227-43.
     
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  44.  25
    Graham Oddie & Pavel Tichý (1982). The Logic of Ability, Freedom and Responsibility. Studia Logica 41 (2-3):227 - 248.
    The aim of this paper is to offer a rigorous explication of statements ascribing ability to agents and to develop the logic of such statements. A world is said to be feasible iff it is compatible with the actual past-and-present. W is a P-world iff W is feasible and P is true in W (where P is a proposition). P is a sufficient condition for Q iff every P world is a Q world. P is a necessary condition for Q (...)
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  45.  22
    Graham Oddie (2000). Permanent Possibilities of Sensation. Philosophical Studies 98 (3):345-359.
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  46.  9
    Gregory Currie & Graham Oddie (1980). Changing Numbers. Theoria 46 (2-3):148-164.
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  47. Graham Oddie (forthcoming). Desire and the Good: In Search of the Right Fit. In Deonna J. & Lauria F. (eds.), The Nature of Desire. Oxford University Press
     
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  48.  11
    Graham Oddie (1990). Creative Value. Inquiry 33 (3):297 – 315.
    Free agents can create and destroy value, for how much value is realized may well depend on what such agents choose to do. Not only may such agents create and destroy value, but such creation and destruction seem to involve a dimension of value: I call it creative value. An explication of the twin concepts of creating value and creative value is given, motivated by two desiderata. It is then shown that creative value turns out to be equivalent to what (...)
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  49.  15
    Graham Oddie (1993). Act and Maxim: Value-Discrepancy and Two Theories of Power. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):71-92.
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  50. Graham Oddie (1988). On a Dogma Concerning Realism and Incommensurability. In R. Nola (ed.), Reativism and Realism in Science. Reidel 169-293.
     
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