Search results for 'Grandfather paradox' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  98
    Theodore Sider (1997). A New Grandfather Paradox? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):139-144.
    In an article in Scientific American (March 1994, pp. 68–74) entitled “The Quantum Physics of Time Travel”, Oxford physicist David Deutsch and Oxford philosopher Michael Lockwood give a defense of the physical possibility of time travel based on the “Many Worlds” interpretation of quantum mechanics. This positive view of theirs is not my concern, however—I want to quarrel with their argument that time travel cannot be accommodated in any other way.1 The best way to spell out the traditional “grandfather (...)
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  2.  54
    Bradford Skow, Notes on the Grandfather Paradox.
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  3.  5
    Giovanni Boniolo (1999). Wormholes and Timelike Curves: Is There Room for the Grandfather Paradox? In Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara (ed.), Language, Quantum, Music. 143--157.
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  4.  23
    Kay Herrmann (2014). Faszination Zeitreisen. Universitätsverlag Chemnitz.
    Time travel is one of mankind's most ancient dreams. It inspires our imagination and provides material for bizarre stories. H. G. Wells' novel, "The Time Machine" (1895), marks the beginning of a long history of science fiction literature devoted to the subject of time travel. -/- A work on the subject of time travel forces us to re-examine our concept of "time". The complexity and the contradictory nature this subject makes it difficult to be more precise about "time". On its (...)
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  5. Peter Eldridge-Smith (2007). Paradoxes and Hypodoxes of Time Travel. In Jan Lloyd Jones, Paul Campbell & Peter Wylie (eds.), Art and Time. Australian Scholarly Publishing 172--189.
    I distinguish paradoxes and hypodoxes among the conundrums of time travel. I introduce ‘hypodoxes’ as a term for seemingly consistent conundrums that seem to be related to various paradoxes, as the Truth-teller is related to the Liar. In this article, I briefly compare paradoxes and hypodoxes of time travel with Liar paradoxes and Truth-teller hypodoxes. I also discuss Lewis’ treatment of time travel paradoxes, which I characterise as a Laissez Faire theory of time travel. Time travel paradoxes are impossible according (...)
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  6.  5
    Neal A. Tognazzini (forthcoming). Free Will and Time Travel. In Meghan Griffith, Neil Levy & Kevin Timpe (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Free Will. Routledge
    In this chapter I articulate the threat that time travel to the past allegedly poses to the free <span class='Hi'>will</span> of the time traveler (drawing on the work of David Lewis, Kadri Vihvelin, Ted Sider, and others), and I argue that on the traditional way of thinking about free <span class='Hi'>will</span>, the incompatibilist about time travel and free <span class='Hi'>will</span> wins the day. However, a residual worry about the incompatibilist view points the way toward a novel way of thinking about (...)
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  7.  66
    Joel Hunter, Time Travel. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  8. Frank Arntzenius, Time Travel and Modern Physics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Time travel has been a staple of science fiction. With the advent of general relativity it has been entertained by serious physicists. But, especially in the philosophy literature, there have been arguments that time travel is inherently paradoxical. The most famous paradox is the grandfather paradox: you travel back in time and kill your grandfather, thereby preventing your own existence. To avoid inconsistency some circumstance will have to occur which makes you fail in this attempt to (...)
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  9.  26
    Andrea Guardo (2013). Due osservazioni sulla metafisica della prescienza. Lebenswelt 3 (1):47-57.
    The paper discusses two problems concerning the metaphysics of foreknowledge. In the first section I focus on an argument that purports to show that there is no such a thing. In the second one I discuss the relation between the foreknowledge of our own behaviour, or "autoforeknowledge", and what we may call "the phenomenology of freedom". As for the first issue, I employ David Lewis' discussion of the Grandfather Paradox to argue that the argument in question overlooks a (...)
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  10.  61
    Declan Smithies (forthcoming). Belief and Self-Knowledge: Lessons From Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Issues 26.
    The aim of this paper is to argue that what I call the simple theory of introspection can be extended to account for our introspective knowledge of what we believe as well as what we consciously experience. In section one, I present the simple theory of introspection and motivate the extension from experience to belief. In section two, I argue that extending the simple theory provides a solution to Moore’s paradox by explaining why believing Moorean conjunctions always involves some (...)
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  11.  75
    Nikk Effingham (2012). An Unwelcome Consequence of the Multiverse Thesis. Synthese 184 (3):375 - 386.
    The Multiverse Thesis is a proposed solution to the Grandfather Paradox. It is popular and well promulgated, found in fiction, philosophy and (most importantly) physics. I first offer a short explanation on behalf of its advocates as to why it qualifies as a theory of time travel (as opposed to mere 'universe hopping'). Then I argue that the thesis nevertheless has an unwelcome consequence: that extended objects cannot travel in time. Whilst this does not demonstrate that the Multiverse (...)
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  12.  57
    Hans Moravec, Time Travel and Computing.
    The last few years have been good for time machines. Kip Thorne's renowned general relativity group at Caltech invented a new quantum gravitational approach to building a time gate, and, in an international collaboration, gave a plausible rebuttal of "grandfather paradox" arguments against time travel. Another respected group suggested time machines that exploit quantum mechanical time uncertainty. The technical requirements for these suggestions exceed our present capabilities, but each new approach seems less onerous than the last. There is (...)
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  13.  17
    Jiri Benovsky (2011). Endurance and Time Travel. Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):65-72.
    Suppose that you travel back in time to talk to your younger self in order to tell her that she (you) should have done some things in her (your) life differently. Of course, you will not be able to make this plan work, we know that from the many versions of 'the grandfather paradox' that populate the philosophical literature about time travel. What will be my centre of interest in this paper is the conversation between you and ... (...)
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  14.  81
    Hartry H. Field (2008). Saving Truth From Paradox. Oxford University Press.
    A selective background -- Broadly classical approaches -- Paracompleteness -- More on paracomplete solutions -- Paraconsistent dialetheism.
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  15.  93
    Jc Beall & Julien Murzi (2013). Two Flavors of Curry's Paradox. Journal of Philosophy 110 (3):143-165.
    In this paper, we distinguish two versions of Curry's paradox: c-Curry, the standard conditional-Curry paradox, and v-Curry, a validity-involving version of Curry's paradox that isn’t automatically solved by solving c-curry. A unified treatment of curry paradox thus calls for a unified treatment of both c-Curry and v-Curry. If, as is often thought, c-Curry paradox is to be solved via non-classical logic, then v-Curry may require a lesson about the structure—indeed, the substructure—of the validity relation itself.
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  16. Gabriel Uzquiano (2015). Modality and Paradox. Philosophy Compass 10 (4):284-300.
    Philosophers often explain what could be the case in terms of what is, in fact, the case at one possible world or another. They may differ in what they take possible worlds to be or in their gloss of what is for something to be the case at a possible world. Still, they stand united by the threat of paradox. A family of paradoxes akin to the set-theoretic antinomies seem to allow one to derive a contradiction from apparently plausible (...)
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  17.  56
    Joe Salerno (ed.) (2009). New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press.
    This collection assembles Church's referee reports, Fitch's 1963 paper, and nineteen new papers on the knowability paradox.
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  18. Bryan Frances (forthcoming). Why the Vagueness Paradox is Amazing. Think.
    One of the hardest problems in philosophy, one that has been around for over two thousand years without generating any significant consensus on its solution, involves the concept of vagueness: a word or concept that doesn’t have a perfectly precise meaning. There is an argument that seems to show that the word or concept simply must have a perfectly precise meaning, as violently counterintuitive as that is. Unfortunately, the argument is usually so compressed that it is difficult to see why (...)
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  19.  30
    Andrew Bacon, John Hawthorne & Gabriel Uzquiano (forthcoming). Higher-Order Free Logic and the Prior-Kaplan Paradox. Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
    The principle of Universal Instantiation plays a pivotal role both in the derivation of intensional paradoxes such as Prior's paradox or Kaplan's paradox and the debate between necessitism and contingentism. We outline a distinctively free-logical approach to the intensional paradoxes and note how the free-logical outlook allows one to distinguish two different, though allied themes in higher-order necessitism. We examine the costs of this solution and compare it with the more familiar ramificationist approaches to higher-order logic. Our assessment (...)
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  20. Susanna Rinard (2014). A New Bayesian Solution to the Paradox of the Ravens. Philosophy of Science 81 (1):81-100.
    The canonical Bayesian solution to the ravens paradox faces a problem: it entails that black non-ravens disconfirm the hypothesis that all ravens are black. I provide a new solution that avoids this problem. On my solution, black ravens confirm that all ravens are black, while non-black non-ravens and black non-ravens are neutral. My approach is grounded in certain relations of epistemic dependence, which, in turn, are grounded in the fact that the kind raven is more natural than the (...)
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  21.  46
    Rafael Ferber, Zeno's Metrical Paradox of Extension and Descartes' Mind-Body Problem.
    The article uses Zeno’s metrical paradox of extension, or Zeno’s fundamental paradox, as a thought-model for the mind-body problem. With the help of this model, the distinction contained between mental and physical phenomena can be formulated as sharply as possible. I formulate Zeno’s fundamental paradox and give a sketch of four different solutions to it. Then I construct a mind-body paradox corresponding to the fundamental paradox. Through that, it becomes possible to copy the solutions to (...)
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  22.  74
    Richard Oxenberg, Einstein's Quandary, Socrates' Irony, and Jesus' Laughter: A 'Post-Modern' Meditation on Faith, Reason, Love, and the Paradox of the One and the Many.
    The paradox of 'the One and the Many' might, more generally, be understood as the paradox of relationship. In order for there to be relationship there must be at least two parties in relation. The relation must, at once, hold the parties apart (otherwise they would collapse into unity) while holding them together (otherwise relationship itself would cease). It must do so, further, without itself becoming a third party which would then, itself, need to be related. This paper (...)
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  23.  50
    Benj Hellie (forthcoming). Rationalization and the Ross Paradox. In Nate Charlow & Matthew Chrisman (eds.), Deontic Modality. Oxford UP
    'Post this letter!' does not entail 'Post this letter or drink up my wine!' (the Ross Paradox) because one can be in a state with the content of the former without being in a state with the content of the latter; in turn, because the latter can rationalize drinking up my wine but the former cannot; in turn, because practical rationalization flows toward one's present situation, in contrast with the flow of theoretical rationalization from one's present situation. Formally, this (...)
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  24. Jennifer Nagel (2011). The Psychological Basis of the Harman-Vogel Paradox. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (5):1-28.
    Harman’s lottery paradox, generalized by Vogel to a number of other cases, involves a curious pattern of intuitive knowledge ascriptions: certain propositions seem easier to know than various higher-probability propositions that are recognized to follow from them. For example, it seems easier to judge that someone knows his car is now on Avenue A, where he parked it an hour ago, than to judge that he knows that it is not the case that his car has been stolen and (...)
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  25. Gabriel Uzquiano (2015). Recombination and Paradox. Philosophers' Imprint 15 (19).
    The doctrine that whatever could exist does exist leads to a proliferation of possibly concrete objects given certain principles of recombination. If, for example, there could have been a large infinite number of concrete objects, then there is at least the same number of possibly concrete objects in existence. And further cardinality considerations point to a tension between the preceding doctrine and the Cantorian conception of the absolutely infinite. This paper develops a parallel problem for a variety of possible worlds (...)
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  26. Alex Worsnip (forthcoming). Belief, Credence, and the Preface Paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-14.
    Many discussions of the “preface paradox” assume that it is more troubling for deductive constraints on rational belief if outright belief is reducible to credence. I show that this is an error: we can generate the problem without assuming such reducibility. All we need are some very weak normative assumptions about rational relationships between belief and credence. The only view that escapes my way of formulating the problem for the deductive closure constraint is in fact itself a reductive view: (...)
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  27.  75
    J. C. Beall (ed.) (2007). Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press.
    The Liar paradox raises foundational questions about logic, language, and truth (and semantic notions in general). A simple Liar sentence like 'This sentence is false' appears to be both true and false if it is either true or false. For if the sentence is true, then what it says is the case; but what it says is that it is false, hence it must be false. On the other hand, if the statement is false, then it is true, since (...)
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  28.  76
    Alessandro Giordani (2015). On a New Tentative Solution to Fitch’s Paradox. Erkenntnis.
    In a recent paper, Alexander argues that relaxing the requirement that sound knowers know their own soundness might provide a solution to Fitch’s paradox and introduces a suitable axiomatic system where the paradox is avoided. In this paper an analysis of this solution is proposed according to which the effective move for solving the paradox depends on the axiomatic treatment of the ontic modality rather than the limitations imposed on the epistemic one. It is then shown that, (...)
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  29.  40
    Roy T. Cook (2014). There is No Paradox of Logical Validity. Logica Universalis 8 (3-4):447-467.
    A number of authors have argued that Peano Arithmetic supplemented with a logical validity predicate is inconsistent in much the same manner as is PA supplemented with an unrestricted truth predicate. In this paper I show that, on the contrary, there is no genuine paradox of logical validity—a completely general logical validity predicate can be coherently added to PA, and the resulting system is consistent. In addition, this observation lead to a number of novel, and important, insights into the (...)
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  30.  98
    Michael Glanzberg (2004). A Contextual-Hierarchical Approach to Truth and the Liar Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (1):27-88.
    This paper presents an approach to truth and the Liar paradox which combines elements of context dependence and hierarchy. This approach is developed formally, using the techniques of model theory in admissible sets. Special attention is paid to showing how starting with some ideas about context drawn from linguistics and philosophy of language, we can see the Liar sentence to be context dependent. Once this context dependence is properly understood, it is argued, a hierarchical structure emerges which is (...)
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  31. Andrew Bacon (2013). Curry's Paradox and Omega Inconsistency. Studia Logica 101 (1):1-9.
    In recent years there has been a revitalised interest in non-classical solutions to the semantic paradoxes. In this paper I show that a number of logics are susceptible to a strengthened version of Curry's paradox. This can be adapted to provide a proof theoretic analysis of the omega-inconsistency in Lukasiewicz's continuum valued logic, allowing us to better evaluate which logics are suitable for a naïve truth theory. On this basis I identify two natural subsystems of Lukasiewicz logic which individually, (...)
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  32. Gabriel Uzquiano (2015). A Neglected Resolution of Russell’s Paradox of Propositions. Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (2):328-344.
    Bertrand Russell offered an influential paradox of propositions in Appendix B of The Principles of Mathematics, but there is little agreement as to what to conclude from it. We suggest that Russell's paradox is best regarded as a limitative result on propositional granularity. Some propositions are, on pain of contradiction, unable to discriminate between classes with different members: whatever they predicate of one, they predicate of the other. When accepted, this remarkable fact should cast some doubt upon some (...)
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  33. Jack Woods (2014). Expressivism and Moore's Paradox. Philosophers' Imprint 14 (5):1-12.
    Expressivists explain the expression relation which obtains between sincere moral assertion and the conative or affective attitude thereby expressed by appeal to the relation which obtains between sincere assertion and belief. In fact, they often explicitly take the relation between moral assertion and their favored conative or affective attitude to be exactly the same as the relation between assertion and the belief thereby expressed. If this is correct, then we can use the identity of the expression relation in the two (...)
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  34.  89
    Ken Levy (2007). The Solution to the Real Blackmail Paradox: The Common Link Between Blackmail and Other Criminal Threats. Connecticut Law Review 39:1051-1096.
    Disclosure of true but reputation-damaging information is generally legal. But threats to disclose true but reputation-damaging information unless payment is made are generally criminal. Many scholars think that this situation is paradoxical because it seems to involve illegality mysteriously arising out of legality, a criminal act mysteriously arising out of an independently legal threat to disclose conjoined with an independently legal demand for money. -/- But this formulation is not quite right. The real paradox raised by the different legal (...)
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  35.  66
    Terence Rajivan Edward, A Solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox.
    The students’ argument against the possibility of a surprise exam assumes that the following would not occur: the teacher decides to give the exam on a certain day, the exam would not be a surprise on that day, but the teacher does not realize this. I give a reason to reject this assumption, and I point out that an attempt to reformulate the surprise exam paradox in order to allow for the assumption does not result in an acceptable argument.
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  36.  11
    Ansten Klev (2016). A Proof‐Theoretic Account of the Miners Paradox. Theoria 82 (2).
    By maintaining that a conditional sentence can be taken to express the validity of a rule of inference, we offer a solution to the Miners Paradox that leaves both modus ponens and disjunction elimination intact. The solution draws on Sundholm's recently proposed account of Fitch's Paradox.
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  37.  79
    Sean Walsh (forthcoming). Predicativity, the Russell-Myhill Paradox, and Church’s Intensional Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-50.
    This paper sets out a predicative response to the Russell-Myhill paradox of propositions within the framework of Church's intensional logic. A predicative response places restrictions on the full comprehension schema, which asserts that every formula determines a higher-order entity. In addition to motivating the restriction on the comprehension schema from intuitions about the stability of reference, this paper contains a consistency proof for the predicative response to the Russell-Myhill paradox. The models used to establish this consistency (...)
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  38.  99
    Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno, Fitch's Paradox of Knowability. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The paradox of knowability is a logical result suggesting that, necessarily, if all truths are knowable in principle then all truths are in fact known. The contrapositive of the result says, necessarily, if in fact there is an unknown truth, then there is a truth that couldn't possibly be known. More specifically, if p is a truth that is never known then it is unknowable that p is a truth that is never known. The proof has been used to (...)
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  39. Clayton Littlejohn (2010). Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100.
    We shall evaluate two strategies for motivating the view that knowledge is the norm of belief. The first draws on observations concerning belief's aim and the parallels between belief and assertion. The second appeals to observations concerning Moore's Paradox. Neither of these strategies gives us good reason to accept the knowledge account. The considerations offered in support of this account motivate only the weaker account on which truth is the fundamental norm of belief.
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  40. Elia Zardini (2013). Higher-Order Sorites Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):25-48.
    The naive theory of vagueness holds that the vagueness of an expression consists in its failure to draw a sharp boundary between positive and negative cases. The naive theory is contrasted with the nowadays dominant approach to vagueness, holding that the vagueness of an expression consists in its presenting borderline cases of application. The two approaches are briefly compared in their respective explanations of a paramount phenomenon of vagueness: our ignorance of any sharp boundary between positive and (...)
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  41.  68
    Roy A. Sorensen (2003). A Brief History of the Paradox: Philosophy and the Labyrinths of the Mind. Oxford University Press.
    Can God create a stone too heavy for him to lift? Can time have a beginning? Which came first, the chicken or the egg? Riddles, paradoxes, conundrums--for millennia the human mind has found such knotty logical problems both perplexing and irresistible. Now Roy Sorensen offers the first narrative history of paradoxes, a fascinating and eye-opening account that extends from the ancient Greeks, through the Middle Ages, the Enlightenment, and into the twentieth century. When Augustine asked what God was doing before (...)
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  42.  50
    Mark Pinder (2014). Borg’s Minimalism and the Problem of Paradox. In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Semantics and Beyond: Philosophical and Linguistic Inquiries. De Gruyter 207-230.
    According to Emma Borg, minimalism is (roughly) the view that natural language sentences have truth conditions, and that these truth conditions are fully determined by syntactic structure and lexical content. A principal motivation for her brand of minimalism is that it coheres well with the popular view that semantic competence is underpinned by the cognition of a minimal semantic theory. In this paper, I argue that the liar paradox presents a serious problem for this principal motivation. Two lines (...)
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  43. Philippe Mongin (2012). The Doctrinal Paradox, the Discursive Dilemma, and Logical Aggregation Theory. Theory and Decision 73 (3):315-355.
    Judgment aggregation theory, or rather, as we conceive of it here, logical aggregation theory generalizes social choice theory by having the aggregation rule bear on judgments of all kinds instead of merely preference judgments. It derives from Kornhauser and Sager’s doctrinal paradox and List and Pettit’s discursive dilemma, two problems that we distinguish emphatically here. The current theory has developed from the discursive dilemma, rather than the doctrinal paradox, and the final objective of the paper is to give (...)
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  44. Thomas Kroedel (2012). The Lottery Paradox, Epistemic Justification and Permissibility. Analysis 72 (1):57-60.
    The lottery paradox can be solved if epistemic justification is assumed to be a species of permissibility. Given this assumption, the starting point of the paradox can be formulated as the claim that, for each lottery ticket, I am permitted to believe that it will lose. This claim is ambiguous between two readings, depending on the scope of ‘permitted’. On one reading, the claim is false; on another, it is true, but, owing to the general failure of permissibility (...)
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  45. Hartry Field (forthcoming). Disarming a Paradox of Validity. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic.
    Abstract. Any theory of truth must find a way around Curry’s paradox, and there are well-known ways to do so. This paper concerns an apparently analogous paradox, about validity rather than truth, which JC Beall and Julien Murzi (“Two Flavor's of Curry's Paradox”) call the v-Curry. They argue that there are reasons to want a common solution to it and the standard Curry paradox, and that this rules out the solutions to the latter offered by most (...)
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  46.  9
    Bradley N. Seeman (2016). The “Paradox of Self‐Constitution” and Korsgaard's Two Conceptions of Maxims for Action. Metaphilosophy 47 (2):233-250.
    This article argues that Christine Korsgaard gives two accounts of maxims, the identity-priority account and the form-priority account. There is a tension between the accounts because Korsgaard's form-priority maxims account cannot function apart from the identity of a well-formed agent that precedes and tests maxims to determine if they should count as reasons or laws, and Korsgaard's identity-priority maxims account needs the form of the maxim to precede, bind, and constitute the well-formed agent. This tension mirrors the two sides of (...)
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  47.  23
    Danny Frederick, Decisions, Facts, Fictions and a Spurious Miners Paradox.
    Kolodny and MacFarlane claim to identify a deontic paradox in a case of some threatened miners. They propose to avoid the paradox by rejecting the logical principle of modus ponens. Other authors concur that a remedy requires rejection of classical logical principles. Graham considers a structurally similar case concerning a doctor, but he thinks that the appearance of paradox arises out of a confusion between acting rightly and not being blameworthy. I explain why Graham’s solution fails. I (...)
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  48. Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (2011). Moore's Paradox, Truth and Accuracy. Acta Analytica 26 (3):243-255.
    G. E. Moore famously observed that to assert ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I do not believe that I did’ would be ‘absurd’. Moore calls it a ‘paradox’ that this absurdity persists despite the fact that what I say about myself might be true. Krista Lawlor and John Perry have proposed an explanation of the absurdity that confines itself to semantic notions while eschewing pragmatic ones. We argue that this explanation faces four objections. We give a (...)
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  49.  26
    John N. Williams (2013). Moore's Paradox and the Priority of Belief Thesis. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1117-1138.
    Moore’s paradox is the fact that assertions or beliefs such asBangkok is the capital of Thailand but I do not believe that Bangkok is the capital of Thailand or Bangkok is the capital of Thailand but I believe that Bangkok is not the capital of Thailand are ‘absurd’ yet possibly true. The current orthodoxy is that an explanation of the absurdity should first start with belief, on the assumption that once the absurdity in belief has been explained then this (...)
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  50. Uriah Kriegel (2004). Moore's Paradox and the Structure of Conscious Belief. Erkenntnis 61 (1):99-121.
    Propositions such as are paradoxical, in that even though they can be true, they cannot be truly asserted or believed. This is Moore’s paradox. Sydney Shoemaker has recently ar- gued that the paradox arises from a constitutive relation that holds between first- and second-order beliefs. This paper explores this approach to the paradox. Although Shoemaker’s own account of the paradox is rejected, a different account along similar lines is endorsed. At the core (...)
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