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Grant Gillett [89]Grant R. Gillett [32]
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Profile: Grant Gillett (University of Otago)
  1.  18
    Grant Gillett (2009). The Subjective Brain, Identity, and Neuroethics. American Journal of Bioethics 9 (9):5-13.
    The human brain is subjective and reflects the life of a being-in-the-world-with-others whose identity reflects that complex engaged reality. Human subjectivity is shaped and in-formed (formed by inner processes) that are adapted to the human life-world and embody meaning and the relatedness of a human being. Questions of identity relate to this complex and dynamic reality to reflect the fact that biology, human ecology, culture, and one's historic-political situation are inscribed in one's neural network and have configured its architecture so (...)
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  2.  1
    Grant Gillett (2013). The Conceptual Link From Physical to Mental. By Robert Kirk. Oxford: University Press, 2013. 252pp, £35. ISBN 10: 0199669414. [REVIEW] Philosophy 89 (2):1-5.
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  3.  5
    Grant Gillett (2009). The Mind and its Discontents: An Essay in Discursive Psychiatry. Oxford University Press.
    The first edition of The Mind and its Discontents was a powerful analysis of how, as a society, we view mental illness. In the ten years since the first edition, there has been growing interest in the philosophy of psychiatry, and a new edition of this text is more timely and important than ever. -/- In The Mind and its Discontents, Grant Gillett argues that an understanding of mental illness requires more than just a study of biological models of mental (...)
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  4.  4
    Grant R. Gillett (1992). Representation, Meaning, and Thought. Oxford University Press.
    This study examines the relationship between thought and language by considering the views of Kant and the later Wittgenstein along with many strands of contemporary debate in the area of mental content. Building on an analysis of the nature of concepts and conceptions of objects, Gillett provides an account of psychological explanation and the subject of experience, offers a novel perspective on mental representation and linguistic meaning, looks at the difficult topics of cognitive roles and singular thought, and concludes with (...)
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  5. Grant R. Gillett (2001). Free Will and Events in the Brain. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (3):287-310.
    Free will seems to be part of the romantic echo of a world view which predates scientific psychology and, in particular, cognitive neuroscience. Findings in cognitive neuroscience seem to indicate that some form of physicalist determinism about human behavior is correct. However, when we look more closely we find that physical determinism based on the view that brain events cause mental events is problematic and that the data which are taken to support that view, do nothing of the kind. In (...)
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  6.  43
    Grant Gillett (1993). Explaining Intentions: Critical Review of Explaining Behaviour. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):157-165.
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  7.  3
    Grant Gillett (2015). Moral Responsibility by Christopher Cowley, 2014 London, Routledge256 Pp., £52/$90 ; £16/$29.95 Consciousness and Moral Responsibility by Neil Levy, 2014 Oxford, Oxford University Press176 Pp., £27.50. [REVIEW] Journal of Applied Philosophy 32 (3):330-333.
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  8.  6
    Grant R. Gillett (1987). Concepts, Structures, and Meanings. Inquiry 30 (March):101-112.
    Concepts are basic elements of thought. Piaget has a conception of the nature of concepts as informational or computational operations performed in an inner milieu and enabling the child to understand the world in which it lives and acts. Concepts are, however, not merely logico?mathematical but are also conceptually linked to the mastery of language which itself involves the appropriate use of words in social and interpersonal settings. In the light of Vygotsky's work on the social and interactive nature of (...)
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  9. Grant Gillett & Robin Hankey (2005). Oedipus the King: Temperament, Character, and Virtue. Philosophy and Literature 29 (2):269-285.
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  10.  84
    Grant R. Gillett (1989). Perception and Neuroscience. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (March) 83 (March):83-103.
    Perception is often analysed as a process in which causal events from the environment act on a subject to produce states in the mind or brain. The role of the subject is an increasing feature of neuroscientific and cognitive literature. This feature is linked to the need for an account of the normative aspects of perceptual competence. A holographic model is offered in which objects are presented to the subject classified according to rules governing concepts and encoded in brain function (...)
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  11.  14
    Grant Gillett (2011). The Gold-Plated Leucotomy Standard and Deep Brain Stimulation. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 8 (1):35-44.
    Walter Freeman, the self styled neurosurgeon, became famous (or infamous) for psychosurgery. The operation of frontal leucotomy swept through the world (with Freeman himself performing something like 18,000 cases) but it has tainted the whole idea of psychosurgery down to the present era. Modes of psychosurgery such as Deep Brain Stimulation and other highly selective neurosurgical procedures for neurological and psychiatric conditions are in ever-increasing use in current practice. The new, more exciting techniques are based in a widely held philosophical (...)
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  12.  28
    Flora Huang & Grant Gillett (2014). Bao-Yu: A Mental Disorder or a Cultural Icon? Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 11 (2):183-189.
    The embodied human subject is dynamically connected to his or her historico-sociocultural context, the soil from which a person’s psyche is nourished as multiplex meanings are absorbed and enable personal development. In each culture certain towering artistic works embody this perspective. The Dream of the Red Chamber introduces Jia Bao-yu—a scion of the prestigious Jia family—and his relationships with a large cast of characters. Bao-yu is controversial but, at the time of the family’s tragic collapse, he can be seen as (...)
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  13.  4
    Grant Gillett (2006). Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 1:13.
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  14. Arthur R. Peacocke & Grant R. Gillett (eds.) (1987). Persons and Personality: A Contemporary Inquiry. Blackwell.
  15.  94
    Grant R. Gillett (1987). The Generality Constraint and Conscious Thought. Analysis 47 (January):20-24.
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  16.  9
    Grant R. Gillett (1989). Representations and Cognitive Science. Inquiry 32 (September):261-77.
    ?Representation? is a concept which occurs both in cognitive science and philosophy. It has common features in both settings in that it concerns the explanation of behaviour in terms of the way the subject categorizes and systematizes responses to its environment. The prevailing model sees representations as causally structured entities correlated on the one hand with elements in a natural language and on the other with clearly identifiable items in the world. This leads to an analysis of representation and cognition (...)
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  17.  21
    Grant Gillett (2009). Intention, Autonomy, and Brain Events. Bioethics 23 (6):330-339.
    Informed consent is the practical expression of the doctrine of autonomy. But the very idea of autonomy and conscious free choice is undercut by the view that human beings react as their unconscious brain centres dictate, depending on factors that may or may not be under rational control and reflection. This worry is, however, based on a faulty model of human autonomy and consciousness and needs close neurophilosophical scrutiny. A critique of the ethics implied by the model takes us towards (...)
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  18.  3
    Grant R. Gillett (1988). Consciousness and Brain Function. Philosophical Psychology 1 (3):325-39.
    Abstract The language of consciousness and that of brain function seem vastly different and incommensurable ways of approaching human mental life. If we look at what we mean by consciousness we find that it has a great deal to do with the sensitivity and responsiveness shown by a subject toward things that happen. Philosophically, we can understnd ascriptions of consciousness best by looking at the conditions which make it true for thinkers who share the concept to say that one of (...)
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  19.  6
    Grant Gillett (1991). Multiple Personality and Irrationality. Philosophical Psychology 4 (1):103-118.
    Abstract The phenomenology of Multiple Personality (MP) syndrome is used to derive an Aristotelian explanation of the failure to achieve rational integration of mental content. An MP subject is best understood as having failed to master the techniques of integrating conative and cognitive aspects of her mental life. This suggests that in irrationality the subject may lack similar skills basic to the proper articulation and use of mental content in belief formation and control of action. The view that emerges centres (...)
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  20.  4
    Paul Copland & Grant Gillett (2003). The Bioethical Structure of a Human Being. Journal of Applied Philosophy 20 (2):123–131.
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  21.  27
    Grant R. Gillett (1991). The Neurophilosophy of Pain. Philosophy 66 (April):191-206.
    The ability to feel pain is a property of human beings that seems to be based entirely in our biological natures and to place us squarely within the animal kingdom. Yet the experience of pain is often used as an example of a mental attribute with qualitative properties that defeat attempts to identify mental events with physiological mechanisms. I will argue that neurophysiology and psychology help to explain the interwoven biological and subjective features of pain and recommend a view of (...)
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  22. Grant Gillett (2004). Bioethics in the Clinic Hippocratic Reflections. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
     
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  23.  94
    Grant R. Gillett (1986). Brain Bisection and Personal Identity. Mind 95 (April):224-9.
    It has been argued that 'brain bisection' data leads us to abandon our traditional conception of personal identity. Nagel has remarked: The ultimate account of the unity of what we call a single mind consists of an enumeration of the types of functional integration that typify it. We know that these can be eroded in different ways and to different degrees. The belief that even in their complete version they can be explained by the presence of a numerically single subject (...)
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  24.  19
    Grant R. Gillett (1988). Learning to Perceive. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (June):601-618.
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  25.  84
    John McMillan & Grant R. Gillett (2005). Moral Responsibility, Consciousness and Psychiatry. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 39 (11):1018-1021.
  26.  84
    Grant R. Gillett (1997). A Discursive Account of Multiple Personality Disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 4 (3):213-22.
  27.  5
    Grant Gillett (1990). Consciousness, the Brain and What Matters. Bioethics 4 (3):181–198.
    Grant Gillett argues that it is consciousness which makes a human or other being the 'locus of ethical value'. Since cortical functioning is, in Gillett's view, necessary for conscious activity, an individual whose neocortex is permanently non-functional is no longer a locus of ethical value and cannot be benefited or harmed in a morally relevant sense. This means that there is no obligation to continue treating those who have suffered neocortical death.
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  28.  60
    Grant R. Gillett (1986). Disembodied Persons. Philosophy 61 (July):377-386.
    In discussing Disembodied Persons we need to confront two problems: A. Under what conditions would we consider that a person was present in the absence of the normal bodily cues? B. Could such circumstances arise? The first question may be regarded as epistemic and the second as metaphysical.
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  29.  9
    Grant Gillett (1987). AIDS and Confidentiality. Journal of Applied Philosophy 4 (1):15-20.
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  30.  13
    Carl Elliott & Grant Gillett (1992). Moral Insanity and Practical Reason. Philosophical Psychology 5 (1):53 – 67.
    The psychopathic personality disorder historically has been thought to include an insensitivity to morality. Some have thought that the psychopath's insensitivity indicates that he does not understand morality, but the relationship between the psychopath's defects and moral understanding has been unclear. We attempt to clarify this relationship, first by arguing that moral understanding is incomplete without concern for morality, and second, by showing that the psychopath demonstrates defects in frontal lobe activity which indicate impaired attention and adaptation to environmental conditions (...)
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  31.  71
    Grant R. Gillett (1995). Humpty Dumpty and the Night of the Triffids: Individualism and Rule-Following. Synthese 105 (2):191-206.
  32.  19
    Grant Gillett (1999). Consciousness and Lesser States: The Evolutionary Foothills of the Mind. Philosophy 74 (3):331-360.
    Consciousness and its relation to the unconscious mind have long been debated in philosophy. I develop the thesis that consciousness and its contents reflect the highest elaboration of a set of abilities to respond to the environment realized in more primitive organisms and brain circuits. The contents of the states lesser than consciousness are, however, intrinsically dubious and indeterminate as it is the role of the discursive skills we use to construct conscious contents that lends articulation and clarity to the (...)
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  33.  19
    Grant Gillett (2001). Signification and the Unconscious. Philosophical Psychology 14 (4):477 – 498.
    In European philosophical psychology, the work of Jacques Lacan has exerted a great deal of influence but it has received little attention from analytic philosophers. He is famous for the view that the unconscious is a repository of influences arising from language and the meanings it captures, but the presentation of his ideas is sometimes perplexing and impenetrable and its conceptual links with analytic philosophers like Frege and Wittgenstein are not easily discerned. In fact, there are a number of such (...)
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  34.  49
    Grant Gillett (2004). Review: Therapeutic Action. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (452):769-771.
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  35.  5
    Richard Mullen & Grant Gillett (2014). Delusions: A Different Kind of Belief? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 21 (1):27-37.
    Delusions, a key feature of psychosis, are usually thought of as a type of belief, as in the definition of the American Psychiatric Association: A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary. The belief is not one ordinarily accepted by other members of the person’s culture or subculture (e.g. it is not an article of religious (...)
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  36.  14
    Grant Gillett (1999). Dennett, Foucault, and the Selection of Memes. Inquiry 42 (1):3 – 23.
    The idea of cultural evolution, coined by Daniel Dennett, suggests we might be able to formulate a Darwinian type of explanation for the adaptive 'tricks' we learn as human beings. The proposed explanation makes use of the idea of memes. That idea is examined and related to semantic units linked to the terms in a natural language. It is agreed with Dennett that these are of pivotal significance in understanding the structure of human cognition. The alternative is then explored to (...)
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  37.  32
    Grant Gillett & Sam C. Liu (2012). Free Will and Necker's Cube: Reason, Language and Top-Down Control in Cognitive Neuroscience. Philosophy 87 (01):29-50.
    The debates about human free will are traditionally the concern of metaphysics but neuroscientists have recently entered the field arguing that acts of the will are determined by brain events themselves causal products of other events. We examine that claim through the example of free or voluntary switch of perception in relation to the Necker cube. When I am asked to see the cube in one way, I decide whether I will follow the command (or do as I am asked) (...)
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  38.  57
    Christopher D. Green & Grant R. Gillett (1995). Are Mental Events Preceded by Their Physical Causes? Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):333-340.
    Libet's experiments, supported by a strict one-to-one identity thesis between brain events and mental events, have prompted the conclusion that physical events precede the mental events to which they correspond. We examine this claim and conclude that it is suspect for several reasons. First, there is a dual assumption that an intention is the kind of thing that causes an action and that can be accurately introspected. Second, there is a real problem with the method of timing the mental events (...)
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  39.  36
    Grant Gillett (2005). Schechtman's Narrative Account of Identity. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (1):23-24.
  40.  1
    Grant Gillett (2003). Reasoning in Bioethics. Bioethics 17 (3):243–260.
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  41.  9
    Alister Browne, Grant Gillett & Martin Tweeddale (2000). Elective Ventilation Reply to Kluge. Bioethics 14 (3):248–253.
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  42.  14
    Grant Gillett (1994). Killing, Letting Die and Moral Perception. Bioethics 8 (4):312–328.
    ABSTRACTThere are a number of arguments that purport to show, in general terms, that there is no difference between killing and letting die. These are used to justify active euthanasia on the basis of the reasons given for allowing patients to die. I argue that the general and abstract arguments fail to take account of the complex and particular situations which are found in the care of those with terminal illness. When in such situations, there are perceptions and intuitions available (...)
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  43.  46
    Grant R. Gillett (1985). Brain, Mind and Soul. Zygon 20 (December):425-434.
  44.  13
    Grant R. Gillett (1993). Freedom of the Will and Mental Content. Ratio 6 (2):89-107.
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  45.  40
    Grant Gillett (2008). Identity and Resurrection. Heythrop Journal 49 (2):254–268.
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  46.  39
    Grant Gillett (1997). Husserl, Wittgenstein and the Snark: Intentionality and Social Naturalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):331-349.
    The Snark is an intentional object. I examine the general philosophical characteristics of thoughts of objects from the perspective of Husserl's, hyle, noesis, and noema and show how this meets constraints of opacity, normativity, and possible existence as generated by a sensitive theory of intentionality. Husserl introduces terms which indicate the normative features of intentional content and attempts to forge a direct relationship between the norms he generates and the actual world object which a thought intends. I then attempt to (...)
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  47.  6
    Grant Gillett (2012). How Do I Learn to Be Me Again? Autonomy, Life Skills, and Identity. In Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press
  48.  4
    Grant Gillett (1991). McGinn on Ascriptions of Content. Inquiry 34 (3 & 4):401 – 410.
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  49.  21
    Grant Gillett (2011). Minimally Conscious States, Deep Brain Stimulation, and What is Worse Than Futility. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 8 (2):145-149.
    The concept of futility is sometimes regarded as a cloak for medical paternalism in that it rolls together medical and value judgments. Often, despite attempts to disambiguate the concept, that is true and it can be applied in such a way as to marginalize the real interests of a patient. I suggest we replace it with a conceptual toolkit that includes physiological futility, substantial benefit (SB), and the risk of unacceptable badness (RUB) in that these concepts allow us to articulate (...)
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  50.  2
    Grant Gillett & Richard Mullen (2014). Delusions and the Postures of the Mind. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 21 (1):47-49.
    The two commentators have examined and illuminated different aspects of the analysis of delusions that we have offered. Their discussions both raise points that clarify that analysis in helpful ways. Richard Bentall (2014) makes the telling point that distinguishing the mental phenomena that count as delusions is not always straightforward and that, at the margins, there is a perennial problem with patterns of thought that seem to fall outside the realm of shared meanings that most of us derive from our (...)
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