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Profile: Grant Lamond (Oxford University)
  1. Grant Lamond (forthcoming). Analogical Reasoning in the Common Law. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 34 (3).
    Analogical reasoning is a pervasive feature of the common law, yet its structure and rational force is much disputed by legal theorists, some of whom are sceptical that it has any rational force at all. This paper argues that part of the explanation for these disagreements lies in there being not one form of analogical reasoning in the common law, but three: classificatory analogies, close analogies, and distant analogies. These three differ in their functions and rationale. Classificatory analogies involve the (...)
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  2. Grant Lamond (2014). Legal Sources, the Rule of Recognition, and Customary Law. American Journal of Jurisprudence 59 (2):25-48.
    A perennial puzzle about source-based law such as precedent is what makes sources legally binding. One of the most influential answers to this puzzle is provided by Hart’s rule of recognition. According to Hart, the sources of law are accepted as binding by the officials of a legal system, and this collective social practice of officials provides the foundations for a legal system. According to Hart, the rule of recognition differs fundamentally from other legal rules in three ways: (1) the (...)
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  3. Grant Lamond (2012). Persuasive Authority in the Law. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 17 (1):16-35.
    This article discusses the nature of persuasive authorities in the common law, and argues that many of them are best understood in terms of their (being regarded) as having theoretical rather than practical authorities for the courts that cite them. The contrast between theoretical and practical authority is examined at length in order to support the view that the treatment of many persuasive authorities by courts is more consistent with this view. Finally, it is argued that if persuasive authorities are (...)
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  4. Grant Lamond, Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  5. Grant Lamond (2007). Precedent. Philosophy Compass 2 (5):699–711.
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  6. Grant Lamond (2007). What is a Crime? Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 27 (4):609-632.
    This article presents a philosophical account of the nature of crime. It argues that the criminal law contains both fault-based crimes and strict liability offences, and that these two represent different paradigms of liability. It goes on to argue that the gist of fault-based crimes lies in their being public wrongs, not (as is often thought) because they wrong the public, but because the public is responsible for punishing them, i.e. because they merit state punishment. What makes wrongs deserving of (...)
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  7. Grant Lamond (2005). Do Precedents Create Rules? Legal Theory 11 (1):1-26.
    This article argues that legal precedents do not create rules, but rather create a special type of reason in favour of a decision in later cases. Precedents are often argued to be analogous to statutes in their law-creating function, but the common law practice of distinguishing is difficult to reconcile with orthodox accounts of the function of rules. Instead, a precedent amounts to a decision on the balance of reasons in the case before the precedent court, and later courts are (...)
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  8. Grant Lamond (2001). Coercion and the Nature of Law. Legal Theory 7 (1):35-57.
    It is a commonplace that coercion forms part of the nature of law: Law is inherently coercive. But how well founded is this claim, and what would it mean for coercion to be part of the of law? This article suggests that the claim is grounded in our current conception of law. The main focus of the article, however, is upon two major lines of argument that attempt to establish a link between law and coercion: one based upon the laws (...)
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  9. Grant Lamond (1996). Coercion, Threats, and the Puzzle of Blackmail. In A. P. Simester & A. T. H. Smith (eds.), Harm and Culpability. Oxford University Press. 215-38.
    This paper discusses the puzzle of blackmail, i.e. the way in which the threat of an otherwise legally permissible action can in some cases constitute blackmail. It argues that the key to understanding blackmail is in terms of coercion and threats, and the effect such threats have on the validity of a victim’s consent. The nature of coercion and of coercive threats is considered in detail to support the thesis that threats are prima facie impermissible, though often justified all-things-considered. The (...)
     
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