Search results for 'Greg Frost‐Arnold' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Ulrike Hahn, John-Mark Frost & Greg Maio (2005). What's in a Heuristic? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):551-552.score: 240.0
    The term “moral heuristic” as used by Sunstein seeks to bring together various traditions. However, there are significant differences between uses of the term “heuristic” in the cognitive and the social psychological research, and these differences are accompanied by very distinct evidential criteria. We suggest the term “moral heuristic” should refer to processes, which means that further evidence is required.
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  2. Arnold Arluke, Randy Frost, Gail Steketee, Gary Patronek, Carter Luke, Edward Messner, Jane Nathanson & Michelle Papazian (1994). Brill Online Books and Journals. Society and Animals 2 (1).score: 240.0
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  3. Arnold Arluke, Randy Frost, Gail Steketee, Gary Patronek, Carter Luke, Edward Messner, Jane Nathanson & Michelle Papazian (2002). Press Reports of Animal Hoarding. Society and Animals 10 (2):113-135.score: 240.0
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  4. Michelle Papazian, Jane Nathanson, Edward Messner, Carter Luke, Gary Patronek, Gail Steketee, Randy Frost & Arnold Arluke (2002). Press Reports of Animal Hoarding. Society and Animals 10 (2):113-135.score: 240.0
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  5. Matthew Arnold (1969). Matthew Arnold and the Education of the New Order: A Selection of Arnold's Writings on Education. London, Cambridge U.P..score: 180.0
     
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  6. Matthew Arnold (1973). Matthew Arnold on Education. Harmondsworth,Penguin Education.score: 180.0
     
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  7. Greg Frost-Arnold, J. Brian Pitts, John Norton, John Manchak, D. Tulodziecki, P. D. Magnus, David Harker & Kyle Stanford, Synopsis and Discussion. Workshop: Underdetermination in Science 21-22 March, 2009. Center for Philosophy of Science.score: 177.0
    This document collects discussion and commentary on issues raised in the workshop by its participants. Contributors are: Greg Frost-Arnold, David Harker, P. D. Magnus, John Manchak, John D. <span class='Hi'>Norton</span> , J. Brian Pitts, Kyle Stanford, Dana Tulodziecki.
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  8. Greg Frost-Arnold (2011). Putting the 'Empiricism' in 'Logical Empiricism': The Director's Cut. [REVIEW] Metascience 20 (2):373-376.score: 177.0
    Putting the ‘empiricism’ in ‘logical empiricism’: the director’s cut Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9444-x Authors Greg Frost-Arnold, Department of Philosophy, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Geneva, NY 14456, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
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  9. Greg Frost‐Arnold (2010). The No‐Miracles Argument for Realism: Inference to an Unacceptable Explanation. Philosophy of Science 77 (1):35-58.score: 96.0
    I argue that a certain type of naturalist should not accept a prominent version of the no‐miracles argument (NMA). First, scientists (usually) do not accept explanations whose explanans‐statements neither generate novel predictions nor unify apparently disparate established claims. Second, scientific realism (as it appears in the NMA) is an explanans that makes no new predictions and fails to unify disparate established claims. Third, many proponents of the NMA explicitly adopt a naturalism that forbids philosophy of science from using any methods (...)
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  10. Greg Frost-Arnold, The Limits of Scientific Explanation and the No-Miracles Argument.score: 87.0
    There are certain explanations that scientists do not accept, even though such explanations do not conflict with observation, logic, or other scientific theories. I argue that a common version of the no-miracles argument (NMA) for scientific realism relies upon just such an explanation. First, scientists (usually) do not accept explanations whose explanans neither generates novel predictions nor unifies apparently disparate phenomena. Second, scientific realism (as it appears in the NMA) is an explanans that makes no new predictions, and fails to (...)
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  11. Greg Frost-Arnold (2004). Was Tarski's Theory of Truth Motivated by Physicalism? History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (4):265-280.score: 87.0
    Many commentators on Alfred Tarski have, following Hartry Field, claimed that Tarski's truth-definition was motivated by physicalism—the doctrine that all facts, including semantic facts, must be reducible to physical facts. I claim, instead, that Tarski did not aim to reduce semantic facts to physical ones. Thus, Field's criticism that Tarski's truth-definition fails to fulfill physicalist ambitions does not reveal Tarski to be inconsistent, since Tarski's goal is not to vindicate physicalism. I argue that Tarski's only published remarks that speak approvingly (...)
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  12. Greg Frost-Arnold & P. D. Magnus (2010). The Identical Rivals Response to Underdetermination. In P. D. Magnus Jacob Busch (ed.), New Waves in Philosophy of Science. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 87.0
    The underdetermination of theory by data obtains when, inescapably, evidence is insufficient to allow scientists to decide responsibly between rival theories. One response to would-be underdetermination is to deny that the rival theories are distinct theories at all, insisting instead that they are just different formulations of the same underlying theory; we call this the identical rivals response. An argument adapted from John Norton suggests that the response is presumptively always appropriate, while another from Larry Laudan and Jarrett Leplin (...)
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  13. Greg Frost-Arnold (2005). The Large-Scale Structure of Logical Empiricism: Unity of Science and the Elimination of Metaphysics. Philosophy of Science 72 (5):826-838.score: 87.0
    Two central and well-known philosophical goals of the logical empiricists are the unification of science and the elimination of metaphysics. I argue, via textual analysis, that these two apparently distinct planks of the logical empiricist party platform are actually intimately related. From the 1920’s through 1950, one abiding criterion for judging whether an apparently declarative assertion or descriptive term is metaphysical is that that assertion or term cannot be incorporated into a language of unified science. I explore various versions of (...)
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  14. Greg Frost-Arnold (2004). How to Be an Anti-Reductionist About Developmental Biology: Response to Laubichler and Wagner. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 19 (1):75-91.score: 87.0
    Alexander Rosenberg recently claimed (1997) that developmental biology is currently being reduced to molecular biology. cite several concrete biological examples that are intended to impugn Rosenberg's claim. I first argue that although Laubichler and Wagner's examples would refute a very strong reductionism, a more moderate reductionism would escape their attacks. Next, taking my cue from the antireductionist's perennial stress on the importance of spatial organization, I describe one form an empirical finding that refutes this moderate reductionism would take. Finally, I (...)
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  15. Greg Frost-Arnold (2010). The No-Miracles Argument for Realism: Inference to an Unacceptable Explanation. Philosophy of Science 77 (1):35-58.score: 87.0
    I argue that a certain type of naturalist should not accept a prominent version of the no-miracles argument (NMA). First, scientists (usually) do not accept explanations whose explanans-statements neither generate novel predictions nor unify apparently disparate established claims. Second, scientific realism (as it appears in the NMA) is an explanans that makes no new predictions and fails to unify disparate established claims. Third, many proponents of the NMA explicitly adopt a naturalism that forbids philosophy of science from using any methods (...)
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  16. Greg Frost-Arnold (2008). Too Much Reference: Semantics for Multiply Signifying Terms. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (3):239 - 257.score: 87.0
    The logic of singular terms that refer to nothing, such as ‘Santa Claus,’ has been studied extensively under the heading of free logic. The present essay examines expressions whose reference is defective in a different way: they signify more than one entity. The bulk of the effort aims to develop an acceptable formal semantics based upon an intuitive idea introduced informally by Hartry Field and discussed by Joseph Camp; the basic strategy is to use supervaluations. This idea, as it stands, (...)
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  17. Greg Frost-Arnold (2008). Review of Alan Richardson, Thomas Uebel (Eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (5).score: 87.0
    For much of the second half of the 20th Century, the primary role logical empiricism played was that of the argumentative foil. The 'received view' on a given topic (especially in philosophy of science, logic, or language) was frequently identified with some supposedly dogmatic tenet of logical empiricism. However, during the last twenty-five years, scholars have paid serious, sustained attention to what the logical positivists, individually and collectively, actually said. Early scholarship on logical empiricism had to engage in heavy-duty PR (...)
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  18. Greg Frost-Arnold (2014). Can the Pessimistic Induction Be Saved From Semantic Anti-Realism About Scientific Theory? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (3):521-548.score: 87.0
    Scientific anti-realists who appeal to the pessimistic induction (PI) claim that the theoretical terms of past scientific theories often fail to refer to anything. But on standard views in philosophy of language, such reference failures prima facie lead to certain sentences being neither true nor false. Thus, if these standard views are correct, then the conclusion of the PI should be that significant chunks of current theories are truth-valueless. But that is semantic anti-realism about scientific discourse—a position most philosophers of (...)
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  19. Greg Frost-Arnold (2011). From the Pessimistic Induction to Semantic Antirealism. Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1131-1142.score: 87.0
    The Pessimistic Induction (PI) states: most past scientific theories were radically mistaken; therefore, current theories are probably similarly mistaken. But mistaken in what way? On the usual understanding, such past theories are false. However, on widely held views about reference and presupposition, many theoretical claims of previous scientific theories are neither true nor false. And if substantial portions of past theories are truth-valueless, then the PI leads to semantic antirealism. But most current philosophers of science reject semantic antirealism. So PI (...)
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  20. Greg Frost-Arnold (2013). Carnap, Tarski, and Quine at Harvard: Conversations on Logic, Mathematics, and Science. Open Court Press.score: 87.0
    During the academic year 1940-1941, several giants of analytic philosophy congregated at Harvard, holding regular private meetings, with Carnap, Tarski, and Quine. Carnap, Tarski, and Quine at Harvard allows the reader to act as a fly on the wall for their conversations. Carnap took detailed notes during his year at Harvard. This book includes both a German transcription of these shorthand notes and an English translation in the appendix section. Carnap’s notes cover a wide range of topics, but surprisingly, the (...)
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  21. Greg Frost-Arnold (2011). Quine's Evolution From 'Carnap's Disciple' to the Author of “Two Dogmas”. Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 1 (2):291-316.score: 87.0
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  22. Greg Frost-Arnold (2008). Tarski's Nominalism. In Douglas Patterson (ed.), New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy. Oup Oxford.score: 87.0
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  23. N. Scott Arnold (1983). Hume's Skepticism About Inductive Inference. Journal of the History of Philosophy 21 (1):31-56.score: 60.0
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Hume's Skepticism about Inductive Inference N. SCOTT ARNOLD IT HAS BEEN A COMMONPLACE among commentators on Hume's philosophy that he was a radical skeptic about inductive inference. In addition, he is alleged to have been the first philosopher to pose the so-called problem of induction. Until recently, however, Hume's argument in this connection has not been subject to very close scrutiny. As attention has become focused on this (...)
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  24. Daniel Anderson Arnold (2012). Brains, Buddhas, and Believing: The Problem of Intentionality in Classical Buddhist and Cognitive-Scientific Philosophy of Mind. Columbia University Press.score: 60.0
    Aiming to complicate this story, Dan Arnold confronts a significant obstacle to popular attempts at harmonizing classical Buddhist and modern scientific thought: since most Indian Buddhists believe that the mental continuum is uninterrupted ...
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  25. Marcin Szwed, Fabien Vinckier, Laurent Cohen, Stanislas Dehaene & Ram Frost (2012). Towards a Universal Neurobiological Architecture for Learning to Read. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (5):308.score: 60.0
    Letter-position tolerance varies across languages. This observation suggests that the neural code for letter strings may also be subtly different. Although language-specific models remain useful, we should endeavor to develop a universal model of reading acquisition which incorporates crucial neurobiological constraints. Such a model, through a progressive internalization of phonological and lexical regularities, could perhaps converge onto the language-specific properties outlined by Frost.
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  26. N. Scott Arnold (2009). Imposing Values: Liberalism and Regulation. OUP USA.score: 60.0
    A major question for liberal politics and liberal political theory concerns the proper scope of government. Liberalism has always favored limited government, but there has been wide-ranging dispute among liberals about just how extensive the scope of government should be. Included in this dispute are questions about the extent of state ownership of the means of production, redistribution of wealth and income through the tax code and transfer programs, and the extent of government regulation. One of N. Scott Arnold's goals (...)
     
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  27. Jack Arnold & Stewart Shapiro (2007). Where in the (World Wide) Web of Belief is the Law of Non-Contradiction? Noûs 41 (2):276–297.score: 30.0
    It is sometimes said that there are two, competing versions of W. V. O. Quine’s unrelenting empiricism, perhaps divided according to temporal periods of his career. According to one, logic is exempt from, or lies outside the scope of, the attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction. This logic-friendly Quine holds that logical truths and, presumably, logical inferences are analytic in the traditional sense. Logical truths are knowable a priori, and, importantly, they are incorrigible, and so immune from revision. The other, radical (...)
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  28. Denis G. Arnold & Keith Bustos (2005). Business, Ethics, and Global Climate Change. Business and Professional Ethics Journal 24 (1/2):103-130.score: 30.0
    After providing a brief history of global climate change, we consider and reject the influential position that free markets and responsive democracies relieve corporations of obligations to protect the environment. Five main objections to the free market view are presented, focusing in particular on the roles of business organizations in the transportation and electricity generation sectors. Ethically grounded management and public policy recommendations are offered.
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  29. Peter J. Arnold (1992). Sport as a Valued Human Practice: A Basis for the Consideration of Some Moral Issues in Sport. Journal of Philosophy of Education 26 (2):237–255.score: 30.0
  30. Peter J. Arnold (1984). Sport, Moral Education and the Development of Character. Journal of Philosophy of Education 18 (2):275–281.score: 30.0
  31. Denis G. Arnold (2003). Libertarian Theories of the Corporate and Global Capitalism. Journal of Business Ethics 48 (2):155-173.score: 30.0
    Libertarian theories of the normative core of the corporation hold in common the view that is the responsibility of publicity held corporations to return profits to shareholders within the bounds of certain moral side-constraints. Side-constraints may be either weak (grounded in the rules of the game) or strong (grounded in rights). This essay considers libertarian arguments regarding the normative core of the corporation in the context of global capitalism and in the light of actual corporate behavior. First, it is argued (...)
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  32. Dan Arnold (2008). Dharmakīrti's Dualism: Critical Reflections on a Buddhist Proof of Rebirth. Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1079-1096.score: 30.0
    Dharmakīrti, elaborating one of the Buddhist tradition's most complete defenses of rebirth, advanced some of this tradition's most explicitly formulated arguments for mind-body dualism. At the same time, Dharmakīrti himself may turn out to be vulnerable to some of the same kinds of arguments pressed against physicalists. It is revealing, then, that in arguing against physicalism himself, Dharmakīrti does not have available to him what some would judge to be more promising arguments for dualism (arguments, in particular, following Kant's 2nd (...)
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  33. Denis G. Arnold (1997). Introspection and its Objects. Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (April):87-94.score: 30.0
    Traditionally conceived, introspection is a form of nonsensuous perception that allows the mind to scrutinize at least some of its own states while it is experiencing them. The traditional account of introspection has been in disrepute ever since Ryle argued that the very idea of introspection is a logical muddle. Recent critics such as William Lyons, John Searle, and Sydney Shoemaker argue that this disrepute is well-deserved. Three distinct objections to the traditional account of introspection are considered and rejected. It (...)
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  34. Keith Arnold (1989). Personal Identity: The Galton Details. Philosophia 19 (1):35-44.score: 30.0
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  35. Megan Crowley-Matoka & Robert M. Arnold (2004). The Dead Donor Rule: How Much Does the Public Care ... And How Much Should. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 14 (3):319-332.score: 30.0
    : In this brief commentary, we reflect on the recent study by Siminoff, Burant, and Youngner of public attitudes toward "brain death" and organ donation, focusing on the implications of their findings for the rules governing from whom organs can be obtained. Although the data suggest that many seem to view "brain death" as "as good as dead" rather than "dead" (calling the dead donor rule into question), we find that the study most clearly demonstrates that understanding an individual's definition (...)
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  36. N. Scott Arnold (1987). Hume's Skepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature. Journal of the History of Philosophy 25 (3):450-452.score: 30.0
  37. Daniel Arnold (2001). Of Intrinsic Validity: A Study on the Relevance of Purva Mimamsa. Philosophy East and West 51 (1):26-53.score: 30.0
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  38. N. Scott Arnold (2009). The Endangered Species Act, Regulatory Takings, and Public Goods. Social Philosophy and Policy 26 (2):353-377.score: 30.0
    The Endangered Species Act (ESA) can impose significant limitations on what landowners may do with their property, especially as it pertains to development. These restrictions imposed by the ESA are part of a larger controversy about the reach of the of the Fifth Amendment, which says that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The question this paper addresses is whether these restrictions require compensation. The paper develops a position on the general question of compensation (...)
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  39. Denis G. Arnold (2006). Corporate Moral Agency. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):279–291.score: 30.0
    "The main conclusion of this essay is that it is plausible to conclude that corporations are capable of exhibiting intentionality, and as a result that they may be properly understood as moral agents" (p. 281).
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  40. Felix Arnold (1906). The So-Called Hedonist Paradox. International Journal of Ethics 16 (2):228-234.score: 30.0
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  41. Donald F. Arnold, Richard A. Bernardi, Presha E. Neidermeyer & Josef Schmee (2005). Personal Versus Professional Ethics in Confidentiality Decisions: An Exploratory Study in Western Europe. Business Ethics 14 (3):277-289.score: 30.0
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  42. Felix Arnold (1906). The Given Situation in Attention. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 3 (21):567-573.score: 30.0
  43. N. Scott Arnold (1987). Why Profits Are Deserved. Ethics 97 (2):387-402.score: 30.0
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  44. Christine Mangala Frost (2006). Bhakti and Nationalism in the Poetry of Subramania Bharati. International Journal of Hindu Studies 10 (2):151-167.score: 30.0
  45. Dan Arnold (2001). How to Do Things with Candrakirti: A Comparative Study in Anti-Skepticism. Philosophy East and West 51 (2):247-279.score: 30.0
    Two strikingly similar critiques of epistemological foundationalism are examined: J. L. Austin's critique of A. J. Ayer in the former's "Sense and Sensibilia," and part of Candrakīrti's critique of Dignāga in the first chapter of the "Prasannapadā." With respect to Austin, it is argued that his writings on epistemology in fact relate quite closely to his better-known philosophy of speech acts, and that the appeal to ordinary language is part of a transcendental argument against the possibility of radical skepticism. It (...)
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  46. Dan Arnold (2008). Buddhist Idealism, Epistemic and Otherwise: Thoughts on the Alternating Perspectives of Dharmakīrti. Sophia 47 (1):3-28.score: 30.0
    Some influential interpreters of Dharmakīrti have suggested understanding his thought in terms of a ‘sliding scale of analysis.’ Here it is argued that this emphasis on Dharmakīrti's alternating philosophical perspectives, though helpful in important respects, obscures the close connection between the two views in play (identified by later commentators as ‘Sautrāntika’ and ‘Yogācāra’). Indeed, with respect to these perspectives as Dharmakīrti develops them, the epistemology is the same either way. Insofar as that is right, John Dunne's characterization of Dharmakīrti's Yogācāra (...)
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  47. Denis G. Arnold & Laura P. Hartman (2005). Beyond Sweatshops: Positive Deviancy and Global Labour Practices. Business Ethics 14 (3):206–222.score: 30.0
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  48. Felix Arnold (1905). The Unity of Mental Life. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (18):487-493.score: 30.0
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  49. Keith Arnold (2008). How to Think About Meaning - by Paul Saka. Philosophical Books 49 (4):386-388.score: 30.0
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  50. Dan Arnold (2006). On Semantics and Saṃketa: Thoughts on a Neglected Problem with Buddhist Apoha Doctrine. [REVIEW] Journal of Indian Philosophy 34 (5):415-478.score: 30.0
    “...a theory of meaning for a particular language should be conceived by a philosopher as describing the practice of linguistic interchange by speakers of the language without taking it as already understood what it is to have a language at all: that is what, by imagining such a theory, we are trying to make explict." – Michael Dummer (2004: 31).
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