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Profile: Greg Janzen
  1. Greg Janzen (2014). Another Look at the Rule‐Following Paradox. Philosophical Forum 45 (1):69-88.
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  2. Greg Janzen (2013). An Adverbialist–Objectualist Account of Pain. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):859-876.
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  3. Greg Janzen (2013). Consciousness and the Nonexistence of God. Journal of Philosophical Research 38:1-25.
    According to the Judeo-Christian-Islamic theological tradition, or "classical theism," disembodiment (or non-physicality) and psychologicality are two of God’s necessary or essential attributes. This paper mounts a case for the thesis that these attributes are incompatible. More exactly, it provides compelling evidentiary support for the claim that, given the basic structure of consciousness, it is impossible for a psychological being to be disembodied (and vice versa). But if it is impossible for a psychological being to be disembodied (and vice versa), then, (...)
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  4. Greg Janzen (2013). Evidence and Religious Belief. [REVIEW] Dialogue 52 (1):198-204.
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  5. Greg Janzen (2013). Evidence and Religious Belief Clark Kelly James and VanArragon Raymond J., Editors. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 214 Pp. [REVIEW] Dialogue 52 (1):198-204.
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  6. Greg Janzen (2013). Frankfurt Cases, Alternate Possibilities, and Prior Signs. Erkenntnis 78 (5):1037-1049.
    In his seminal paper ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’, Harry Frankfurt argues against the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP)—the principle that persons are morally responsible for what they have done only if they could have done otherwise—by presenting a case in which, apparently, a person is morally responsible for what he has done even though, due to the presence of a counterfactual intervener, he could not have done otherwise. According to a compelling (yet relatively under-discussed) response to Frankfurt’s attack on (...)
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  7. Greg Janzen (2012). Critical Notice of Alvin Plantinga's Where the Conflict Really Lies. Grazer Philosophische Studien 86:291-295.
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  8. Greg Janzen (2012). Physicalists Have Nothing to Fear From Ghosts. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (1):91-104.
    It is well known that, according to some, philosophical reflection on zombies (i.e., bodies without minds) poses a problem for physicalism. But what about ghosts, i.e., minds without bodies? Does philosophical reflection on them pose a problem for physicalism? Descartes, of course, thought so, and lately rumours have been surfacing that has was right after all, that ghosts pose a problem for both a priori and a posteriori physicalism, and for any kind of physicalism in between. This paper argues that (...)
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  9. Greg Janzen (2012). Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):155-159.
  10. Greg Janzen (2011). In Defense of the What-It-is-Likeness of Experience. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):271-293.
    It is common parlance among philosophers who inquire into the nature of consciousness to speak of there being something it is like for the subject of a mental state to be in it. The popularity of the ‘what-it-is-like’ phrase stems, in part, from the assumption that it enables us to distinguish, in an intuitive and illuminating way, between conscious and unconscious mental states: conscious mental states, unlike unconscious mental states, are such that there is something it is like for their (...)
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  11. Greg Janzen (2011). Is God's Belief Requirement Rational? Religious Studies 47 (4):465-478.
    This paper sketches an evidential atheological argument that can be answered only if one of the central tenets of some theistic traditions is rejected, namely, that (propositional) belief in God is a necessary condition for salvation. The basic structure of the argument is as follows. Under theism, God is essentially omniscient, but no one can be both omniscient and irrational. So, if there is reason to hold that God is irrational, then it would follow that God doesn’t exist. And there (...)
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  12. Greg Janzen (2011). On Three Arguments Against Endurantism. Metaphysica 12 (2):101-115.
    Judith Thomson, David Lewis, and Ted Sider have each formulated different arguments that apparently pose problems for our ordinary claims of diachronic sameness, i.e., claims in which we assert that familiar, concrete objects survive (or persist) through time by enduring as numerically the same entity despite minor changes in their intrinsic or relational properties. In this paper, I show that all three arguments fail in a rather obvious way--they beg the question--and so even though there may be arguments that provide (...)
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  13. Greg Janzen (2011). Pascal's Wager and the Nature of God. Sophia 50 (3):331-344.
    This paper argues that Pascal's formulation of his famous wager argument licenses an inference about God's nature that ultimately vitiates the claim that wagering for God is in one's rational self-interest. In particular, it is argued that if we accept Pascal's premises, then we can infer that the god for whom Pascal encourages us to wager is irrational. But if God is irrational, then the prudentially rational course of action is to refrain from wagering for him.
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  14. Greg Janzen (2008). Bennett and Hacker on Neural Materialism. Acta Analytica 23 (3):273-286.
    In their recent book Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Max Bennett and Peter Hacker attack neural materialism (NM), the view, roughly, that mental states (events, processes, etc.) are identical with neural states or material properties of neural states (events, processes, etc.). Specifically, in the penultimate chapter entitled “Reductionism,” they argue that NM is unintelligible, that “there is no sense to literally identifying neural states and configurations with psychological attributes.” This is a provocative claim indeed. If Bennett and Hacker are right, then (...)
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  15. Greg Janzen (2008). Intentionalism and Change Blindness. Philosophia 36 (3):355-366.
    According to reductive intentionalism, the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is constituted by the experience's intentional (or representational) content. The goal of this article is to show that a phenomenon in visual perception called change blindness poses a problem for this doctrine. It is argued, in particular, that phenomenal character is not sensitive, as it should be if reductive intentionalism is correct, to fine-grained variations in content. The standard anti-intentionalist strategy is to adduce putative cases in which phenomenal character (...)
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  16. Greg Janzen (2008). The Reflexive Nature of Consciousness. John Benjamins.
    Combining phenomenological insights from Brentano and Sartre, but also drawing on recent work on consciousness by analytic philosophers, this book defends the view that conscious states are reflexive, and necessarily so, i.e., that they have a built-in, implicit awareness of their own occurrence, such that the subject of a conscious state has an immediate, non-objectual acquaintance with it. As part of this investigation, the book also explores the relationship between reflexivity and the phenomenal, or what-it-is-like, dimension of conscious experience, defending (...)
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  17. Greg Janzen (2007). Subjectivity and Selfhood. [REVIEW] Psyche 13 (1).
  18. Greg Janzen (2006). Phenomenal Character as Implicit Self-Awareness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (12):44-73.
    One of the more refractory problems in contemporary discussions of consciousness is the problem of determining what a mental state's being conscious consists in. This paper defends the thesis that a mental state is conscious if and only if it has a certain reflexive character, i.e., if and only if it has a structure that includes an awareness of itself. Since this thesis finds one of its clearest expressions in the work of Brentano, it is his treatment of the thesis (...)
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  19. Greg Janzen (2006). The Representational Theory of Phenomenal Character: A Phenomenological Critique. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4):321-339.
    According to a currently popular approach to the analysis of phenomenal character, the phenomenal character of an experience is entirely determined by, and is in fact identical with, the experience's representational content. Two underlying assumptions motivate this approach to phenomenal character: (1) that conscious experiences are diaphanous or transparent, in the sense that it is impossible to discern, via introspection, any intrinsic features of an experience of x that are not experienced as features of x, and (2) that the immediate (...)
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  20. Greg Janzen (2005). Self-Consciousness and Phenomenal Character. Dialogue 44 (4):707-733.
    This article defends two theses: that a mental state is conscious if and only if it has phenomenal character, i.e., if and only if there is something it is like for the subject to be in that state, and that all state consciousness involves self-consciousness, in the sense that a mental state is conscious if and only if its possessor is, in some suitable way, conscious of being in it. Though neither of these theses is novel, there is a dearth (...)
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  21. Greg Janzen (2004). Enlightenment and Action From Descartes to Kant: Passionate Thought. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 24 (2):127-129.
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  22. Greg Janzen (2004). Michael Losonsky, Enlightenment and Action From Descartes to Kant Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 24 (2):127-129.
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  23. Greg Janzen (2002). Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment. [REVIEW] History of Intellectual Culture 2 (1).
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