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Profile: Greg Novack (Virginia Tech)
  1.  87
    Greg Novack (2010). A Defense of the Principle of Indifference. Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (6):655-678.
    The principle of indifference (hereafter ‘Poi’) says that if one has no more reason to believe A than B (and vice versa ), then one ought not to believe A more than B (nor vice versa ). Many think it’s demonstrably false despite its intuitive plausibility, because of a particular style of thought experiment that generates counterexamples. Roger White ( 2008 ) defends Poi by arguing that its antecedent is false in these thought experiments. Like White I believe Poi, but (...)
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    Greg Novack (2007). Does Evidential Variety Depend on How the Evidence is Described? Philosophy of Science 74 (5):701-711.
    The Variety of Evidence Thesis (VET) says that (ceteris paribus) the more diverse (or varied) of two bodies of evidence is the more confirmatory of a hypothesis H. Two recent types of Bayesian explication of VET account for the intuitive force of VET by defining variety as some function of the probabilities of the propositions which collectively constitute a body of evidence. I show that these two accounts of VET are not tracking a meaningful property of bodies of evidence, but (...)
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    Greg Novack (2010). A Defense of the Principle of Indifference. Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (6):655-678.