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Profile: Greg P. Hodes
  1. Greg P. Hodes (2005). What Would It "Be Like" to Solve the Hard Problem?: Cognition, Consciousness, and Qualia Zombies. Neuroquantology 3 (1):43-58.
    David Chalmers argues that consciousness -- authentic, first-person, conscious consciousness -- cannot be reduced to brain events or to any physical event, and that efforts to find a workable mind-body identity theory are, therefore, doomed in principle. But for Chalmers and non-reductionist in general consciousness consists exclusively, or at least paradigmatically, of phenomenal or qualia-consciousness. This results in a seriously inadequate understanding both of consciousness and of the “hard problem.” I describe other, higher-order cognitional events which must be conscious if (...)
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  2. Greg P. Hodes (2002). Intentional Structure and the Identity Theory of Knowledge in Bernard Lonergan. International Philosophical Quarterly 42 (4):437-452.
    Bernard Lonergan has argued for a theory of cognition that is transcendentally secure, that is, one such that any plausible attempt to refute it must presuppose its correctness, and one that also grounds a correct metaphysics and ontology. His proposal combines an identity theory of knowledge with an intentional relation between knower and known. It depends in a crucial way upon an appropriation of one’s own cognitional motives and acts, that is, upon “knowing one’s own knowing.” I argue that because (...)
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  3. James R. Otteson, Christopher Robin DeFusco, Arthur H. Prince, Elmer Sprague, Greg P. Hodes & John Davenport (1999). Letters to the Editor. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 73 (2):109 - 114.
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