Fiona Nicoll and Melissa Gregg met on the job at a new university having both moved from Sydney to Brisbane to take up their appointments. Here they share reflections on teaching a cultural theory course that they inherited from a prominent Australian Professor of Cultural Studies, offering the perspectives of two consecutive generations of cultural studies theorists now teaching in the field since the early 1990s. This situation gives rise to new interpretations regarding the value and uses of theory (...) in the classroom. Noting the subtle differences involved in teaching the same theoretical material in different cities, the ironies of teaching radical cultural theory in a conservative institutional environment, and the specific opportunities and challenges of teaching cultural studies theory as opposed to others, the article considers some of the silences teachers must also contend with in their classroom practice, drawing on and expanding the terrain established by Thorkelson's thesis. (shrink)
One of the most certain truths in the world is Descartes' "I think, therefore I am". Descartes was so certain of the existence of some kind of essential _self_ that others have coined the term "Cartesian theater" to describe the sense that we all have of being the audience enjoying the rich play of our experiences. We tend to believe in an enduring self, independent of our individual percepts. Sometimes this virtual "self" in our mind, sitting in the audience of (...) the Cartesian theater who watches our thoughts is referred to as a homunculus. This is not necessarily to imply that most of us believe that the self or homunculus is an identifiable region of the brain like the pineal gland, just that at some level of organization, we assume that there is a self that is separate from the stuff that self experiences, remembers, thinks about, etc. (shrink)
Roger Penrose, in _The Emperor's New Mind_ (1989), writes about the way Mozart perceived music. Mozart did not play a piece in his mind in real time, or even speeded up, but could hold it before him all at once. We all do this, although usually for much shorter riffs than entire symphonies. I have argued that the all-at-onceness of our thoughts and perceptions is at least as inexplicable as what it is like to see red; I think the aural/temporal (...) all-at-onceness makes the point at least as vividly as the visual/spatial all-at-onceness of the curl of smoke in an art nouveau poster. (shrink)
Contemporary philosophy of language and semantics rests on an unjustified and largely unacknowledged Platonism. This Platonism misdirects inquiry in unfruitful directions, seeking what meaning “really is”, and what terms “really mean”. Arguing against the sorts of hypotheses put forward by Kripke and Putnam as well as the theory of two dimensional semantics, I claim that if meaning is to be construed in any philosophically interesting way, it must be thought of in strictly internalist terms: meaning is “all in the head”, (...) or else it is a colloquial term with no precise meaning whatsoever. Construed internalistically, however, meaning is no less mysterious an aspect of consciousness than the oft-cited redness of red. Squeamishness about facing up to this mystery can only hamper attempts to get to the heart of the matter, and find out what semantics is really all about. (shrink)
This paper argues that the founding fathers of the tradition of Scottish Enlightenment natural jurisprudence, Gersholm Carmichael (1672–1729) and Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746), articulated a view of rights that is pertinent to the contemporary dominance of the language of rights. Maintaining a metaphysical foundation for rights while drawing upon the early-modern Protestant natural law tradition, their conception of rights is more significantly indebted to the pre-modern scholastic natural law tradition than often realized. This is illustrated by exploring some of the background (...) to their respective theories of rights, detailing the precise reasoning that Carmichael and Hutcheson brought to bear upon their conception of rights, and then exploring their application of their understanding of rights to the question of property. (shrink)
To counter possibilities for human rights as cultural imperialism, (1) I develop a notion of human rights as culturally particular and valid only locally. But they are an increasingly generalizable particularism. (2) Because the incommensurability of different cultures does not entail an uncritical tolerance of just about anything, but rather allows for an objectivating stance toward other communities or cultures, locally valid human rights have a critical capacity. (3) Locally valid human rights promote a community's self-representation and thus allow for (...) diversity, rejecting the coercive (mis)representation of a community or culture as incapable of representing itself. (shrink)
As we encounter things in the world around us, when do we judge something to be just a heap or aggregate of smaller things, like a pile of sand, and when do we judge it to be a true, unified, single thing? It depends, almost always, on how you look at it. I have argued that when we look at the world in strict reductionist terms, nothing above the sub-atomic level really counts as a holistic thing. Are there any things (...) above the micro level that really are inherent, single things in a way that does not depend on how you look at them? Do we have any reason to believe that there are, in contrast to the reductionist view, inherently unitary mid-level things in the universe? (shrink)
Internal mechanisms, especially those implicating the self, are crucial for the egoism-altruism debate. Self-liking is extended to close others and can be extended, through socialization and reinforcement experiences, to non-close others: Altruistic responses are directed toward others who are included in the self. The process of self-extension can account for cross-situational variability, contextual variability, and individual differences in altruistic behavior.
"We think that grass is green, that stones are hard, and that snow is cold. But physics assures us that the greenness of grass, the hardness of stones, and the coldness of snow, are not the greenness, hardness, and coldness that we know in our own experience, but something very different. The observer, when he seems to himself to be observing a stone, is really, if physics is to be believed, observing the effects of the stone upon himself.".
By the light of the moon -- Seeing -- Going inside -- Our magical bodies -- And then there were words -- Awakening -- Beyond the mists -- Heaven on earth -- What would love do? -- Circle of light -- The love and the laughter -- Life is but a dream -- Mirror, mirror on the wall.
There is a biological controversy of long standing between proponents of the Wilsonian view that all organisms of a certain class have at least one part that is a cell and proponents of the contradictory, or Dobellian, view that some organisms in the same class have no parts that are cells. The controversy is considered from the standpoint of the methodology of explication. It is concluded that on the grounds of prevalent biological usage, precision, utility and generality the Wilsonian view (...) may be defended successfully against attacks that have been made upon it. (shrink)
Krueger & Funder (K&F) overstate the defects of Null Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST), and with it the magnitude of negativity bias within social psychology. We argue that replication matters more than NHST, that the pitfalls of NHST are not always or necessarily realized, and that not all biases are harmless offshoots of adaptive mental abilities.
I propose human rights as self-authored through a personality structure of “assertive selfhood.” To that end I identify three features of self-authorship: emergent through collective political action; as a critical stance; and borne by non-idiosyncratic norms. So conceived, human rights require a field of recognition as a social structure supportive of claims to assertive selfhood. I show that the capacity to self-grant depends critically on the participant’s personality structure as well as on the structure of some of the social institutions (...) he or she inhabits. But like any political vision, the project for self-granted human rights has distinct limits, above all with respect to the many inequalities among potential self-authors. (shrink)
Despite numerous obituaries to the contrary, Critical Theory, now half a century old, is still very much alive. The historical context in which the Frankfurt Circle worked has of course changed radically, as have forms of philosophy and social science. Hence no one can be surprised to find that the classical Frankfurt texts no longer shed direct light on contemporary society. Yet the various reconstructions of this tradition's potential for new social theory save it from the fate proclaimed for it (...) by the necrologists. Theory and Politics exemplifies this most recent type of scholarship. It neither consigns the Frankfurt tradition to a past of questionable relevance, nor reverently celebrates it'in an overly selective interpretation. (shrink)
Auditory perception and cognition entails both low-level and high-level processes, which are likely to interact with each other to create our rich conscious experience of soundscapes. Recent research that we review has revealed numerous influences of high-level factors, such as attention, intention, and prior experience, on conscious auditory perception. And recently, studies have shown that auditory scene analysis tasks can exhibit multistability in a manner very similar to ambiguous visual stimuli, presenting a unique opportunity to study neural correlates of auditory (...) awareness and the extent to which mechanisms of perception are shared across sensory modalities. Research has also led to a growing number of techniques through which auditory perception can be manipulated and even completely suppressed. Such findings have important consequences for our understanding of the mechanisms of perception and also should allow scientists to precisely distinguish the influences of different higher-level influences. (shrink)
Les traditions évangéliques rapportent un nombre conséquent de paroles de Jésus sur le jugement eschatologique. Les travaux qui tentent de cerner le lien entre ces logia et le Jésus de l’histoire sont cependant rares. Par ailleurs, de l’aveu du grand spécialiste Kloppenborg lui-même, les études majeures sur la source Q des quarante dernières années ont placé au second rang le lien entre cette source et le Jésus de l’histoire. Le constat de cette double lacune permet à B. H. Gregg (...) de circonscr.. (shrink)
From 1919 to 1951, Alan Gregg and his mentor, Richard Pearce, directed the Medical Education and Medical SciencesDivisions of the Rockefeller Foundation. Although they oversaw the expenditure of millions of dollars, today they are forgotten. Yet, the system that Gregg administered became the model for the funding of biomedical research after the Second World War. This paper draws on the records of the Rockefeller Foundation to assess Gregg and his impact on biomedicine and philanthropy.
In December 1927, Alan Gregg,Associate Director of the RockefellerFoundation's Division of Medical Education, setoff from Paris on an exploratory mission toRussia. After a seventeen-day visit, Greggreturned firmly committed to improvingrelations. What did Gregg `see' in the field?Using the briefing book prepared for Gregg, histravel diaries, and his final report, thispaper analyses the social and cognitivedynamics of what became an exercise inFoundation bridge-building.