12 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Gregor Damschen (Martin Luther Universität Halle-Wittenberg, University of Lucerne, Switzerland)
  1. Gregor Damschen (forthcoming). Aristoteles,'Analytica Posteriora'A 2, 72A8-9:'Der eine Teil Einer Aussage'. Hermes.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Gregor Damschen (forthcoming). Idaeos Cato. Zu einem Akrostichon bei Seneca (AL 394 SB). Hermes.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Gregor Damschen (2011). Dispositional Knowledge-How Vs. Propositional Knowledge-That. Universitas Philosophica 28 (57):189-212.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Gregor Damschen (2011). Questioning Gödel's Ontological Proof: Is Truth Positive? European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (1):161-169.
    In his "Ontological proof", Kurt Gödel introduces the notion of a second-order value property, the positive property P. The second axiom of the proof states that for any property φ: If φ is positive, its negation is not positive, and vice versa. I put forward that this concept of positiveness leads into a paradox when we apply it to the following self-reflexive sentences: (A) The truth value of A is not positive; (B) The truth value of B is positive. Given (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Gregor Damschen (2011). Saber-cómo disposicional vs. saber-que proposicional. Universitas Philosophica 57 (57):189-212.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Gregor Damschen (2010). Are There Ultimately Founded Propositions? Universitas Philosophica 54 (54):163-177.
    Can we find propositions that cannot rationally be denied in any possible world without assuming the existence of that same proposition, and so involving ourselves in a contradiction? In other words, can we find transworld propositions needing no further foundation or justification? Basically, three differing positions can be imagined: firstly, a relativist position, according to which ultimately founded propositions are impossible; secondly, a meta-relativist position, according to which ultimately founded propositions are possible but unnecessary; and thirdly, an absolute position, according (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Gregor Damschen (2009). Dispositional Knowledge-How Versus Propositional Knowledge-That. In Gregor Damschen, Robert Schnepf & Karsten Stueber (eds.), Debating Dispositions. Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind. de Gruyter.
    The paper deals with the question of the structure of knowledge and the precise relationship between propositional "knowledge that" and dispositional "knowledge how." In the first part of my essay, I provide an analysis of the term 'knowing how' and argue that the usual alternatives in the recent epistemological debate – knowing how is either a form of propositional or dispositional knowledge – are misleading. In fact it depends on the semantic and pragmatic context of the usage of this term (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Gregor Damschen, Robert Schnepf & Karsten Stueber (eds.) (2009). Debating Dispositions. Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind. de Gruyter.
    The contributions of this volume analyze the ancient foundations of the discussion about disposition, examine the problem of disposition within the context of ...
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Gregor Damschen (2008). This is Nonsense. The Reasoner 2 (10):6-8.
    In his Paradoxes (1995: Cambridge University Press: 149) Mark Sainsbury presents the following pair of sentences: Line 1: The sentence written on Line 1 is nonsense. Line 2: The sentence written on Line 1 is nonsense. Sainsbury (1995: 149, 154) here makes three assertions: (1) The sentence in Line 1 is so viciously self-referential that it falls into the truth-value gap. The sentence is really nonsense. (2) The sentence in Line 2 is by contrast true. For it states precisely that (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Gregor Damschen & Dieter Schönecker (2007). Saving Seven Embryos or Saving One Child? Journal of Philosophical Research 32 (Supplement):239-245.
    Suppose a fire broke out in a fertility clinic. One had time to save either a young girl, or a tray of ten human embryos. Would it be wrong to save the girl? According to Michael Sandel, the moral intuition is to save the girl; what is more, one ought to do so, and this demonstrates that human embryos do not possess full personhood, and hence deserve only limited respect and may be killed for medical research. We will argue, however, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Gregor Damschen, Alfonso Gómez-Lobo & Dieter Schönecker (2006). Sixteen Days? A Reply to B. Smith and B. Brogaard on the Beginning of Human Individuals. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 31 (2):165 – 175.
    When does a human being begin to exist? Barry Smith and Berit Brogaard have argued that it is possible, through a combination of biological fact and philosophical analysis, to provide a definitive answer to this question. In their view, a human individual begins to exist at gastrulation, i. e. at about sixteen days after fertilization. In this paper we argue that even granting Smith and Brogaard's ontological commitments and biological assumptions, the existence of a human being can be shown to (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Gregor Damschen & Dieter Schönecker (2006). Saving Seven Embryos or Saving One Child? Michael Sandel on the Moral Status of Human Embryos. Journal of Philosophical Research (Ethics and the Life Sciences):239-245.
    Suppose a fire broke out in a fertility clinic. One had time to save either a young girl, or a tray of ten human embryos. Would it be wrong to save the girl? According to Michael Sandel, the moral intuition is to save the girl; what is more, one ought to do so, and this demonstrates that human embryos do not possess full personhood, and hence deserve only limited respect and may be killed for medical research. We will argue, however, (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation