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Gregory Wheeler [41]Gregory R. Wheeler [1]
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Profile: Gregory Wheeler (Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München)
  1. Gregory Wheeler (forthcoming). Is There a Logic of Information? Journal of Theoretical and Applied Artificial Intelligence.
    Information-based epistemology maintains that ‘being informed’ is an independent cognitive state that cannot be reduced to knowledge or to belief, and the modal logic KTB has been proposed as a model. But what distinguishes the KTB analysis of ‘being informed’, the Brouwersche schema (B), is precisely its downfall, for no logic of information should include (B) and, more generally, no epistemic logic should include (B), either.
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  2. Gregory Wheeler (2014). Announcement. Minds and Machines:1-1.
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  3. Hanne Andersen, Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao González, Thomas Uebel & Gregory Wheeler (eds.) (2013). New Challenges to Philosophy of Science. Springer Verlag.
    This fourth volume of the Programme “The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective” deals with new challenges in this field. In this regard, it seeks to broaden the scope of the philosophy of science in two directions. On the one hand, ...
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  4. Arthur Paul Pedersen & Gregory Wheeler (2013). Demystifying Dilation. Erkenntnis:1-38.
    Dilation occurs when an interval probability estimate of some event E is properly included in the interval probability estimate of E conditional on every event F of some partition, which means that one’s initial estimate of E becomes less precise no matter how an experiment turns out. Critics maintain that dilation is a pathological feature of imprecise probability models, while others have thought the problem is with Bayesian updating. However, two points are often overlooked: (1) knowing that E is stochastically (...)
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  5. Gregory Wheeler (2013). Models, Models, and Models. Metaphilosophy 44 (3):293-300.
    Michael Dummett famously maintained that analytic philosophy was simply philosophy that followed Frege in treating the philosophy of language as the basis for all other philosophy (1978, 441). But one important insight to emerge from computer science is how difficult it is to animate the linguistic artifacts that the analysis of thought produces. Yet, modeling the effects of thought requires a new skill that goes beyond analysis: procedural literacy. Some of the most promising research in philosophy makes use of a (...)
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  6. Gregory Wheeler & Richard Scheines (2013). Coherence and Confirmation Through Causation. Mind 122 (485):135-170.
    Coherentism maintains that coherent beliefs are more likely to be true than incoherent beliefs, and that coherent evidence provides more confirmation of a hypothesis when the evidence is made coherent by the explanation provided by that hypothesis. Although probabilistic models of credence ought to be well-suited to justifying such claims, negative results from Bayesian epistemology have suggested otherwise. In this essay we argue that the connection between coherence and confirmation should be understood as a relation mediated by the causal relationships (...)
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  7. Boris Kovalerchuk, Leonid Perlovsky & Gregory Wheeler (2012). Modeling of Phenomena and Dynamic Logic of Phenomena. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logic 22 (1):1-82.
    Modeling a complex phenomena such as the mind presents tremendous computational complexity challenges. Modeling field theory (MFT) addresses these challenges in a non-traditional way. The main idea behind MFT is to match levels of uncertainty of the model (also, a problem or some theory) with levels of uncertainty of the evaluation criterion used to identify that model. When a model becomes more certain, then the evaluation criterion is adjusted dynamically to match that change to the model. This process is called (...)
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  8. Gregory Wheeler (2012). Erratum To: Introduction. Synthese 187 (2):815-815.
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  9. Gregory Wheeler (2012). Explaining the Limits of Olsson's Impossibility Result. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):136-150.
    In his groundbreaking book, Against Coherence (2005), Erik Olsson presents an ingenious impossibility theorem that appears to show that there is no informative relationship between probabilistic measures of coherence and higher likelihood of truth. Although Olsson's result provides an important insight into probabilistic models of epistemological coherence, the scope of his negative result is more limited than generally appreciated. The key issue is the role conditional independence conditions play within the witness testimony model Olsson uses to establish his result. Olsson (...)
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  10. Gregory Wheeler (2012). Formal Epistemology. In Andrew Cullison (ed.), Contiuum Companion to Epistemology. Contiuum.
    Yet, in broader terms, formal epistemology is not merely a methodological tool for epistemologists, but a discipline in its own right. On this programmatic view, formal epistemology is an interdisciplinary research program that covers work by philosophers, mathematicians, computer scientists, statisticians, psychologists, operations researchers, and economists who aim to give mathematical and sometimes computational representations of, along with sound strategies for reasoning about, knowledge, belief, judgment and decision making.
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  11. Gregory Wheeler (2012). Introduction. Synthese 186 (2):443-446.
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  12. Gregory Wheeler (2012). Objective Bayesian Calibration and the Problem of Non-Convex Evidence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (4):841-850.
    Jon Williamson's Objective Bayesian Epistemology relies upon a calibration norm to constrain credal probability by both quantitative and qualitative evidence. One role of the calibration norm is to ensure that evidence works to constrain a convex set of probability functions. This essay brings into focus a problem for Williamson's theory when qualitative evidence specifies non-convex constraints.
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  13. Gregory Wheeler & Pedro Barahona (2012). Why the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever Cannot Be Solved in Less Than Three Questions. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (2):493-503.
    Rabern and Rabern (Analysis 68:105–112 2 ) and Uzquiano (Analysis 70:39–44 4 ) have each presented increasingly harder versions of ‘the hardest logic puzzle ever’ (Boolos The Harvard Review of Philosophy 6:62–65 1 ), and each has provided a two-question solution to his predecessor’s puzzle. But Uzquiano’s puzzle is different from the original and different from Rabern and Rabern’s in at least one important respect: it cannot be solved in less than three questions. In this paper we solve Uzquiano’s puzzle (...)
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  14. Rolf Haenni, Jan-Willem Romeijn, Gregory Wheeler & Jon Williamson (2011). Probabilistic Logics and Probabilistic Networks. Synthese Library.
    Additionally, the text shows how to develop computationally feasible methods to mesh with this framework.
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  15. Marc Lange, Raphael van Riel, Maximilian Schlosshauer, Gregory Wheeler, Zalán Gyenis, Miklós Rédei, John Byron Manchak, James Owen Weatherall, Bruce Glymour & Bradford Skow (2011). 10. Discussion: Problems for Natural Selection as a Mechanism Discussion: Problems for Natural Selection as a Mechanism (Pp. 512-523). [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 78 (3).
     
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  16. Maximillian Schlosshauer & Gregory Wheeler (2011). Focused Correlation, Confirmation, and the Jigsaw Puzzle of Variable Evidence. Philosophy of Science 78 (3):376-92.
    Focused correlation compares the degree of association within an evidence set to the degree of association in that evidence set given that some hypothesis is true. A difference between the confirmation lent to a hypothesis by one evidence set and the confirmation lent to that hypothesis by another evidence set is robustly tracked by a difference in focused correlations of those evidence sets on that hypothesis, provided that all the individual pieces of evidence are equally, positively relevant to that hypothesis. (...)
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  17. Gregory Wheeler & Marco Alberti (2011). NO Revision and NO Contraction. Minds and Machines 21 (3):411-430.
    One goal of normative multi-agent system theory is to formulate principles for normative system change that maintain the rule-like structure of norms and preserve links between norms and individual agent obligations. A central question raised by this problem is whether there is a framework for norm change that is at once specific enough to capture this rule-like behavior of norms, yet general enough to support a full battery of norm and obligation change operators. In this paper we propose an answer (...)
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  18. Gregory Wheeler & Richard Scheines (2011). Causation, Association and Confirmation. In Stephan Hartmann, Marcel Weber, Wenceslao Gonzalez, Dennis Dieks & Thomas Uebe (eds.), Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation: New Trends and Old Ones Reconsidered. Springer. 37--51.
    Many philosophers of science have argued that a set of evidence that is "coherent" confirms a hypothesis which explains such coherence. In this paper, we examine the relationships between probabilistic models of all three of these concepts: coherence, confirmation, and explanation. For coherence, we consider Shogenji's measure of association (deviation from independence). For confirmation, we consider several measures in the literature, and for explanation, we turn to Causal Bayes Nets and resort to causal structure and its constraint on probability. All (...)
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  19. Gregory Wheeler & Jon Williamson (2011). Evidential Probability and Objective Bayesian Epistemology. In Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm Forster (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Statistics. Elsevier.
    In this chapter we draw connections between two seemingly opposing approaches to probability and statistics: evidential probability on the one hand and objective Bayesian epistemology on the other.
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  20. Gregory Wheeler, AGM Belief Revision in Monotone Modal Logics. LPAR 2010 Short Paper Proceedings.
    Classical modal logics, based on the neighborhood semantics of Scott and Montague, provide a generalization of the familiar normal systems based on Kripke semantics. This paper defines AGM revision operators on several first-order monotonic modal correspondents, where each first-order correspondence language is defined by Marc Pauly’s version of the van Benthem characterization theorem for monotone modal logic. A revision problem expressed in a monotone modal system is translated into first-order logic, the revision is performed, and the new belief set is (...)
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  21. Gregory Wheeler (2009). Focused Correlation and Confirmation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (1):79-100.
    This essay presents results about a deviation from independence measure called focused correlation . This measure explicates the formal relationship between probabilistic dependence of an evidence set and the incremental confirmation of a hypothesis, resolves a basic question underlying Peter Klein and Ted Warfield's ‘truth-conduciveness’ problem for Bayesian coherentism, and provides a qualified rebuttal to Erik Olsson's claim that there is no informative link between correlation and confirmation. The generality of the result is compared to recent programs in Bayesian epistemology (...)
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  22. Gregory Wheeler (2009). Review of Hendricks and Symons (Eds.): Formal Philosophy: Aim, Scope, Direction. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 76 (1):112-115.
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  23. Jan-Willem Romeijn, Jon Williamson, Gregory Wheeler & Rolf Haenni (2008). Possible Semantics for a Common Framework of Probabilistic Logics. In V. N. Huynh (ed.), International Workshop on Interval Probabilistic Uncertainty and Non-Classical Logics. Springer.
    In V. N. Huynh (ed.): Interval / Probabilistic Uncertainty and Non-Classical Logics, Advances in Soft Computing Series, Springer 2008, pp. 268-279. This paper proposes a common framework for various probabilistic logics. It consists of a set of uncertain premises with probabilities attached to them. This raises the question of the strength of a conclusion, but without imposing a particular semantics, no general solution is possible. The paper discusses several possible semantics by looking at it from the perspective of probabilistic argumentation.
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  24. Gregory Wheeler (2008). Applied Logic Without Psychologism. Studia Logica 88 (1):137 - 156.
    Logic is a celebrated representation language because of its formal generality. But there are two senses in which a logic may be considered general, one that concerns a technical ability to discriminate between different types of individuals, and another that concerns constitutive norms for reasoning as such. This essay embraces the former, permutation-invariance conception of logic and rejects the latter, Fregean conception of logic. The question of how to apply logic under this pure invariantist view is addressed, and a methodology (...)
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  25. Gregory Wheeler & Luís Moniz Pereira (2008). Methodological Naturalism and Epistemic Internalism. Synthese 163 (3):315 - 328.
    Epistemic naturalism holds that the results or methodologies from the cognitive sciences are relevant to epistemology, and some have maintained that scientific methods are more compatible with externalist theories of justification than with internalist theories. But practically all discussions about naturalized epistemology are framed exclusively in terms of cognitive psychology, which is only one of the cognitive sciences. The question addressed in this essay is whether a commitment to naturalism really does favor externalism over internalism, and we offer reasons for (...)
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  26. Gregory Wheeler, Jon Williamson, Jan-Willem Romeijn & Rolf Haenni (2008). Possible Semantics for a Common Framework of Probabilistic Logics. In V. N. Huynh (ed.), International Workshop on Interval Probabilistic Uncertainty and Non-Classical Logics. Springer.
    Summary. This paper proposes a common framework for various probabilistic logics. It consists of a set of uncertain premises with probabilities attached to them. This raises the question of the strength of a conclusion, but without imposing a particular semantics, no general solution is possible. The paper discusses several possible semantics by looking at it from the perspective of probabilistic argumentation.
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  27. Jon Williamson, Jan-Willem Romeijn, Rolf Haenni & Gregory Wheeler (2008). Logical Relations in a Statistical Problem. In Benedikt Lowe, Jan-Willem Romeijn & Eric Pacuit (eds.), Proceedings of the Foundations of the Formal Sciences VI: Reasoning about probabilities and probabilistic reasoning. College Publications.
    This paper presents the progicnet programme. It proposes a general framework for probabilistic logic that can guide inference based on both logical and probabilistic input. After an introduction to the framework as such, it is illustrated by means of a toy example from psychometrics. It is shown that the framework can accommodate a number of approaches to probabilistic reasoning: Bayesian statistical inference, evidential probability, probabilistic argumentation, and objective Bayesianism. The framework thus provides insight into the relations between these approaches, it (...)
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  28. William Harper & Gregory Wheeler (2007). Probability and Inference: Essays in Honour of Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. College Publications.
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  29. Gregory Wheeler (2007). A Review of the Lottery Paradox. [REVIEW] In William Harper & Gregory Wheeler (eds.), Probability and Inference: Essays in Honour of Henry E. Kyburg, Jr.
    Henry Kyburg’s lottery paradox (1961, p. 197) arises from considering a fair 1000 ticket lottery that has exactly one winning ticket. If this much is known about the execution of the lottery it is therefore rational to accept that one ticket will win. Suppose that an event is very likely if the probability of its occurring is greater than 0.99. On these grounds it is presumed rational to accept the proposition that ticket 1 of the lottery will not win. Since (...)
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  30. Gregory Wheeler (2007). Humanists and Scientists. The Reasoner 1 (1).
    C.P. Snow observed that universities are largely made up of two broad types of people, literary intellectuals and scientists, yet a typical individual of each type is barely able, if able at all, to communicate with his counterpart. Snow's observation, popularized in his 1959 lecture Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution (reissued by Cambridge 1993), goes some way to explaining the two distinct cultures one hears referred to as "the humanities" and "the sciences." Snow's lecture is a study of these (...)
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  31. Gregory Wheeler (ed.) (2007). Progress in Artificial Intelligence (EPIA 2007). Springer.
  32. Gregory Wheeler (2007). Two Puzzles Concerning Measures of Uncertainty and the Positive Boolean Connectives. In , Progress in Artificial Intelligence (EPIA 2007). Springer.
     
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  33. Gregory Wheeler, Henry E. Kyburg & Choh Man Teng (2007). Conditionals and Consequences. Journal of Applied Logic 5 (4):638-650.
    We examine the notion of conditionals and the role of conditionals in inductive logics and arguments. We identify three mistakes commonly made in the study of, or motivation for, non-classical logics. A nonmonotonic consequence relation based on evidential probability is formulated. With respect to this acceptance relation some rules of inference of System P are unsound, and we propose refinements that hold in our framework.
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  34. Gregory Wheeler (2006). Rational Acceptance and Conjunctive/Disjunctive Absorption. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (1-2):49-63.
    A bounded formula is a pair consisting of a propositional formula φ in the first coordinate and a real number within the unit interval in the second coordinate, interpreted to express the lower-bound probability of φ. Converting conjunctive/disjunctive combinations of bounded formulas to a single bounded formula consisting of the conjunction/disjunction of the propositions occurring in the collection along with a newly calculated lower probability is called absorption. This paper introduces two inference rules for effecting conjunctive and disjunctive absorption and (...)
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  35. Gregory Wheeler (2005). Book Review Change, Choice and Inference. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 72 (3):498-503.
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  36. Gregory Wheeler (2005). On the Structure of Rational Acceptance: Comments on Hawthorne and Bovens. Synthese 144 (2):287 - 304.
    The structural view of rational acceptance is a commitment to developing a logical calculus to express rationally accepted propositions sufficient to represent valid argument forms constructed from rationally accepted formulas. This essay argues for this project by observing that a satisfactory solution to the lottery paradox and the paradox of the preface calls for a theory that both (i) offers the facilities to represent accepting less than certain propositions within an interpreted artificial language and (ii) provides a logical calculus of (...)
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  37. Gregory Wheeler (2004). A Resource-Bounded Default Logic. In J. Delgrande & T. Schaub (eds.), Proceedings of NMR 2004. AAAI.
    This paper presents statistical default logic, an expansion of classical (i.e., Reiter) default logic that allows us to model common inference patterns found in standard inferential statistics, including hypothesis testing and the estimation of a populations mean, variance and proportions. The logic replaces classical defaults with ordered pairs consisting of a Reiter default in the first coordinate and a real number within the unit interval in the second coordinate. This real number represents an upper-bound limit on the probability of accepting (...)
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  38. Gregory Wheeler & Carlos Damasio (2004). An Implementation of Statistical Default Logic. In Jose Alferes & Joao Leite (eds.), Logics in Artificial Intelligence (JELIA 2004). Springer.
    Statistical Default Logic (SDL) is an expansion of classical (i.e., Reiter) default logic that allows us to model common inference patterns found in standard inferential statistics, e.g., hypothesis testing and the estimation of a population‘s mean, variance and proportions. This paper presents an embedding of an important subset of SDL theories, called literal statistical default theories, into stable model semantics. The embedding is designed to compute the signature set of literals that uniquely distinguishes each extension on a statistical default theory (...)
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  39. Gregory Wheeler & Luis Moniz Pereira (2004). Epistemology and Artificial Intelligence. Journal of Applied Logic 2 (4):469-93.
    In this essay we advance the view that analytical epistemology and artificial intelligence are complementary disciplines. Both fields study epistemic relations, but whereas artificial intelligence approaches this subject from the perspective of understanding formal and computational properties of frameworks purporting to model some epistemic relation or other, traditional epistemology approaches the subject from the perspective of understanding the properties of epistemic relations in terms of their conceptual properties. We argue that these two practices should not be conducted in isolation. We (...)
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  40. Gregory Wheeler (2000). Error Statistics and Duhem's Problem. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):410-420.
    No one has a well developed solution to Duhem's problem, the problem of how experimental evidence warrants revision of our theories. Deborah Mayo proposes a solution to Duhem's problem in route to her more ambitious program of providing a philosophical account of inductive inference and experimental knowledge. This paper is a response to Mayo's Error Statistics (ES) program, paying particular attention to her response to Duhem's problem. It turns out that Mayo's purported solution to Duhem's problem is very significant to (...)
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