Search results for 'Group rationality' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. John Broomespecial Issue On Normativity & Edited by Teresa Marques Rationality (2007). Is Rationality Normative? Special Issue on Normativity and Rationality, Edited by Teresa Marques 2 (23).score: 210.0
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  2. Husain Sarkar (2007). Group Rationality in Scientific Research. Cambridge University Press.score: 192.0
    Group Rationality in Scientific Research.
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  3. Gerald Gaus (2012). Constructivist and Ecological Modeling of Group Rationality. Episteme 9 (3):245-254.score: 180.0
    These brief remarks highlight three aspects of Christian List and Philip Pettit's Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents that illustrate its constructivist nature: (i) its stress on the discursive dilemma as a primary challenge to group rationality and reasoning; (ii) its general though qualified support for premise-based decision-making as the preferred way to cope with the problems of judgment aggregation; and (iii) its account of rational agency and moral responsibility. The essay contrasts List (...)
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  4. Christian List (2005). Group Knowledge and Group Rationality: A Judgment Aggregation Perspective. Episteme 2 (1):25-38.score: 156.0
    The Ostrogorski paradox and the discursive dilemma are seemingly unrelated paradoxes of aggregation. The former is discussed in traditional social choice theory, while the latter is at the core of the new literature on judgment aggregation. Both paradoxes arise when, in a group, each individual consistently makes a judgment, or expresses a preference, (in the form of yes or no) over specific propositions, and the collective outcome is in some respect inconsistent. While the result is logically inconsistent in the (...)
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  5. Reed Richter (1985). Rationality, Group Choice and Expected Utility. Synthese 63 (2):203 - 232.score: 156.0
    This paper proposes a view uniformly extending expected utility calculations to both individual and group choice contexts. Three related cases illustrate the problems inherent in applying expected utility to group choices. However, these problems do not essentially depend upon the tact that more than one agent is involved. I devise a modified strategy allowing the application of expected utility calculations to these otherwise problematic cases. One case, however, apparently leads to contradiction. But recognizing the falsity of proposition (1) (...)
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  6. Alvin I. Goldman (2004). Group Knowledge Versus Group Rationality: Two Approaches to Social Epistemology. Episteme 1 (1):11-22.score: 150.0
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  7. Katie Steele (2007). Review of Husain Sarkar, Group Rationality in Scientific Research. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (10).score: 150.0
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  8. H. Sarkar (1997). The Task of Group Rationality: The Subjectivist's View--Part I. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 28 (2):267-288.score: 150.0
    If we first ask about the goals Machiavelli urges us to embrace as citizens, these all turn out to be feminine: wealth, liberty, and civic greatness. If we next ask about the type of community we need to sustain in order to realize these goals, we find that this is seen by contrast as masculine: it must be a vivere politico, a vivere civile, a vivere libero--terms usually translated as a 'free state.' If we go on to ask about the (...)
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  9. H. Sarkar (1997). The Task of Group Rationality: The Subjectivist's View--Part II. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 28 (3):497-520.score: 150.0
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  10. Anguel Stefanov & Dimiter Ginev (1985). One Dimension of the Scientific Type of Rationality (a Reflection Upon the Theory of Group Rationality). Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 16 (2):101-111.score: 150.0
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  11. Husain Sarkar (1982). A Theory of Group Rationality. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 13 (1):55-72.score: 150.0
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  12. Lansana Keita (2010). Hussain Sarkar, Group Rationality in Scientific Research Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 30 (1):60-62.score: 150.0
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  13. Philip Pettit (2007). Rationality, Reasoning and Group Agency. Dialectica 61 (4):495-519.score: 144.0
    The rationality of individual agents is secured for the most part by their make-up or design. Some agents, however – in particular, human beings – rely on the intentional exercise of thinking or reasoning in order to promote their rationality further; this is the activity that is classically exemplified in Rodin’s sculpture of Le Penseur. Do group agents have to rely on reasoning in order to maintain a rational profile? Recent results in the theory of judgment aggregation (...)
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  14. Don Ross (2006). Group Doxastic Rationality Need Not Supervene on Individual Rationality. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):106-117.score: 144.0
    There is a strong formal analogy between proposition-wise supervenience of collective doxastic rationality on individual doxasticrationality and supervenience of social choice functions on individual choice functions. In light of this analogy, the basis for List and Pettit’s impossibility theorems can fruitfully be compared with the basis for Arrow’s. This helps to explain why List and Pettit can derive no impossibility theorem for set-wise supervenience. However, there are empirical reasons for doubting that set-wise supervenience of collective doxastic rationality on (...)
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  15. Alex de Waal (1997). Group Identity, Rationality, and the State. Critical Review 11 (2):279-289.score: 144.0
    Abstract The rational choice approach to the understanding of group identity and conflict tends to overlook the extent to which groups are mutable, and the element of design by group leaders (especially those wielding state power) in the definition of group identity and the shaping of rationality. The 1994 genocide of the Rwandese Tutsis was the outcome of an extreme case of planning ethnic and ideological engineering. To see such phenomena as instances of ?rational self?interest? stretches (...)
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  16. Torsten Reimer & Ulrich Hoffrage (2006). The Ecological Rationality of Simple Group Heuristics: Effects of Group Member Strategies on Decision Accuracy. Theory and Decision 60 (4):403-438.score: 132.0
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  17. Prasanta K. Pattanaik (1976). Collective Rationality and Strategy-Proofness of Group Decision Rules. Theory and Decision 7 (3):191-203.score: 120.0
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  18. Michael W. Howard (2001). The Rationality of Ethnic Conflict and of Positive Solidarity: Russell Hardin's One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict and Martin Hollis's Trust Within Reason. Radical Philosophy Review 3 (2):196-206.score: 120.0
  19. Nicholas Rescher (1985). Reason and Rationality in Natural Science: A Group of Essays. University Press of America.score: 120.0
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  20. Kay Mathiesen (2006). The Epistemic Features of Group Belief. Episteme 2 (3):161-175.score: 102.0
    Recently, there has been a debate focusing on the question of whether groups can literally have beliefs. For the purposes of epistemology, however, the key question is whether groups can have knowledge. More specifi cally, the question is whether “group views” can have the key epistemic features of belief, viz., aiming at truth and being epistemically rational. I argue that, while groups may not have beliefs in the full sense of the word, group views can have these key (...)
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  21. Darrell P. Rowbottom (2013). Group Level Interpretations of Probability: New Directions. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):188-203.score: 96.0
    In this article, I present some new group level interpretations of probability, and champion one in particular: a consensus-based variant where group degrees of belief are construed as agreed upon betting quotients rather than shared personal degrees of belief. One notable feature of the account is that it allows us to treat consensus between experts on some matter as being on the union of their relevant background information. In the course of the discussion, I also introduce a novel (...)
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  22. Duncan MacIntosh (1992). Buridan and the Circumstances of Justice (On the Implications of the Rational Unsolvability of Certain Co-Ordination Problems). Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2):150-173.score: 94.0
    Gauthier and Hobbes reduce Prisoners Dilemmas to co-ordination problems (CPs). Many think rational, face-to-face agents can solve any CP by agreed fiat. But though an agent can rationally use a symmetry-breaking technique (ST) to decide between equal options, groups cannot unless their members' STs luckily converge. Failing this, the CP is escapable only by one agent's non-rational stubbornness, or by the group's "conquest" by an outside force. Implications: one's strategic rationality is group-relative; there are some optimums groups (...)
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  23. Christian List & Philip Pettit (2006). Group Agency and Supervenience. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):85-105.score: 90.0
    Can groups be rational agents over and above their individual members? We argue that group agents are distinguished by their capacity to mimic the way in which individual agents act and that this capacity must 'supervene' on the group members' contributions. But what is the nature of this supervenience relation? Focusing on group judgments, we argue that, for a group to be rational, its judgment on a particular proposition cannot generally be a function of the members' (...)
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  24. Wynn C. Stirling (2002). Games Machines Play. Minds and Machines 12 (3):327-352.score: 84.0
    Individual rationality, or doing what is best for oneself, is a standard model used to explain and predict human behavior, and von Neumann–Morgenstern game theory is the classical mathematical formalization of this theory in multiple-agent settings. Individual rationality, however, is an inadequate model for the synthesis of artificial social systems where cooperation is essential, since it does not permit the accommodation of group interests other than as aggregations of individual interests. Satisficing game theory is based upon a (...)
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  25. Christopher Woodard (2003). Group-Based Reasons for Action. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2):215-229.score: 66.0
    This article endorses a familiar, albeit controversial, argument for the existence of group-based reasons for action, but then rejects two doctrines which other advocates of such reasons usually accept. One such doctrine is the willingness requirement, which says that a group-based reason exists only if (sufficient) other members of the group in question are willing to cooperate. Thus the paper argues that there is sometimes a reason, which derives from the rationality of some group action, (...)
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  26. Leo Townsend (2013). Being and Becoming in the Theory of Group Agency. Abstracta 7 (1).score: 66.0
    Article Title: ‘Being and Becoming in the Theory of Group Agency’This paper explores a bootstrapping puzzle which appears to afflict Philip Pettit’s theory of group agency. Pettit claims that the corporate persons recognised by his theory come about when a set of individuals ‘gets its act together’ by undertaking to reason at the collective level. But this is puzzling, because it is hard to see how the step such a collective must take to become a group agent (...)
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  27. Juliane E. Kämmer, Wolfgang Gaissmaier, Torsten Reimer & Carsten C. Schermuly (2014). The Adaptive Use of Recognition in Group Decision Making. Cognitive Science 38 (2):911-942.score: 66.0
    Applying the framework of ecological rationality, the authors studied the adaptivity of group decision making. In detail, they investigated whether groups apply decision strategies conditional on their composition in terms of task-relevant features. The authors focused on the recognition heuristic, so the task-relevant features were the validity of the group members' recognition and knowledge, which influenced the potential performance of group strategies. Forty-three three-member groups performed an inference task in which they had to infer which of (...)
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  28. Todor Tsankov (2011). The Additive Group of the Rationals Does Not Have an Automatic Presentation. Journal of Symbolic Logic 76 (4):1341-1351.score: 64.0
    We prove that the additive group of the rationals does not have an automatic presentation. The proof also applies to certain other abelian groups, for example, torsion-free groups that are p-divisible for infinitely many primes p, or groups of the form ⊕ p∈I Z(p ∞ ), where I is an infinite set of primes.
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  29. Christian List & Philip Pettit (2005). On the Many as One: A Reply to Kornhauser and Sager. Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (4):377–390.score: 62.0
    In a recent paper on ‘The Many as One’, Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager look at an issue that we take to be of great importance in political theory. How far should groups in public life try to speak with one voice, and act with one mind? How far should public groups try to display what Ronald Dworkin calls integrity? We do not expect the many on the market to be integrated in this sense. But should we expect (...)
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  30. Marc Moffett (2007). Reasonable Disagreement and Rational Group Inquiry. Episteme 4 (3):352-367.score: 60.0
    According to one widely held view, a belief is fully justified only if it holds up against the strongest available counterarguments, and we can be appropriately confident that it does hold up only if there is free and open critical discussion of those beliefs between us and our epistemic peers. In this paper I argue that this common picture of ideal rational group inquiry interacts with epistemic problems concerning reasonable disagreement in a way that makes those problems particularly difficult (...)
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  31. Philip Pettit & David Schweikard (2006). Joint Actions and Group Agents. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):18-39.score: 54.0
    University of Cologne, Germany Joint action and group agency have emerged as focuses of attention in recent social theory and philosophy but they have rarely been connected with one another. The argument of this article is that whereas joint action involves people acting together to achieve any sort of result, group agency requires them to act together for the achievement of one result in particular: the construction of a centre of attitude and agency that satisfies the usual constraints (...)
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  32. J. McKenzie Alexander (2001). Group Dynamics in the State of Nature. Erkenntnis 55 (2):169-182.score: 54.0
    One common interpretation of the Hobbesian state of nature views itas a social dilemma, a natural extension of the well-knownprisoner''s dilemma to a group context. Kavka (1986)challenges this interpretation, suggesting that the appropriate wayto view the state of nature is as a quasi social dilemma. Iargue that Hobbes''s remarks on the rationality of keeping covenantsin the state of nature indicate that the quasi social dilemma doesnot accurately represent the state of nature. One possiblesolution, I suggest, views the state (...)
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  33. Margaret Gilbert (1990). Rationality, Coordination, and Convention. Synthese 84 (1):1 - 21.score: 54.0
    Philosophers using game-theoretical models of human interactions have, I argue, often overestimated what sheer rationality can achieve. (References are made to David Gauthier, David Lewis, and others.) In particular I argue that in coordination problems rational agents will not necessarily reach a unique outcome that is most preferred by all, nor a unique 'coordination equilibrium' (Lewis), nor a unique Nash equilibrium. Nor are things helped by the addition of a successful precedent, or by common knowledge of generally accepted personal (...)
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  34. Cristina Bicchieri & Gian Aldo Antonelli (1995). Game-Theoretic Axioms for Local Rationality and Bounded Knowledge. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 4 (2):145-167.score: 54.0
    We present an axiomatic approach for a class of finite, extensive form games of perfect information that makes use of notions like rationality at a node and knowledge at a node. We distinguish between the game theorist's and the players' own theory of the game. The latter is a theory that is sufficient for each player to infer a certain sequence of moves, whereas the former is intended as a justification of such a sequence of moves. While in general (...)
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  35. Franz Dietrich, Judgment Aggregation Without Full Rationality.score: 54.0
    Several recent results on the aggregation of judgments over logically connected propositions show that, under certain conditions, dictatorships are the only propositionwise aggregation functions generating fully rational (i.e., complete and consistent) collective judgments. A frequently mentioned route to avoid dictatorships is to allow incomplete collective judgments. We show that this route does not lead very far: we obtain oligarchies rather than dictatorships if instead of full rationality we merely require that collective judgments be deductively closed, arguably a minimal condition (...)
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  36. Gian Aldo Antonelli & Cristina Bicchieri (1995). Game-Theoretic Axioms for Local Rationality and Bounded Knowledge. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 4 (2):145-167.score: 54.0
    We present an axiomatic approach for a class of finite, extensive form games of perfect information that makes use of notions like “rationality at a node” and “knowledge at a node.” We distinguish between the game theorist's and the players' own “theory of the game.” The latter is a theory that is sufficient for each player to infer a certain sequence of moves, whereas the former is intended as a justification of such a sequence of moves. While in general (...)
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  37. Paul Weirich (2010). Collective Rationality: Equilibrium in Cooperative Games. Oxford University Press.score: 54.0
    This book argues that a group's act is evaluable for rationality if it is the products of acts its members fully control.
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  38. Vuko Andrić (2014). Can Groups Be Autonomous Rational Agents? A Challenge to the List-Pettit Theory. In Anita Konzelmann Ziv & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents - Contributions to Social Ontology. Springer. 343-353.score: 54.0
    Christian List and Philip Pettit argue that some groups qualify as rational agents over and above their members. Examples include churches, commercial corporations, and political parties. According to the theory developed by List and Pettit, these groups qualify as agents because they have beliefs and desires and the capacity to process them and to act on their basis. Moreover, the alleged group agents are said to be rational to a high degree and even to be fit to be held (...)
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  39. Matthew Kopec (2012). We Ought to Agree: A Consequence of Repairing Goldman's Group Scoring Rule. [REVIEW] Episteme 9 (2):101-114.score: 54.0
    In Knowledge in a Social World, Alvin Goldman presents a framework to quantify the epistemic effects that various policies, procedures, and behaviors can have on a group of agents. In this essay, I show that the framework requires some modifications when applied to agents with credences. The required modifications carry with them an interesting consequence, namely, that any group whose members disagree can become more accurate by forming a consensus through averaging their credences. I sketch a way that (...)
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  40. Celine Kermisch (2008). Cultural Theory, Risk, Rationality and Ethical Implications. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 3:47-53.score: 54.0
    This paper intends to highlight the philosophical and ethical implications of cultural theory as initiated in the seventies by the British anthropologist, Mary Douglas. The first part will present cultural theory, mainly through her early works. We will particularly insist on the originality of this functionalist theory based on four interpersonal relationships patterns – defined according to grid and group dimensions – and their associated cultural biases, namely the egalitarian bias, the hierarchical, the insulated and the individualist one. In (...)
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  41. Godehard Brüntrup & Ronald K. Tacelli (eds.) (1999). The Rationality of Theism. Kluwer Academic Publishers.score: 54.0
    In May 1998, a distinguished group of philosophers met in Munich to discuss the rationality of theism. This volume is a collection of the papers read at that conference. While in recent years the rationality of theistic belief has been widely discussed, the Munich conference was an event of some moment in the history of philosophical dialogue: for the first time German- and English-speaking philosophers of religion, representatives of both the Continental and the Anglo-Saxon traditions, joined together (...)
     
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  42. Georg Theiner (2013). Onwards and Upwards with the Extended Mind: From Individual to Collective Epistemic Action. In Linnda Caporael, James Griesemer & William Wimsatt (eds.), Developing Scaffolds. MIT Press. 191-208.score: 50.0
    In recent years, philosophical developments of the notion of distributed and/or scaffolded cognition have given rise to the “extended mind” thesis. Against the popular belief that the mind resides solely in the brain, advocates of the extended mind thesis defend the claim that a significant portion of human cognition literally extends beyond the brain into the body and a heterogeneous array of physical props, tools, and cultural techniques that are reliably present in the environment in which people grow, think, and (...)
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  43. Frank Arntzenius & David McCarthy (1997). Self Torture and Group Beneficence. Erkenntnis 47 (1):129-144.score: 48.0
    Moral puzzles about actions which bring about very small or what are said to be imperceptible harms or benefits for each of a large number of people are well known. Less well known is an argument by Warren Quinn that standard theories of rationality can lead an agent to end up torturing himself or herself in a completely foreseeable way, and that this shows that standard theories of rationality need to be revised. We show where Quinn's argument goes (...)
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  44. Frank Zenker & Carlo Proietti (2014). Editors' Introduction: Social Dynamics and Collective Rationality. Synthese 191 (11):2353-2358.score: 48.0
    We provide a brief introduction to this special issue on social dynamics and collective rationality, and summarize the gist of the papers collected therein.
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  45. J. Moreh (1989). The Authority of Moral Rules. Theory and Decision 27 (3):257-273.score: 48.0
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  46. Susan Hurley (2003). The Limits of Individualism Are Not the Limits of Rationality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):164-165.score: 42.0
    Individualism fixes the unit of rational agency at the individual, creating problems exemplified in Hi-Lo and Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) games. But instrumental evaluation of consequences does not require a fixed individual unit. Units of agency can overlap, and the question of which unit should operate arises. Assuming a fixed individual unit is hard to justify: It is natural, and can be rational, to act as part of a group rather than as an individual. More attention should be paid to (...)
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  47. Keith Lehrer (1983). Rationality as Weighted Averaging. Synthese 57 (3):283 - 295.score: 42.0
    Weighted averaging is a method for aggregating the totality of information, both regimented and unregimented, possessed by an individual or group of individuals. The application of such a method may be warranted by a theorem of the calculus of probability, simple conditionalization, or Jeffrey's formula for probability kinematics, all of which average in terms of the prior probability of evidence statements. Weighted averaging may, however, be applied as a method of rational aggregation of the probabilities of diverse perspectives or (...)
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  48. Alison Wylie (2005). Socially Naturalized Norms of Epistemic Rationality. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (Supplement):43-48.score: 42.0
    In response to those who see rational deliberation as a source of epistemic norms and a model for well-functioning scientific inquiry, Solomon cites evidence that aggregative techniques often yield better results; deliberative processes are vulnerable to biasing mechanisms that impoverish the epistemic resources on which group judgments are based. I argue that aggregative techniques are similarly vulnerable and illustrate this in terms of the impact of gender schemas on both individual and collective judgment. A consistently externalist and socially naturalized (...)
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  49. Jens David Ohlin (forthcoming). The One or the Many. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-15.score: 42.0
    The following Review Essay, inspired by Tracy Isaacs’ new book, Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts, connects the philosophical literature on group agency with recent trends in international criminal law. Part I of the Essay sketches out the relevant philosophical positions, including collectivist and individualist accounts of group agency. Particular attention is paid to Kornhauser and Sager’s development of the doctrinal paradox, Philip Pettit’s deployment of the paradox towards a general argument for group rationality, and Michael Bratman’s (...)
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  50. Harald Ofstad (forthcoming). How Can We - Irrational Persons Operating in Irrational Societies - Decide Rationality? Grazer Philosophische Studien 12:227-249.score: 42.0
    Utilitarian deliberation has a number of weak or open points where the agent's judgements tend to be influenced by psychological and sociological factors, e.g., by his prejudices, anxieties, insecurities or group-identifications. The most vulnerable points are: the formulation of the problem, the selection of alternatives, the calculation of consequences, the weighing of evidence, the selection of ultimate values and the comparison of different values towards each other.— The utilitarian vocabulary provides the chooser with misleading expressions such as "The action (...)
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