Search results for 'Group rationality' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  70
    John Broomespecial Issue On Normativity & Edited by Teresa Marques Rationality (2007). Is Rationality Normative? Special Issue on Normativity and Rationality, Edited by Teresa Marques 2 (23).
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  2.  24
    Husain Sarkar (2007). Group Rationality in Scientific Research. Cambridge University Press.
    Group Rationality in Scientific Research.
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  3.  24
    Gerald Gaus (2012). Constructivist and Ecological Modeling of Group Rationality. Episteme 9 (3):245-254.
    These brief remarks highlight three aspects of Christian List and Philip Pettit's Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents that illustrate its constructivist nature: its stress on the discursive dilemma as a primary challenge to group rationality and reasoning; its general though qualified support for premise-based decision-making as the preferred way to cope with the problems of judgment aggregation; and its account of rational agency and moral responsibility. The essay contrasts List and Pettit's constructivist (...)
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  4. Husain Sarkar (2009). Group Rationality in Scientific Research. Cambridge University Press.
    Under what conditions is a group of scientists rational? How would rational scientists collectively agree to make their group more effective? What sorts of negotiations would occur among them and under what conditions? What effect would their final agreement have on science and society? These questions have been central to the philosophy of science for the last two decades. In this 2007 book, Husain Sarkar proposes answers to them by building on classical solutions - the skeptical view, two (...)
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  5. Husain Sarkar (2011). Group Rationality in Scientific Research. Cambridge University Press.
    Under what conditions is a group of scientists rational? How would rational scientists collectively agree to make their group more effective? What sorts of negotiations would occur among them and under what conditions? What effect would their final agreement have on science and society? These questions have been central to the philosophy of science for the last two decades. In this 2007 book, Husain Sarkar proposes answers to them by building on classical solutions - the skeptical view, two (...)
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  6.  63
    Christian List (2005). Group Knowledge and Group Rationality: A Judgment Aggregation Perspective. Episteme 2 (1):25-38.
    The Ostrogorski paradox and the discursive dilemma are seemingly unrelated paradoxes of aggregation. The former is discussed in traditional social choice theory, while the latter is at the core of the new literature on judgment aggregation. Both paradoxes arise when, in a group, each individual consistently makes a judgment, or expresses a preference, (in the form of yes or no) over specific propositions, and the collective outcome is in some respect inconsistent. While the result is logically inconsistent in the (...)
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  7. Alvin I. Goldman (2004). Group Knowledge Versus Group Rationality: Two Approaches to Social Epistemology. Episteme 1 (1):11-22.
    Social epistemology is a many-splendored subject. Different theorists adopt different approaches and the options are quite diverse, often orthogonal to one another. The approach I favor is to examine social practices in terms of their impact on knowledge acquisition . This has at least two virtues: it displays continuity with traditional epistemology, which historically focuses on knowledge, and it intersects with the concerns of practical life, which are pervasively affected by what people know or don't know. In making this choice, (...)
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  8.  7
    Husain Sarkar (1982). A Theory of Group Rationality. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 13 (1):55-72.
  9.  4
    Anguel Stefanov & Dimiter Ginev (1985). One Dimension of the Scientific Type of Rationality (a Reflection Upon the Theory of Group Rationality). Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 16 (2):101-111.
  10.  10
    Katie Steele (2007). Review of Husain Sarkar, Group Rationality in Scientific Research. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (10).
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  11.  3
    H. Sarkar (1997). The Task of Group Rationality: The Subjectivist's View--Part I. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 28 (2):267-288.
    If we first ask about the goals Machiavelli urges us to embrace as citizens, these all turn out to be feminine: wealth, liberty, and civic greatness. If we next ask about the type of community we need to sustain in order to realize these goals, we find that this is seen by contrast as masculine: it must be a vivere politico, a vivere civile, a vivere libero--terms usually translated as a 'free state.' If we go on to ask about the (...)
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  12.  4
    H. Sarkar (1997). The Task of Group Rationality: The Subjectivist's View--Part II. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 28 (3):497-520.
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  13.  1
    Lansana Keita (2010). Hussain Sarkar, Group Rationality in Scientific Research Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 30 (1):60-62.
  14. Lansana Keita (2010). Hussain Sarkar, Group Rationality in Scientific Research. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 30:60-62.
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  15. Philip Pettit (2007). Rationality, Reasoning and Group Agency. Dialectica 61 (4):495-519.
    The rationality of individual agents is secured for the most part by their make-up or design. Some agents, however – in particular, human beings – rely on the intentional exercise of thinking or reasoning in order to promote their rationality further; this is the activity that is classically exemplified in Rodin’s sculpture of Le Penseur. Do group agents have to rely on reasoning in order to maintain a rational profile? Recent results in the theory of judgment aggregation (...)
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  16.  19
    Don Ross (2006). Group Doxastic Rationality Need Not Supervene on Individual Rationality. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):106-117.
    There is a strong formal analogy between proposition-wise supervenience of collective doxastic rationality on individual doxasticrationality and supervenience of social choice functions on individual choice functions. In light of this analogy, the basis for List and Pettit’s impossibility theorems can fruitfully be compared with the basis for Arrow’s. This helps to explain why List and Pettit can derive no impossibility theorem for set-wise supervenience. However, there are empirical reasons for doubting that set-wise supervenience of collective doxastic rationality on (...)
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  17.  7
    Alex de Waal (1997). Group Identity, Rationality, and the State. Critical Review 11 (2):279-289.
    Abstract The rational choice approach to the understanding of group identity and conflict tends to overlook the extent to which groups are mutable, and the element of design by group leaders (especially those wielding state power) in the definition of group identity and the shaping of rationality. The 1994 genocide of the Rwandese Tutsis was the outcome of an extreme case of planning ethnic and ideological engineering. To see such phenomena as instances of ?rational self?interest? stretches (...)
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  18.  18
    Reed Richter (1985). Rationality, Group Choice and Expected Utility. Synthese 63 (2):203 - 232.
    This paper proposes a view uniformly extending expected utility calculations to both individual and group choice contexts. Three related cases illustrate the problems inherent in applying expected utility to group choices. However, these problems do not essentially depend upon the tact that more than one agent is involved. I devise a modified strategy allowing the application of expected utility calculations to these otherwise problematic cases. One case, however, apparently leads to contradiction. But recognizing the falsity of proposition (1) (...)
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  19.  9
    Torsten Reimer & Ulrich Hoffrage (2006). The Ecological Rationality of Simple Group Heuristics: Effects of Group Member Strategies on Decision Accuracy. Theory and Decision 60 (4):403-438.
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  20.  2
    Prasanta K. Pattanaik (1976). Collective Rationality and Strategy-Proofness of Group Decision Rules. Theory and Decision 7 (3):191-203.
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  21. Michael W. Howard (2001). The Rationality of Ethnic Conflict and of Positive Solidarity: Russell Hardin's One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict and Martin Hollis's Trust Within Reason. Radical Philosophy Review 3 (2):196-206.
  22. Nicholas Rescher (1985). Reason and Rationality in Natural Science: A Group of Essays. Upa.
    A collection of essays on fundamental issues regarding scientific knowledge.
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  23.  68
    Matthew Kopec (2015). A New Group Dutch Book Argument. Ratio 28 (4):n/a-n/a.
    In this essay, I repair the group Dutch Book argument presented by Donald Gillies. I then examine what additional assumptions would be needed for the argument to generate genuinely normative prescriptions for groups of inquirers. Although the resulting norms will apply to fewer groups than Gillies originally intended, they are still an important addition to the normative landscape in social epistemology.
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  24.  82
    Kay Mathiesen (2006). The Epistemic Features of Group Belief. Episteme 2 (3):161-175.
    Recently, there has been a debate focusing on the question of whether groups can literally have beliefs. For the purposes of epistemology, however, the key question is whether groups can have knowledge. More specifi cally, the question is whether “group views” can have the key epistemic features of belief, viz., aiming at truth and being epistemically rational. I argue that, while groups may not have beliefs in the full sense of the word, group views can have these key (...)
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  25.  55
    Darrell P. Rowbottom (2013). Group Level Interpretations of Probability: New Directions. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):188-203.
    In this article, I present some new group level interpretations of probability, and champion one in particular: a consensus-based variant where group degrees of belief are construed as agreed upon betting quotients rather than shared personal degrees of belief. One notable feature of the account is that it allows us to treat consensus between experts on some matter as being on the union of their relevant background information. In the course of the discussion, I also introduce a novel (...)
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  26. Christian List & Philip Pettit (2006). Group Agency and Supervenience. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):85-105.
    Can groups be rational agents over and above their individual members? We argue that group agents are distinguished by their capacity to mimic the way in which individual agents act and that this capacity must 'supervene' on the group members' contributions. But what is the nature of this supervenience relation? Focusing on group judgments, we argue that, for a group to be rational, its judgment on a particular proposition cannot generally be a function of the members' (...)
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  27. Duncan MacIntosh (1992). Buridan and the Circumstances of Justice (On the Implications of the Rational Unsolvability of Certain Co-Ordination Problems). Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2):150-173.
    Gauthier and Hobbes reduce Prisoners Dilemmas to co-ordination problems (CPs). Many think rational, face-to-face agents can solve any CP by agreed fiat. But though an agent can rationally use a symmetry-breaking technique (ST) to decide between equal options, groups cannot unless their members' STs luckily converge. Failing this, the CP is escapable only by one agent's non-rational stubbornness, or by the group's "conquest" by an outside force. Implications: one's strategic rationality is group-relative; there are some optimums groups (...)
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  28.  10
    Wynn C. Stirling (2002). Games Machines Play. Minds and Machines 12 (3):327-352.
    Individual rationality, or doing what is best for oneself, is a standard model used to explain and predict human behavior, and von Neumann–Morgenstern game theory is the classical mathematical formalization of this theory in multiple-agent settings. Individual rationality, however, is an inadequate model for the synthesis of artificial social systems where cooperation is essential, since it does not permit the accommodation of group interests other than as aggregations of individual interests. Satisficing game theory is based upon a (...)
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  29.  39
    Daniele Porello (2013). A Proof-Theoretical View of Collective Rationality. In Proceedings of the 23rd International Joint Conference of Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2013).
    The impossibility results in judgement aggregation show a clash between fair aggregation procedures and rational collective outcomes. In this paper, we are interested in analysing the notion of rational outcome by proposing a proof-theoretical understanding of collective rationality. In particular, we use the analysis of proofs and inferences provided by linear logic in order to define a fine-grained notion of group reasoning that allows for studying collective rationality with respect to a number of logics. We analyse the (...)
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  30.  30
    Christopher Woodard (2003). Group-Based Reasons for Action. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2):215-229.
    This article endorses a familiar, albeit controversial, argument for the existence of group-based reasons for action, but then rejects two doctrines which other advocates of such reasons usually accept. One such doctrine is the willingness requirement, which says that a group-based reason exists only if (sufficient) other members of the group in question are willing to cooperate. Thus the paper argues that there is sometimes a reason, which derives from the rationality of some group action, (...)
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  31.  13
    Leo Townsend (2013). Being and Becoming in the Theory of Group Agency. Abstracta 7 (1).
    Article Title: ‘Being and Becoming in the Theory of Group Agency’This paper explores a bootstrapping puzzle which appears to afflict Philip Pettit’s theory of group agency. Pettit claims that the corporate persons recognised by his theory come about when a set of individuals ‘gets its act together’ by undertaking to reason at the collective level. But this is puzzling, because it is hard to see how the step such a collective must take to become a group agent (...)
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  32.  6
    Juliane E. Kämmer, Wolfgang Gaissmaier, Torsten Reimer & Carsten C. Schermuly (2014). The Adaptive Use of Recognition in Group Decision Making. Cognitive Science 38 (5):911-942.
    Applying the framework of ecological rationality, the authors studied the adaptivity of group decision making. In detail, they investigated whether groups apply decision strategies conditional on their composition in terms of task-relevant features. The authors focused on the recognition heuristic, so the task-relevant features were the validity of the group members' recognition and knowledge, which influenced the potential performance of group strategies. Forty-three three-member groups performed an inference task in which they had to infer which of (...)
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  33.  3
    Bojana Radovanovic (2012). Individual Decision Making, Group Decision Making and Deliberation. Filozofija I Društvo 23 (2):147-167.
    Each of us makes a number of decisions, from the less important to those with far-reaching consequences. As members of different groups, we are also actors of group decision making. In order to make a rational decision, a choice-making procedure must satisfy a number of assumptions of rationality. In addition, when it comes to group decisions, those procedures should also be “fair.” However, it is not possible to define a procedure of choice-making that would transform individual orders (...)
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  34.  44
    Christian List & Philip Pettit (2005). On the Many as One: A Reply to Kornhauser and Sager. Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (4):377–390.
    In a recent paper on ‘The Many as One’, Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager look at an issue that we take to be of great importance in political theory. How far should groups in public life try to speak with one voice, and act with one mind? How far should public groups try to display what Ronald Dworkin calls integrity? We do not expect the many on the market to be integrated in this sense. But should we expect (...)
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  35. Philip Pettit & David Schweikard (2006). Joint Actions and Group Agents. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):18-39.
    University of Cologne, Germany Joint action and group agency have emerged as focuses of attention in recent social theory and philosophy but they have rarely been connected with one another. The argument of this article is that whereas joint action involves people acting together to achieve any sort of result, group agency requires them to act together for the achievement of one result in particular: the construction of a centre of attitude and agency that satisfies the usual constraints (...)
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  36.  64
    Jonathan Matheson (2014). A Puzzle About Disagreement and Rationality. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3 (4):1-3.
    According to Conciliationism, rationality calls for a removal of dissenting opinions – in the end, the disagreement should lead to skepticism toward the disputed proposition for all the involved parties. However, psychological data regarding group inquiry indicates that groups with dissenting members are more successful in their inquiry with respect to the disputed propositions. So, according to the psychological data, rationality calls for preserving dissent – disagreement should be embraced as a great tool for getting at true (...)
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  37.  41
    Franz Dietrich, Judgment Aggregation Without Full Rationality.
    Several recent results on the aggregation of judgments over logically connected propositions show that, under certain conditions, dictatorships are the only propositionwise aggregation functions generating fully rational (i.e., complete and consistent) collective judgments. A frequently mentioned route to avoid dictatorships is to allow incomplete collective judgments. We show that this route does not lead very far: we obtain oligarchies rather than dictatorships if instead of full rationality we merely require that collective judgments be deductively closed, arguably a minimal condition (...)
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  38. J. McKenzie Alexander (2001). Group Dynamics in the State of Nature. Erkenntnis 55 (2):169-182.
    One common interpretation of the Hobbesian state of nature views itas a social dilemma, a natural extension of the well-knownprisoner''s dilemma to a group context. Kavka (1986)challenges this interpretation, suggesting that the appropriate wayto view the state of nature is as a quasi social dilemma. Iargue that Hobbes''s remarks on the rationality of keeping covenantsin the state of nature indicate that the quasi social dilemma doesnot accurately represent the state of nature. One possiblesolution, I suggest, views the state (...)
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  39.  15
    Paul Weirich (2010). Collective Rationality: Equilibrium in Cooperative Games. Oxford University Press.
    This book argues that a group's act is evaluable for rationality if it is the products of acts its members fully control.
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  40. Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks & Gerhard Preyer (eds.) (2014). From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Includes essays that challenge the need for a theory of collective intentionality as well as essays that extend and enrich existing theories of collective intentionality The essays concerning collective rationality (part II) break new ground in that they challenge the idea that there is a straightforward dichotomy between individual and collective level rationality Many of the things we do, we do together with other people. Think of carpooling and playing tennis. In the past two or three decades it (...)
     
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  41.  47
    Margaret Gilbert (1990). Rationality, Coordination, and Convention. Synthese 84 (1):1 - 21.
    Philosophers using game-theoretical models of human interactions have, I argue, often overestimated what sheer rationality can achieve. (References are made to David Gauthier, David Lewis, and others.) In particular I argue that in coordination problems rational agents will not necessarily reach a unique outcome that is most preferred by all, nor a unique 'coordination equilibrium' (Lewis), nor a unique Nash equilibrium. Nor are things helped by the addition of a successful precedent, or by common knowledge of generally accepted personal (...)
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  42.  19
    Gian Aldo Antonelli & Cristina Bicchieri (1995). Game-Theoretic Axioms for Local Rationality and Bounded Knowledge. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 4 (2):145-167.
    We present an axiomatic approach for a class of finite, extensive form games of perfect information that makes use of notions like “rationality at a node” and “knowledge at a node.” We distinguish between the game theorist's and the players' own “theory of the game.” The latter is a theory that is sufficient for each player to infer a certain sequence of moves, whereas the former is intended as a justification of such a sequence of moves. While (...)
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  43.  8
    Celine Kermisch (2008). Cultural Theory, Risk, Rationality and Ethical Implications. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 3:47-53.
    This paper intends to highlight the philosophical and ethical implications of cultural theory as initiated in the seventies by the British anthropologist, Mary Douglas. The first part will present cultural theory, mainly through her early works. We will particularly insist on the originality of this functionalist theory based on four interpersonal relationships patterns – defined according to grid and group dimensions – and their associated cultural biases, namely the egalitarian bias, the hierarchical, the insulated and the individualist one. In (...)
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  44.  29
    Cristina Bicchieri & Gian Aldo Antonelli (1995). Game-Theoretic Axioms for Local Rationality and Bounded Knowledge. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 4 (2):145-167.
    We present an axiomatic approach for a class of finite, extensive form games of perfect information that makes use of notions like rationality at a node and knowledge at a node. We distinguish between the game theorist's and the players' own theory of the game. The latter is a theory that is sufficient for each player to infer a certain sequence of moves, whereas the former is intended as a justification of such a sequence of moves. While in (...)
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  45.  10
    Matthew Kopec (2012). We Ought to Agree: A Consequence of Repairing Goldman's Group Scoring Rule. Episteme 9 (2):101-114.
    In Knowledge in a Social World, Alvin Goldman presents a framework to quantify the epistemic effects that various policies, procedures, and behaviors can have on a group of agents. In this essay, I show that the framework requires some modifications when applied to agents with credences. The required modifications carry with them an interesting consequence, namely, that any group whose members disagree can become more accurate by forming a consensus through averaging their credences. I sketch a way that (...)
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  46. Caroline Arruda (forthcoming). Review Essay: Chant, Sara Rachel, Frank Hindriks and Gerhard Preyer, Editors. From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. 240. [REVIEW] Philosophy of the Social Sciences.
    I summarize and evaluate the aims of the collection From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays edited by Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks and Gerhard Preyer in the context of the on-going debate about collective intentionality and group agency. I then consider the individual essays contained therein, both from the perspective of how they advance the collection’s goals and the coherence of their individual arguments.
     
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  47. Godehard Brüntrup & Ronald K. Tacelli (eds.) (1999). The Rationality of Theism. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    In May 1998, a distinguished group of philosophers met in Munich to discuss the rationality of theism. This volume is a collection of the papers read at that conference. While in recent years the rationality of theistic belief has been widely discussed, the Munich conference was an event of some moment in the history of philosophical dialogue: for the first time German- and English-speaking philosophers of religion, representatives of both the Continental and the Anglo-Saxon traditions, joined together (...)
     
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  48.  1
    Godehard Brüntrup & Ronald K. Tacelli (eds.) (1999/2014). The Rationality of Theism. Springer.
    In May 1998, a distinguished group of philosophers met in Munich to discuss the rationality of theism. This volume is a collection of the papers read at that conference. While in recent years the rationality of theistic belief has been widely discussed, the Munich conference was an event of some moment in the history of philosophical dialogue: for the first time German- and English-speaking philosophers of religion, representatives of both the Continental and the Anglo-Saxon traditions, (...)
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  49. Mathias Risse (2000). Majority Rule, Rights, Utilitarianism, and Bayesian Group Decision Theory: Philosophical Essays in Decision-Theoretic Aggregation. Dissertation, Princeton University
    My dissertation focuses on problems that arise when a group makes decisions that are in reasonable ways connected to the beliefs and values of the group members. These situations are represented by models of decision-theoretic aggregation: Suppose a model of individual rationality in decision-making applies to each of a group of agents. Suppose this model also applies to the group as a whole, and that this group model is aggregated from the individual models. Two (...)
     
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  50. Paul Weirich (2012). Collective Rationality: Equilibrium in Cooperative Games. Oxford University Press Usa.
    Groups of people perform acts that are subject to standards of rationality. A committee may sensibly award fellowships, or may irrationally award them in violation of its own policies. A theory of collective rationality defines collective acts that are evaluable for rationality and formulates principles for their evaluation. This book argues that a group's act is evaluable for rationality if it is the products of acts its members fully control. It also argues that such an (...)
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