This paper examines Aristotle’s treatment of friendship and self-love in Books VIII and IX of the Nicomachean Ethics. The purpose is to explore what Aristotle means by self, and his understanding of why selves become, engaged in benevolent relationships with others. Some discussion of Aristotle’s influence on Kierkegaard helps to bring out the significance of Aristotle’s insights about the self. Aristotle explains how the self’s movement toward actuality grounds friendship and benevolence. True friendship and all endeavors to “produce” good, derive (...) from love for one’s own being as mediated by one’s intelligence or nous. All such authentic endeavors constitute an effortto actualize one’s self, to act nobly, to be in one’s achievement and to panicipate in the community of being. (shrink)
Inadequate pain control, especially in older adults, remains a significant issue when caring for this population. Older adults, many of whom experience multiple acute and chronic conditions, are especially vulnerable to having their pain seriously underassessed and inadequately treated. Nurses have an ethical obligation to appropriately treat patients’ pain. To fulfill their ethical obligation to relieve pain in older patients, nurses often need to advocate on their behalf. This article provides an overview of the persistent problem of undertreated pain in (...) older adults and explores how nurses can meet this ethical duty through the application of Beauchamp and Childress’ three principles of beneficence. (shrink)
Este artigo apresenta o projeto de G. Vico para o estabelecimento da ciência moral. Vico esteve empenhado na emancipação do estudo das manifestações objetivas do espírito por intermédio da reforma do racionalismo cartesiano. A crítica ao iluminismo é feita com a retomada do conceito de barbárie no âmbito da filosofia, contrapondo-o ao conceito de esclarecimento do Século das Luzes.
This paper aims to study the concept of “fact of reason”, with the assistance Beck as North on the stage of transcendental philosophy, more specifically its basic Kantian approach, continuing to explore the potential of the above since the contributions of Guido de Almeida and Loparic.
This paper is intended to offer an analysis of William of Ockham's and Guido Terreni's discourses on papal authority; it illuminates how their polemical use of the same authority -- Thomas Aquinas -- resulted in two diametrically opposed views. Guido Terreni's precarious understanding of Aquinas' commentary on the gospel of Luke stretched papal authority on doctrinal definition to the point of papal infallibility. Whereas, William of Ockham's use (and transformation) of Aquinas' idea of the object of explicit faith (...) resulted in a demand that every ecclesiastical authority should have thorough knowledge of the Christian faith and take every caution in doctrinal decision making. The paper shows that, in the context of polemics, Aquinas' ecclesiology was dissolved and different aspects of it were exaggerated by Terreni and Ockham. Thus, the paper also highlights Ockham's polemical skill in turning Aquinas -- the papalists' favourite authority -- against them. (shrink)