We show that there is a structure of countably infinite signature with $P = N_{2}P$ and a structure of finite signature with $P = N_{1}P$ and $N_{1}P \neq N_{2}P$ . We give a further example of a structure of finite signature with $P \neq N_{1}P$ and $N_{1}P \neq N_{2}P$ . Together with a result from [10] this implies that for each possibility of P versus NP over structures there is an example of countably infinite signature. Then we show that for (...) some finite ℒ the class of ℒ-structures with $P = N_{1}P$ is not closed under ultraproducts and obtain as corollaries that this class is not $\delta$ -elementary and that the class of ᵍ-structures with $P \neq N_{1}P$ is not elementary. Finally we prove that for all f dominating all polynomials there is a structure of finite signature with the following properties: $P \neq N_{1}P$ . $N_{1}P \neq N_{2}P$ , the levels $N_{2}TIME(n^{i})$ of $N_{2}P$ and the levels $N_{1}TIME(n^{i})$ of $N_{1}P$ are different for different i, indeed $DTIME(n^{i'}) \nsubseteq N_{2}TIME(n^{i})$ if $i' \textgreater i$ ; $DTIME(f) \nsubseteq N_{2}P$ , and $N_{2}P \nsubseteq DEC$ . DEC is the class of recognizable sets with recognizable complements. So this is an example where the internal structure of $N_{2}P$ is analyzed in a more detailed way. In our proofs we use methods in the style of classical computability theory to construct structures except for one use of ultraproducts. (shrink)
Philosophers of mind have recently sought to establish a theoret- ical use for nonconceptual content. Although there is disagreement about what nonconceptual content is supposed to be, this much is clear. A state with nonconceptual content is mental. Hence, while one may deny that refrigerators and messy rooms have conceptual capacities, their states, as physical and not mental, do not have nonconceptual content. A state with nonconceptual content is also intentional, which is to say that it represents a feature of (...) the world for a subject. It may be tempting to think of qualitative states as having nonconceptual content since they can be experienced by indi- viduals independently of their possession of the requisite concepts, e.g. someone could experience pains, itches or tingles without possessing the concept pain, itch or tingle. But on such a view, one would have to assume that qualitative states are representational since mental states cannot be candidates for nonconceptuality unless they have intentional properties.2. (shrink)
Driven by privacy-related fears, users of Online Social Networks may start to reduce their network activities. This trend can have a negative impact on network sustainability and its business value. Nevertheless, very little is understood about the privacy-related concerns of users and the impact of those concerns on identity performance. To close this gap, we take a systematic view of user privacy concerns on such platforms. Based on insights from focus groups and an empirical study with 210 subjects, we find (...) that (i) Organizational Threats and (ii) Social Threats stemming from the user environment constitute two underlying dimensions of the construct Privacy Concerns in Online Social Networks . Using a Structural Equation Model, we examine the impact of the identified dimensions of concern on the Amount, Honesty, and Conscious Control of individual self-disclosure on these sites. We find that users tend to reduce the Amount of information disclosed as a response to their concerns regarding Organizational Threats. Additionally, users become more conscious about the information they reveal as a result of Social Threats. Network providers may want to develop specific mechanisms to alleviate identified user concerns and thereby ensure network sustainability. (shrink)
An iron mortar bomb, which was excavated in a suburb of Stralsund (Northern Germany) and dates from the siege of this town in 1678 by the elector of Brandenburg, Friedrich Wilhelm, has been investigated. The residual blasting powder was contaminated with rock minerals and large amounts of iron oxide [α-FeO(OH)]. Analytical data and the results of explosivity tests are presented. The original composition of the powder corresponds to historical recipes.
P.Churchland argued for the nomological character of action explanation by presenting an alleged law - I call it below L2 - which, according to Churchland, we make use ofimplicitly when explaining rational actions. I shall argue that Churchland'sargumentation is not complete because he does not exclude an alternative interpretation of L2. According to this alternative interpretation, L2 is not a law, but, it indicates the general form of complete action explanations. I shall argue that this alternative interpretation (...) is more acceptable than Churchland's interpretation of L2 as a law. Moreover, if the alleged law is interpreted as the general form of action explanations, then Churchland's article even transforms itself into a confirmation ofthe non-nomological character of action explanation. I conclude my article with some short remarks about action explanation as a kind of non-nomological explanation. (shrink)
The revived interest in the emotions has generated much discussion of late. Analyses typically begin by considering the various features that are involved in emotional experience generally, e.g., feeling, physiology, cognition, and behavior. This is often followed by explanations about the role of emotions in rationality, moral psychology, ethics, and/or society, as well as examinations of specific emotions like pride, jealousy, love, or guilt. Overall, the topic has been approached from a diversity of perspectives, including philosophy, psychology, evolutionary theory, and (...) anthropology. In fact, it’s not uncommon for a single author to assume more than one disciplinary perspective on the features and roles of emotion. (shrink)
Any satisfactory model of the emotions must at once recognize their place within intentional psychology and acknowledge their uniqueness as mental causes. In the first half of the century, the James-Lange model had considerable influence on reinforcing the idea that emotions are non-intentional (see Lange 1885 and James 1890). The uniqueness of emotions was therefore acknowledged at the price of denying them a place within intentional psychology proper. More recently, cognitive reductionists (including identity theorists) like Robert Solomon and Joel Marks (...) recognize that emotions are intentional but, by reducing them to judgments, beliefs, desires, etc., fail to capture their distinctiveness as mental causes (see Solomon 1976 and Marks 1982). In other words, their place within intentional psychology is acknowledged at the price of denying them their uniqueness. (shrink)
Composer, conductor, educator, jazz critic, and horn virtuoso, Gunther Schuller here brings together his writings on music. There are numerous articles about jazz, dealing with his favourite figures like Duke Ellington and Ornette Coleman, and also Schuller's concept of the 'Third Stream', the area where jazz and concert music intersect. Other sections deal with the composition and performance of contemporary music, musical education, and musical aesthetics.
In the BODY WORLDS exhibitions currently touring the United States, Gunther von Hagens displays human cadavers preserved through plastination. Whole bodies are playfully posed and exposed to educate the public. However, the educational aims are ambiguous, and some aspects of the exhibit violate human dignity. In particular, the signature cards attached to the whole-body plastinates that bear the title, the signature of Gunther von Hagens, and the date of creation mark the plastinates as artwork and von Hagens as (...) the artist in a gesture that strips the personal dignity from the donors. I conclude that the educational use of cadavers is compatible with respect for dignity if: 1) the utility of such use is great enough; 2) there are no other ways of achieving these ends; and 3) every effort is made to honor the dignity of the donors. (shrink)
An ongoing debate in the philosophy of emotion concerns the relationship between two prima facie aspects of emotional states. The first is affective: felt and/or motivational. The second, which I call object-identifying, represents whatever the emotion is about or directed towards. “Componentialists” – such as R. S. Lazarus, Jesse Prinz, and Antonio Damasio – assume that an emotion’s object-identifying aspect can have the same representational content as a non-emotional state’s, and that it is psychologically separable or dissociable from the emotion’s (...) affective aspect. Some further hold that emotions have no object-identifying aspects of their own, and can properly be said to be about things only in virtue of their associations with other mental states (such as beliefs or perceptions). By contrast, “blenderists” – such as Peter Goldie, York Gunther, and Matthew Ratcliffe – insist that the two aspects are indissociable, because the affective aspect “infuses” the object-identifying aspect, altering the subject’s concept or percept of the object. As a result, an emotion’s object-identifying aspect cannot possibly have the same representational content as any non-emotional state’s. I argue that the strongest blenderist arguments fail to rule out plausible componentialist alternatives, and that the blenderists’ broader motivations are orthogonal to structural issues. (shrink)
In this 2002 J.F. Lewis Award-winning monograph, Gunther Stent traces the origins and development of the paradoxes of free will in this well-crafted ...
