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Profile: Gurpreet Rattan (University of Toronto)
  1.  19
    Gurpreet Rattan (2016). Are Propositions Mere Measures Of Mind? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3).
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  2.  10
    Gurpreet Rattan (2016). Truth Incorporated. Noûs 50 (2):227-258.
    What is the cognitive value of the concept of truth? What epistemic difference does the concept of truth make to those who grasp it? This paper employs a new perspective for thinking about the concept of truth and recent debates concerning it, organized around the question of the cognitive value of the concept of truth. The paper aims to defend a substantively correct and dialectically optimal account of the cognitive value of the concept of truth. This perspective is employed in (...)
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  3.  21
    Gurpreet Rattan & Åsa Wikforss (2015). Is Understanding Epistemic in Nature? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Is understanding epistemic in nature? Does a correct account of what constitutes understanding of a concept mention epistemological notions such as knowledge, justification or epistemic rationality? We defend the view that understanding is epistemic in nature – we defend epistemological conceptions of understanding. We focus our discussion with a critical evaluation of Tim Williamson's challenges to epistemological conceptions of understanding in The Philosophy of Philosophy. Against Williamson, we distinguish three kinds of epistemological conceptions and argue that Williamson's arguments succeed against (...)
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  4.  35
    Gurpreet Rattan (2014). Epistemological Semantics Beyond Irrationality and Conceptual Change. Journal of Philosophy 111 (12):667-688.
    Quine’s arguments in the final two sections of “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” bring semantic and epistemic concerns into spectacular collision. Many have thought that the arguments succeed in irreparably smashing a conception of a distinctively analytic and a priori philosophy to pieces. In Constructing the World, David Chalmers argues that much of this distinctively analytical and a priori conception of philosophy can be reconstructed, with Quine’s criticisms leaving little lasting damage. I agree with Chalmers that Quine’s arguments do not have (...)
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  5.  79
    Imogen Dickie & Gurpreet Rattan (2010). Sense, Communication, and Rational Engagement. Dialectica 64 (2):131-151.
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  6.  2
    Gurpreet Rattan & Åsa Wikforss (2015). Is Understanding Epistemic in Nature? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Is understanding epistemic in nature? Does a correct account of what constitutes understanding of a concept mention epistemological notions such as knowledge, justification or epistemic rationality? We defend the view that understanding is epistemic in nature – we defend epistemological conceptions of understanding. We focus our discussion with a critical evaluation of Tim Williamson's challenges to epistemological conceptions of understanding in The Philosophy of Philosophy. Against Williamson, we distinguish three kinds of epistemological conceptions and argue that Williamson's arguments succeed against (...)
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  7.  32
    Gurpreet Rattan (2014). Disagreement and the First‐Person Perspective. Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):31-53.
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  8.  18
    David Hunter & Gurpreet Rattan (2014). Introduction. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5-6):515-517.
    (2013). Introduction. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 43, Essays on the Nature of Propositions, pp. 515-517.
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  9.  7
    Gurpreet Rattan (2015). Truth Incorporated. Noûs 50 (1):n/a-n/a.
    What is the cognitive value of the concept of truth? What epistemic difference does the concept of truth make to those who grasp it? This paper employs a new perspective for thinking about the concept of truth and recent debates concerning it, organized around the question of the cognitive value of the concept of truth. The paper aims to defend a substantively correct and dialectically optimal account of the cognitive value of the concept of truth. This perspective is employed in (...)
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  10.  5
    Gurpreet Rattan (2013). On the Sense and Reference of the Concept of Truth. Philosophy 88 (3):433-450.
    This paper analyzes the concept of truth in terms of an account of Fregean sense as cognitive value. The account highlights the importance of understanding-based knowledge of co-reference for the individuation of senses. Explicit truth attributions, like involve an inter-level version of understanding-based knowledge of co-reference in the that-clause concepts of thoughts that they employ: one cannot understand the that-clause concept of the thought in the truth attribution without understanding the thought the that-clause concept is a concept of. This is (...)
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  11. Gurpreet Rattan (2007). The Two Worlds of Deflationism. Journal of Philosophy 104 (12):609-638.
    A structural similarity between deflationism and a certain semantically excessive interpretation of the results of cognitive science is developed. Both views incorporate "two-worlds" accounts of the nature of representation. But two-worlds accounts are committed to what I call quasi-technically “the worst possible theory of truth”. This renders the semantically excessive interpretation committed to the worst possible theory of truth; but it renders deflationism internally inconsistent or incoherent.
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  12.  20
    Gurpreet Rattan (2006). The Knowledge in Language. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):505-521.
    Is knowledge of language a kind of knowledge-that or knowledge-how? Michael Devitt’s Ignorance of Language argues that knowledge of language is a kind of knowledge-how. Devitt’s account of knowledge of language is embedded in a more general account of the nature of language as grounded in thought. The paper argues that Devitt’s view is inconsistent when thought is understood in an externalist or anti-individualist way. A key phenomenon in externalist thought experiments is the possibility of incomplete or mistaken understanding, and (...)
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  13.  10
    Gurpreet Rattan (2010). Metarepresentation and the Cognitive Value of the Concept of Truth. In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan 139--156.
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  14.  1
    Gurpreet Rattan (2016). Are Propositions Mere Measures Of Mind? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1).
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  15.  1
    Gurpreet Rattan & Åsa Wikforss (2015). Is Understanding Epistemic in Nature? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Is understanding epistemic in nature? Does a correct account of what constitutes understanding of a concept mention epistemological notions such as knowledge, justification or epistemic rationality? We defend the view that understanding is epistemic in nature – we defend epistemological conceptions of understanding. We focus our discussion with a critical evaluation of Tim Williamson's challenges to epistemological conceptions of understanding in The Philosophy of Philosophy. Against Williamson, we distinguish three kinds of epistemological conceptions and argue that Williamson's arguments succeed against (...)
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  16.  1
    Gurpreet Rattan & Åsa Wikforss (2015). Is Understanding Epistemic in Nature? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Is understanding epistemic in nature? Does a correct account of what constitutes understanding of a concept mention epistemological notions such as knowledge, justification or epistemic rationality? We defend the view that understanding is epistemic in nature – we defend epistemological conceptions of understanding. We focus our discussion with a critical evaluation of Tim Williamson's challenges to epistemological conceptions of understanding in The Philosophy of Philosophy. Against Williamson, we distinguish three kinds of epistemological conceptions and argue that Williamson's arguments succeed against (...)
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  17.  1
    Gurpreet Rattan & Åsa Wikforss (2015). Is Understanding Epistemic in Nature? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Is understanding epistemic in nature? Does a correct account of what constitutes understanding of a concept mention epistemological notions such as knowledge, justification or epistemic rationality? We defend the view that understanding is epistemic in nature – we defend epistemological conceptions of understanding. We focus our discussion with a critical evaluation of Tim Williamson's challenges to epistemological conceptions of understanding in The Philosophy of Philosophy. Against Williamson, we distinguish three kinds of epistemological conceptions and argue that Williamson's arguments succeed against (...)
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  18.  15
    Gurpreet Rattan (2001). Prospects for a Contemporary Republicanism. The Monist 84 (1):113-130.
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  19.  70
    Gurpreet Rattan (2010). Indeterminacy, a Priority, and Analyticity in the Quinean Critique. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):203-226.
    : Significant issues remain for understanding and evaluating the Quinean critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction. These issues are highlighted in a puzzling mismatch between the common philosophical attitude toward the critique and its broader intellectual legacy. A discussion of this mismatch sets the larger context for criticism of a recent tradition of interpretation of the critique. I argue that this tradition confuses the roles and relative importance of indeterminacy, a priority, and analyticity in the Quinean critique.
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  20.  10
    Gurpreet Rattan (2010). Intellect and Concept. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5 (1).
    The connections between theories of concepts and issues of knowledge and epistemic normativity are complex and controversial. According to the general, broadly Fregean, view that stands in the background of this paper, these connections are taken not only to exist, but also to be fundamental to issues about the individuation of concepts. This kind of view fleshed out should clarify the nature and role of epistemic norms, and of different kinds of epistemic norms, in concept individuation. This paper takes up (...)
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  21.  34
    Gurpreet S. Rattan (2004). The Theory of Truth in the Theory of Meaning. European Journal of Philosophy 12 (2):214–243.
    The connection between theories of truth and meaning is explored. Theories of truth and meaning are connected in a way such that differences in the conception of what it is for a sentence to be true are engendered by differences in the conception of how meanings depend on each other, and on a base of underlying facts. It is argued that this view is common ground between Davidson and Dummett, and that their dispute over realism is really a dispute in (...)
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  22.  31
    Gurpreet Rattan (2008). On the Value and Nature of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Research 33:235-251.
    The thought that truth is valuable for its own sake is obvious, yet difficult to explicate in a precise and vindicating way. The paper tries to explicate and vindicate this thought with an argument for the conclusion that truth is an epistemic value. Truth is an epistemic value in the sense that a commitment to the value of truth plays a role in the justification and explanation of a fundamental aspect of our epistemic practice, namely, critical reflection. The paper also (...)
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  23.  20
    Gurpreet Rattan (2002). Tacit Knowledge of Grammar: A Reply to Knowles. Philosophical Psychology 15 (2):135 – 154.
    I defend the non-cognitivist outlook on knowledge of grammar from the criticisms levelled against it by Jonathan Knowles. The first part of the paper is largely critical. First, I argue that Knowles's argument against Christopher Peacocke and Martin Davies's non-cognitivist account of the psychological reality of grammar fails, and thus that no reason has been given to think that cognitivism is integral to an understanding of Chomskyan theoretical linguistics. Second, I argue that cognitivism is philosophically problematic. In particular, I argue (...)
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  24. David Hunter & Gurpreet Rattan (eds.) (2015). New Essays on the Nature of Propositions. Routledge.
    These are exciting times for philosophical theorizing about propositions, with the last 15 years seeing the development of new approaches and the emergence of new theorists. Propositions have been invoked to explain thought and cognition, the nature and attribution of mental states, language and communication, and in philosophical treatments of truth, necessity and possibility. According to Frege and Russell, and their followers, propositions are structured mind- and language-independent abstract objects which have essential and intrinsic truth-conditions. Some recent theorizing doubts whether (...)
     
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  25. Gurpreet Rattan (2009). Intellect and Concept. Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5 (1).
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  26. Gurpreet Rattan & Åsa Wikforss (2015). Is Understanding Epistemic in Nature? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Is understanding epistemic in nature? Does a correct account of what constitutes understanding of a concept mention epistemological notions such as knowledge, justification or epistemic rationality? We defend the view that understanding is epistemic in nature – we defend epistemological conceptions of understanding. We focus our discussion with a critical evaluation of Tim Williamson's challenges to epistemological conceptions of understanding in The Philosophy of Philosophy. Against Williamson, we distinguish three kinds of epistemological conceptions and argue that Williamson's arguments succeed against (...)
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  27. Gurpreet Rattan & Åsa Wikforss (2015). Is Understanding Epistemic in Nature? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Is understanding epistemic in nature? Does a correct account of what constitutes understanding of a concept mention epistemological notions such as knowledge, justification or epistemic rationality? We defend the view that understanding is epistemic in nature – we defend epistemological conceptions of understanding. We focus our discussion with a critical evaluation of Tim Williamson's challenges to epistemological conceptions of understanding in The Philosophy of Philosophy. Against Williamson, we distinguish three kinds of epistemological conceptions and argue that Williamson's arguments succeed against (...)
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  28. Gurpreet Rattan & Åsa Wikforss (2015). Is Understanding Epistemic in Nature? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Is understanding epistemic in nature? Does a correct account of what constitutes understanding of a concept mention epistemological notions such as knowledge, justification or epistemic rationality? We defend the view that understanding is epistemic in nature – we defend epistemological conceptions of understanding. We focus our discussion with a critical evaluation of Tim Williamson's challenges to epistemological conceptions of understanding in The Philosophy of Philosophy. Against Williamson, we distinguish three kinds of epistemological conceptions and argue that Williamson's arguments succeed against (...)
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  29. Gurpreet Rattan & Åsa Wikforss (2015). Is Understanding Epistemic in Nature? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Is understanding epistemic in nature? Does a correct account of what constitutes understanding of a concept mention epistemological notions such as knowledge, justification or epistemic rationality? We defend the view that understanding is epistemic in nature – we defend epistemological conceptions of understanding. We focus our discussion with a critical evaluation of Tim Williamson's challenges to epistemological conceptions of understanding in The Philosophy of Philosophy. Against Williamson, we distinguish three kinds of epistemological conceptions and argue that Williamson's arguments succeed against (...)
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  30. Gurpreet Rattan & Åsa Wikforss (2015). Is Understanding Epistemic in Nature? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Is understanding epistemic in nature? Does a correct account of what constitutes understanding of a concept mention epistemological notions such as knowledge, justification or epistemic rationality? We defend the view that understanding is epistemic in nature – we defend epistemological conceptions of understanding. We focus our discussion with a critical evaluation of Tim Williamson's challenges to epistemological conceptions of understanding in The Philosophy of Philosophy. Against Williamson, we distinguish three kinds of epistemological conceptions and argue that Williamson's arguments succeed against (...)
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  31. Gurpreet Rattan & Åsa Wikforss (2015). Is Understanding Epistemic in Nature? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Is understanding epistemic in nature? Does a correct account of what constitutes understanding of a concept mention epistemological notions such as knowledge, justification or epistemic rationality? We defend the view that understanding is epistemic in nature – we defend epistemological conceptions of understanding. We focus our discussion with a critical evaluation of Tim Williamson's challenges to epistemological conceptions of understanding in The Philosophy of Philosophy. Against Williamson, we distinguish three kinds of epistemological conceptions and argue that Williamson's arguments succeed against (...)
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  32. Gurpreet Rattan & Åsa Wikforss (2015). Is Understanding Epistemic in Nature? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Is understanding epistemic in nature? Does a correct account of what constitutes understanding of a concept mention epistemological notions such as knowledge, justification or epistemic rationality? We defend the view that understanding is epistemic in nature – we defend epistemological conceptions of understanding. We focus our discussion with a critical evaluation of Tim Williamson's challenges to epistemological conceptions of understanding in The Philosophy of Philosophy. Against Williamson, we distinguish three kinds of epistemological conceptions and argue that Williamson's arguments succeed against (...)
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  33. Gurpreet Rattan & Åsa Wikforss (2015). Is Understanding Epistemic in Nature? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Is understanding epistemic in nature? Does a correct account of what constitutes understanding of a concept mention epistemological notions such as knowledge, justification or epistemic rationality? We defend the view that understanding is epistemic in nature – we defend epistemological conceptions of understanding. We focus our discussion with a critical evaluation of Tim Williamson's challenges to epistemological conceptions of understanding in The Philosophy of Philosophy. Against Williamson, we distinguish three kinds of epistemological conceptions and argue that Williamson's arguments succeed against (...)
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  34. Gurpreet Rattan & Åsa Wikforss (2015). Is Understanding Epistemic in Nature? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Is understanding epistemic in nature? Does a correct account of what constitutes understanding of a concept mention epistemological notions such as knowledge, justification or epistemic rationality? We defend the view that understanding is epistemic in nature – we defend epistemological conceptions of understanding. We focus our discussion with a critical evaluation of Tim Williamson's challenges to epistemological conceptions of understanding in The Philosophy of Philosophy. Against Williamson, we distinguish three kinds of epistemological conceptions and argue that Williamson's arguments succeed against (...)
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  35. Gurpreet Rattan & Åsa Wikforss (2015). Is Understanding Epistemic in Nature? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    Is understanding epistemic in nature? Does a correct account of what constitutes understanding of a concept mention epistemological notions such as knowledge, justification or epistemic rationality? We defend the view that understanding is epistemic in nature – we defend epistemological conceptions of understanding. We focus our discussion with a critical evaluation of Tim Williamson's challenges to epistemological conceptions of understanding in The Philosophy of Philosophy. Against Williamson, we distinguish three kinds of epistemological conceptions and argue that Williamson's arguments succeed against (...)
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  36. Gurpreet Rattan & Åsa Wikforss (2015). Is Understanding Epistemic in Nature? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Is understanding epistemic in nature? Does a correct account of what constitutes understanding of a concept mention epistemological notions such as knowledge, justification or epistemic rationality? We defend the view that understanding is epistemic in nature – we defend epistemological conceptions of understanding. We focus our discussion with a critical evaluation of Tim Williamson's challenges to epistemological conceptions of understanding in The Philosophy of Philosophy. Against Williamson, we distinguish three kinds of epistemological conceptions and argue that Williamson's arguments succeed against (...)
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