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Profile: Guy Fletcher (University of Edinburgh)
  1. Guy Fletcher (2013). A Fresh Start for the Objective-List Theory of Well-Being. Utilitas 25 (2):206-220.
    So-called theories of well-being (prudential value, welfare) are under-represented in discussions of well-being. I do four things in this article to redress this. First, I develop a new taxonomy of theories of well-being, one that divides theories in a more subtle and illuminating way. Second, I use this taxonomy to undermine some misconceptions that have made people reluctant to hold objective-list theories. Third, I provide a new objective-list theory and show that it captures a powerful motivation for the main competitor (...)
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  2. Guy Fletcher (2013). A Millian Objection to Reasons as Evidence. Utilitas 25 (3):417-420.
  3. Guy Fletcher (2012). Resisting Buck-Passing Accounts of Prudential Value. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):77-91.
    This paper aims to cast doubt upon a certain way of analysing prudential value (or good for ), namely in the manner of a ‘buck-passing’ analysis. It begins by explaining why we should be interested in analyses of good for and the nature of buck-passing analyses generally (§I). It moves on to considering and rejecting two sets of buck-passing analyses. The first are analyses that are likely to be suggested by those attracted to the idea of analysing good for in (...)
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  4. Guy Fletcher (2012). The Locative Analysis of Good For Formulated and Defended. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (JESP) 6 (1).
    THE STRUCTURE OF THIS PAPER IS AS FOLLOWS. I begin §1 by dealing with preliminary issues such as the different relations expressed by the “good for” locution. I then (§2) outline the Locative Analysis of good for and explain its main elements before moving on to (§3) outlining and discussing the positive features of the view. In the subsequent sections I show how the Locative Analysis can respond to objections from, or inspired by, Sumner (§4-5), Regan (§6), and Schroeder and (...)
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  5. Guy Fletcher (2011). Review of Ben Eggleston, Dale Miller & David Weinstein (Eds.), John Stuart Mill and the Art of Life. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  6. Guy Fletcher (2010). Brown and Moore's Value Invariabilism Vs Dancy's Variabilism. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):162-168.
    Campbell Brown has recently argued that G.E. Moore's intrinsic value holism is superior to Jonathan Dancy's. I show that the advantage which Brown claims for Moore's view over Dancy's is illusory, and that Dancy's view may be superior.
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  7. Guy Fletcher (2010). Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication – Rachel Cohon. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241):861-863.
  8. Guy Fletcher (2009). On Hatzimoysis on Sentimental Value. Philosophia 37 (1):149-152.
    Despite its apparent ubiquity, philosophers have not talked much about sentimental value. One exception is Anthony Hatzimoysis (The Philosophical Quarterly 53:373–379, 2003). Those who wish to take sentimental value seriously are likely to make use of Christine Korsgaard’s ideas on two distinctions in value. In this paper I show that Hatzimoysis has misrendered Korsgaard’s insight in his discussion of sentimental value. I begin by briefly summarising Korsgaard’s idea before showing how Hatzimoysis’ treatment of it is mistaken.
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  9. Guy Fletcher (2009). Review of Richard Kraut’s What is Good And Why: The Ethics of Well-Being. [REVIEW] Analysis 69 (3):576-8.
  10. Guy Fletcher (2009). Rejecting Well-Being Invariabilism. Philosophical Papers 38 (1):21-34.
    This paper is an attempt to undermine a basic assumption of theories of well-being, one that I call well-being invariabilism. I argue that much of what makes existing theories of well-being inadequate stems from the invariabilist assumption. After distinguishing and explaining well-being invariabilism and well-being variabilism, I show that the most widely-held theories of well-being—hedonism, desire-satisfaction, and pluralist objective-list theories—presuppose invariabilism and that a large class of the objections to them arise because of it. My aim is to show that (...)
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  11. Guy Fletcher (2009). Sentimental Value. Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (1):55-65.
  12. Guy Fletcher (2009). Uneasy Companions. Ratio 22 (3):359-368.
  13. Guy Fletcher (2008). 'Mill, Moore, and Intrinsic Value'. Social Theory and Practice 34 (4):517-32.
    In this paper, I examine how philosophers before and after G. E. Moore understood intrinsic value. The main idea I wish to bring out and defend is that Moore was insufficiently attentive to how distinctive his conception of intrinsic value was, as compared with those of the writers he discussed, and that such inattentiveness skewed his understanding of the positions of others that he discussed and dismissed. My way into this issue is by examining the charge of inconsistency that Moore (...)
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  14. Guy Fletcher (2008). The Consistency of Qualitative Hedonism and the Value of (at Least Some) Malicious Pleasures. Utilitas 20 (4):462-471.
    In this article, I examine two of the standard objections to forms of value hedonism. The first is the common claim, most famously made by Bradley and Moore, that Mill's qualitative hedonism is inconsistent. The second is the apparent problem for quantitative hedonism in dealing with malicious pleasures. I argue that qualitative hedonism is consistent, even if it is implausible on other grounds. I then go on to show how our intuitions about malicious pleasure might be misleading.
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  15. Brad Hooker & Guy Fletcher (2008). Variable Versus Fixed-Rate Rule-Utilitarianism. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):344–352.
    Fixed-rate versions of rule-consequentialism and rule-utilitarianism evaluate rules in terms of the expected net value of one particular level of social acceptance, but one far enough below 100% social acceptance to make salient the complexities created by partial compliance. Variable-rate versions of rule-consequentialism and rule-utilitarianism instead evaluate rules in terms of their expected net value at all different levels of social acceptance. Brad Hooker has advocated a fixed-rate version. Michael Ridge has argued that the variable-rate version is better. The debate (...)
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  16. Guy Fletcher (2007). Wrongness, Welfarism and Evolution: Crisp on Reasons and the Good. Ratio 20 (3):341–347.