El filósofo francés Alain Guy (La Rochelle, 1918 - Narbonne, 1998) dedicó por entero su vida al estudio de la filosofía española e hispanoamericana, dándola a conocer no sólo en el extranjero sino también en nuestro país.
In the past, notions of embodiment have been applied to robotics mainly in the realm of very simple robots, and supporting low-level mechanisms such as dynamics and navigation. In contrast, most human-like, interactive, and socially adept robotic systems turn away from embodiment and use amodal, symbolic, and modular approaches to cognition and interaction. At the same time, recent research in Embodied Cognition (EC) is spanning an increasing number of complex cognitive processes, including language, nonverbal communication, learning, and social behavior. This (...) article suggests adopting a modern EC approach for autonomous robots interacting with humans. In particular, we present three core principles from EC that may be applicable to such robots: (a) modal perceptual representation, (b) action/perception and action/cognition integration, and (c) a simulation-based model of top-down perceptual biasing. We describe a computational framework based on these principles, and its implementation on two physical robots. This could provide a new paradigm for embodied human–robot interaction based on recent psychological and neurological findings. (shrink)
This is a collection of Paul Hoffman's wide-ranging essays on Descartes composed over the past twenty-five years. The essays in Part I include his celebrated "The Unity of Descartes' Man," in which he argues that Descartes accepts the Aristotelian view that soul and body are related as form to matter and that the human being is a substance; a series of subsequent essays elaborating on this interpretation and defending it against objections; and an essay on Descartes' theory of distinction. (...) In the essays in Part II he argues that Descartes retains the Aristotelian theory of causation according to which an agent's action is the same as the passion it brings about, and explains the significance of this doctrine for understanding Descartes' dualism and physics. In the essays in Part III he argues that Descartes accepts the Aristotelian theory of cognition according to which perception is possible because things that exist in the world are also capable of a different way of existing in the soul, and he shows how this theory figures in Descartes' account of misrepresentation and in the controversy over whether Descartes is a direct realist or a representationalist. The essays in Part IV examine Descartes' theory of the passions of the soul: their definition; their effect on our happiness, virtue, and freedom; and methods of controlling them. (shrink)
The paper focuses on an online business ethics course that three professors (Painter-Morland, Fontrodona and Hoffman) taught together, and in which the fourth author (Rowe) participated as a student, from their respective locations on three continents. The course was conducted using Centra software, which allowed for synchronous online interaction. The class included students from Europe, South Africa and the United States. In order to assess the value of synchronous online teaching for ethics training, the paper identifies certain knowledge, skills (...) and capacities that are crucial to the moral development process within individuals. The paper argues that the online teaching method succeeds in creating an environment within which important ethical knowledge and skills might be developed. It provides an in-depth reflection on the advantages and dis-advantages of online teaching and proposes improvements on the way forward. One of the major advantages relates to its ability to facilitate cross-cultural discussion and debate on ethical issues and foster insight into contextual influences on ethics management within an international arena. (shrink)
Following on the arguments adumbrated in his previous works, Piotr Hoffman here argues that the notion of and concern with violence are not limited to political philosophy but in fact form the essential component of philosophy in general. The acute awareness of the ever-present possibility of violence, Hoffman claims, filters into and informs ontology and epistemology in ways that require careful analysis. In his previous book, Doubt, Time, Violence , Hoffman explored the theme of violence in relation (...) to Descartes' problematic of doubt and Heidegger's work on temporality. The pivotal notion deriving from that investigation is the notion of the other as the ultimate limit of one's powers. In effect, Hoffman argues, our practical mastery of the natural environment still leaves intact the limitation of human agents by each other. In a violent environment, the other emerges as an insurmountable obstacle to one's aims and purposes or as an inescapable danger which one is powerless to hold at bay. The other is thus the focus of an ultimate resistance to one's powers. The special status of the other, as Hoffman articulates it, is at the root of several key notions around which modern philosophy has built its problematic. Arguing here that when the theme of violence is taken into account many conceptual tensions and puzzles receive satisfying solutions, Hoffman traces the theme through the issue of things versus properties; through Kant's treatment of causality, necessity, and freedom in the Critique of Pure Reason; and through the early parts of Hegel's Logic. The result is a complete reorientation and reinterpretation of these important texts. Violence in Modern Philosophy offers patient and careful textual clarification in light of Hoffman's central thesis regarding the other as ultimate limit. With a high level of originality, he shows that the theme of violence is the hidden impulse behind much of modern philosophy. Hoffman's unique stress on the constitutive importance of violence also offers a challenge to the dominant "compatibilist" tradition in moral and political theory. Of great interest to all philosophers, this work will also provide fresh insights to anthropologists and all those in the social sciences and humanities who occupy themselves with the general theory of culture. (shrink)
The claim that empathy is both automatic and representational is criticized as follows: (a) five empathy-arousing processes ranging from conditioning and mimicry to prospective-taking show that empathy can be either automatic or representational, and only under certain circumstances, both; (b) although automaticity decreases, empathy increases with age and cognitive development; (c) observers' causal attributions can shift rapidly and produce more complex empathic responses than the theory allows.
In his book Liberty Worth the Nd?72€,1 Gideon Yaffe has provided an interpretation of Lock:-z's account of moral responsibility according to which it bears important affinities with the views of contemporary theorists Harry lirankfurt and Susan Wolf. On Yaffe’s reading, Locke, like Frankfurt and Wolf separates moral responsibility from the ability to have acted otherwise; like Wolf, Locke associates freedom with the dependency ofone’s choices on the good. I am going to argue that Yaffe’s interpretation of the key passages underlying (...) his interpretation is suspect. We get a very different perspective in trying to interpret the points Locke is trying to make if instead of looking forward to Frankfurt and Wolf we look backward to Aquinas. The first part of this paper will be concerned with an investi~ gation of Loclshrink)
This paper examines an often-ignored aspect of the evaluation of metaphysical analyses, namely, their ontological commitments. Such evaluations are part of metaphysical methodology, and reflection on this methodology is itself part of metametaphysics. I will develop a theory for assessing what these commitments are, and then I will apply it to an important historical and an important contemporary metaphysical analysis of the concept of an individual substance (i.e., an object, or thing). I claim that in evaluating metaphysical analyses, we should (...) not only rule out counterexamples, but also compare them with respect to their ontological commitments, and we should hold that if they are comparable in other respects, then an analysis with fewer such commitments is preferable to one with more (There is, of course, a connection between counterexamples and ontological commitments. If the existence or possible existence of something one is committed to the existence or possible existence of is incompatible with an analysis, then one should reject that analysis as inadequate to the data. On the other hand, if one is uncertain about the existence or possible existence of something that is incompatible with an analysis, then while this does not refute the analysis for one, it raises doubts about it. The fewer such doubts are raised by an analysis, the better it is.). (shrink)
Substance: Its Nature and Existence investigates the very nature and existence of individual substances, including both living things and inanimate objects. It provides an accessible introduction to the history and contemporary debates of this important and often complex issue. Starting with a critical survey of the main historical attempts by Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke and Hume to provide an analysis of substance, the authors present the view that a substance must satisfy an independence condition which could not be satisfied by (...) an insubstantial entity. Throughout the book, the authors also consider problems for the notion of substance raised by the unity of the parts of organisms and explore the problem of how we can actually know what kinds of physical substance there are. (shrink)
In his What is Business Ethics? Peter Drucker accuses business ethics of singling out business unfairly for special ethical treatment, of subordinating ethical to political concerns, and of being, not ethics at all, but ethical chic. We contend that Drucker's denunciation of business ethics rests upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the field. This article is a response to his charges and an effort to clarify the nature, scope and purpose of business ethics.
ne of the leading problems for Cartesian dualism is to provide an account of the union of mind and body. This problem is often construed to be one of explaining how thinking things and extended things can causally interact. That is, it needs to be explained how thoughts in the mind can produce motions in the body and how motions in the body can produce sensations, appetites, and emotions in the mind. The conclusion often drawn, as it was by three (...) of Descartes's illustrious successors, Malebranche, Spinoza, and Leibniz, is that mind and body cannot causally interact.' I mention this problem of the interaction between thinking things and extended things only to distinguish it from the problem concerning the union of mind and body which I wish to discuss. Some commentators, such as Daisie Radner, maintain that the.. (shrink)
From the early to mid-1970s, Michel Foucault posited that power consists of a relation rather than a substance and that this relation is comprised of unequal forces engaged in a warlike struggle against each other, resulting invariably in the domination of some forces over others. This understanding of power, which he retrospectively dubbed `Nietzsche's hypothesis' and `the model of war', underpinned his well-known analyses of disciplinary power. Yet, Foucault in his Collège de France course from the academic year 1975-6, (...) `Society Must Be Defended', suddenly began to call into question this understanding and his doubts about it did not abate well into the late 1970s. In this article, we suggest that his militant politics in the early 1970s sustained his adherence to the war model and that his more cautious political attitude later in the decade underpinned his suspicions about this model. Key Words: biopolitics Henri de Boulainvilliers Michel Foucault Thomas Hobbes militancy F. W. Nietzsche politics power race war. (shrink)
Despite substantial efforts by many researchers, we still have no scientific theory of how brain activity can create or be con- scious experience. This is troubling since we have a large body of correlations between brain activity and consciousness, correlations normally assumed to entail that brain activity creates conscious experience. Here I explore a solution to the mind-body problem that starts with the converse assumption: these correlations arise because consciousness creates brain activity and indeed creates all objects and properties of (...) the physical world To this end, I develop two theses. The multimodal user interface theory of perception states that perceptual experiences do not match or approximate properties of the objective world but instead provide a simplified species-specific, user interface to that world Conscious realism states that the objective world consists of conscious agents and their experiences; these can be mathematically modeled and em- pirically explored in the normal scientific manner. (shrink)
Can absolute freedom of will be defended by arguing that apparent cases of diminished freedom when we act out of passion are cases of weakness of will? Rogers Albritton thought so. What is intriguing about Albritton's view is that he thought when we act from desire we are making choices, yet our desires are not functioning as reasons for those choices. So our desires must be influencing our choices in some other unspecified way that does not diminish our freedom. I (...) challenge the coherence of this position. My strategy is to examine the views of leading theorists of the will – Descartes, Aquinas and Reid – to argue that the only clear way in which passions can influence our choices so that we can accurately be described as weak-willed and yet nevertheless free is that our passions influence our choices by providing reasons for them. (shrink)
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 15, 2007, pp. 561-567. (Author Posting. (c) Taylor & Francis, 2007. It is posted here by permission of Taylor & Francis for personal use, not for redistribution.).
Was Heidegger a 'realist' or an 'idealist'? The issue has been and continues to be hotly debated in Heidegger scholarship. Here it is argued that the much more desirable realistic interpretation of Heidegger can be sustained, provided his theory of moods is given its due. Moods, I argue, are not only 'equiprimordial' with Dasein's understanding of being, but are also irreducible to the latter. It is often held - correctly, as it seems to the author - that Heidegger's idealism is (...) all but inevitable if Dasein's awareness of entities is grounded only in Dasein's understanding of being. But in Being and Time Heidegger speaks also of how what there is is 'disclosed moodwise'. The essay closely analyzes this specifically moody mode of disclosure, and shows both its autonomy vis-à-vis the understanding of being and its function of securing, for Dasein, an access to a truly independent reality. (shrink)
This paper is about different types of silence, and about differing processes of philosophical investigation and sagely illumination. It is argued that the sagely Dao of wu wei leads to silence in the sense of no spoken words, and the philosophical way of proof leads to silence in the sense of no spoken words. So both proof and wu wei both lead to silence in the sense of no spoken words. Accordingly there is a type of silence that results from (...) the explosive process of philosophical argumentation and reduction to no spoken words because of undecidability, and there is also a type of silence that results from the implosive process of sagely silence and reversion to silent illumination with no spoken words. However, the silence of explosion and the silence of implosion differ as regards processes of reduction and reversion respectively. Therefore, proof and wu wei both lead to silence in the sense of no spoken words, but the type of silence resulting from the explosive process of philosophical argumentation and reduction to no spoken words because of undecidability and the type of silence resulting from the implosive process of sagely silence and reversion to silent illumination because of the incommunicability of Dao differ. (shrink)
Recent models in quantum cosmology make use of the concept of imaginary time. These models all conjecture a join between regions of imaginary time and regions of real time. We examine the model of James Hartle and Stephen Hawking to argue that the various no-boundary attempts to interpret the transition from imaginary to real time in a logically consistent and physically significant way all fail. We believe this conclusion also applies to quantum tunneling models, such as that proposed by Alexander (...) Vilenkin. We conclude, therefore, that the notion of emerging from imaginary time is incoherent. A consequence of this conclusion seems to be that the whole class of cosmological models appealing to imaginary time is thereby refuted. (shrink)
There is a sense in which antidepressants are feminist drugs, liberating and empowering …A lot of things have been said about Prozac.1 We have been instructed both to "listen" and to "talk back" to Prozac (Kramer 1993; Breggin 1994), Prozac has been called a wonder drug (Schumer 1989; Cowley 1990), it has been described as capable of dramatically changing selves and dramatically changing our conception of what a self is (Kramer 1993), it has been accused of dulling our artistic drive (...) (Berlin 2008), of diminishing our authenticity (Elliott 2000) and has been called a modern-day Soma, à la Brave New World (Weisberger 1995, 72; PCBE 2003, 258). It has also been called a "feminist drug." It is this last claim that we .. (shrink)
Burgess and Rosen argue that Yablo’s figuralist account of mathematics fails because it says mathematical claims are really only metaphorical. They suggest Yablo’s view is implausible as an account of what mathematicians say and confused about literal language. I show their argument isn’t decisive, briefly exploring some questions in the philosophy of language it raises, and argue Yablo’s view may be amended to a kind of revolutionary fictionalism not refuted by Burgess and Rosen.
This book revives a neglected but important topic in philosophy: the nature of substance. The belief that there are individual substances, for example, material objects and persons, is at the core of our common-sense view of the world yet many metaphysicians deny the very coherence of the concept of substance. The authors develop a novel account of what an individual substance is in terms of independence from other beings. In the process many other important ontological categories are explored: property, event, (...) space, time. The authors show why alternative theories of substance fail, and go on to defend the intelligibility (though not the existence) of interacting spiritual and material substances. (shrink)
This paper explores some interconnections between the business and environmental ethics movements. The first section argues that business has obligations to protect the environment over and above what is required by environmental law and that it should cooperate and interact with government in establishing environmental regulation. Business must develop and demonstrate environmental moral leadership. The second section exposes the danger of using the rationale of "good ethics is good business" as a basis for such business moral leadership in both the (...) business and environmental ethics movements. The third section cautions against the moral shallowness inherent in the position or in the promotional strategy of ecological homocentrism which claims that society, including business, ought to protect the environment solely because of harm done to human beings and human interests. This paper urges business and environmental ethicists to promote broader and deeper moral perspectives than ones based on mere self-interest or human interest. Otherwise both movements will come up ethically short. (shrink)
At the beginning of this essay I sketch a solution to the question of how we can predicate moral properties, such as moral excellence, to the corporation. This solution suggests that there are at least two necessary criteria for corporate moral excellence: (1) a moral corporate culture and (2) the moral autonomy of the individual within the corporate culture. I put forward guidelines for the development of both and argue for their necessary interdependence.
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This paper investigates how deans and directors at the top 50 global MBA programs (as rated by the "Financial Times" in their 2006 Global MBA rankings) respond to questions about the inclusion and coverage of the topics of ethics, corporate social responsibility, and sustainability at their respective institutions. This work purposely investigates each of the three topics separately. Our findings reveal that: (1) a majority of the schools require that one or more of these topics be covered in their MBA (...) curriculum and one-third of the schools require coverage of all three topics as part of the MBA curriculum, (2) there is a trend toward the inclusion of sustainability-related courses, (3) there is a higher percentage of student interest in these topics (as measured by the presence of a Net Impact club) in the top 10 schools, and (4) several schools are teaching these topics using experiential learning and immersion techniques. We note a fivefold increase in the number of stand-alone ethics courses since a 1988 investigation on ethics, and we include other findings about institutional support of centers or special programs; as well as a discussion of integration, teaching techniques, and notable practices in relation to all three topics. (shrink)
The commentary is in general agreement with Roger Shepard's view of evolutionary internalization of certain procedural memories, but advocates the use of Lie groups to express the invariances of motion and color perception involved. For categorization, the dialectical pair is suggested. [Barlow; Hecht; Kubovy & Epstein; Schwartz; Shepard; Todorovic].
In this paper we consider whether one type of individual investor, which we call at risk investors, should be denied access to securities markets to prevent them from suffering serious financial harm. We consider one kind of paternalistic justification for prohibiting at risk investors from participating in securities markets, and argue that it is not successful. We then argue that restricting access to markets is justified in some circumstances to protect the rights of at risk investors. We conclude with some (...) suggestions about how this might be done. (shrink)
Aquinas maintains that when we succumb to temptation our actions are wholly voluntary. When we give up a good in the face of a threat our actions are partly involuntary, but they are more voluntary than involuntary. I argue that when we succumb to temptation our actions can also be partly involuntary. I also defend my intuition that in some mixed cases our action is more involuntary than voluntary, and I show how Aquinas’s psychological theory can explain this. Finally, I (...) explain why it matters that actions fully in accordance with our reasonsresponsive choices might not be fully voluntary. (shrink)
This paper outlines and argues against some criticisms of business ethics education. It maintains that these criticisms have been put forward due to a misunderstanding of the nature of business and/or ethics. Business ethics seeks a meaningful reciprocity among economic, social and moral concerns. This demands that business organizations autonomously develop ethical goals from within, which in turn demands a reciprocity between ethical theory and practical experience. Working toward such a reciprocity, the ultimate goal of business ethics education is a (...) moral business point of view through which one can live with integrity and fulfillment. (shrink)
The thesis of this paper is that the question of whether and how statements of the form 'p and not-p' can have religious meaning in Buddhism can be answered in the affirmative and how in terms of a movement from pre-meditative to meditative state to a post-meditative state in life. The paper focuses on the Diamond Sutra in light of Shigenori Nagatomo's study (Asian Philosophy Vol. 10, No. 3, 2000) and advances an additional line of inquiry. This view emphasises the (...) process in the meditation learning curve from pre-meditative to meditative to post-meditative states that provides the personal religious significance (but not ordinary factual meaning) when the phrase 'A is not A, therefore it is A' is used in the Diamond Sutra. (shrink)
: Thomas Reid uses the notion of exertion in various ways that have not been distinguished in the secondary literature. Sometimes he uses it to refer to the exercise of a capacity or power, sometimes to the turning on or activitating of a capacity or power, and still other times to the attempt to activate a capacity or power. Getting clear on Reid's different uses of the term 'exertion' is essential to understanding his account of the sequence of events in (...) human action. It is also helpful in defending Reid against the objection that his account of action is subject to an infinite regress. (shrink)
This paper concerns Hume?s treatment of the distinction of reason in the Treatise, I.i.7. Many scholars have claimed that there is a tension between his account of the distinction of reason and his commitment to his so-called separability principle. I explain why Hume?s account of the distinction of reason is fully consistent with the principle, and show how other discussions, both critical of and sympathetic to Hume, fail to appreciate the radicalness of his position. I evaluate Hume?s bold position and (...) compare it to earlier positions (Aquinas) and current positions (Donald Davidson). (shrink)
This book brings together emerging perspectives from organization theory and management, environmental sociology, international regime studies, and the social studies of science and technology to provide a starting point for discipline-based studies of environmental policy and corporate environmental behavior. Reflecting the book’s theoretical and empirical focus, the audience is two-fold: organizational scholars working within the institutional tradition, and environmental scholars interested in management and policy. Together this mix forms a creative synthesis for both sets of readers, analyzing how environmental policy (...) and organizational practices are shaped, spread and contested. (shrink)
Kitcher urges us to think of mathematics as an idealized science of human operations, rather than a theory describing abstract mathematical objects. I argue that Kitcher's invocation of idealization cannot save mathematical truth and avoid platonism. Nevertheless, what is left of Kitcher's view is worth holding onto. I propose that Kitcher's account should be fictionalized, making use of Walton's and Currie's make-believe theory of fiction, and argue that the resulting ideal-agent fictionalism has advantages over mathematical-object fictionalism.
: Protection of human subjects from investigators' conflicts of interest is critical to the integrity of clinical investigation. Personal financial conflicts of interest are addressed by university policies, professional society guidelines, publication standards, and government regulation, but "intrinsic conflicts of interest"—conflicts of interest inherent in all clinical research—have received relatively less attention. Such conflicts arise in all clinical research endeavors as a result of the tension among professionals' responsibilities to their research and to their patients and both academic and financial (...) incentives. These conflicts should be disclosed to research subjects and managed as assiduously as are financial conflicts of interest. (shrink)
Vision scientists standardly assume that the goal of vision is to recover properties of the external world. Lehar's “miniature, virtual-reality replica of the external world inside our head” (target article, sect. 10) is an example of this assumption. I propose instead, on evolutionary grounds, that the goal of vision is simply to provide a useful user interface to the external world.
Recent studies have shown that Einstein did not write the EPR paper and that he was disappointed with the outcome. He thought, rightly, that his own argument for the incompleteness of quantum theory was badly presented in the paper. We reconstruct the argument of EPR, indicate the reasons Einstein was dissatisfied with it, and discuss Einstein's own argument. We show that many commentators have been misled by the obscurity of EPR into proposing interpretations of its argument that do not accurately (...) represent Einstein's own views. Finally, we evaluate Einstein's own incompleteness argument, concluding that recent experimental findings have likely shown it to be unsound. (shrink)
This study tested the hypothesis that overt rehearsal is sufficient to explain enhanced memory associated with emotion by experimentally manipulating rehearsal of emotional material. Participants viewed two sets of film clips, one set of emotional films and one set of relatively neutral films. One set of films was viewed in each of two sessions, with approximately 1 week between the sessions. Participants were given a free recall test of all of films viewed approximately 1 week after the second session. Rehearsal (...) was manipulated by instructing one group of participants not to discuss the films with anyone (no talkgroup) and instructing a second group to discuss both sets of films with at least three people (forced talkgroup). A third group consisted of participants instructed not to discuss the films with anyone, but who did not comply with these instructions (talkersgroup). All groups recalled significantly more of the emotional films than the neutral films. Furthermore, the relative number of emotional and neutral films recalled did not differ significantly among the three groups. The results indicate that overt rehearsal is insufficient to explain the enhancing effects of emotion on memory. (shrink)
Comparative effectiveness research (CER) is one of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act's significant initiatives that aims to improve treatment outcomes and lower health care costs. This article takes CER a step further and suggests a novel clinical application for it. The article proposes the development of a national framework to enable physicians to rapidly perform, through a computerized service, medically sound personalized comparisons of the effectiveness of possible treatments for patients' conditions. A treatment comparison for a given patient (...) would be based on data from electronic health records of a cohort of clinically similar patients who received the treatments previously and whose outcomes were recorded. This framework has unique potential to simultaneously improve the quality of health care, reduce its cost, and alleviate public concerns about rationing and “one size fits all” medicine. (shrink)
This article presents a close reading of Kierkegaard’s Works of Love in light of the question whether neighborly aspirations are sensitive to the worth of close personal relationships and to the importance of the material well-being of fellow citizens. The interpretive analysis is set within the larger debate overKierkegaard’s critique of preferential love and his apparently apolitical focus on inward authenticity, and it concludes that neighborly love is far more emotionally vulnerable and sensitive to the particulars of individuals and their (...) social and material standing than isolated passages suggest. Kierkegaard’s work thus contributes to the current preoccupation with the moral relevance of emotions and their place within public life. (shrink)