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  1. H. Clark Barrett, Do Human Parents Face a Quantity-Quality Tradeoff? Evidence From a Shuar Community.
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  2. H. Clark Barrett, Evolved Cognitive Mechanisms and Human Behavior.
    In Crawford, C. & Krebs, D. (eds.) Foundations of evolutionary psychology: Ideas, issues, applications and findings. (2nd Ed.) Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum Associates.
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  3. H. Clark Barrett, Modularity and Design Reincarnation.
     
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  4. H. Clark Barrett & E. Hagen, Perinatal Sadness Among Shuar Women: Support for an Evolutionary Theory of Psychic Pain.
  5. James Broesch, H. Clark Barrett & Joseph Henrich (forthcoming). Adaptive Content Biases in Learning About Animals Across the Life Course. Human Nature.
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  6. H. Clark Barrett, Stephen Stich & Stephen Laurence (2012). Should the Study of Homo Sapiens Be Part of Cognitive Science? Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (3):379-386.
    Beller, Bender, and Medin argue that a reconciliation between anthropology and cognitive science seems unlikely. We disagree. In our view, Beller et al.’s view of the scope of what anthropology can offer cognitive science is too narrow. In focusing on anthropology’s role in elucidating cultural particulars, they downplay the fact that anthropology can reveal both variation and universals in human cognition, and is in a unique position to do so relative to the other subfields of cognitive science. Indeed, without cross-cultural (...)
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  7. Thomas Flamson, Gregory A. Bryant & H. Clark Barrett (2011). Prosody in Spontaneous Humor: Evidence for Encryption. Pragmatics and Cognition 19 (2):248-267.
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  8. Karthik Panchanathan, Willem E. Frankenhuis & H. Clark Barrett (2010). Development: Evolutionary Ecology's Midwife. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):105-106.
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  9. H. Clark Barrett, Willem E. Frankenhuis & Andreas Wilke (2008). Adaptation to Moving Targets: Culture/Gene Coevolution, Not Either/Or. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (5):511-512.
    We agree that much of language evolution is likely to be adaptation of languages to properties of the brain. However, the attempt to rule out the existence of language-specific adaptations a priori is misguided. In particular, the claim that adaptation to cannot occur is false. Instead, the details of gene-culture coevolution in language are an empirical matter.
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  10. David J. Buller, Edouard Machery & H. Clark Barrett (2006). Essay Review-Adapting Minds: Evolutionary Psychology and the Persistent Quest for Human Nature. In Borchert (ed.), Philosophy of Science. Macmillan. 73--2.
     
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  11. Edouard Machery & H. Clark Barrett (2006). Debunking Adapting Minds. Philosophy of Science 73.
    David Buller’s recent book, _Adapting Minds_, is a philosophical critique of the field of evolutionary psychology. Buller argues that evolutionary psychology is utterly bankrupt from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view. Although _Adapting Minds _has been well received in both the academic press and the popular media, we argue that Buller’s critique of evolutionary psychology fails.
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  12. H. Clark Barrett (2005). Enzymatic Computation and Cognitive Modularity. Mind and Language 20 (3):259-87.
    Currently, there is widespread skepticism that higher cognitive processes, given their apparent flexibility and globality, could be carried out by specialized computational devices, or modules. This skepticism is largely due to Fodor’s influential definition of modularity. From the rather flexible catalogue of possible modular features that Fodor originally proposed has emerged a widely held notion of modules as rigid, informationally encapsulated devices that accept highly local inputs and whose opera- tions are insensitive to context. It is a mistake, however, to (...)
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  13. H. Clark Barrett (2005). Modularity And. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind. Oxford University Press. 2--199.
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  14. H. Clark Barrett & Tanya Behne (2005). Children's Understanding of Death as the Cessation of Agency: A Test Using Sleep Versus Death. Cognition 96 (2):93-108.
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  15. John Tooby, Leda Cosmides & H. Clark Barrett (2005). Resolving the Debate on Innate Ideas: Learnability Constraints and the Evolved Interpenetration of Motivational and Conceptual Functions. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. New York: Oxford University Press New York. 305--337.
    In P. Carruthers, S. Laurence, & S. Stich (Eds.). The innate mind: Structure and content. (pp. 305-337). New York: Oxford University Press.
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  16. H. Clark Barrett (2004). Rise of the Humans. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (10):442-443.
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  17. H. Clark Barrett (2001). Is Category Specificity in the World or in the Mind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3):478-479.
    HIT produces category-specific deficits without category- specific mechanisms by assuming that differences in properties of objects are transparently converted into differences in representational format. A complete model would specify the mechanisms that accomplish this. Such category-specific mechanisms may have evolved because assumptions about the properties of some kinds of objects (e.g., living things) are invalid for others (e.g., artifacts).
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  18. H. Clark Barrett (2001). On the Functional Origins of Essentialism. [Journal (Paginated)] (in Press) 2 (1):1-30.
    This essay examines the proposal that psychological essentialism results from a history of natural selection acting on human representation and inference systems. It has been argued that the features that distinguish essentialist representational systems are especially well suited for representing natural kinds. If the evolved function of essentialism is to exploit the rich inductive potential of such kinds, then it must be subserved by cognitive mechanisms that carry out at least three distinct functions: identifying these kinds in the environment, constructing (...)
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  19. H. Clark Barrett & Laurence Fiddick (2000). Evolution and Risky Decisions. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (7):251-252.
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