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  1.  82
    Hartry H. Field (2008). Saving Truth From Paradox. Oxford University Press.
    A selective background -- Broadly classical approaches -- Paracompleteness -- More on paracomplete solutions -- Paraconsistent dialetheism.
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  2. Hartry Field (1989). Realism, Mathematics & Modality. Basil Blackwell.
  3.  10
    Hartry Field (2001). Truth and the Absence of Fact. Oxford University Press.
    Presenting a selection of thirteen essays on various topics at the foundations of philosophy--one previously unpublished and eight accompanied by substantial new postscripts--this book offers outstanding insight on truth, meaning, and propositional attitudes; semantic indeterminacy and other kinds of "factual defectiveness;" and issues concerning objectivity, especially in mathematics and in epistemology. It will reward the attention of any philosopher interested in language, epistemology, or mathematics.
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  4.  49
    Hartry Field (2016). Egocentric Content. Noûs 50 (1):n/a-n/a.
    The paper distinguishes two approaches to understanding the representational content of sentences and intentional states, and its role in describing people, predicting and explaining their behavior, and so forth. It sets forth the case for one of these approaches, the “egocentric” one, initially on the basis of its ability to explain the near-indefeasibility of ascriptions of content to our own terms, but more generally on the basis of its providing an attractive overall picture of the descriptive and explanatory role of (...)
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  5. Hartry Field (1980). Science Without Numbers. Princeton University Press.
     
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  6. Hartry Field (1978). Mental Representation. Erkenntnis 13 (July):9-61.
  7. Hartry Field (1994). Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content. Mind 103 (411):249-285.
  8. Hartry Field (2009). What is the Normative Role of Logic? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):251-268.
    The paper tries to spell out a connection between deductive logic and rationality, against Harman's arguments that there is no such connection, and also against the thought that any such connection would preclude rational change in logic. One might not need to connect logic to rationality if one could view logic as the science of what preserves truth by a certain kind of necessity (or by necessity plus logical form); but the paper points out a serious obstacle to any such (...)
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  9. Hartry Field (1972). Tarski's Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophy 64 (13):347-375.
  10. Hartry Field (forthcoming). Indicative Conditionals, Restricted Quantifiers and Naive Truth. Review of Symbolic Logic:1-28.
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  11. Hartry Field (1977). Logic, Meaning, and Conceptual Role. Journal of Philosophy 74 (July):379-409.
  12. Hartry Field (2009). Epistemology Without Metaphysics. Philosophical Studies 143 (2):249 - 290.
    The paper outlines a view of normativity that combines elements of relativism and expressivism, and applies it to normative concepts in epistemology. The result is a kind of epistemological anti-realism, which denies that epistemic norms can be (in any straightforward sense) correct or incorrect; it does allow some to be better than others, but takes this to be goal-relative and is skeptical of the existence of best norms. It discusses the circularity that arises from the fact that we need to (...)
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  13. Hartry Field (1973). Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference. Journal of Philosophy 70 (14):462-481.
  14. Hartry Field (2015). What Is Logical Validity? In Colin R. Caret & Ole T. Hjortland (eds.), Foundations of Logical Consequence. Oxford University Press
    What are people who disagree about logic disagreeing about? The paper argues that (in a wide range of cases) they are primarily disagreeing about how to regulate their degrees of belief. An analogy is drawn between beliefs about validity and beliefs about chance: both sorts of belief serve primarily to regulate degrees of belief about other matters, but in both cases the concepts have a kind of objectivity nonetheless.
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  15. Hartry Field (2009). Pluralism in Logic. Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (2):342-359.
    There are quite a few theses about logic that are in one way or another pluralist: they hold (i) that there is no uniquely correct logic, and (ii) that because of this, some or all debates about logic are illusory, or need to be somehow reconceived as not straightforwardly factual. Pluralist theses differ markedly over the reasons offered for there being no uniquely correct logic. Some such theses are more interesting than others, because they more radically affect how we are (...)
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  16.  72
    Hartry Field (2003). A Revenge-Immune Solution to the Semantic Paradoxes. Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (2):139-177.
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  17. Hartry Field (2003). Causation in a Physical World. In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press 435-460.
    1. Of what use is the concept of causation? Bertrand Russell [1912-13] argued that it is not useful: it is “a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm.” His argument for this was that the kind of physical theories that we have come to regard as fundamental leave no place for the notion of causation: not only does the word ‘cause’ not appear in the advanced sciences, but the (...)
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  18. Hartry Field (forthcoming). Disarming a Paradox of Validity. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic.
    Abstract. Any theory of truth must find a way around Curry’s paradox, and there are well-known ways to do so. This paper concerns an apparently analogous paradox, about validity rather than truth, which JC Beall and Julien Murzi (“Two Flavor's of Curry's Paradox”) call the v-Curry. They argue that there are reasons to want a common solution to it and the standard Curry paradox, and that this rules out the solutions to the latter offered by most “naive truth theorists”. To (...)
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  19.  9
    Hartry Field (2000). 1. The Concept of Apriority. In Paul Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the a Priori. Oxford University Press 117.
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  20.  66
    Hartry Field (1994). Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse. Philosophical Review 103 (3):405-452.
  21.  29
    Hartry Field (2013). Naive Truth and Restricted Quantification: Saving Truth a Whole Lot Better. Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (1):1-45.
    Restricted quantification poses a serious and under-appreciated challenge for nonclassical approaches to both vagueness and the semantic paradoxes. It is tempting to explain as ; but in the nonclassical logics typically used in dealing with vagueness and the semantic paradoxes (even those where thend expect. If we’re going to use a nonclassical logic, we need one that handles restricted quantification better.
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  22. Hartry Field (2003). No Fact of the Matter. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):457 – 480.
    Are there questions for which 'there is no determinate fact of the matter' as to which answer is correct? Most of us think so, but there are serious difficulties in maintaining the view, and in explaining the idea of determinateness in a satisfactory manner. The paper argues that to overcome the difficulties, we need to reject the law of excluded middle; and it investigates the sense of 'rejection' that is involved. The paper also explores the logic that is required if (...)
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  23. Hartry Field (2005). Recent Debates About the A Priori. In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. OUP Oxford
  24.  64
    Hartry Field (2006). Truth and the Unprovability of Consistency. Mind 115 (459):567 - 605.
    It might be thought that we could argue for the consistency of a mathematical theory T within T, by giving an inductive argument that all theorems of T are true and inferring consistency. By Gödel's second incompleteness theorem any such argument must break down, but just how it breaks down depends on the kind of theory of truth that is built into T. The paper surveys the possibilities, and suggests that some theories of truth give far more intuitive diagnoses of (...)
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  25.  71
    Hartry Field (2000). Indeterminacy, Degree of Belief, and Excluded Middle. Noûs 34 (1):1–30.
  26. Hartry Field (1988). Realism, Mathematics and Modality. Philosophical Topics 16 (1):57-107.
  27.  91
    Hartry Field (1999). Deflating the Conservativeness Argument. Journal of Philosophy 96 (10):533-540.
  28. Hartry Field (2008). Saving Truth From Paradox. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Saving Truth from Paradox is an ambitious investigation into paradoxes of truth and related issues, with occasional forays into notions such as vagueness, the nature of validity, and the Gödel incompleteness theorems. Hartry Field presents a new approach to the paradoxes and provides a systematic and detailed account of the main competing approaches. Part One examines Tarski's, Kripke>'s, and Lukasiewicz>'s theories of truth, and discusses validity and soundness, and vagueness. Part Two considers a wide range of attempts to resolve the (...)
     
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  29.  51
    Hartry Field (1998). ``Epistemological Nonfactualism and the A Prioricity of Logic". Philosophical Studies 92 (1/2):1--24.
  30.  77
    Hartry Field (1978). A Note on Jeffrey Conditionalization. Philosophy of Science 45 (3):361-367.
    Bayesian decision theory can be viewed as the core of psychological theory for idealized agents. To get a complete psychological theory for such agents, you have to supplement it with input and output laws. On a Bayesian theory that employs strict conditionalization, the input laws are easy to give. On a Bayesian theory that employs Jeffrey conditionalization, there appears to be a considerable problem with giving the input laws. However, Jeffrey conditionalization can be reformulated so that the problem disappears, and (...)
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  31.  7
    S. Chopra, B. J. Copeland, E. Corazza, S. Donaho, F. Ferreira, H. Field, D. M. Gabbay, L. Goldstein, J. Heidema & M. J. Hill (2002). Benton, RA, 527 Blackburn, P., 281 Braüner, T., 359 Brink, C., 543. Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (615).
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  32. H. Field (1986). The Deflationary Conception of Truth. In G. MacDonald & C. Wright (eds.), Fact, Science and Morality. Blackwell 55-117.
  33. Hartry Field (2000). A Priority as an Evaluative Notion. In Paul A. Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the a Priori. Oxford University Press
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  34.  35
    Hartry Field (1996). The a Prioricity of Logic. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:359 - 379.
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  35. Hartry Field (1982). Realism and Relativism. Journal of Philosophy 79 (10):553-567.
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  36.  94
    Hartry Field (1984). Is Mathematical Knowledge Just Logical Knowledge? Philosophical Review 93 (4):509-552.
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  37.  86
    Hartry Field (1993). The Conceptual Contingency of Mathematical Objects. Mind 102 (406):285-299.
  38.  62
    Hartry Field, Harvey Lederman & Tore Fjetland Øgaard (forthcoming). Prospects for a Naive Theory of Classes. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic.
  39. Hartry Field (1975). Conventionalism and Instrumentalism in Semantics. Noûs 9 (4):375-405.
  40.  89
    H. Field (1992). Critical Notice: Paul Horwich's ‘Truth'. Philosophy of Science 59 (1):321-30.
  41.  91
    Hartry Field (1984). Can We Dispense with Space-Time? PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:33-90.
    This paper is concerned with the debate between substantival and relational theories of space-time, and discusses two difficulties that beset the relationalist: a difficulty posed by field theories, and another difficulty called the problem of quantities. A main purpose of the paper is to argue that possibility can not always be used as a surrogate of ontology, and that in particular that there is no hope of using possibility to solve the problem of quantities.
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  42. Hartry Field (1985). On Conservatives and Incompleteness. Journal of Philosophy 82 (5):239-260.
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  43.  93
    Hartry Field (1991). Metalogic and Modality. Philosophical Studies 62 (1):1 - 22.
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  44. Hartry Field (1974). Quine and the Correspondence Theory. Philosophical Review 83 (2):200-228.
    A correspondence theory of truth explains truth in terms of various correspondence relations (e.G., Reference) between words and the extralinguistic world. What are the consequences of quine's doctrine of indeterminacy for correspondence theories? in "ontological relativity" quine implicitly claims that correspondence theories are impossible; that is what the doctrine of 'relative reference' amounts to. But quine's doctrine of relative reference is incoherent. Those who think the indeterminacy thesis valid should not try to relativize reference, They should abandon the relation and (...)
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  45.  55
    Hartry Field (2002). Saving the Truth Schema From Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (1):1-27.
    The paper shows how we can add a truth predicate to arithmetic (or formalized syntactic theory), and keep the usual truth schema Tr( ) ↔ A (understood as the conjunction of Tr( ) → A and A → Tr( )). We also keep the full intersubstitutivity of Tr(>A>)) with A in all contexts, even inside of an →. Keeping these things requires a weakening of classical logic; I suggest a logic based on the strong Kleene truth tables, but with → (...)
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  46.  11
    Hartry Field (2011). Comments on Martin's and Welch's Comments. Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (3):360-366.
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  47.  17
    Hartry Field (1998). Which Undecidable Mathematical Sentences Have Determinate Truth Values. In H. G. Dales & Gianluigi Oliveri (eds.), Truth in Mathematics. Oxford University Press, Usa 291--310.
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  48. Hartry Field (1984). Platonism for Cheap? Crispin Wright on Frege's Context Principle. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14:637--62.
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  49.  43
    Hartry Field (1992). Book Review:Truth Paul Horwich. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 59 (2):321-.
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  50.  90
    Harty Field (2004). The Consistency of the Naïve Theory of Properties. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):78 - 104.
    If properties are to play a useful role in semantics, it is hard to avoid assuming the naïve theory of properties: for any predicate Θ(x), there is a property such that an object o has it if and only if Θ(o). Yet this appears to lead to various paradoxes. I show that no paradoxes arise as long as the logic is weakened appropriately; the main difficulty is finding a semantics that can handle a conditional obeying reasonable laws without engendering paradox. (...)
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