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Profile: Howard H. Pattee (State University of New York at Binghamton)
  1.  8
    H. H. Pattee (2008). Physical and Functional Conditions for Symbols, Codes, and Languages. Biosemiotics 1 (2):147-168.
    All sciences have epistemic assumptions, a language for expressing their theories or models, and symbols that reference observables that can be measured. In most sciences the language in which their models are expressed are not the focus of their attention, although the choice of language is often crucial for the model. On the contrary, biosemiotics, by definition, cannot escape focusing on the symbol–matter relationship. Symbol systems first controlled material construction at the origin of life. At this molecular level it is (...)
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  2.  6
    H. H. Pattee (2009). Response by H. H. Pattee to Jon Umerez's Paper: “Where Does Pattee's “How Does a Molecule Become a Message?” Belong in the History of Biosemiotics?”. [REVIEW] Biosemiotics 2 (3):291-302.
    Umerez’s analysis made me aware of the fundamental differences in the culture of physics and molecular biology and the culture of semiotics from which the new field of biosemiotics arose. These cultures also view histories differently. Considering the evolutionary span and the many hierarchical levels of organization that their models must cover, models at different levels will require different observables and different meanings for common words, like symbol, interpretation, and language. These models as well as their histories should be viewed (...)
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    H. H. Pattee (2013). Epistemic, Evolutionary, and Physical Conditions for Biological Information. Biosemiotics 6 (1):9-31.
    The necessary but not sufficient conditions for biological informational concepts like signs, symbols, memories, instructions, and messages are (1) an object or referent that the information is about, (2) a physical embodiment or vehicle that stands for what the information is about (the object), and (3) an interpreter or agent that separates the referent information from the vehicle’s material structure, and that establishes the stands-for relation. This separation is named the epistemic cut, and explaining clearly how the stands-for relation is (...)
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  4.  18
    H. H. Pattee (1983). Review of Gödel, Escher, Bach. [REVIEW] International Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):87-88.
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  5.  23
    1Imre Balogh, Brian Beakley, Paul Churchland, Michael Gorman, Stevan Harnad, David Mertz, H. H. Pattee, William Ramsey, John Ringen, Georg Schwarz, Brian Slator, Alan Strudler & Charles Wallis (1990). Responses to 'Computationalism'. Social Epistemology 4 (2):155 – 199.
  6.  6
    H. H. Pattee (1983). Gödel, Escher, Bach. International Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):87-88.
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    H. H. Pattee (1979). Artificial Intelligence and Natural Man. International Studies in Philosophy 11:196-197.
  8. H. H. Pattee (1990). Response to E. Dietrich's “Computationalism”. Social Epistemology 4 (2):176-181.
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