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  1. Mazhar Hasan & Henry E. Kyburg Jr (2011). Worlds‐Antiworlds; Antimatter in Cosmology, Hannes Alfven. World Futures 11 (sup1):1-10.
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  2. Henry E. Kyburg Jr (2010). Subjective Probability : Criticisms, Reflections and Problems. [REVIEW] In Antony Eagle (ed.), Journal of Philosophical Logic. Routledge. 157 - 180.
  3. H. E. Kyburg Jr (2008). Inductive Logic and Inductive Reasoning. In Jonathan Eric Adler & Lance J. Rips (eds.), Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations. Cambridge University Press.
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  4. Henry Kyburg Jr (2007). The Ways of Our Errors. In Cornelis De Waal (ed.), Susan Haack: A Lady of Distinctions: The Philosopher Responds to Critics. Prometheus Books.
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  5. Gregory Wheeler, Henry E. Kyburg & Choh Man Teng (2007). Conditionals and Consequences. Journal of Applied Logic 5 (4):638-650.
    We examine the notion of conditionals and the role of conditionals in inductive logics and arguments. We identify three mistakes commonly made in the study of, or motivation for, non-classical logics. A nonmonotonic consequence relation based on evidential probability is formulated. With respect to this acceptance relation some rules of inference of System P are unsound, and we propose refinements that hold in our framework.
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  6. Paul E. Griffiths, Jordi Cat, Henry E. Kyburg Jr, Torsten Wilholt & Alisa Bokulich (2006). 1. IC Jarvie: The Republic of Science: The Emergence of Popper&# X2019; s Social View of Science 1935&# X2013; 1945, IC Jarvie: The Republic of Science: The Emergence of Popper&# X2019; s Social View of Science 1935&# X2013; 1945, (Pp. 108-121). [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 73 (1).
     
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  7. Henry E. Kyburg Jr (2006). Belief, Evidence, and Conditioning. Philosophy of Science 73 (1):42-65.
    Since Ramsey, much discussion of the relation between probability and belief has taken for granted that there are degrees of belief, i.e., that there is a real-valued function, B, that characterizes the degree of belief that an agent has in each statement of his language. It is then supposed that B is a probability. It is then often supposed that as the agent accumulates evidence, this function should be updated by conditioning: BE(·) should be B(·E)/B(E). Probability is also important in (...)
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  8. Henry E. Kyburg (2006). Vexed Convexity. In Erik J. Olsson (ed.), Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi. Cambridge University Press. 97--110.
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  9. D. Christensen & Henry E. Kyburg Jr (2005). REVIEWS-Putting Logic in its Place. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11 (4):534-534.
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  10. H. E. Kyburg (2005). D. Christensen, Putting Logic in its Place. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11 (4).
     
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  11. Henry E. Kyburg (2002). Don't Take Unnecessary Chances! Synthese 132 (1-2):9-26.
    The dominant argument for the introduction of propensities or chances as an interpretation of probability depends on the difficulty of accounting for single case probabilities. We argue that in almost all cases, the``single case'' application of probability can be accounted for otherwise. ``Propensities'' are needed only intheoretical contexts, and even there applications of probability need only depend on propensities indirectly.
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  12. Henry E. Kyburg Jr (2001). Real Logic is Nonmonotonic. Minds and Machines 11 (4):577-595.
    Charles Morgan has argued that nonmonotonic logic is ``impossible''. We show here that those arguments are mistaken, and that Morgan's preferred alternative, the representation of nonmonotonic reasoning by ``presuppositions'' fails to provide a framework in which nonmonotonic reasoning can be constructively criticised. We argue that an inductive logic, based on probabilistic acceptance, offers more than Morgan's approach through presuppositions.
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  13. Henry E. Kyburg Jr (2001). Probability as a Guide in Life. The Monist 84 (2):135-152.
    Bishop Butler, [Butler, 1736], said that probability was the very guide of life. But what interpretations of probability can serve this function? It isn’t hard to see that empirical (frequency) views won’t do, and many recent writers-for example John Earman, who has said that Bayesianism is “the only game in town”-have been persuaded by various dutch book arguments that only subjective probability will perform the function required. We will defend the thesis that probability construed in this way offers very little (...)
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  14. Henry E. Kyburg (2001). Real Logic is Nonmonotonic. Minds and Machines 11 (4):577-595.
    Charles Morgan has argued that nonmonotonic logic is ``impossible''. We show here that those arguments are mistaken, and that Morgan's preferred alternative, the representation of nonmonotonic reasoning by ``presuppositions'' fails to provide a framework in which nonmonotonic reasoning can be constructively criticised. We argue that an inductive logic, based on probabilistic acceptance, offers more than Morgan's approach through presuppositions.
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  15. Henry E. Kyburg Jr (2000). Rethinking the Foundations of Statistics. Journal of Philosophy 97 (12):677-680.
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  16. Henry Kyburg (1998). Epistemology and Computing. In Terrell Ward Bynum & James Moor (eds.), The Digital Phoenix: How Computers Are Changing Philosophy. Blackwell Publishers. 37.
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  17. Henry Kyburg (1998). [Omnibus Review]. Journal of Symbolic Logic 63 (3):1183-1184.
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  18. Henry E. Kyburg (1998). Logic and the Foundations of Statistical Inference. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (2):208-209.
    The rapprochement between methodology and statistics suggested by Chow's book is a much needed one. His examples suggest that the situation is even worse in psychology than in some other disciplines. It is suggested that both historical accuracy and attention to recent work on the foundations of statistics would be beneficial in achieving the goals that Chow seeks.
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  19. Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1997). Quantities, Magnitudes, and Numbers. Philosophy of Science 64 (3):377-410.
    Quantities are naturally viewed as functions, whose arguments may be construed as situations, events, objects, etc. We explore the question of the range of these functions: should it be construed as the real numbers (or some subset thereof)? This is Carnap's view. It has attractive features, specifically, what Carnap views as ontological economy. Or should the range of a quantity be a set of magnitudes? This may have been Helmholtz's view, and it, too, has attractive features. It reveals the close (...)
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  20. Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1997). The Rule of Adjunction and Reasonable Inference. Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):109-125.
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  21. Henry E. Kyburg (1997). Thinking About Reasoning About Knowledge. Minds and Machines 7 (1):103-112.
  22. Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1996). Dennett's Beer. In K. M. Ford & Z. W. Pylyshyn (eds.), The Robot's Dilemma Revisited: The Frame Problem in Artificial Intelligence. Ablex.
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  23. Henry E. Kyburg (1996). Keynes's Philosophical Development, John B. Davis. Cambridge University Press, 1994, 196 + Xii Pages. Economics and Philosophy 12 (02):230-.
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  24. Henry E. Kyburg (1996). Gamut LTF (Pseudonym). Logica, Taal En Betekenis. Volume I. Inleiding in de Logica. Dutch Original of Volume I of the Preceding. Het Spectrum, De Meern 1982, 351 Pp. Gamut LTF (Pseudonym). Logica, Taal En Betekenis. Volume II. Intensionele Logica En Logische Grammatica. Dutch Original of Volume II of the Preceding. Het Spectrum, De Meern 1982, 422 Pp. Paris JB The Uncertain Reasoner's Companion. A Mathematical Perspective. Cambridge Tracts in Theoretical Computer Science, No. 39. Cambridge University .. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 61 (1):346-347.
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  25. Henry E. Kyburg (1996). Probabilistic Fallacies. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):31.
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  26. Henry E. Kyburg (1996). Review: J. B. Paris, The Uncertain Reasoner's Companion. A Mathematical Perspective. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 61 (1):346-347.
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  27. Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1994). The Fixation of Belief and Its Undoing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3):122-123.
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  28. Henry E. Kyburg & David A. Nelson (1994). Discussion Reviews. Minds and Machines 4 (1):81-101.
  29. Henry E. Kyburg (1993). The Evidence of Your Own Eyes. Minds and Machines 3 (2):201-218.
    The evidence of your own eyes has often been regarded as unproblematic. But we know that people make mistaken observations. This can be looked on as unimportant if there issome class of statements that can serve as evidence for others, or if every statement in our corpus of knowledge is allowed to be no more than probable. Neither of these alternatives is plausible when it comes to machine or robotic observation. Then we must take the possibility of error seriously, and (...)
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  30. Henry Kyburg (1992). The Scope of Bayesian Reasoning. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:139 - 152.
    The Bayesian view of inference has become popular in philosophy in recent years. Scientific Reasoning: a Bayesian Approach, by Colin Howson and Peter Urbach, represents an articulate and persuasive defense of the Bayesian view. We focus on the theme of that book, and argue that there are difficulties with Bayesianism, and alternatives worth considering. One of the most serious drawbacks to Bayesianism is the subjectivity that pervades most versions of it. We argue that this is an instance of a more (...)
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  31. Henry E. Kyburg (1992). Getting Fancy with Probability. Synthese 90 (2):189-203.
    There are a number of reasons for being interested in uncertainty, and there are also a number of uncertainty formalisms. These formalisms are not unrelated. It is argued that they can all be reflected as special cases of the approach of taking probabilities to be determined by sets of probability functions defined on an algebra of statements. Thus, interval probabilities should be construed as maximum and minimum probabilities within a set of distributions, Glenn Shafer's belief functions should be construed as (...)
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  32. Henry E. Kyburg (1992). Matters of Metaphysics. Review of Metaphysics 46 (2):409-411.
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  33. Henry E. Kyburg (1991). A Two-Level System of Knowledge Representation Based on Evidential Probability. Philosophical Studies 64 (1):105 - 114.
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  34. F. Bacchus, Mariam Thalos & H. E. Kyburg (1990). Against Conditionalization. Synthese 85 (3):475 - 506.
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  35. H. E. Kyburg Jr (1990). Belief Revision, Non-Monotonic Reasoning, and the Ramsey Test. In Kyburg Henry E., Loui Ronald P. & Carlson Greg N. (eds.), Knowledge Representation and Defeasible Reasoning. Kluwer. 223.
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  36. H. E. Kyburg Jr (1990). Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities: Three Triviality Theorems. In Kyburg Henry E., Loui Ronald P. & Carlson Greg N. (eds.), Knowledge Representation and Defeasible Reasoning. Kluwer. 287.
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  37. H. E. Kyburg Jr (1990). Introduction to A Logic of Assertions. In Kyburg Henry E., Loui Ronald P. & Carlson Greg N. (eds.), Knowledge Representation and Defeasible Reasoning. Kluwer. 361.
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  38. Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1990). Theories as Mere Conventions. In C. Wade Savage (ed.), Scientific Theories. University of Minnesota Press. 158-174.
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  39. Henry E. Kyburg (1990). Giving Up Certainties. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:333 - 347.
    One of the serious motivations for the development of non-monotonic logics is the fact that, however sure we may be of some set of facts, there can come a time at which at least some of them must be given up. A number of philosophical approaches have stemmed from the study of scientific inference, in which a law or theory, accepted on good evidence at one time, comes to be rejected on the basis of more evidence. These approaches are reviewed, (...)
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  40. Henry Ely Kyburg (1990). Science & Reason. Oxford University Press.
    In this work Henry Kyburg presents his views on a wide range of philosophical problems associated with the study and practice of science and mathematics. The main structure of the book consists of a presentation of Kyburg's notions of epistemic probability and its use in the scientific enterprise i.e., the effort to modify previously adopted beliefs in the light of experience. Intended for cognitive scientists and people in artificial intelligence as well as for technically oriented philosophers, the book also provides (...)
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  41. Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1989). Convention, Confirmation, and Credibility. In Marjorie Clay & Keith Lehrer (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism. Westview Press.
     
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  42. Henry E. Kyburg (1988). Review. [REVIEW] Synthese 76 (1):179-182.
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  43. Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1987). The Hobgoblin. The Monist 70 (2):141-151.
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  44. E. Kyburg, Henry (1987). Bayesian and Non-Bayesian Evidential Updating. Artificial Intelligence 31:271--294.
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  45. Henry E. Kyburg (1986). Induction and Probability. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (4):660.
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  46. Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1985). The Confirmation of Quantitative Laws. Philosophy of Science 52 (1):1-22.
    Quantitative laws are more typical of science than are generalizations involving observational predicates, yet much discussion of scientific inference takes the confirmation of a universal generalization by its instances to be typical and paradigmatic. The important difference is that measurement necessarily involves error. It is argued that because of error laws can no more be refuted by observation than they can be verified by observation. Without much background knowledge, tests of a law mainly provide evidence for the distribution of errors (...)
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  47. He Kyburg (1985). A Problem About Frequencies in Direct Inference-Reply to Leeds. Philosophical Studies 48 (1):145-148.
     
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  48. Henry E. Kyburg (1985). Another Reply to Leeds. Philosophical Studies 48 (1):145 - 148.
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  49. Henry E. Kyburg (1985). Probability Intervals and Rational Norms. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):753-754.
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