Provided here is a characterisation of absolute probability functions for intuitionistic (propositional) logic L, i.e. a set of constraints on the unary functions P from the statements of L to the reals, which insures that (i) if a statement A of L is provable in L, then P(A) = 1 for every P, L's axiomatisation being thus sound in the probabilistic sense, and (ii) if P(A) = 1 for every P, then A is provable in L, L's axiomatisation being thus (...) complete in the probabilistic sense. As there are theorems of classical (propositional) logic that are not intuitionistic ones, there are unary probability functions for intuitionistic logic that are not classical ones. Provided here because of this is a means of singling out the classical probability functions from among the intuitionistic ones. (shrink)
Shown here is that a constraint used by Popper in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959) for calculating the absolute probability of a universal quantification, and one introduced by Stalnaker in "Probability and Conditionals" (1970, 70) for calculating the relative probability of a negation, are too weak for the job. The constraint wanted in the first case is in Bendall (1979) and that wanted in the second case is in Popper (1959).
This paper studies the extent to which probability functions are recursively definable. It proves, in particular, that the (absolute) probability of a statement A is recursively definable from a certain point on, to wit: from the (absolute) probabilities of certain atomic components and conjunctions of atomic components of A on, but to no further extent. And it proves that, generally, the probability of a statement A relative to a statement B is recursively definable from a certain point on, to wit: (...) from the probabilities relative to that very B of certain atomic components and conjunctions of atomic components of A, but again to no further extent. These and other results are extended to the less studied case where A and B are compounded from atomic statements by means of `` ∀ '' as well as `` ∼ '' and "&". The absolute probability functions considered are those of Kolmogorov and Carnap, and the relative ones are those of Kolmogorov, Carnap, Renyi, and Popper. (shrink)
Kolmogorov's account in his  of an absolute probability space presupposes given a Boolean algebra, and so does Rényi's account in his  and  of a relative probability space. Anxious to prove probability theory ‘autonomous’. Popper supplied in his  and  accounts of probability spaces of which Boolean algebras are not and  accounts of probability spaces of which fields are not prerequisites but byproducts instead.1 I review the accounts in question, showing how Popper's issue from and how (...) they differ from Kolmogorov's and Rényi's, and I examine on closing Popper's notion of ‘autonomous independence’. So as not to interrupt the exposition, I allow myself in the main text but a few proofs, relegating others to the Appendix and indicating as I go along where in the literature the rest can be found. (shrink)
Teddy Seidenfeld recently claimed that Kolmogorov's probability theory transgresses the Substitutivity Law. Underscoring the seriousness of Seidenfeld's charge, the author shows that (Popper's version of) the law, to wit: If (∀ D)(Pr(B,D)=Pr(C,D)), then Pr(A,B)=Pr(A,C), follows from just C1. 0≤ Pr(A,B)≤ 1 C2. Pr(A,A)=1 C3. Pr(A & B,C)=Pr(A,B & C)× Pr(B,C) C4. Pr(A & B,C)=Pr(B & A,C) C5. Pr(A,B & C)=Pr(A,C & B), five constraints on Pr of the most elementary and most basic sort.
tic sequenzen-kalkul of Gentzen, into rules for PCc, the classical sequenzenkalkul. We shall limit ourselves here to sequenzen or turnstile statements of the form AâAâ..., Aâ I- B, where AâAâ..., Aâ(n ~ 0), and B are wffs consisting of propositional variables, zero or more of the connectives '5', "v', ' ', ')', and '=', and zero or more parentheses. One can pass from PCi to PCc by amending the intelim rules for ' a result of long standing, or by amending (...) the intelim rules for either one of.. (shrink)
This evenhanded treatment addresses the decades-old dispute among probability theorists, asserting that both statistical and inductive probabilities may be treated as sentence-theoretic measurements, and that the latter qualify as estimates of the former. Beginning with a survey of the essentials of sentence theory and of set theory, the author examines statistical probabilities, showing that statistical probabilities may be passed on to sentences, and thereby qualify as truth-values. An exploration of inductive probabilities follows, demonstrating their reinterpretation as estimates of truth-values. Each (...) chapter is preceded by a summary of its contents. Illustrations and footnotes elucidate definitions, theorems, and technicalities. 1962 ed. (shrink)
The author recently claimed that Pr(P, Q), where Pr is a probability function and P and Q are two sentences of a formalized language L, qualifies as an estimate--made in the light of Q--of the truth-value of P in L. To substantiate his claim, the author establishes here that the two strategies lying at the opposite extremes of the spectrum of truth-value estimating strategies meet the first five of the six requirements (R1-R6) currently placed upon probability functions and fail to (...) meet the sixth one. He concludes from those two results that the value for P and Q of any function satisfying R1-R5 must rate "minimally satisfactory" and the value for P and Q of any function satisfying R1-R6 must rate "satisfactory" as an estimate--made in the light of Q--of the truth-value of P in L. (shrink)
The author discusses Professor Darlington's recent paper "On the Confirmation of Laws." He criticizes Professor Darlington for not writing out in full the evidence sentence in formula III of his paper, and expresses doubts as to whether Professor Darlington's solution to the problem of the confirmation of laws follows from the complete version of that formula.