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  1. Hallvard Lillehammer (forthcoming). Minding Your Own Business? Understanding Indifference as a Virtue. Philosophical Perspectives 28.
    Indifference is sometimes described as a virtue. Yet who is indifferent; to what; and in what way is poorly understood, and frequently subject to controversy and confusion. This paper proposes a framework for the interpretation and analysis of ethically acceptable forms of indifference in terms of how different states of indifference can be either more or less dynamic, or more or less sensitive to the nature and state of their object.
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  2. Hallvard Lillehammer & Niklas Möller (forthcoming). We Can Believe the Error Theory. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-7.
    Bart Streumer argues that it is not possible for us to believe the error theory, where by ‘error theory’ he means the claim that our normative beliefs are committed to the existence of normative properties even though such properties do not exist. In this paper, we argue that it is indeed possible to believe the error theory. First, we suggest a critical improvement to Streumer’s argument. As it stands, one crucial premise of that argument—that we cannot have a belief while (...)
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  3. Hallvard Lillehammer (2014). Moral Testimony, Moral Virtue, and the Value of Autonomy. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):111-127.
    According to some, taking moral testimony is a potentially decent way to exercise one's moral agency. According to others, it amounts to a failure to live up to minimal standards of moral worth. What's the issue? Is it conceptual or empirical? Is it epistemological or moral? Is there a ‘puzzle’ of moral testimony; or are there many, or none? I argue that there is no distinctive puzzle of moral testimony. The question of its legitimacy is as much a moral or (...)
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  4. Hallvard Lillehammer, Who Cares Where You Come From? Cultivating Virtues of Indifference.
    Book synopsis: Assisted reproduction challenges and reinforces traditional understandings of family, kinship and identity. Sperm, egg and embryo donation and surrogacy raise questions about relatedness for parents, children and others involved in creating and raising a child. How socially, morally or psychologically significant is a genetic link between a donor-conceived child and their donor? What should children born through assisted reproduction be told about their origins? Does it matter if a parent is genetically unrelated to their child? How do experiences (...)
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  5. Hallvard Lillehammer, Who is My Neighbour? Understanding Indifference as a Vice.
    Indifference is often described as a vice. Yet who is indifferent; to what; and in what way is poorly understood, and frequently subject to controversy and confusion. This paper proposes a framework for the interpretation and analysis of ethically problematic forms of indifference in terms of how different states of indifference can be either more or less dynamic, or more or less sensitive to the nature and state of their object.
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  6. Hallvard Lillehammer (2013). A Distinction Without a Difference? Good Advice for Moral Error Theorists. Ratio 26 (3):373-390.
    This paper explores the prospects of different forms of moral error theory. It is argued that only a suitably local error theory would make good sense of the fact that it is possible to give and receive genuinely good moral advice.
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  7. Hallvard Lillehammer (2013). The Argument From Queerness. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics.
  8. Hallvard Lillehammer (2013). The Companions in Guilt Strategy. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics.
  9. Hallvard Lillehammer (2012). Autonomy, Value and the First Person. In Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press.
    This paper explores the claim that someone can reasonably consider themselves to be under a duty to respect the autonomy of a person who does not have the capacities normally associated with substantial self-governance.
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  10. Hallvard Lillehammer (2011). Consequentialism and Global Ethics. In Michael Boylan (ed.), The Morality and Global Justice Reader. Westview Press. 89.
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  11. Hallvard Lillehammer (2011). Constructivism and the Error Theory. In Christian Miller (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Ethics. Continuum.
    This paper presents a comparative evaluation of constructivist and error theoretic accounts of moral claims. It is argued that constructivism has distinct advantages over error theory.
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  12. Hallvard Lillehammer (2011). Part Two. In Michael Boylan (ed.), The Morality and Global Justice Reader. Westview Press. 83.
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  13. Hallvard Lillehammer (2011). The Epistemology of Ethical Intuitions. Philosophy 86 (336):175-200.
    Intuitions are widely assumed to play an important evidential role in ethical inquiry. In this paper I critically discuss a recently influential claim that the epistemological credentials of ethical intuitions are undermined by their causal pedigree and functional role. I argue that this claim is exaggerated. In the course of doing so I argue that the challenge to ethical intuitions embodied in this claim should be understood not only as a narrowly epistemological challenge, but also as a substantially ethical one. (...)
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  14. Abigail L. Rosenthal, Hallvard Lillehammer, Nml Nathan, William Lane Craig, Roy Sorensen & Christopher Miles Coope (2011). Philoso. Philosophy 86 (336).
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  15. Hallvard Lillehammer (2010). Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons. Journal of Ethics 14 (1):17 - 26.
    This paper is about the relationship between two widely accepted and apparently conflicting claims about how we should understand the notion of ‘reason giving’ invoked in theorising about reasons for action. According to the first claim, reasons are given by facts about the situation of agents. According to the second claim, reasons are given by ends. I argue that the apparent conflict between these two claims is less deep than is generally recognised.
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  16. Hallvard Lillehammer (2010). Methods of Ethics and the Descent of Man: Darwin and Sidgwick on Ethics and Evolution. Biology and Philosophy 25 (3):361-378.
    Darwin’s treatment of morality in The Descent of Man has generated a wide variety of responses among moral philosophers. Among these is the dismissal of evolution as irrelevant to ethics by Darwin’s contemporary Henry Sidgwick; the last, and arguably the greatest, of the Nineteenth Century British Utilitarians. This paper offers a re-examination of Sidgwick’s response to evolutionary considerations as irrelevant to ethics and the absence of any engagement with Darwin’s work in Sidgwick’s main ethical treatise, The Methods of Ethics . (...)
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  17. Hallvard Lillehammer (2010). Scanlon on Intention and Permissibility. Analysis 70 (3):578 - 585.
  18. Hallvard Lillehammer (2010). Review of Richard Joyce, Simon Kirchin (Eds.), A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie's Moral Error Theory. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (7).
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  19. Hallvard Lillehammer (2009). Reproduction, Partiality, and the Non-Identity Problem. In M. A. Roberts & D. T. Wasserman (eds.), Harming Future Persons. Springer Verlag. 231--248.
    Much work in contemporary bioethics defends a broadly liberal view of human reproduction. I shall take this view to comprise (but not to be exhausted by) the following four claims.1 First, it is permissible both to reproduce and not to reproduce, either by traditional means or by means of assisted reproductive techniques such as IVF and genetic screening. Second, it is permissible either to reproduce or to adopt or otherwise foster an existing child to which one is not biologically related. (...)
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  20. Hallvard Lillehammer (2008). Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm. Journal of Moral Philosophy 5 (3):455-457.
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  21. Hallvard Lillehammer (2008). Values of Art and the Ethical Question. British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (4):376-394.
    Does the ethical value of a work of art ever contribute to its aesthetic value? I argue that when conventionally interpreted as a request for a conceptual analysis the answer to this question is indeterminate. I then propose a different interpretation of the question on which it is understood as a substantial and normative question internal to the practice of aesthetic criticism.
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  22. H. Lillehammer (2007). Review: Metaethics After Moore. [REVIEW] Mind 116 (463):756-758.
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  23. Hallvard Lillehammer (2007). Davidson on Value and Objectivity. Dialectica 61 (2):203–217.
    According to one version of objectivism about value, ethical and other evaluative claims have a fixed truth-value independently of who makes them or the society in which they happen to live (c.f. Davidson 2004, 42). Subjectivists about value deny this claim. According to subjectivism so understood, ethical and other evaluative claims have no fixed truth-value, either because their truth-value is dependent on who makes them, or because they have no truth-value at all.
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  24. Hallvard Lillehammer (2006). Review of Robert Audi, Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (5).
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  25. H. Lillehammer (2005). Review: Rules, Reasons, and Norms: Selected Essays. [REVIEW] Mind 114 (454):444-447.
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  26. Hallvard Lillehammer (2005). Benefit, Disability and the Non-Identity Problem. In Nafsika Athanassoulis (ed.), Philosophical Reflections on Medical Ethics. Palgrave Macmillan.
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  27. Hallvard Lillehammer (2005). Introduction. In Hallvard Lillehammer & D. H. Mellor (eds.), Ramsey's Legacy. Oup Oxford.
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  28. Hallvard Lillehammer (2005). Review of Alan Millar, Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (8).
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  29. Hallvard Lillehammer & D. H. Mellor (eds.) (2005). Ramsey's Legacy. Oxford University Press.
    The Cambridge philosopher Frank Ramsey died tragically in 1930 at the age of 26, but had already established himself as one of the most brilliant minds of the twentieth century. Besides groundbreaking work in philosophy, particularly in logic, language, and metaphysics, he created modern decision theory and made substantial contributions to mathematics and economics. In these original essays, written to commemorate the centenary of Ramsey's birth, a distinguished international team of contributors offer fresh perspectives on his work and show its (...)
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  30. Hallvard Lillehammer (2004). Jamieson on the Ethics of Animals and the Environment. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 35 (4):743-751.
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  31. Hallvard Lillehammer (2004). Who Needs Bioethicists? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 35 (1):131-144.
    Recent years have seen the emergence of a new brand of moral philosopher. Straddling the gap between academia on the one hand, and the world of law, medicine, and politics on the other, bioethicists have appeared, offering advice on ethical issues to a wider public than the philosophy classroom. Some bioethicists, like Peter Singer, have achieved wide notoriety in the public realm with provocative arguments that challenge widely held beliefs about the relative moral status of animals, human foetuses and newborn (...)
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  32. Hallvard Lillehammer (2004). Moral Error Theory. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (2):93–109.
    The paper explores the consequences of adopting a moral error theory targeted at the notion of reasonable convergence. I examine the prospects of two ways of combining acceptance of such a theory with continued acceptance of moral judgements in some form. On the first model, moral judgements are accepted as a pragmatically intelligible fiction. On the second model, moral judgements are made relative to a framework of assumptions with no claim to reasonable convergence on their behalf. I argue that the (...)
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  33. Hallvard Lillehammer (2004). Review of Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defense. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (5).
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  34. Hallvard Lillehammer (2004). Review: The Myth of Morality. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (452):760-763.
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  35. Hallvard Lillehammer (2003). Debunking Morality: Evolutionary Naturalism and Moral Error Theory. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 18 (4):567-581.
    The paper distinguishes three strategies by means of which empirical discoveries about the nature of morality can be used to undermine moral judgements. On the first strategy, moral judgements are shown to be unjustified in virtue of being shown to rest on ignorance or false belief. On the second strategy, moral judgements are shown to be false by being shown to entail claims inconsistent with the relevant empirical discoveries. On the third strategy, moral judgements are shown to be false in (...)
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  36. Hallvard Lillehammer (2003). The Idea of a Normative Reason. In P. Schaber & R. Huntelmann (eds.), Grundlagen der Ethik. 41--65.
    Recent work in English speaking moral philosophy has seen the rise to prominence of the idea of a normative reason1. By ‘normative reasons’ I mean the reasons agents appeal to in making rational claims on each other. Normative reasons are good reasons on which agents ought to act, even if they are not actually motivated accordingly2. To this extent, normative reasons are distinguishable from the motivating reasons agents appeal to in reason explanations. Even agents who fail to act on their (...)
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  37. Hallvard Lillehammer & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.) (2003). Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor. New York: Routledge.
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  38. Hallvard Lillehammer & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.) (2003). Real Metaphysics. Routledge.
    This text brings together a collection of new essays by a number of philosophers to honor Hugh Mellor's contribution to philosophy.
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  39. Hallvard Lillehammer & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.) (2003). Real Metaphysics. Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor. Routledge.
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  40. Halvard Lillehammer (2003). The Metaphysics of Normative Reasons. In P. Schaber & R. Huntelmann (eds.), Grundlagen der Ethik.
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  41. D. H. Mellor, Hallvard Lillehammer & Gonzalo Rodríguez Pereyra (eds.) (2003). Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D.H. Mellor. Routledge.
    This text brings together a collection of new essays by a number of philosophers to honor Hugh Mellor's contribution to philosophy. The collection stands as an original exploration of some of the most central issues in philosophy.
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  42. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra & Hallvard Lillehammer (eds.) (2003). Real Metaphysics. Routledge.
    Real Metaphysics brings together new articles by leading metaphysicians to honour Hugh Mellor's outstanding contribution to metaphysics. Some of the most outstanding minds of current times shed new light on all the main topics in metaphysics: truth, causation, dispositions and properties, explanation, and time. At the end of the book, Hugh Mellor responds to the issues raised by each of the thirteen contributors and gives us new insight into his own highly influential work on metaphysics.
     
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  43. Hallvard Lillehammer (2002). Moral Cognitivism. Philosophical Papers 31 (1):1-25.
    Abstract The paper explicates a set of criteria the joint satisfaction of which is taken to qualify moral judgements as cognitive. The paper examines evidence that some moral judgements meet these criteria, and relates the resulting conception of moral judgements to ongoing controversies about cognitivism in ethics.
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  44. Hallvard Lillehammer (2002). Moral Realism, Normative Reasons, and Rational Intelligibility. Erkenntnis 57 (1):47-69.
    This paper concerns a prima facie tension between the claims that (a) agents have normative reasons obtaining in virtue of the nature of the options that confront them, and (b) there is a non-trivial connection between the grounds of normative reasons and the upshots of sound practical reasoning. Joint commitment to these claims is shown to give rise to a dilemma. I argue that the dilemma is avoidable on a response dependent account of normative reasons accommodating both (a) and (b) (...)
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  45. Hallvard Lillehammer, Moral Realism, Normative Reasons, Rational Intelligibility, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Does Practical Deliberation, Crowd Out Self-Prediction & Peter McLaughlin (2002). Hard Ernst) Corrigendum Van Brakel, J., Philosophy of Chemistry (U. Klein). Erkenntnis 57 (1).
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  46. H. Lillehammer (2001). From Genes to Eugenics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 32 (4):589-600.
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  47. Hallvard Lillehammer (2001). Socratic Puzzles. Robert Nozick. Mind 110 (439):802-806.
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  48. H. Lillehammer (2000). Revisionary Dispositionalism and Practical Reason. Journal of Ethics 4 (3):173-190.
    This paper examines the metaphysically modest view that attributionsof normative reasons can be made true in the absence of a responseindependent normative reality. The paper despairs in finding asatisfactory account of normative reasons in metaphysically modestterms.
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  49. H. Lillehammer (2000). The Doctrine of Internal Reasons. Journal of Value Inquiry 34 (4):507-516.
    According to advocates of internalism about reasons for action, there is an interesting connection between an agent’s reasons and the agent’s present desires. On the simplest version of this view, an agent has a reason to act a certain way at some time if and only if acting that way would promote his present desires. Let us call this the sub-Humean model.1 The sub-Humean model is widely regarded as too simple on the grounds that there are adverse conditions, such as (...)
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