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Hamid Vahid [33]H. Vahid [2]
  1. Hamid Vahid (2014). Cognitive Penetration, the Downgrade Principle, and Extended Cognition. Philosophical Issues 24 (1):439-459.
    It has been argued that just as, say, prejudice or wishful thinking can generate ill-founded beliefs, the same is true of experiences. The idea is that the etiology of cognitively penetrated experiences can downgrade their justificatory force. This view, known as the Downgrade Principle, seems to be compatible with both internalist and externalist conceptions of epistemic justification. An assessment of the credentials of the Downgrade Principle is particularly important in view of the fact that not all cases of cognitive penetration (...)
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  2. Hamid Vahid (2014). Varieties of Pragmatic Encroachment. Acta Analytica 29 (1):25-41.
    According to a recent view, known as the 'pragmatic encroachment' thesis, an agent’s non-truth-related factors are relevant to the epistemic status of her beliefs. In particular, in addition to truth-related factors, practical factors are said to be relevant to the question whether or not true belief amounts to knowledge. Despite the intuitive appeal of the thesis, however, it is puzzling how practical factors can impact the truth-related factors that ground the epistemic status of one's beliefs. In this paper, I will (...)
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  3. Hamid Vahid (2013). Skepticism, A Priori Skepticism, and the Possibility of Error. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (4):235-252.
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  4. Hamid Vahid (2013). Skepticism and the Liberal/Conservative Conceptions of Perceptual Justification. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (1):45-61.
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  5. Hamid Vahid (2012). Burge on Perceptual Entitlement. Metaphilosophy 43 (3):187-203.
    This article is concerned with the question of the nature of the epistemic liaison between experience and belief. The problem, often known as the problem of nondoxastic justification, is to see how a causal transition between experience and belief could assume a normative dimension, that is, how perceptual experience serves to justify beliefs about the world. Currently a number of theories have been proposed to resolve this problem. The article considers a particular solution offered by Tyler Burge which, among other (...)
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  6. Hamid Vahid (2012). The Dogmatism Paradox and the Problem of Misleading Evidence. Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 31 (1):47-58.
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  7. Hamid Vahid (2011). The Concept of Entitlement and its Epistemic Relevance. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):380-399.
    Crispin Wright has recently suggested that, in addition to the notion of justification, we also possess a non-evidential notion of warrant, ‘entitlement’, that can play an important role in responding to various skeptical questions. My concern here is with the question of whether entitlement constitutes an epistemic kind of warrant. I claim Wright's argument for this thesis at most shows that entitlement has a pragmatic character. Having identified the sources of the troubles of this argument in its underlying assumptions, I (...)
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  8. Hamid Vahid (2010). Rationalizing Beliefs: Evidential Vs. Pragmatic Reasons. Synthese 176 (3):447 - 462.
    Beliefs can be evaluated from a number of perspectives. Epistemic evaluation involves epistemic standards and appropriate epistemic goals. On a truthconducive account of epistemic justification, a justified belief is one that serves the goal of believing truths and avoiding falsehoods. Beliefs are also prompted by nonepistemic reasons. This raises the question of whether, say, the pragmatic benefits of a belief are able to rationalize it. In this paper, after criticizing certain responses to this question, I shall argue that, as far (...)
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  9. Hamid Vahid (2009). Alston on Belief and Acceptance in Religious Faith. Heythrop Journal 50 (1):23-30.
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  10. Hamid Vahid (2009). Triangulation, Content and the Basing Relation. Grazer Philosophische Studien 78 (1):231-250.
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  11. Hamid Vahid (2009). The Epistemology of Belief. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Truth and the aim of belief -- Belief, interpretation, and Moore's paradox -- Belief, sensitivity, and safety -- Basic beliefs and the problem of non-doxastic justification -- Experience as reason for beliefs -- The problem of the basing relation -- Basic beliefs, easy knowledge, and the problem of warrant transfer -- Belief, justification, and fallibility -- Knowledge of our beliefs and privileged access.
     
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  12. Hamid Vahid (2008). Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Non-Doxastic Justification. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 69 (3):295 - 313.
    It is not difficult to make sense of the idea that beliefs may derive their justification from other beliefs. Difficulties surface when, as in certain epistemological theories, one appeals to sensory experiences to give an account of the structure of justification. This gives rise to the so-called problem of ‘nondoxastic justification’, namely, the problem of seeing how sensory experiences can confer justification on the beliefs they give rise to. In this paper, I begin by criticizing a number of theories that (...)
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  13. Hamid Vahid (2008). Radical Interpretation and Moore's Paradox. Theoria 74 (2):146-163.
    Abstract: Moore's sentences of the form "P & ∼I believe that P" and "P & I believe that ∼P" are thought to be paradoxical because they cannot be properly asserted despite being possibly true. Solutions to the paradox usually explain the oddity of such sentences in terms of phenomena as diverse as the pragmatics of speech acts, nature of belief or justification. In this paper I shall argue that despite their seemingly different approaches to the problem, there is a single (...)
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  14. Hamid Vahid (2008). The Puzzle of Fallible Knowledge. Metaphilosophy 39 (3):325–344.
    Although the fallible/infallible distinction in the theory of knowledge has traditionally been upheld by most epistemologists, almost all contemporary theories of knowledge claim to be fallibilist. Fallibilists have, however, been forced to accommodate knowledge of necessary truths. This has proved to be a daunting task, not least because there is as yet no consensus on how the fallible/infallible divide is to be understood. In this article, after examining and rejecting a number of representative accounts of the notion of fallible knowledge, (...)
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  15. Hamid Vahid (2007). Varieties of Easy Knowledge Inference: A Resolution. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 22 (3):223-237.
    It has recently been argued that any epistemological theory that allows for what is called basic knowledge, viz., knowledge that an agent acquires from a certain source, even if he fails to know that the source is reliable, falls victim to what is known as the problem of easy knowledge. The idea is that for such theories bootstrapping and closure allow us far too easily to acquire knowledge (justification) that seems unlikely under the envisaged circumstances. In this paper, I begin (...)
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  16. Hamid Vahid (2006). Aiming at Truth: Doxastic Vs. Epistemic Goals. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):303-335.
    Belief is generally thought to be the primary cognitive state representing the world as being a certain way, regulating our behavior and guiding us around the world. It is thus regarded as being constitutively linked with the truth of its content. This feature of belief has been famously captured in the thesis that believing is a purposive state aiming at truth. It has however proved to be notoriously difficult to explain what the thesis really involves. In this paper, I begin (...)
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  17. Hamid Vahid (2006). Conceivability and Possibility: Chalmers on Modal Epistemology. Philosophical Explorations 9 (3):243-260.
    We often decide whether a state of affairs is possible (impossible) by trying to mentally depict a scenario (using words, images, etc.) where the state in question obtains (or fails to obtain). These mental acts (broadly thought of as 'conceiving') seem to provide us with an epistemic route to the space of possibilities. The problem this raises is whether conceivability judgments provide justification-conferring grounds for the ensuing possibility-claims (call this the 'conceivability thesis'). Although the question has a long history, contemporary (...)
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  18. Hamid Vahid (2005). Epistemic Justification and the Skeptical Challenge. Palgrave Macmillan.
    This book explores the concept of epistemic justification and our understanding of the problem of skepticism. Providing critical examination of key responses to the skeptical challenge, Hamid Vahid presents a theory which is shown to work alongside the internalism/externalism issue and the thesis of semantic externalism, with a deontological conception of justification at its core.
     
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  19. Hamid Vahid (2005). Moore's Paradox and Evans's Principle: A Reply to Williams. Analysis 65 (288):337–341.
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  20. Hamid Vahid (2004). Doubts About Epistemic Supervenience. Journal of Philosophical Research 29:153-172.
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  21. Hamid Vahid (2004). Varieties of Epistemic Conservatism. Synthese 141 (1):97 - 122.
    According to the thesis of epistemic conservatism it would be unreasonable to change one's beliefs in the absence of any good reasons. Although it is claimed that epistemic conservatism has informed and resolved a number of positions and problems in epistemology, it is difficult to identify a single representative view of the thesis. This has resulted in advancing a series of disparate and largely unconnected arguments to establish conservatism. In this paper, I begin by casting doubt on the claim of (...)
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  22. Hamid Vahid (2003). Content Externalism and the Internalism/Externalism Debate in Justification Theory. European Journal of Philosophy 11 (1):89-107.
  23. Hamid Vahid (2003). Externalism, Slow Switching and Privileged Self-Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):370-388.
    Recent discussions of externalism about mental content have been dominated by the question whether it undermines the intuitively plausible idea that we have knowledge of the contents of our thoughts. In this article I focus on one main line of reasoning (the so-called 'slow switching argument') for the thesis that externalism and self-knowledge are incompatible. After criticizing a number of influential responses to the argument, I set out to explain why it fails. It will be claimed that the argument trades (...)
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  24. Hamid Vahid (2003). Truth and the Aim of Epistemic Justification. Teorema 20 (3):83-91.
    Any theory of epistemic justification must address the question of what its aim is and why we value it. The almost general consensus among epistemologists is that there is an intimate link between justification and truth. However, the standard formu- lation of this connection (as the truth-directed goal of maximizing true belief and minimizing false belief) has been increasingly challenged in recent times on the ground that it leaves no room for justified false beliefs and unjustified true beliefs. In this (...)
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  25. Hamid Vahid (2002). The Nature and Significance or Transcendental Arguments. Kant-Studien 93 (3):273-290.
  26. Hamid Vahid (2001). Charity, Supervenience, and Skepticism. Metaphilosophy 32 (3):308-325.
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  27. Hamid Vahid (2001). Realism and the Epistemological Significance of Inference to the Best Explanation. Dialogue (Canadian Philosophical Association) 40 (03):487-507.
  28. Hamid Vahid (2001). Skepticism and Varieties of Epistemic Universalizability. Journal of Philosophical Research 26:325-341.
    While there is general agreement that knowing a proposition p involves knowing that nothing incompatible with p is true, there is much controversy over the range of possibilities that have to be ruled out if knowledge claims are to be sustained. With the failure of attempts on behalf of commonsense to delimit the range of counterpossibilities in order to leave room for knowledge, some theorists, most notably Adler, have sought to introduce a set of so-called ‘universalizability principles’ that require us (...)
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  29. Hamid Vahid (1999). A Priori Knowledge, Experience and Defeasibility. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (2):173 – 188.
    Some recent discussions of a priori knowledge, taking their departure from Kant's characterization of such knowledge as being absolutely independent of experience, have concluded that while one might delineate a concept of a priori knowledge, it fails to have any application as any purported case of such knowledge can be undermined by suitably recalcitrant experiences. In response, certain defenders of apriority have claimed that a priori justification only requires that a belief be positively dependent on no experience. In this paper, (...)
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  30. H. Vahid (1998). Deontic Vs. Nondeontic Conceptions of Epistemic Justification. Erkenntnis 49 (3):285-301.
    Theories of epistemic justification are usually described as belonging to either deontological or nondeontological categories of justification with the former construing the concept of justification as involving the fulfillment of epistemic duty. Despite being the dominant view among traditional epistemologists, the deontological conception has been subjected to severe criticisms in the current literature for failing, among others, to do justice to the (alleged) truth-conducive character of epistemic justification. In this paper I set out to show that there is something deeply (...)
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  31. Hamid Vahid (1998). The Internalism/Externalism Controversy: The Epistemization of an Older Debate. Dialectica 52 (3):229–246.
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  32. Hamid Vahid (1995). Deductive Closure, Scepticism and The Paradoxes of Confirmation. Ratio 8 (1):70-86.
    To undermine much of what we ordinarily claim to know, sceptics have often appealed to a principle (known as the principle of closure) according to which knowledge (justification) is closed under known entailment. In this paper after expounding the views of Stein, Klein and others, I shall argue that they all fail to take note of different contexts in which the principle of closure is applied. The relevance of the principle of closure for scepticism is then analyzed in the light (...)
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  33. H. Vahid (1994). Experience and Belief: Haack on the Problem of Empirical Basis. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8 (2):139 – 140.
    Abstract In her recent discussion of the problem of the empirical basis, Susan Haack sets out to show that the solutions offered by the Popperian school are all inadequate. Her objectives, however, go well beyond the mere refutation of such?claims. She also tries to explicate the contribution of experience to the justification of one's belief, thus adjudicating between founda?tionalism and coherentism. She puts forward what she calls a ?foundherentist? account of the structure of justification which, she claims, retains the virtues (...)
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  34. Hamid Vahid (1994). Experience and Justification: In Search of the Epistemic Pineal Gland. Philosophica 53 (1):91-104.
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  35. Hamid Vahid (1994). Origin, Subsequent History and Necessity1. Dialectica 48 (1):65-72.
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